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Case No. 20 I 00891-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
RIQO M. PEREA, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his ·convictions and sentences for two counts each of 
aggravated murder, non-capital first-degree felonies, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202, 
and attempted murder, first degree felonies, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203. R1566-
69. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny Defendant's motion to suppress his 
confession in which he argued that he "anticipatorily" invoked his Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel during a phone conversation two days before his arrest? 
Standard of review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Price, 2012 UT 7, ~ 5, 270 P.3d 527 {citation omitted). Its 
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. !d. 
2a. Should this Court issue an advisory opinion on whether police should be 
required to video record stationhouse confessions? 
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2b. If it reaches this issue, should this Court fonnulate a recording rule or should 
it leave this issue to a body better suited to studying the costs and benefits of such a rule? 
Standard ofreview. No standard of review applies to these issues. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony that 
Defendant's confession was a lie? 
Standard of review. The admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. T-Mobile USA, Inc., v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2011 UT 28, ~ 41, 254 P.3d 
752. 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding for lack of foundation 
Defendant's expert's photographs and computer-generated animation of the shooting? 
Standard of review. A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude 
evidence. Barrientos ex rel. Nelson v. Jones, 2012 UT 33, ~ 10, 710 Utah Adv. Rep. 35. 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding some of Defendant's 
witnesses when Defendant would disclose those witnesses' identities only if the police 
could not investigate their stories? 
Standard of review. See standard of review for issue 4. 
6. Is Defendant's life without parole sentence unconstitutional under the state or 
federal constitutions? 
Standard of review. Issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation are 
reviewed for coiTectness. Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ~ 7, 158 P.3d 540. 
7. Does the cumulative eiTor doctrine entitle Defendant to relief? 
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Standard of review. A verdict will be reversed for cumulative error only if the 
cumulative effect of several elTors undermines confidence that the trial was fair. State v. 
Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, ~ 39, 220 P.3d 136 (citation omitted) (omission in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains: U. S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 
9, 24; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7; Utah R. Crim. P. 12 & 16; and Utah R. Evid. 608 
& 702. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant Riqo Perea confessed that he fired 
several gunshots from an SUV towards a wedding party. Defendant killed two people, 
and seriously injured two others. Seven eyewitnesses, including three who were in the 
SUV, cotToborated all or part of his confession. 
The drive-by shooting 
Defendant is an Ogden Trece gang member. R1925:31. Around 1 a.m. in August 
2007, Defendant and several friends visited an Ogden home. R1925:26-28,31,39-40. 
Defendant rode in the front passenger seat of a GMC Yukon Denali driven by Dominique 
Duran. R1924:6-7;1923:65. Across the street, several people celebrated a wedding. 
R1922:76-78,144,155. Some of the partygoers belonged to the rival Nortenos gang. 
R1925 :32; 1926:21,27-28,97. 
1 Consistent with appellate standards, the State recites the facts in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ~ 3, 243 P.3d 1250. 
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Shortly after Defendant's group arrived, an argument erupted between some in 
Defendant's group and some of the partygoers. R1922:83-85;1924:9-11;1925:29-30. 
Gang insults were heatedly exchanged and an unknown person fired a gun into the air 
once or twice. R1922:85-86,125,136, 147-48; 1925:30-31. Defendant and his friends then 
got back into their vehicles, Defendant again sitting in the front passenger seat of Duran's 
SUV. Rl922:105-06,110;1924:6-7,13-17;1925:10,32-33. Duran's two young children 
and one of her nieces were also in her SUV, along with Angelo Gallegos and Elias 
Christopher Garcia. Rl924:8,17;1925:10,32. 
The SUV slowly pulled away, coasting west along the street. Rl922:86,107,150. 
Defendant climbed out of the passenger window, reached over the roof, and fired ten 
shots at the wedding party. R1922:86,89,150;1923:59;1925:10-11,20-21,32-34;State's 
Exhibit 80 at 3. 
Sarah Valencia and Sabrina Prieto stood on a walkway between the front door and 
the carport ofthe home where the party was held.2 R1922:104-05. Valencia testified that 
she saw Defendant fire from the SUV at the party guests. R1922:86,95,107. As the shots 
rang out, Valencia ducked and ran east along the front of the home towards the carport. 
Rl922:87-88,108. Valencia tried to grab Prieto's ann, but lost her grip. Id .. Valencia ran 
into the carport, turned south, and headed for the home's side door. !d. Valencia looked 
2 A diagram of the crime scene (State's Exhibit 89) and three photos of the home 
where the shooting occurred (State's Exhibits 5, 6, & 16) are attached in Addendum I. 
Exhibit 89 is oriented with north towards the bottom of the page. The home where the 
shooting took place is in the middle of the page facing north. A blue van is parked in the 
carport, a silver car is parked behind the van, and a white car is behind the silver car. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
back to see Prieto fall on the doorstep. !d. Prieto had been fatally shot once in the right 
side of her chest. R1922:63-65. The bullet traveled downward and from right to left 
through her chest. R1922:68. 
Richard Esquivel stood on the grass east of the carport when the initial shot or 
shots were fired into the air. R1922:145-46. Upon hearing gunfire, Esquivel ran west 
between a blue van and silver car parked in the driveway, then north down the driveway, 
stopping near his cousin Rocendo Nevarez who stood by the front edge of the white car 
parked in the driveway. R1922:149-50. Esquivel saw someone climb out of the 
passenger side of the SUV and begin shooting over the vehicle's roof as it pulled away. 
!d. After the first shot from the SUV, Esquivel knelt down, turned away from the road, 
and tried to cover himself. R1922:150-52,161-62. He was shot in the "back shoulder" 
and hip but survived. R1922:151. Nevarez was fatally shot in the back. R1922:49. 
Keri Garcia stood in the driveway when Defendant started shooting. R1922:123-
25. She turned and ran south towards the carport. R1922:126,138. She was shot once in 
the back, three inches from her spine, but survived. R1922:128. She testified that all the 
shots came from the road. Rl922:127. 
When the shots began, Lacey Randall stood beside her car-the white car parked 
in the driveway. R1923:10-13. She testified that she saw someone sitting on the 
passenger windowsill of the SUV as it pulled away and that all the shots came from the 
SUV. !d. When the shots began, someone pulled her to the ground just before her car 
window shattered above her. !d. 
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Elias Christopher Garcia sat directly behind Defendant in Duran's SUV and saw 
Defendant climb back in with a gun in his hand. R1925 :32-34. Garcia and fellow 
passenger Angelo Gallegos both testified that Defendant was the shooter. R1925: 10-
11,20-21,33. Duran, who was romantically involved with Defendant, was reluctant to 
testify that he was the shooter, but admitted telling police that the shots came from the 
passenger side of her vehicle where Defendant was hanging out the window. 
R1924:6,13-18. 
After climbing back into the SUV, Defendant threatened the passengers that if 
they "said anything, there would be a bullet with [their] name on it." R1925:10-12. He 
told Duran to "Drive right" so she would not get pulled over. R1924:19. Defendant and 
others later "dumped the gun" in an alleyway. R1925:37. 
The bullets recovered from the Prieto's and Nevarez's bodies were both .22 
caliber and fired from the same gun. R1922:67-68;1923:116,127. Police recovered ten 
expended .22 caliber shell casings in the street west of the home where the party was 
held. R1923:59-60,64-65;State's Exhibit 16. The same gun expended all ofthe casings. 
R1923:119,127. The State's ballistics expert could not detennine whether the gun that 
fired the fatal bullets also expended the casings, because the murder weapon was never 
recovered. R1923: 11 8-19. No other expended casings were found at the crime scene. 
R1923:29-31,79. The SUV was undamaged. R1923:41;State's Exhibits 53-54. 
Defendant confesses 
After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant confessed to having fired at the 
partygoers from the passenger window of Duran's SUV. R652;State's Exhibit 80. 
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Defendant confessed during an interrogation that lasted "less than two hours," and 
included "breaks during which Defendant was offered food and water." !d. The 
interrogation did not include any "physical or psychological force" or any "evidence that 
Defendant was coerced, pressured, or threatened." !d. 
After confessing, Defendant helped a detective produce a typewritten statement. 
R652;State's Exhibit 80. Defendant watched the detective's computer screen as the 
detective typed questions and then typed Defendant's responses verbatim. 
R652;1909:221-22. Defendant initialed the spaces on the typed confession indicating 
that he had received his Miranda warnings and understood them. State's Exhibit 80. He 
also initialed each page of the confession, and signed at the bottom. !d. 
Defendant was 19 years and 9 months old at the time of the murders. R1909:22. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with two counts each of aggravated murder, and 
attempted murder. R6-7. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, but 
later withdrew it. R63,1237;1920:3-4. A jury convicted Defendant as charged. Rl375-
84. 
After recetvmg a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and hearing evidence at 
sentencing, the trial court identified several aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
Rl567-68;1928:158-164. The court ultimately found that "the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh[ ed] the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt" and that a 
sentence of life without parole (L WOP) was justified under the circumstances. 
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R1928:164,167. The court therefore imposed LWOP for both aggravated murder counts 
and three years to life for the attempted murder counts.3 Rl569;1928:164. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court cmTectly denied Defendant's motion to suppress his confession. 
Defendant could not "anticipatorily" invoke his Miranda right to counsel during a phone 
call with police, because Miranda and its progeny establish that the right attaches only in 
the context of custodial interrogation. The United States Supreme Court has strongly 
suggested that a suspect cannot "anticipatorily" invoke his Miranda right to counsel. 
And the overwhelming majority of courts reject the idea that a defendant not yet in 
custody can invoke the Miranda right to counsel. Moreover, Defendant asked to talk to a 
lawyer only before talking to police, not to have a lawyer present during his questioning. 
II. This Court should not create a rule requiring police to video record 
stationhouse confessions, because Defendant essentially seeks an advisory opinion. He 
does not explain how such a rule should function or how it would apply in this case. If 
this Court reaches the issue, it should defer the issue to the Legislature or a similar body 
better suited to policy making, because fashioning such a rule is a policy decision that 
requires balancing various factors and interests. Moreover, this is not the case to create 
such a rule because the police did not ignore this Comi's direction regarding recording 
confessions. This Court has recognized a written statement as a proper way to record a 
3 Because Defendant committed these crimes while on probation for a third 
degree felony charge of possession of a concealed weapon, the trial court reinstated the 
original zero-to-five year sentence in that case, and ordered it to run consecutively to the 
sentences in this case. Rl569,1928:165. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
confession. Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his confession is inadequately 
briefed and, in any event, fails based on the trial court's findings, which Defendant 
Ignores. 
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony that 
Defendant's confession was a lie. This testimony was inadmissible under rules 608 and 
702, Utah Rules of Evidence, because it would have directly commented on Defendant's 
credibility and improperly invaded the jury's exclusive province to detennine credibility. 
Also, the jury did not need an expert to help them understand that someone might falsely 
confess to avoid harm to themselves or others. Defendant has also failed to establish the 
reliability of the methodology underlying his expert's opinion where he argues only that 
such testimony is generally accepted. Caselaw and scientific literature demonstrate 
otherwise. Regardless, any en-or in excluding the testimony was harmless given 
Defendant's failure to testify and claim that his confession was false, the mountain of 
eyewitness testimony corroborating the confession, and the jury instruction on false 
confessions. 
IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion m excluding photos and a 
computer-generated animation prepared by Defendant's crime scene reconstruction 
expert, because Defendant did not establish adequate foundation for the exhibits. Given 
their dramatic impact and potential for editorial manipulation, video animations require a 
heightened foundational showing. Here, no evidence supported the expert's theory 
depicted in the animation that there were two other shooters. Thus, the animation 
misrepresented the facts of the shooting. The expert's pictures purporting to reconstruct 
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Defendant's view of the crime scene also lacked foundation because, in staging the 
pictures, the expert did not use vehicles identical to those at the crime scene, nor did he 
know the precise location of one of the vehicles depicted in the photos. 
The trial court did not allow the State to unfairly surprise Defendant by raising its 
foundation objection when Defendant offered the exhibits at trial. Nor did the court 
improperly limit the expert's testimony where he testified to his theory. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting State's Exhibit 89, showing bullet trajectories, 
because it was based on a crime scene diagram admitted without Defendant's objection. 
Regardless, any error was harmless because the jury heard the expert's theory 
about the shooting. Viewing the animation and photos illustrating that theory would not 
have changed their verdict. And Defendant's confession and corroborating eyewitness 
testimony provided overwhelming evidence of his guilt. 
V. The trial court acted well within its discretion in ruling that Defendant's 
unnamed witnesses could testify only if the police could investigate their stories. The 
integrity of the trial process depended on the police being able to investigate witnesses 
whose stories allegedly contradicted seven eyewitnesses and Defendant's confession. 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, also requires disclosure of information 
necessarv to allow the nrosecution to nrenare its case. Moreover. Defendant nroffered no 
-' .J.. ~ ..a. "' .J.. 
evidence of any specific threats to these witnesses. Regardless, any error was hannless 
because Defendant never proffered the witnesses' specific testimony and the evidence 
that Defendant was the shooter was overwhelming. 
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VI. Defendant's L WOP sentences are not unconstitutional. Defendant lacks 
standing to challenge section 76-3-207.7 as vague, because he suffered no harm from the 
alleged deficiencies he identifies in the statute. Although he claims that the statute lacks 
guidance and standards for imposing L WOP, the court imposed sentence only after 
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt and that LWOP was justified under the circumstances. For 
these same reasons, the statute was not vague as applied to Defendant. 
The statute does not violate equal protection principles because it is the sentencing 
decision, not the statute itself, that creates the classification between those who receive 
L WOP and those who do not. Regardless, any disparate treatment is justified by the 
unique circumstances of each case and the legitimate State interest in sentencing more 
dangerous offenders to a harsher sentence. 
The statute does not violate Apprendi, because Defendant's conviction made him 
eligible for L WOP. The sentencing court was not required to find any additional fact 
before imposing that sentence. 
Defendant's sentence does not violate Utah's unnecessary rigor clause, because 
that clause applies only to conditions of confinement, not to a sentence itself. Those 
challenges must be raised under the cmel and unusual punishment clause. But Defendant 
argues that his sentence is cruel and unusual only under the Federal Constitution. 
In any event, Defendant's sentence is not cruel and unusual because, as an adult 
who was not mentally retarded, he was eligible for a death sentence. Defendant was 19 
years and 9 months old when he committed the murders, and his own expert admitted that 
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Defendant was not mentally retarded. Moreover, although Defendant claims that he is 
mentally immature, it is his chronological age, not his mental age, that determines death 
eligibility. Death is not a cruel and unusual punishment for an adult who commits 
aggravated murder. Because Defendant could have constitutionally received a death 
sentence, the lesser L WOP sentence is not a cruel and unusual punishment. Even if 
Defendant could properly be likened to a juvenile, United States Supreme Court 
precedent establishes that L WOP is not a cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles who 
commit aggravated murder. 
VII. Defendant's cumulative error claim fails because he establishes no error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION FOR A MIRANDA VIOLATION4 
Defendant claims that his confession was obtained in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), because he 
"anticipatorily" invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel while talking on the phone 
with a detective, but was arrested and questioned two days later without counsel present. 
Br. Aplt. at 55-62. He argues that a suspect may invoke his Miranda right to counsel 
when interrogation is "imminent." According to Defendant, he invoked his right to 
counsel "in the context of an anticipated interrogation" when he told the detective on the 
phone that he wanted to talk to a lawyer before the two met. !d. at 60-62. 
4 This point responds to Defendant's point IV. 
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The trial court correctly ruled that a defendant cannot invoke his Miranda right to 
counsel until he is at least in custody. R653-54. Miranda rights are tied to the context of 
custodial inten·ogation and therefore attach only in that context. Although the United 
States Supreme Court has never decided this precise issue, it has strongly suggested that, 
given Miranda's context, a suspect cannot "anticipatorily" invoke his Miranda right to 
counsel. Defendant cites no case, nor is the State aware of one, which has held that a 
defendant not yet in custody can invoke his Miranda right to counsel. 
A. Factual background. 
After the shootings, Detective Thomas called Defendant's cellphone and spoke 
with someone who identified himself as Defendant. R1909:235-36. The detective asked 
what happened on the night of the murders and Defendant replied "that he wasn't coming 
in yet, that he needed to speak with his lawyer first before he came in .... He told me that 
he got screwed the last time he spoke with cops and he was innocent." 
R652;1909:236,247-48. Detective Thomas had no idea where Defendant was during this 
conversation. R652;1909:237. 
Two days later, officers found Defendant in Layton, an·ested him, and took him to 
the Ogden Police station. R652;1909:207,237;1926:12,13-16. Detective Thomas read 
Defendant the Miranda warnings and Defendant agreed to talk. R652;1909:239-40. 
Before reading the warnings, Thomas commented that Defendant had been read his rights 
so many times that Defendant "could probably read them back" to him. !d. Defendant 
"kind oflaughed and said, 'Yeah, probably."' !d. 
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The trial court found no Miranda violation. R651-54 (the court~ s ruling is in 
Addendum B). The court found that because Defendant was not in custody during his 
phone conversation with the detective, no Miranda warning was required, and Defendant 
therefore could not invoke his Miranda right to counsel. R654. The court also found that 
Defendant received the Miranda warnings after his arrest, waived his right to counsel, 
a..11d agreed to speak with police. R652. 
B. The trial court correctly found no Miranda violation. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented the prosecution from using 
statements "stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant" unless the defendant 
is warned that he has a right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney, and then 
knowingly and intelligently waives those rights. 384 U.S. at 444, 479. Thus, the Fifth 
Amendment grants a person in police custody "a constitutional right to have an attorney 
present during an in-custody questioning."5 State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 
1984). In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court expanded Miranda by holding that once a 
custodial suspect has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel," 
he cannot be "subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been 
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S. at 484-85. 
5 This Court sometimes refers to this right as the "Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel." See Newton, 682 P.2d at 297 n.1; State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ~· 43, 122 PJd 
543 ("[T]he Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches during custodial interrogation."). 
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The rules in Miranda and Edwards were fonnulated specifically for custodial 
interrogations. In Miranda, the Court first described the custodial circumstances of the 
interrogations at issue and then explained that "[a ]n understanding of the nature and 
setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today." I d. (emphasis 
added). Edwards likewise involved a suspect who had been an·ested and was questioned 
at the police station. 451 U.S. at 478. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that Miranda was concerned only with 
a suspect's rights during custodial interrogation. In Oregon v. Mathiason, the Court 
explained: "Our decision in Miranda set forth rules of police procedure applicable to 
'custodial interrogation."' 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977) (emphasis added). In Rhode Island 
v. Innis, the Court stated: "The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the 
'interrogation environment' created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would 
'subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination." 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (quoting Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 457-58). See also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) ("Miranda is 
premised on "the interaction of custody and official interrogation"). 
Put simply, "[a]bsent the interplay of custody and interrogation, an individual's 
. '1 . lf . . . . . h .l " p l 'll l b pnv1~ege agamst se_ -mcnmmat10n 1s not t reateneu. eop e v. Vz .. a .o os, 73 7 N.E.2d 
639, 645 (Ill. 2000). As this Court has recognized, Miranda applies only when a suspect 
is ~n custody. State v. Shuman, 639 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1981) ("Miranda warnings are 
required only where a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom in a significant way.") (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492). 
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Defendant's argument that he can anticipatorily invoke his Miranda right to 
counsel outside of a custodial interrogation fails because he reads Miranda and its 
progeny out of context. Defendant relies on Miranda's recognition that a suspect can 
invoke his right to remain silent "at any time prior to or during questioning," and 
Edward's recognition that a suspect may choose "to deal with the police only through 
counsel." Br. Aplt. at 55-56 (quoting_Miranda; 384 U.S. at473-74; Edwards~ 451 U.S. at 
484-85). But Defendant ignores that Miranda and Edwards were concerned only with 
custodial interrogation. Because the Miranda-Edwards regime applies only to a custodial 
interrogation, the trial court correctly found that Defendant did not validly invoke his 
Miranda right to counsel during his noncustodial phone call with the detective. R651-54. 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to directly address whether a suspect can 
anticipatorily invoke his Miranda right to counsel. But it has strongly suggested that a 
suspect cannot. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991). In McNeil, the 
Court rejected an argument that invoking the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a 
bail hearing simultaneously invokes the Miranda right to counsel. !d. at 173-81. 
McNeil was arrested for robbery and had a bail hearing where a public defender 
represented him. !d. at 173. Later that evening, a detective visited McNeil in jail to ask 
about an umelated murder. Id McNeil waived his Miranda rights and eventually 
confessed involvement in the murder. !d. at 173-74. He moved to suppress his 
confession, arguing that "his courtroom appearance with an attorney [on the um·elated 
robbery] constituted an invocation of the Miranda right to counsel, and that any 
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subsequent waiver of that right during police-initiated questioning regarding any offense 
was invalid." Id. at 174. 
The Court rejected McNeil's claim. Id. at 174-81. It held that to invoke the 
Miranda right to counsel, a suspect must state "his wish for the particular sort of lawyerly 
assistance that is the subject of Miranda," in other words, "a desire for the assistance of 
a..'1 attorney in dealing 1-vith custodial interrogation by the police." Id. at 17R. 
The McNeil dissent suggested that a defendant could avoid this result simply by 
invoking his Miranda right to counsel at a preliminary hearing. I d. at 182 n.3. The 
majority responded that the Court had "never held that a person can invoke his Miranda 
rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial interrogation."' !d. (citations 
omitted). The Court observed that "[i]fthe Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a 
preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no logical reason why it could not be 
invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification as a suspect." Id. 
The Court was highly skeptical of the dissenfs logic, noting that "[m]ost rights must be 
asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against." Id. The 
Court continued, "[t]he fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once 
asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial interrogation does not necessarily 
mean that we will a!lmv it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial 
interrogation, with similar future effect." Id. 
More recently, in Montejo v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court reemphasized that 
"the Miranda-Edwards regime ... applies only in the context of custodial interrogation. 
If the defendant is not in custody then those decisions do not apply; nor do they govern 
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other, noninterrogative types of interactions between the defendant and the State." 556 
U.S. 778, 795 (2009). Miranda's concerns do not apply outside of the custodial setting 
because "[w]hen a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his 
door or walk away to avoid police badgering." ld. The Montejo Court again addressed 
and dismissed the claim that a defendant could theoretically invoke his Miranda right to 
counsel at a preliminary hearing: "' [ w ]e have in fact never held that a person can invoke 
his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial interrogation."' !d. at 
797 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3). 
Other courts agree that a defendant cannot anticipatorily invoke his Miranda right 
to counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this claim in People v. Villalobos: "[i]t 
is the right to an attorney during custodial interrogation that Miranda and its progeny 
protects. That right does not exist outside the context of custodial interrogation. One 
cannot invoke a right that does not yet exist." 737 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ill. 2000). The court 
continued, "[ s ]tretching Miranda to allow anticipatory invocations of the right to counsel 
would extend Miranda far beyond its boundaries and upset the very balance that Miranda 
sought to protect-the balance between effective law enforcement and protection of 
individual rights." ld. at 646. 
The oven:vhelming majority of courts to consider this issue have rejected it See, 
e.g., State v. Hurst, 258 P.3d 950, 955-56 (Idaho App. 2011) (collecting cases); State v. 
Appleby, 221 P.3d 525, 545-46 (Kan. 2009) (collecting cases); Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d at 
643 (collecting cases). For example, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that "many lower 
courts, while generally recognizing that the Supreme Court's statements in McNeil and 
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Montejo are dicta, have followed those pronouncements and held that an effort to invoke 
Miranda rights outside the context of custodial interrogation will not be effective to 
restrain police interrogation." Hurst, 258 P.3d at 955-56. 
Defendant argues that "[ s ]ome courts have held that defendants may invoke the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel pre-interrogation, so long as the interrogation was 
'imminent.'" Br. Aplt. at 60. But the fact that some courts recognize that a suspect can 
invoke his Miranda right to counsel in anticipation of an imminent interrogation says 
nothing about whether a suspect can invoke that same right before he is even arrested. 
Defendant cites no case holding that a suspect not in custody can anticipatorily invoke his 
Miranda right to counsel. Br. Aplt. at 54-62. Nor is the State aware of any such case. 
Moreover, all the cases that Defendant relies on involve suspects who were in 
custody or courts that entirely rejected the proposition that a suspect could anticipatorily 
invoke his Miranda right to counsel. See United States v. Kelsey, 951 F .2d 1196, 1198 
(lOth Cir. 1991) (Kelsey "was ... arrested and handcuffed"); United States v. Grimes, 142 
F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Grimes was arrested"); United States v. LaGrone, 43 
F.3d 332, 339 (7th Cir. 1994) (agreeing with three other Circuit Court of Appeals "that a 
defendant may not invoke his Miranda rights outside the context of custodial 
interrogation."); People v. Nguyen, 132 Cal. App. 4th 350, 356 (Cal. App. 2005) ("To 
conclude defendant asserted her Miranda right to counsel before the officer had 
completed the a1Test or sought to question her would permit invocation of Miranda rights 
'anticipatorily,' and contravene the views expressed in McNeil."); Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d 
at 646 (Miranda rights "do not exist outside the context of custodial inteiTogation"); State 
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v. Kramer, 720 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Wis. App. 2006) ("[U]nless a defendant is in custody, 
he or she may not invoke the right to counsel under Miranda."); United States v. 
Goodson, 22 M.J. 22, 22 (C.M.A. 1986) ("Goodson initially was apprehended"); Pecina 
v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ("the time and place" to invoke the 
Miranda right to counsel is when police give the Miranda warnings). 
Even if Defendant's reading of _Miranda and Edwards were correct. he still would 
not be entitled to relief because he never requested counsel's assistance during a police 
interview. Defendant said only "that he needed to speak with his lawyer first before he 
came in." R652;1909:247-48. Thus Defendant expressed a desire only to speak with 
counsel before meeting with police, not to have counsePs assistance during a custodial 
interrogation. Therefore, even under his interpretation of the Miranda-Edwards regime, 
Defendant did not invoke his Miranda right to counsel. 
Allowing suspects to anticipatorily invoke their Miranda right to counsel before 
they are in custody would not only sever Miranda from its contextual roots, but also 
hamper police by making it difficult for officers to know who they could approach for 
questioning. As the United State Supreme Court has "stressed on numerous occasions, 
' [ o ]ne of the principal advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application." 
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 T_LS. 675, 680 (1988) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 430 (1984)). Stretching Miranda beyond its boundaries makes its application 
difficult and unclear. Moreover, the '"ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is 
not an evil but an unmitigated good."' Montejo, 556 U.S. at 796 (quoting McNeil, 501 
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U.S. at 181 ). "Without these confessions, crimes go unsolved and criminals unpunished. 
These are not negligible costs." Jd. 
In sum, the trial court conectly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CREATE A RULE REQUIRING POLICE 
TO ELECTRONICALLY RECORD STATIONHOUSE CONFESSIONS6 
stationhouse confessions because, according to him, (1) the detectives ignored this 
Court's "suggestion" to record confessions; (2) recording has many advantages, including 
helping courts to resolve admissibility challenges; and (3) other states have recording 
requirements. Br. Aplt. at 41-54. Defendant is unclear about what type of recording 
should be required, but he apparently favors videotape. !d. at 47-52. Defendant does not 
explain the parameters of such a rule or how it would apply in this case. Finally, in one 
paragraph, Defendant claims that his confession was involuntary. Id. at 53. 
This Court should decline Defendant's invitation to create a recOiding rule, 
because he does not explain how such a rule should apply in this case. He therefore 
essentially seeks an advisory opinion. Regardless, this is not the case in which to create 
such a rule because the police did not ignore this Court's direction regarding recording 
recording a confession. And while electronic recording does have many advantages, it is 
not without costs. Formulating a recording requirement involves considering and 
6 This point responds to Defendant's Point III. 
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balancing a number of variables and interests. Such a requirement is therefore a policy 
decision best left to the Legislature or another body better suited to fully examine the 
costs, benefits, and parameters of such a requirement. 
This Court should disregard Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his 
confession because it is inadequately briefed. In any event, this claim fails based on the 
trial court's factual findings, which Defendant ignores. 
A. Factual background. 
In addition to moving to suppress his confession for a Miranda violation, 
Defendant argued that his confession was involuntary because he allegedly had Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and a low I.Q. R256-71. Defendant filed a 
supplemental memorandum arguing that the trial court should also consider the failure to 
electronically record his confession as evidence of its unreliability. RS00-10. 
The confession. While riding to the Ogden police station, Defendant asked why 
so many officers came to arrest him. Rl909:238. Detective Thomas replied that the 
"word on the street was that [Defendant] was a bad dude." Id. Defendant "laughed" and 
replied, "'I'm not bad. I'm just Riqo."' Id. 
After arriving at the station, Thomas allowed Defendant to use the restroom before 
putting him in the interview room. Rl909:237-39. Defendant asked for and received 
water. R1909:207,240. Thomas read the Miranda warnings and Defendant agreed to 
talk. R652;1909:208,239-40. Detectives Thomas and Gent interviewed Defendant. 
R1909:208,240. The conversation "never became adversarial at any point" and everyone 
talked in "normal tones." R1909:213,215. 
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When Defendant initially denied any involvement in the shootings, the detectives 
told him that they did not believe he was being truthful. R1909:209-13. When asked 
about his relationship with Dominique Duran, the SUV driver, Defendant smiled and said 
he loved her and her kids and that they planned to live together. R1909:214;1926:92. 
The detectives then suggested that perhaps Defendant had acted out of concern for 
Duran's children \;vho were in the SUV. R1909:214:1926:93. Gent exolained that he 
' ~ 
offered this suggestion as a way for Defendant ''to minimize his consequences so that he 
would be more truthful." R1909:230. Defendant's demeanor began to change and he 
leaned forward, looked down, and eventually began to cry. Rl909:214-15;1926:93-94. 
Defendant requested and was given tissues. R1909:214-15. 
Hoping to give Defendant another way to minimize his actions, Gent asked if 
Defendant had aimed high or low when he fired the shots. R1909:215-16. Defendant 
explained that he became afraid as the SUV drove off and claimed that he had "blacked 
out" and couldn't remember what happened. R1909:217;1926:96. 
Gent then encouraged Defendant to tell the truth and asked whether Defendant 
reached over the SUV and fired a gun. Rl909:217;1926:97. Defendant responded, "I 
just did it." R1909:217. Gent asked what kind of gun Defendant had used, and 
De-t..._P-ndant_ rP-DliP-rl, "::~ .2/." R1QOQ·?17·10?6·07 No onf" h ci told D .c- ..J t th l'h --~ -· --.._ ~~~~- ~ -- . ~. / ~- ·- •. , ~-- ., . . - - ----~ _a_ -~ e1enuan. ___ e ca_l_ er 
ofthe gun police believed was used. R1909:218;1926:97-98. 
When asked if he got out of the SUV to shoot, Defendant said that the SUV door 
was open and that he stood on the floor and reached across the roof with the gun. 
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R1909:218;1926:98. Crying, Defendant said he was upset because he had killed his 
cousin. !d. 
Defendant agreed to provide a typewritten statement R1909:219;1926: 101. He 
asked for and was given food before beginning. R1909:219;1926:103. 
Gent opened a fonn document on his computer and positioned Defendant so that 
he could read the computer screen. Rl909:219,221-22;1926:101. The fonn contained a 
Miranda warning at the top. Id.;State's Exhibit 80 (the typed statement (Exhibit 80) is in 
Addendum C). Gent again read Defendant the Miranda warning and Defendant agreed to 
dictate his statement. R1909:219-20;1926:105. Gent would ask Defendant a question, 
which he typed verbatim, and then type Defendant's answer verbatim as Defendant read 
along on the monitor. R1909:221-22;1926:102-06. 
Gent first asked Defendant to explain "what happened on the evening of 8-4-07T' 
State's Exhibit 80 at 1. Defendant's answer, in part, was "A shot was fired and glass was 
breaking[,] I panicked and got scared for the kids and I shot back to protect the kids. I 
didn't think I was pointing that low[,] I didn't mean to kill anybody." !d. Defendant later 
said, "I grabbed the hand gun I had and I got out of the truck and standed [sic] up and I 
let off a couple of rounds to scare everyone away." !d. at 3. Defendant said that he 
"stood up from the passenger seat and leaned over the top" and thought he "was just 
shooting in the air." !d. He again admitted using a .22 caliber gun. !d. 
Gent printed the document and asked Defendant if he could read it. R1909 :222-
23;1926:106. Defendant "laughed" and said he could. Id. Gent gave Defendant a pen 
and instructed him to make any necessary changes. Rl909:220;1926:106-07. Defendant 
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made no corrections, initialed each page, and signed the last page. Rl909:223;1926:107. 
Defendant also initialed the lines indicating that he had waived his Miranda rights. 
Rl926:105;State's Exhibit 80. 
At the motion to suppress hearing, Defendant testified that he feared for his safety 
during the interview because Detective Thomas told him that the rival gang wanted him 
off the street and was seeking retaliation against him and his family. R191 0:36. 
Defendant testified that the detectives "didn't threaten [him] with violence," but he 
claimed that "they did threaten me with my family." R1910:40. But on cross-
examination, Defendant agreed that "the only reason" he felt fear was "because [his] 
brother had reported to" Defendant that the rival gang wanted to retaliate by harming 
either Defendant's sister or wife. Rl910:35,37. 
Defendant also testified that neither detective ever read him his Miranda rights. 
Rl910:40-41. He also claimed that no officer had ever read him the Miranda warnings 
although he had eleven juvenile arrests and "three or four" adult arrests. R1910:43-44. 
The interview room was equipped with a motion sensor that included a camera 
that captured both audio and video. Rl909:208;1926:35-36,88. Detective Gent watched 
on a monitor in another room as Detective Thomas administered the Afiranda warning. 
R1909:208,225-26. Gent admitted that he could have recorded the interview, but that he 
chose not to because: (1) the recording equipment was not reliable; (2) the microphones 
in the room were "less than adequate" and would not pick up the voice of a suspect who 
was talking softly, mumbling, or crying; and (3) his training and department policy was 
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to take typewritten statements rather than to record interviews. R1909:226-
27;1926:37,127. 
Mental health evidence. Defendant's expert Dr. Ronald Houston testified that 
Defendant had ADHD. R1909:35-36. He also testified that, although Defendant was 19 
years and 9 months old at the time of the murders, Defendant's perfonnance on an I.Q. 
test, the \Vechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (\Vii,.IS), \vas equivalent to that of a ] 5 year 
old on one portion of the test, and an 11 or 10 year old on other portions. 
R1909:22,58,74. Houston measured Defendant's total I.Q. as 77. R1909:33. Houston 
conceded, however, that Defendant did not fit Utah's definition of "mentally retarded." 
R1909: 101-02. Houston also admitted that he did not administer any "validity or effort 
testing," which measures the effort a person is putting forth on the test and detects "feign, 
impainnent, and malingering." R1909:75. 
The State's expert, Dr. Stephen Golding, testified that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a diagnosis of ADHD. R1909:135,150-51. Although he agreed that 
Defendant exhibited symptoms consistent with ADHD, he testified that it was impossible 
to attribute those symptoms exclusively to ADHD, as opposed to Defendant's early and 
extensive drug and alcohol abuse. R1909:151-52,175-78. He explained that "given 
[Defendant's] profound level of substance abuse ... it would be impossible to disentangle 
those things." R1909: 176. Golding also noted that Defendant did well in school until the 
fourth grade when he became involved with drugs, alcohol, and gangs, and that 
Defendant also did well in structured settings after fomih grade, all of which undermined 
an ADHD diagnosis. R1909: 151-54. 
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Golding testified that Defendant's I.Q. score was unreliable because Houston did 
not administer any validity or "effort" testing. R1909:170-71. Golding noted that there 
were "very, very strange anomalies" in Defendant's test scores. R1909:172. For 
example, Defendant perfonned worst on the simplest part of the test, "picture 
completion," but scored "slightly above normal on a much more difficult [part] ... letter 
number sequencing." ld. Because that part of the test requires attention and memory 
skills, Defendant's high score also contra-indicated ADHD. R1909:173. Golding 
testified that, I.Q. or "WAIS testing[,] without effort testing in a forensic context is 
meaningless. Period." R1909:195-96. 
The trial court's findings. The trial court found that the confession was 
voluntary. R651-54 (Add. B). The court found that the oral interrogation "was less than 
two hours and included breaks during which Defendant was offered food and water." 
R652. The court also found that "[t]here was no physical or psychological force used to 
induce the Defendant's statements" and that "[t]here is no evidence that Defendant was 
coerced, pressured, or threatened to give the statements." !d. The court specifically 
found that Defendant "was not afraid of either Detective Gent or Detective Thomas" and 
that Defendant "testified that his fear was from gang retaliation, not from law 
enforcement." R653. 
The trial court also found that Defendant's alleged mental state did not render his 
confession involuntary. Id. Based on its own observations of Defendant's demeanor and 
testimony during the hearing, the court found that Defendant "understood all the 
questions put to him, both on direct and on cross-examination" and that he "gave 
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appropriate answers to all the questions, tracked the questioning well and seemed to be 
focused." !d. The court found that the evidence ofDefendanfs "below-average I.Q. and 
symptoms of ADHD [were] not sufficient to establish that he did not understand or 
appreciate what he was doing when he talked with the detectives." !d. 
Finally, the trial court found that "Defendant's testimony that he was not given 
}Jiranda wa..rnings \vas not credible, particularly in the face of the written statement with 
the printed Miranda warning initialed by Defendant acknowledging that he understood 
and waived his rights." !d. The court also concluded that Defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights after his arrest and that his statement "was not 
coerced, forced or threatened." R654. 
B. This Court should not issue an advisory opinion. 
Although Defendant argues that this Court should reqmre police to record 
stationhouse confessions, he does not explain what the specific parameters of his rule 
should be or what remedy should apply for a violation of the rule. Br. Aplt. at 39-54. 
Nor does he explain what effect, if any, such a rule would have in this case. Defendant 
therefore seeks what would essentially be an advisory opinion. 
An opinion is merely advisory when it will have no "meaningful effect" upon the 
narties. See Provo Citv Corv. v. Thomvson, 2004 UT 14,, 22, 86 P.3d 735. "This court 
,!_ "' ~ .,._ 
has consistently refused to issue advisory opinions or resolve purely academic matters 
where the outcome will not affect the rights of the parties." Hills v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., 2010 UT 39,, 15, 232 P.3d 1049 (citation omitted). Because Defendant does not 
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explain how a recording requirement would affect this case, he asks for an advisory 
opinion: See id. This Court should therefore decline to consider this issue. 
Defendant arguably implies that failure to electronically record his confession 
should have resulted in its exclusion. But this claim is unpreserved because Defendant 
did not raise it below; therefore, this Court should not consider it. See State v. King, 2006 
UT 3," 13, 131 P.3d 202 (explaining that a party must raise an issue in the trial court to 
preserve it for appeal and that this Court generally does not review unpreserved issues). 
In any event, Defendant's implied argument fails. This Court has held that 
"contemporaneous recording of a confession is not mandated by the Utah Constitution." 
State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995). 
Moreover, excluding the confession because it was not electronically recorded 
goes too far. The Federal Constitution's Due Process Clause "protects a defendant 
against a conviction based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting 
introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury 
that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit." Perry v. New Hampshire, 
132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012). Defendant had that opportunity here. The jury knew that the 
officers could have videotaped the confession but did not. R1926:35-39,126-27. And 
defense counsel emphasized in closing argument that police did not videotape the 
confession. R1927:123-24. The lack of an electronic recording in this case affected the 
weight of Defendant's confession, not its admissibility. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723. 
Therefore, Defendant demonstrates no e1Tor in the admission of his confession. 
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C. This Court has endorsed recording confessions in writing. 
This is not the case for fashioning a recording requirement because, contrary to 
Defendant's argument, the detectives did not ignore this Court's direction to record a 
confession. Relying on State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995), Defendant argues 
that "[t]his Court expressly and repeatedly has asked police officers to record confessions 
in police stations." Br. Aplt. at 40-42. He implies that this Court has urged electronic 
recording and that, as evidenced by this case, police "have ignored this Court's 
repeatedly patient calls for a unifonn system of recording." !d. at 40-42, 43. But in 
Villarreal, this Court recognized that police can make an acceptable record of a 
confession by "written or electronic means." See 889 P.2d at 426 (emphasis added). 
This Court cannot fault the police here for using a method that it has expressly endorsed. 
This Court's concern in Villarreal was that police record a confession in the 
defendant's own words. See id. Villarreal confessed to an officer who, later that day, 
typed up his memory of Villarreal's statement. See id. The officer did not have 
Villarreal sign the confession and Villarreal denied at trial that he ever confessed. See id. 
This Court nevertheless held that the confession was properly admitted and rejected 
Villarreal's contention that the Utah Constitution mandates contemporaneous recording 
of a confession. See id. at 426-27. This Court reco2:nized that such a rule "would denrive 
- - ,__, ..... 
the courts of much evidence that is generally reliable." !d. 
This Court also observed that it had "previously addressed the importance of 
making a contemporaneous record of a defendant's confession by written or electronic 
means" in State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989). Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 426 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(emphasis added). In Carter, the defendant confessed to a detective who later 
"apparently" dictated his memory of Carter's confession while Carter listened. See 776 
P.2d at 890. The officer stopped "after every few lines to ask [Carter] whether what was 
dictated was accurate." Id. The officer then printed the confession and Carter signed it. 
I d. While this Court held in Carter "that admission of the confession was not prejudicial 
error;" this Court did "not sanction the particular manner in which it was recorded." Id. 
at 891. 
Villarreal noted that the Carter Court had criticized the officer's failure "to record 
the defendant's confession verbatim and endorsed the practice of tape recording 
confessions, at least when possible." 889 P.2d at 426. This practice "better ensures that 
the confession is accurate when presented to the finder of fact" and avoids the problems 
inherent in any attempt to recall someone's precise words. Id. Thus, "[w]hen a fonnal 
confession is given in a police station, it could, and should be recorded." I d. at 427. This 
Court observed that "electronic or other recording of a confession is a simple and 
inexpensive means of preserving critical evidence in an accurate fonn and should be 
implemented." Id. (emphasis added). 
The concern in Carter and Villarreal was that a JUry hear the defendant's 
confession in his mvn words. Thus Villarreal held that police could record a defendant's 
words "by written or electronic means." 889 P.2d at 426 (emphasis added). Therefore, 
contrary to Defendant's argument, this Court has not "expressly and repeatedly" asked 
police to electronically record stationhouse confessions. Br. Aplt. at 42. 
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In any event, the Detectives here complied with Villarreal's suggestion to "make a 
contemporaneous record'' of Defendant's confession "by written ... means." 889 P.2d at 
426. The detectives did not record the interrogation where Defendant initially confessed. 
R1909:226-27. But Detective Gent made a contemporaneous record of Defendant's 
confession in Defendant's own words. R1909:219-23;1926:101,106-07; State's Exhibit 
80. Thus, the jury heard "a contemporaneous record" of Defendant's confession in his 
own words. See Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 426. Because the police here recorded 
Defendant's confession by means that this Court has endorsed, this is not the case in 
which to fashion a recording requirement. 
D. This issue is better left to the Legislature or similar body better suited 
to policymaking. 
Defendant argues that this Court should create an electronic recording requirement 
because recording has obvious benefits and other states have imposed such a 
requirement. Br. Aplt. at 42-54. This Court should leave this policy issue to the 
Legislature or other similar body better suited to rulemaking. 
Most states that have adopted a recording requirement have done so by legislative 
action or court rule, not by judicial mandate. See Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the Law 
in Jurisdictions Requiring Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 16 Rich. 
J.L. & Tech. 9, 4-33 (2010). By one commentator's count, seventeen states and the 
District of Columbia have adopted an electronic recording requirement, but only five 
states have done so by judicial mandate. See id. at 3, 21-3 0. The others have done so by 
legislative action or court rule. !d. at 4-33. 
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For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that "the legislature is 
better suited to gather and assess the facts necessary to establishing a recording 
requirement." See State v. Lockhart, 4 A.3d 1176, 1199-1200 (Conn. 2010). This was so 
because "such a rule requires weighing competing public policies and evaluating a wide 
variety of possible rules," tasks better suited to a legislative body. See id. at 1198. The 
court found persuasive similar holdings from the Vermont, Tennessee, and Montana 
supreme courts. See id. at 1191. 
The Vennont Supreme Court refused to nnpose a recording requirement "by 
judicial fiat" because "[t]he most appropriate means of prescribing rules to augment 
citizens' due process rights is through legislation." State v. Gorton, 548 A.2d 419, 422 
(1988). Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that because "[t]he determination 
of public policy is primarily a function of the legislature ... the issue of electronically 
recording custodial interrogations is one more properly directed to the General 
Assembly." State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 772 (Tenn. 2001) (quotation and citation 
omitted). The :Montana Supreme Court noted the potential benefits of a recording 
requirement, but left "the imposition of any such procedural requirement to the 
legislature and to individual law enforcement agencies." State v. Grey, 907 P.2d 951, 
956 (Mont. 1995); see also People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46, 49 (Colo. App. 1992) 
~ . .... - .... .... -
(refusing "to mold our particular view of better practice into a constitutional mandate 
which would restrict the actions of law enforcement agents in all cases"). 
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to create a recording 
requirement and instead "establish[ ed] a committee to study and make recommendations 
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on the use of electronic recordation of custodial inten·ogations." See State v. Cook, 847 
A.2d 530, 547 (N.J. 2004). The court did so because such a rule would require a 
"balancing of the benefits to suspects in custodial interrogations with any drawbacks to 
law enforcemenC' Id. at 545. 
These decisions are consistent with this Court's precedent regarding policy 
decisions. For example, in State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995), this Court 
noted the complex and competing interests involved in "formulating an insanity defense.'' 
This Court therefore held that "[t]his delicate balancing of public policy is better 
accomplished in the legislature than in the courts." Id. 
A legislative or similar body is better suited to crafting an electronic recording 
requirement because the issue requires weighing a number of factors and competing 
policy interests. The State does not dispute that an electronic recording requirement 
would have benefits. 7 But there are also real costs to consider and a number of factors 
and policy considerations to be balanced. For example, an electronic recording 
requirement may "reduce the ability of police officers to obtain truthful confessions and 
admissions" because "[ c ]ommentators acknowledge that suspects may be reluctant to 
speak candidly in front of a camera." Cook, 847 A.2d at 544 (N.J. 2003) (citation 
omitted). i\dditional considerations include "[t]he financial cost of purchasing; installing 
7 In fact, in 2008 the Utah Attorney General's Office, in cooperation with state-
wide law enforcement organizations, drafted a "best practices" statement for law 
enforcement that recommends electronic recording of custodial interviews and gives 
guidelines for doing so. R509-l 0. 
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and maintaining electronic equipment, as well as training officers on the proper use of the 
equipment, [which] would be a significant expenditure." Lockhart, 4 A.3d at 1195. 
A recording requirement also involves several practical considerations. For 
example, there is the question of "what pm1ion of an inteiTogation ought to be recorded." 
See Cook, 84 7 A.2d at 544. Other issues involve what exceptions should apply and what 
remedy to provide for a violation of the rule. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted "the 
lack of unifonnity among the rules created by high courts of other states'' as one reason to 
defer the matter to the legislature. See Lockhart, 4 A .3d at 1197. 
Also, video recording custodial inteiTogations will not necessarily make it easier to 
determine a confession's voluntariness. See G. Daniel Lassiter, et al., Videotaped 
Confessions: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 28 Law & Pol'y 192, 194 (2006). 
Researchers have documented that the camera angle used to record confessions can "have 
an unintended prejudicial effect on trial participants' subsequent evaluation of the 
voluntariness of the confessions." Id. at 195-96. Studies have shown that "the biasing 
influence of camera perspective tainted not only assessments of voluntariness, but also 
perceived likelihood of guilt and sentencing recommendations." Id. Thus, fonnulating 
an electronic recording requirement is a task better left to the legislature or similar body 
that can fully evaluate the various considerations involved. 
E. Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his confession is 
inadequately briefed. 
In one summary paragraph, Defendant asserts that "the trial court eiToneously 
determined the voluntariness of his confession." Br. Aplt. at 53. The entirety of his 
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claim is that his "relative youth" and alleged "mental illnesses coupled with interrogation . 
tactics" rendered his confession involuntary because "the facts of his case nearly mirrored 
those of State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 P.2d 1009." Jd. His claim is 
inadequately briefed. Moreover, the trial court's findings, which Defendant ignores, 
establish the voluntariness of his confession. 
Defendant has inadequately briefed t11is claim because he does not develop his 
argument or cite any supporting authority beyond Rettenberger. Br. Aplt. at 53. He does 
not set forth the voluntariness standard. See id He also ignores the trial court's findings 
and thus makes no attempt to demonstrate that those findings are clearly erroneous or · 
that, despite the fmdings, his confession was nevertheless involuntary. Therefore, this 
Court should not address this issue. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) 
(refusing to consider inadequately briefed issues). In any event, the trial court's findings 
establish that Defendant voluntarily confessed. 
The Fifth Amendment does not protect individuals against all self-incrimination. 
See State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah 1998) ('"[F]ar from being prohibited 
by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently 
desirable."' (citation omitted)). Rather, it "protects individuals from being compelled to 
give evidence against themselves." Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ~ 11 (quotations and 
citation omitted). Thus, '"coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding 
that a confession is not "voluntary."'" Id. at 1013 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 167 (1986)). Compulsion does not occur merely because officers used a 
technique designed to elicit a confession. Nor does the Constitution "prohibit every 
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element which influences a criminal suspect to make incriminating admissions.~~ United 
States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977). "[T]he test is whether, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne." !d. at 188; 
accord State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998) (the coercive tactics must have 
overcome "the defendant's free will"). Moreover, "'there must be a causal relationship 
be"t'.veen the coercion and the subsequent confession."~ Rettenberger~ 1999 UT 80, ~ 18 
(citation omitted). 
The circumstances of Defendant's confession included no coercive police activity 
and thus bear no resemblance to Rettenberger. The police in Rettenberger made at least 
thirty-six false statements, used the "false friend~' technique, threatened Rettenberger with 
the death penalty, and refused to allow him to call his mother during an interrogation that 
spanned two days, and included 22 hours in solitary confinement without pillow or 
blanket. 1999 UT 80, ~~ 21, 24, 29, 33-35. Rettenberger was eighteen but had the 
maturity level of a fifteen-year-old, a below-average I.Q., little prior experience with the 
judicial system, suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder, and exhibited symptoms of 
other mental impairments. I d. at ~ 3 7. The intenogating officers recognized and 
exploited his mental deficiencies. !d. at ~~ 38, 45. And Rettenberger's confession 
contained "little information that was not first provided or smnzested bv the interro2:atin2: 
..... ................... ., _... -
officers." !d. at~ 40. 
In contrast, Defendant's "interrogation was less than two hours and included breaks 
'--
during which Defendant was offered food and water." R652. Defendant also confessed 
to details that police had not disclosed. The evidence of Defendant's low I.Q. was 
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unreliable because Defendant's expert did not administer any validity or effort testing. 
R1909:75,195-96. Defendant's ADHD diagnosis was likewise questionable. 
R1909:151-54. Moreover, after observing Defendant testify, the trial court found that 
any mental deficiency did not affect the voluntariness of Defendant's confession. R653. 
Defendant's claim that the officers "admitted" to using manipulative techniques, 
like "minimization, threats and false friend tech_niques," misrepresents the record. Br. 
Aplt. at 53. The detectives did admit to suggesting ways that Defendant could minimize 
his culpability. R1909:230. But they never admitted to threatening Defendant or using 
the false-friend technique. Rather, the trial court found that the officers used "no physical 
or psychological force" during the interrogation and that there was "no evidence that 
Defendant was coerced, pressured, or threatened." R652. The court also found that any 
fear Defendant felt "was from gang retaliation, not from law enforcement." R653. 
In short, Defendant's interrogation was nothing like Rettenberger's. No coercive 
police tactic overbore Defendant's will. Therefore, the trial court correctly found that 
Defendant's confession was voluntary. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ~ 18. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO 
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION 
WASALIE8 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert 
testimony that his confession was a lie. Br. Aplt. at 26-38. Defendant sought to call Dr. 
Richard Ofshe, a sociology professor, to testify that his confession was a lie because it 
8 This point responds to Defendant's Point II. 
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was "obtained tlu·ough the use of a psychologically coercive motivational tactic." 
Ofshe's Repmi at 2 (in a sealed manila envelope marked R746). Ofshe believed that 
police had "capitalized" on the allegation that the rival gang was seeking revenge against 
Defendant or his family by promising that if Defendant confessed, he and his family 
would be protected. Id. at 3. 
Defendant argues that this testimony was admissible because (1) jurors do not 
understand that an innocent person might falsely confess, (2) false confessions can occur 
when police "use psychological tricks and subtle fonns of coercion" and (3) the young 
and mentally ill are especially susceptible to these techniques. Br. Aplt. at 26-33. 
Defendant likens this expert testimony to the eyewitness identification expert testimony 
in State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103. Br. Aplt. at 33-35. Defendant discounts 
the trial court's findings that he did not demonstrate the reliability of Ofshe's testimony, 
claiming that the trial court "did not conduct a Rimmasch hearing or in any way assess 
the reliability of the science." Br. Aplt. at 25-26. Defendant argues that false confession 
expert testimony "should be presumptively admissible," apparently because other courts 
have admitted such testimony in some form. Br. Aplt. at 35, 36-37, Addendum F. 
The trial court was well within its discretion to exclude Ofshe's testimony. It was 
inadmissible under rules 608(a) and 702(a), Utah Rules of Evidence; because jt would 
have directly commented on Defendant's credibility and thus invaded the jury's exclusive 
province to judge credibility. It was also inadmissible under rule 702(b) because 
Defendant did not establish that Ofshe's methodology was reliable. Regardless, any error 
in excluding the testimony was harmless given (1) Defendant's failure to testify and thus 
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challenge the truthfulness of his confession, (2) the mountain of eyewitness testimony 
corroborating the confession, and (3) the jury instruction on false confessions. 
A. Factual background. 
The State moved to exclude Ofshe's testimony as unreliable and unhelpful under 
rule 702, an improper comment on Defendant's credibility under rule 608, and more 
ureiudicial than nrobative under rule 403. Utah Rules of Evidence. Rl 064-94. At the 
.... ..J .L .. 
hearing on the motion, defense counsel did not produce Dr. Ofshe to testify about the 
reliability of his methodology, nor did counsel request an opportunity to do so in the 
future. Rl919:58-67 (the argument and ruling on the admissibility of Ofshe's testimony 
is in Addendum D). Rather, defense counsel argued that the State bore the burden to 
prove the unreliability of the testimony. R1919:58. Defense counsel also argued that the 
court should allow Ofshe to testify at trial because it had authorized funds to hire Ofshe. 
Rl919:60. Counsel also argued that if Ofshe could not testify specifically that 
Defendant's confession was a lie, then he should be allowed to testify generally "that 
there are false confessions" and that a "number of factors that go into that." Rl919:74. 
The trial court excluded the testimony. Rl609-14; 1919:70-73 (the ruling is in 
Addendum E). The court based its ruling on the parties' memoranda, and "the studies 
and applicable literature" therein. R1609. The court found that Defendant had not shown 
that Ofshe's principles and methods were reliable under Rule 702 because, among other 
things, (1) the core of Ofshe's research-cases in which he believes false confessions 
occurred-"are not unifonnly accepted within the scientific community as being valid 
false confession cases"; (2) "the methodology employed [by] Ofshe in identifying false 
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confessions is not generally accepted within the scientific community"; (3) "Ofshe has 
never attempted to quantify his theories through any sort of empirical data"; ( 4) his 
hypothesis "lacks support from any empirical data and [has] not been adequately 
studied"; (5) Professor Paul Cassell's research shows that "Ofshe was only able, at best, 
to correctly identify a false confession 55% of the time"; and (6) Ofshe's opinions are 
unsupnorted bv anv "emnirical data or credible research." R1610-12. The court also 
- .J. ..,. ... .1. 
ruled that the testimony would "invade[] the fact finding function of the jury." R1612. 
The trial court ruled that Ofshe' s testimony was also inadmissible under Rule 
608(a) because it would comment directly on Defendant's credibility. Id. Finally, the 
court concluded that the unfair prejudicial effect of Ofshe's unreliable opmwn 
substantially outweighed any probative value under Rule 403. R1613-14. 
The trial court noted that its ruling did not prevent Defendant from developing at 
trial his theory that the confession was coerced. Rl919:73. The court also agreed to 
instruct the jury on false confessions. I d. 
At trial, Defendant did not testify or introduce evidence of his alleged ADHD and 
low I.Q. R1927:5-6. Detective Thomas testified that he "never made [Defendant] any 
promises at the station at any time" and that the subject of "keep[ing the rival gang] off of 
[Defendant]" never came up during the stationhouse interview. R1926:4 7. Consistent 
with the trial court's findings on the motion to suppress, the detectives denied at trial 
employing any physical or psychological force to induce Defendant's statements. R651-
54;1925:24-54,59,112-32. 
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Defendant proposed a jury instruction on false confessions and reminded the trial 
court that it had agreed to give the instruction. Rl922:34. The State objected that the 
instruction was itTelevant because Defendant did not testify that his confession was false. 
R1927: 15. The trial court gave the instruction because it viewed Defendant's initial 
denial of involvement, coupled with his later admission, as "some evidence" of a false 
committing a crime" and listed factors to consider in evaluating a confession's reliability. 
!d. (the instruction is in Addendum F). 
B. The trial court properly exercised its discretion. 
"'Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining whether expert scientific 
evidence is admissible."' T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 2011 UT 28, ~ 
41, 254 P.3d 752 (citation omitted). This Court will reverse a trial court's decision to 
exclude an expert witness "'only if . . . no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court."' !d. (citation omitted) (alterations in original). 
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, "prohibits any testimony as to a witness's 
truthfulness on a particular occasion." State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 
1989). It states, in part, that a witness's credibility "may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the fonn of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the 
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." Utah R. Evid. 
608(a). 
"Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth a two-part test for detennining 
whether expert testimony is admissible." T-Mobile, 2011 UT 28, ~ 42. First, under Rule 
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702(a), the expert's opinion must be "necessary to assist the trier of fact" and the expert 
must possess "the necessary 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education' to 
provide such assistance to the trier of fact." I d. (quoting Eskelson v. Davis Hasp. & Me d. 
Ctr., 2010 UT 15, ~ 9, 242 PJd 762). "Second, rule 702(b) requires that the specialized 
knowledge that forms the expert's testimony be reliable, based on sufficient facts, and be 
reliably applied to the facts." !d. (citing Utah R. Evid. 702(b )). 
1. Expert testimony that Defendant lied was inadmissible under rules 
608(a) and 702(a). 
The trial court correctly ruled that Ofshe's testimony was inadmissible under 
rules 608(a) and 702(a). As explained, rule 608(a) prohibits testimony about "a witness's 
truthfulness on a particular occasion." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 391. Testimony opining 
that Defendant lied to police would have -directly commented on Defendant's credibility. 
It was therefore inadmissible under Rule 608(a). See id.; Utah R. Evid. 608(a). 
Rule 702(a) also barred Ofshe's opinion. The rule allows only expert testimony 
that is necessary to help the jury, and "' [ e ]xpert opinion testimony should not be 
permitted to invade the field of common knowledge or the province of the jury."' Patey 
v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ~ 21, 977 P.2d 1193 (citation omitted); Utah R. Evid. 702(a). 
The jury is "the sole evaluator of witness credibility.'' Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ~ 36. Rule 
702(a) therefore barred Ofshe's opinion that Defendant's confession was a lie. See id. 
(holding that eyewitness identification expert could not "tell the jury that a specific 
eyewitness identification either is or is not accurate"). 
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Other comis agree that expert testimony that a suspect lied to police invades the 
juris sole province to judge witness credibility. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
exclusion of a psychologist's testimony that the defendant's police statements were likely 
false because such testimony would do "little more than 'vouch for the credibility of 
another witness' and thereby 'encroach[] upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to 
make credibility detenninations."' Uvzited States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Likewise, the l\1issouri Court of Appeals affirmed the 
exclusion of expert testimony that the defendant had characteristics "which tend to be 
present in people who make false confessions" because that testimony would "invade the 
province ofthejury." State v. Wright, 247 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Mo. App. 2008). 
Even if Ofshe's testimony were not a direct opinion on Defendant's credibility, it 
would still be inadmissible under Rule 702(a) because it would not "help the trier of fact" 
to understand an issue they were incapable of grasping on their own. See Utah R. Evid. 
702(a). The fundamental inquiry in determining whether expe1i testimony will "help the 
trier of fact" is "whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average 
individual." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
The jury did not need Ofshe's opinion to understand a claim that Defendant's 
confession might be false. Ofshe would have opined that Defendant lied to protect 
himself or his family from harm. R746 (Ofshe's Report at 2-3). The jury did not need an 
expert to explain that a person might lie to avoid harm to himself or others. Rather, a 
claim that a defendant lied to· protect another "is precisely the type of explanation that a 
jury is capable of resolving without expert testimony." Adams, 271 F.3d at 1246. 
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Defendant cites various law review and journal articles for the proposition that 
jurors "are completely unaware" that suspects might falsely confess. Br. Aplt. at 31-33. 
But research from false confession experts themselves undennines this premise. False 
confession experts base their claim that jurors are unaware that false confessions occur on 
a survey of District of Columbia potential jurors. Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False 
Confession in America, The Champion, Vol. 41, No. 10, p. 31. That survey showed that 
68% of respondents believed that suspects falsely confess "not very often" or "almost 
never." !d. Those results do not demonstrate that jurors "are completely unaware" that 
false confessions occur. Rather, as one commentator noted, "[i]mplying that these 
answers foreclose even the possibility of false confessions within the minds of jurors is 
simply wordplay: 'not very often' and 'almost never' do not mean 'never."' David A. 
Perez, The (In)admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony, 26 Touro L. Rev. 23, 
56-57 (2010). The data actually confinn "most juror's beliefs that concede the possibility 
of a false confession in a given case, while also noting its statistical improbability." !d. 
In sum, Ofshe's testimony that Defendant's confession was a lie was inadmissible 
under Rules 608(a) and 702(a). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding it. 
2. General testimonv that defendants mav falselv confess was also 
" ~ ~ 
inadmissible under rules 608(a) and 702(a). 
Defendant argues, as he did below, that even if Ofshe's specific opinion that 
Defendant lied was inadmissible, his general testimony that "there are false confessions" 
and that a "number of factors that go into that" was admissible. Br. Aplt. at 36; 
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R1919:74. The trial court properly excluded that testimony because it would have been 
irrelevant and unhelpful. 
Testimony about general "factors that go into" a false confession would have been 
irrelevant because Ofshe's opinion was based entirely on his unsubstantiated belief that 
Defendant confessed out of fear of retaliation from the rival gang. R 726 ( Ofshe' s Report 
at 2-3). Ofshe did not identify any other factors, like Defendant's alleged mental state, or 
specific interrogation tactics, that supposedly resulted in a false confession. !d. 
Additionally, general testimony "that there are false confessions" would not meet 
Rule 702's requirement to help the jury. Testimony amounting to '"nothing more than an 
assertion that false confessions do occur' . . . would be of no assistance to the jury" 
because "the testimony would be 'so abstract, vague and speculative that its relevance 
and probative value [would be] virtually nil."' State v. Free, 798 A.2d 83, 96 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion to exclude Ofshe's general testimony. 
3. Defendant did not show that his expert's methodology was reliable. 
The trial court also properly exercised its discretion in excluding Ofshe's opinion 
because Defendant did not show that the methodology underlying that opinion was 
reliable. Rule 702(b) reauired the trial court to determine whether Ofshe' s methods and 
- ~ -- . - ~. ·' !. 
principles were (i) "reliable," (ii) "based upon sufficient facts or data," and (iii) "reliably 
applied to the facts of the case." See Utah R. Evid. 702(b ). This showing "is satisfied if 
the principles or methods ... are generally accepted by the relevant expert community." 
Utah R. Evid. 702(c). Defendant had to establish that Ofshe's methodology was reliable. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 393 n.3 ('"[T]he proponent of scientific evidence [bears] the 
burden of establishing a proper foundation as a prerequisite to admissibility, especially in 
a criminal case."); see also Utah R. Evid. 702 (Advisory Committee Note) (recognizing 
that the proponent of expert testimony must establish its reliability). 
Defendant essentially argued below that Ofshe's methodology was generally 
accepted. Defendant never asked to have Ofshe testify about the reliability of his 
methodology. Rather, defense counsel relied on cases from other jurisdictions that had 
allowed some fonn of expert testimony on false confessions. R1171-80. Defendant also 
argued that the trial court should allow Ofshe to testify because it had authorized funds to 
hire Ofshe. R1919:60. Likewise, Defendant contends on appeal that false confession 
expert testimony '"should be presumptively admissible," again citing to cases admitting 
the testimony in some form or another. Br. Aplt. at 35, 36 n.34, Addendum F. 
But the fact that some courts have admitted such testimony does not establish its 
general acceptance. Rather, far from being generally accepted, the reliability of this 
testimony is highly contested and a number of courts have excluded the testimony. False 
confession experts themselves also admit that their principles and methods lack a sound 
scientific basis. Therefore, given the evidence before it, the trial court properly exercised 
its discretion to exclude the expert testimony as unreliable. Rl609-14. 
The principles and methods underlying false confession expert testimony are not 
generally accepted. For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals affinned the exclusion 
of false confession expert testimony from Ofshe's co-author, Dr. Richard Leo, because 
the principles and methods underlying such testimony were unreliable. See People v. 
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Kowalski, No. 294054, 2010 WL 3389741, at *3 (Mich. App. 26 August 2010). The 
court held that "Dr. Leo's conclusions were based on the study of confessions that he 
subjectively determined, without definitive evidence, were false" and that "there is no 
way to test or quantify Dr. Leo's methodologies or to decipher a known error rate." !d. 
See also Lyons v. State, 652 S.E.2d 525, 531 (Ga. 2007) (affinning the trial court's 
exclusion of Ofshe' s testimony because his "theory had not reached a verifiable stae:e of 
.. ., -" 
scientific certainty"), overruled on other grounds by Garza v. State, 670 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 
2008)); see also Free, 798 A.2d at 95 ("[W]e are not satisfied that Dr. Kassin's premises 
[regarding false confessions] have gained general acceptance.") (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court likewise affinned a trial court's decision to 
exclude false confession testimony from Dr. Saul Kassin because he conceded "that there 
was no empirical data on the number of false confessions ... that there is no scientific 
basis for distinguishing true from false confessions," and that one of his articles 
recognized that further research in the field was "sorely needed." Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 864 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (Mass. 2007). The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the 
exclusion of Dr. Leo's testimony on false confessions, because "he could offer no expert 
insight into the actual likelihood that coercive interrogation tactics will lead to a false 
confession" and because he had "not fonnulated a specific theory or methodology about 
false confessions that could be tested, subjected to peer review, or pennit an error rate to 
be detennined." State v. Wooden, No. 23992, 2008 WL 2814346, at *4 (Ohio App. July 
23, 2008). 
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Professor Paul Cassell has observed that "[t]he admissibility of expert testimony 
on false confessions is quite controversial" and that "the clear trend in the cases is that, at 
the very least, courts should preclude any testimony on the truth or falsity of a particular 
confession." See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and The "Innocent": An Examination 
of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction From False Confessions, 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. 
Pol'y 523, 588 (1999). He continues: "It is not at all clear that acceptance of conclusions 
about false confessions yet exists." !d. at 589. Rather, "the empirical data on false 
confessions could be described as 'tentative and fragmentary."' !d. Indeed, as Professor 
Cassell has noted, leading false confession researcher Dr. Saul Kassin himself has 
concluded that because confession evidence has been largely overlooked by the scientific 
community, "'the current empirical foundation may be too meager to ... qualify as a 
subject of 'scientific knowledge' according to' the rules governing expert testimony." !d. 
at 589-90 (quoting Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, Am. 
Psychologist, Mar. 1997, at 221, 231). And Professor Cassell has also criticized Leo and 
Ofshe's methodology because their success rate in determining true from false 
confessions was only 55%, even giving them "the generous benefit of the doubt." !d. at 
587-89. 
methodology does not allow them to determine the rate at which false confessions occur. 
For example, Ofshe has admitted that "it is presently not possible to quantify the number 
and frequency of false confessions or the rate at which they lead to miscarriages of 
justice." Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A 
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Response to Paul Cassell's "Balanced Approach" to the False Confession Problem, 
1997 DENY. U. L. REv. 1135 (1997). Leo acknowledged in a 2009 article that "we do not 
know how frequently [false confessions] occur." Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: 
Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J. Ad. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 332, ~ 4 
(2009). 
In the years since Professor Cassell's article, researchers still have not established 
a sound foundation for false confession theory. Saul Kassin recently acknowledged again 
that "there is no known incidence rate of [false confessions], and to our knowledge 
empirically based estimates have never been published." Saul M. Kassin et. al., Police-
Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 3, 5 
(20 1 0). According to one commentator, the admissibility of false confession expert 
testimony involves a "contentious debate being played out on all levels of state and 
federal courts." Perez, (In)admissibility, 26 Touro L. Rev. at 35, (supra). 
Defendant relies on a Seventh Circuit holding that Ofshe's testimony was 
admissible to help the jury understand the phenomenon of false confessions. Br. Aplt. at 
37 (citing United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345 (ih Cir. 1996)). However, 
Defendant omits that the prosecutor in Hall "did not challenge the scientific basis of the 
nroffered testimonv." 93 F.3d at 1344. 
~ -
On remand from the Seventh Circuit, the trial court admitted Ofshe's testimony. 
See United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997). However, the trial court 
would not allow Ofshe to "explicitly testify about matters of causation, specifically, 
whether the inteiTogation methods used in this case caused Hall to falsely confess." I d. at 
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1205. The court found that, given the lack of scientific basis for such an opinion, "such 
testimony would be speculative and prejudicial." Id. 
The fact that some courts have admitted various fonns of false confession expert 
testimony does not establish the reliability of such testimony. On the contrary, the above 
case law and literature demonstrates that false confession expert testimony is not 
generally acceptedc 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Defendant discounts the trial court's extensive 
findings that Ofshe's methods and principles were unreliable. He claims that the trial 
court "did not conduct a Rimmasch hearing or in any way assess the reliability of the 
science." Br. Aplt. at 25-26. On the contrary, the trial court evaluated the reliability of 
the testimony based on the infonnation that the State and Defendant provided, which 
consisted of "the briefs, the studies and applicable literature referenced in the briefs." 
R1609. The trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing that no one asked 
for. See Utah R. Evid. 702 (Advisory Committee Note). Rather, "admissibility under the 
rule may be determined based on affidavits, expert reports . . . and memoranda of 
counsel" and evidentiary hearings will not be routinely required. I d. 
Moreover, because Defendant never produced Ofshe to testify, nor sought an 
opportunity to do so, the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
Although defense counsel did mention a "Rimmasch hearing," he did so only to argue 
that it was the State's or the trial court's responsibility to seek such a reliability hearing. 
R1919:58,60. Defendant never requested a Rimmasch hearing. Id. At the hearing on the 
State's motion to exclude Ofshe, defense counsel emphasized, "we are not here on a 
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Rimmasch hearing. The State ha[ d] an opportunity, they could have requested one; they 
haven't." R1919:58. Later, defense counsel argued that because the trial court had 
granted counsel funds to hire Ofshe, the court should allow him to testify at trial. 
R1919:60. Counsel asserted that if there was an issue about the reliability of Ofshe's 
methods, the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate reliability before it 
authorized funds to hire Ofshe.9 
But Defendant had to either produce Ofshe or ask for the opportunity to do so 
because he had the burden to establish the reliability of Ofshe's testimony. See 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 393 n.3. Defendant cannot fault the trial court for not holding a 
hearing on the reliability of false confession expert testimony when he never asked for 
such a hearing and instead relied on caselaw to argue that the testimony was reliable. 
4. Any error in excluding the testimony was harmless. 
Regardless, any error in excluding Ofshe's testimony was harmless. Exclusion of 
expert testimony is harmful "only if there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the verdict 
would have been different had the expert testimony been included." Clopten, 2009 UT 
84, ~ 39 (citation omitted). Defendant does not show a reasonable likelihood that Ofshe's 
testimony would have resulted in a different verdict, because ( 1) Defendant provided no 
evidentiary foundation to support his claim that his confession was false, (2) 
9 After acknowledging that other courts have excluded Dr. Ofshe's testimony as 
unreliable, counsel stated, "I guess we should have a Rimnwsch hearing or should have 
had one to determine that. But at this point, the Court's appointed him as an expert. 
We're asking that he be able to testify as an expe1i and ask for some sort of Rinunasch 
[sic] that could show that he's not reliable, I think that it would be incumbent upon the 
Comito allow his testimony." R1919:60. 
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overwhelming evidence from eyewitnesses corroborated Defendant's confession, and (3) 
the trial comi gave an instruction on false confessions. 
a. No evidence supported the expert's opinion. 
Expe1i testimony is unnecessary when no evidence supports the expeti' s opinion. 
See Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ~ 33. This Court held in Clopten that while eyewitness 
identification expert testimony can help a jury understand factors that might lead to a 
mistaken identification, such testimony is unnecessary when those factors do not affect 
an identification. See id. Likewise, there was no basis for false confession expert 
testimony here, because the jury heard no evidence of any factor that could have caused 
Defendant to falsely confess. See id. See also In re Detention of Law, 204 P.3d 230, 236 
(Wash. App. 2008) (false confession expert testimony "is only relevant when a party 
claims that he confessed to something he did not do"). 
Here, Ofshe's testimony would not have affected the verdict because Defendant 
provided no evidentiary foundation for his claim that he falsely confessed. As explained, 
Ofshe's opinion depended entirely on Defendant's claim that the police had promised to 
protect him from the rival gang if he confessed. R746 (Ofshe's Report at 2-3). But the 
detective's version of the interview does not support that claim, and Defendant did not 
testifv to suooort it. R1927:5-6. In fact Defendant did not testify at all. See id. 
-' .l ..t ~ -
Detective Thomas testified that he "never made [Defendant] any promises at the 
station at any time" and that the subject of "keep[ing the rival gang] off of [Defendant]" 
never come up during the stationhouse interview. Rl926:47. Additionally, as the trial 
comi found, "no evidence" showed that Defendant "was coerced, pressured, or threatened 
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to give the statements," or that any "psychological force [was] used to induce the 
Defendant's statements." R652. Therefore, no evidence supported Ofshe's opinion that 
Defendant falsely confessed to seek protection from gang retaliation. 
Defendant argues that his alleged ADHD and low I.Q. contributed to his allegedly 
false confession. Br. Aplt. at 35-38. But Ofshe did not rely on those factors to fonn his 
Nor did Defendant introduce an;.r evidenc.e at 
trial of his alleged ADHD and low I.Q. Therefore, no evidence supported a theory that 
Defendant's mental state led to a false confession. 
Defendant argued below that exclusion of Ofshe's testimony prevented Defendant 
from testifying at trial. Rl928:25-27. The record refutes that argument. After trial, 
Defendant moved to arrest judgment asserting, among other things, that the trial court 
erroneously excluded Ofshe's testimony. Rl509-16. In denying that motion, the trial 
court noted that there was no evidentiary basis for Ofshe' s opinion because Defendant 
did not testify. R1928:23-24. Defense counsel retorted that his decision not to call 
Defendant was driven by the trial court's ruling excluding Ofshe's testimony. R1928:25-
27. The State objected that it was too late for defense counsel to make a record on that 
issue and the trial court agreed, noting that the issue had arisen at the pretrial hearing on 
not be allowed to testify unless Defendant also testified and claimed that he falsely 
confessed. R1919:53-54. Defense counsel never argued at that hearing that he could call 
Defendant only ifthe court also allowed Ofshe to testify. R1919:43-75. On the contrary, 
the trial court explicitly told Defendant that its ruling excluding Ofshe did not prevent 
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Defendant from developing his theory at trial that his confession was false. R1919:73. 
. -
Therefore, the exclusion of Dr. Ofshe did not prevent Defendant from testifying. 
Moreover, Defendant's argument that he could not testify unless Ofshe also 
testified was illogical. Because Ofshe's opinion depended on Defendant's version of the 
detectives' statements, Ofshe's testimony depended on Defendant testifying to his 
version of the interview, not vice versa. 
In short, no evidence supported Ofshe's opinion that Defendant's confession was 
false. Therefore, any error in excluding that opinion was harmless. 
b. Seven eyewitnesses corroborated Defendant's confession. 
Any error in excluding Ofshe was also harmless because overwhelming 
eyewitness evidence corroborated Defendant's confession that he was the shooter. Three 
eyewitnesses, including two who were in the SUV with Defendant, identified him as 
having fired the shots. Sarah Valencia and SUV passengers Angelo Gallegos and Elias 
Christopher Garcia all testified that Defendant was the shooter. R1922:86,95,107; 
1925:10-11,20-21,33. Four other eyewitnesses corroborated the central details of 
Defendant's confession. Richard Esquivel and SUV driver Dominique Duran testified 
that all the shots came from the passenger side of the SUV where Defendant admitted he 
was sitting. R1922:150;1923:11-13;1924:6,13-18. Lacey Randall testified that she saw 
someone sitting on the passenger windowsill on the SUV as it pulled away and that all of 
the shots came from the SUV. R1923: 11-13. And Keri Garcia testified that all the shots 
came from the direction of the road. R1922:127. Given the foregoing evidence, the jury 
would not have likely reached a different result even if it had heard Ofshe's testimony. 
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c. The jury was instructed on false confessions. 
Finally, the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on false confessions mitigated 
any hann that might have stemmed from its ruling excluding Ofshe. Instruction 56 told 
the jury that "an individual might falsely confess to committing a crime" and encouraged 
the jury to consider several factors in judging the validity of Defendant's confession 
including: "the spontaneity of the statement,'' "[w]hether deception, trick, threats, or 
promises were used to obtain the statement," "[t]he defendant's physical and mental 
condition, including age, education, and experience," and "whether an attorney was 
present when the statement was given." R1364-65 (Add. F). 
Given the lack of evidentiary basis for Ofshe's opinion, the overwhelming 
evidence corroborating the confession, and the jury instruction, Ofshe's opinion would 
not have created a reasonable likelihood of an acquittal. Therefore, any error was 
harmless. See Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ~ 39. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO 
EXCLUDE EXHIBITS FROM DEFENDANT'S CRIME SCENE 
RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT FOR INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION10 
The trial court allowed Defendant's crime scene reconstruction expert James 
Gaskill to testify that, in his opinion, there were two other shooters, one in the carport 
area shooting towards the street and another who might have been shooting from inside 
the white car in the driveway. Rl926:213-25. Gaskill testified that the bullets that hit 
Nevarez and Esquivel could not have been fired from the SUV. Rl926:22l-25. The trial 
10 This point responds to Defendant's Point I. 
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court excluded for lack of foundation Gaskill~s computer generated animation depicting 
the supposed two additional shooters, still photographs from that animation, and photos 
purporting to recreate Defendant's view from the SUV. R1926: 181-82 (the relevant 
transcript pages are in Addendum G). 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding the animation and photos 
because they 'vere merely demonstrative exhibits that aecurately reflected the expert~s 
opinion. Br. Aplt. at 12, 15-17. Defendant further argues that the trial court allowed the 
prosecution to unfairly surprise him when it moved midtrial to exclude the exhibits for 
lack of foundation. Br. Aplt. at 12-15. Defendant also asserts that the trial court unfairly 
limited Gaskill~ s testimony by not allowing him to cmmnent on the credibility of the 
State~s witnesses. Br. Aplt. at 22. Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court 
erroneously allowed the State to use a crime scene diagram to illustrate bullet trajectories. 
!d. at 22-23. 
A. Factual background. 
Before trial, the State moved for an order preventing Gaskill from testifying in a 
way that commented on the credibility of the State's witnesses. Rl917:28, 33 (Add. G). 
The trial court granted the State~s motion. R1917:38-40. It ruled that Gaskill could 
testifY about his theory of the shooting and explain that "based on his examination he 
doesn't agree with the conclusion that was reached by some of the witnesses." !d. But 
the court agreed that Gaskill could not testify that he did not "find these witnesses to be 
credible." R1917:39. 
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· As explained, Gaskill testified at trial that he believed that there were shooters in 
the carport and perhaps inside the white car, and that, in his opinion, the shooter in the 
carport shot Sabrina Prieto in the chest as she ran south towards the side door of the 
house. R1926:213-25. Gaskill also testified that, given the position of vehicles in front 
of the house and given the location of the expended casings in the street, the bullets that 
hit Esquivel and Nevarez could not have been fired from the SlN. R1926:221-25. 
To support Gaskill's trial testimony, Defendant sought to introduce a computer-
generated animation depicting the other two supposed shooters, still photos from the 
animation, and photos allegedly recreating Defendant's view from the SUV. R1926:137-
50. The State moved to exclude the exhibits for lack of foundation. !d. 
The trial court expressed frustration that this issue had not been addressed before 
trial. R1926: 141. The prosecutors explained that although defense counsel provided a 
copy of the animation about two weeks before trial, counsel told them that the animation 
was not finalized and "things were going to be changing." R1926:140)45. Defense 
counsel did not provide the final version until the Friday before the Tuesday trial. 
R1921:1;1926:140. The prosecutors did not receive the photos until the day after trial 
began. R1926:148. 
The trial court nevertheless allowed Gaskill to try to establish foundation for the 
animation and photos. R1926: 155. Regarding the animation, Gaskill testified that he did 
not create it himself and could not remember the name of the person or persons that did, 
or even the name or location of their company. R1926:163-64. Gaskill was uncertain 
whether the people who created the animation had any background in bioengineering, 
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biomechanics, forensic pathology, or kinesiology. R1926:166. Gaskill could not recall 
whether he had provided the animators with a copy of the medical examiner's report. !d. 
Gaskill believed he gave the animators some crime scene photos, but could not 
specifically recall which ones. R1926: 166-6 7. Gaskill admitted that the animation did 
not show the precise trajectory for the bullet that struck a female victim as she 
appr"'~"hed +he "amort RI9?6·1 hO n.!'ld,ill's opm· inn thl'lt someone mio-ht hl'lve hePn VU.v L! \.1 p ·.· .1. ._ • .a.'"'""' • '-"-v.a. ... .a..a. ...... _ ............... _ ...... · ...... l::,. ... ..,. ... - y -... .-
shooting from inside the white car was based on photos of a bullet hole in the car's 
window. R1926:213-17. Gaskill admitted on cross-examination that he could not know 
for sure which way the bullet traveled through the window without examining the actual 
window, which he did not do. R1926:236. 
Gaskill admitted that the photos purporting to depict Defendant's view from the 
SUV did not reflect precisely how high Defendant would have been, because the photos 
were not taken from a Yukon Denali, the kind of vehicle involved in the shooting. 
R1926:174. Gaskill also admitted that the pickup truck that he placed in front of the 
house in the staged photos was not the same size, make, or model as the truck parked in 
· front ofthe house on the night ofthe shooting. R1926:167-68. Gaskill also did not know 
the exact location of the car that he parked in front of the truck in the staged photos. 
R1926:229-31. 
No physical evidence or eyewitness testimony supported Gaskill's opinion that 
there were two other shooters. Sarah Valencia testified that no one besides Defendant 
fired the shots occurring after Defendant and his companions got into the SUV. 
R1922:89. She saw no one shooting from the carport area where she and Prieto ran for 
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cover. Id. And Gaskill admitted on cross that Prieto could have been shot while she 
stood in the front yard and then run to the side door of the house. R1926:249-52. 
Keri Garcia, who also ran towards the carport for cover, testified that all the shots 
came from the road and that there was no one shooting in the carport or in the grass east 
of the carport. R1922:128. Richard Esquivel confinned that when the first shots were 
fired in the air by an u!1Jcr10wn individual; no one else was in the grass east of the carport 
where he stood, and that he did not hear any later shots coming from that area. 
R1922:151-52. No expended bullet casings were found in that grassy area or the carport 
area. R1923:29-31,79. And the SUV in which Defendant was riding was undamaged. 
R1923:41;State's Exhibits 53-54. 
Esquivel was "positive" that no one was inside the white car parked in the 
driveway. R1922:152. And Lacey Randall, who owned that car and had been standing 
by it for an hour when the shots began, testified that no one was inside her car. 
R1923:10-13. She instead testified that all the shots came from the SUV. Rl923:11-13. 
Ten expended shell casings were found in the road west of the home where the 
shooting occurred. R1923:57,59-60. The locations of the casings are indicated by black 
dots on State's Exhibit 89. R1923:78;1927:58; State's Exhibit 89 (Add. I). The State's 
ballistics expert testified that the casings were found where he would expect them to be 
given that the shots were fired from the roof of a moving SUV. R1927:91-62. He 
testified that casings roll easily on hard surfaces. R1923: 126;1927:61. Some of the 
casings also looked like they had been run over or stepped on. Rl923:125. 
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The trial court ultimately ruled that Gaskill had not provided sufficient foundation 
for the animation and still photos from it because there was "no basis" to find that the 
animation had "any semblance to what we are talking about in this case." R1926:178-82. 
Moreover, Gaskill did not prepare the animation and could not explain "what went into 
it" or "who was involved in it." !d. The court found that the staged photos lacked 
sufficient foundation because they did "not accurately depict" the crime scene. !d. The 
court therefore excluded the animation and the photos labeled Defendant's Exhibits 14, 
15, and 20-27. !d. 
B. The trial court acted well within its discretion to exclude Defendant's 
computer-generated animation and crime scene reconstruction photos. 
Whether a party has laid an adequate foundation for an exhibit is a decision left to 
the trial court's discretion. See Carpenter Paper Co. v. Brannock, 376 P.2d 939, 940 
(Utah 1962) ("It is the prerogative of the trial court to determine when such foundation is 
laid."). 
"Video animation is a powerful evidentiary tool" and "can have greater weight 
and longer-lasting impact than conventional testimony." Clark v. Cantrell, 504 S.E.2d 
605, 612 (S.C. App. 1998) (citing 2 McCormick on Evidence§ 214 at 19 (4t1-J ed. 1992)). 
The "maxim 'a picture is worth a thousand words"' applies to video animations. State v. 
Trahan, 576 So.2d 1, 8 (La. 1990). 
Given its persuasive power, video animation "has the potential to mislead if used 
improperly." Clark, 504 S.E.2d at 612. "[S]taged video reproductions which stray from 
original facts create impressions that prove especially difficult to limit." !d. "'The 
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extreme vividness and persuasiveness of motion pictures ... is a two-edged sword. If the 
film does not portray original facts in controversy, but rather represents a staged 
reproduction of one party's version of those facts, the danger that the jury may confuse 
art with reality is particularly great.'" Trahan, 576 So.2d at 8 (quoting McConnick on 
Evidence, § 214 (2d ed. 1972)). Moreover, "'the vivid impressions on the trier of fact 
created by the viev-.ring of the motion nictures 'x'il! be narticularlv difficult to limit or, if ~ ~ ~ . -
the film is subsequently deemed to be inadmissible, to expunge by judicial instruction."' 
I d. (quoting McCormick on Evidence, § 214 (2d ed. 1972) ). 
Given video animation's "dramatic power, trial judges should carefully and 
meticulously examine proposed animation evidence for proper foundation, relevancy and 
the potential for undue prejudice." Robinson v. ~Jv!issouri Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 
1088 (lOth Cir. 1994). Video animation also requires "heightened guarantees of 
trustworthiness because of its susceptibility to editorial distortion." Clark, 504 S.E.2d at 
612. 
Computer-generated video animations lack sufficient foundation for admissibility 
when they are inconsistent with trial testimony and do not accurately reflect facts in 
evidence. For example, in Trahan, the Louisiana Supreme Court "concluded that while a 
recreation need not be exact in every detail, the important elements of the test must be 
identical or very similar to the scene in order to have probative value." 576 So.2d at 7. 
The video reenactment of Trahan's version of a shooting was inadmissible because its 
depiction of the victim's position was inconsistent with the defendant's testimony. See 
id. 
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Likewise, the trial court in Clark properly excluded a computer-generated 
animation of a car accident because the animation was "inconsistent with prior 
testimony," including the partis own expert, and did not accurately portray the vehicle's 
speed. 504 S.E.2d at 611, 614. On certiorari review, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
affinned. See Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 538 (S.C. 2000). While acknowledging 
that the mere fact that an "animation in inconsistent with testimony or evidence presented 
by the opposing party should not necessarily lead to its exclusion," the Clark court held 
that proper foundation requires that "the important elements must be identical or very 
similar to the scene as described in other testimony and evidence presented by the 
animation's proponent" to satisfy the foundational requirement that it "constitute a fair 
and accurate representation" of the evidence. !d. at 537. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the admission of a computer-generated 
animation of a shooting in Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1178-82 (Pa. 2006), 
holding that, to be admissible, an animation must be (1) "properly authenticated," (2) 
relevant, and (3) not unfairly prejudicial under the relevant Pennsylvania rules of 
evidence. ld. at 1178-79. The animation in Serge was "properly authenticated" because 
the positions of the actors it depicted were supported by the physical evidence of the 
victim's wounds, including the wound trajectories. See id. 
This Court considered the foundation for admitting crime recreation evidence in 
State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353-54 (Utah 1997). Pearson was convicted of 
aggravated murder for intentionally shooting and killing a highway patrol trooper during 
a high speed chase on I-70. See id. at 1349. Pearson's theory was that the killing was 
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merely reckless, because had he intended to kill the trooper, his aim would have been 
more accurate than the evidence showed. See id. at 1350. 
To support his theory, Pearson offered evidence of a simulation purporting to 
recreate the shooting. !d. In the recreation, two people shot from the passenger-side 
window of a moving tmck at a target mounted on a trailer thirty feet away being towed 
along a country road at about 45 miles per hour. !d. 1350; 1353. The facts at trial; 
however, were that Pearson shot from the driver's side of his vehicle at officers who were 
120 feet away while traveling 75 miles per hour on Interstate Highway 70. !d. 
This Court held that the trial comi properly excluded the recreation evidence 
because it "bore only a limited resemblance to the facts of the case." !d. at 1353. 
Although "exact duplication is not necessary," this Court explained that the "numerous 
significant differences between the simulation scenario and the real events" rendered the 
evidence inadmissible. !d. at 13 54. 
The trial court here correctly found that Defendant had not established sufficient 
foundation to admit the animation and photos. Not only did no evidence support 
Gaskill's theory about two other shooters, the evidence contradicted that theory. All the 
witnesses testified that no one was shooting from the carport or inside the white car. No 
shell casings were found in the can;>ort area. R1923:29-3l 579. Moreover, no evidence 
established exactly where Sabrina Prieto was standing when she was shot in the chest. 
Therefore, Gaskill's theory that she was shot while she ran south through the carport was 
pure speculation. Gaskill himself admitted that she could have been shot in the front yard 
and still have mn to the side door of the house. R1926:249-52. He also admitted that the 
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animation did not depict the correct trajectory for the bullet that is depicted as striking 
Prieto in the chest. R1926:169. Giventhe unique persuasive power of video animation 
evidence, and the concomitant need to carefully scrutinize such evidence, the trial court 
acted well within its discretion in excluding Defendant's animation for lack of 
foundation. See Cantrell, 504 S.E.2d at 612-14; Trahan, 576 So.2d at 7-8; Serge, 896 
A.2d at 1178-82. 
The trial court also acted well within its discretion in excluding Defendant's 
photos attempting to recreate Defendant's view. The photos did not accurately represent 
Defendant's view because they were not taken using vehicles that were the same height 
and size as those involved in the crime, nor did Gaskill know exactly where the car 
parked in front of the truck in the staged photos was. As with the recreation simulation in 
Pearson, Gaskill's photos bore only a limited, if any, resemblance to what actually 
occurred in this case. Therefore, the trial court properly excluded them. See Pearson, 
943 P.2d at 1353-54. 
C. The prosecution timely raised its foundation objection. 
Defendant argues that the trial court allowed the prosecution to unfairly surprise 
him by allowing the foundation objection midtrial. Br. Aplt. at 12-15. Likening the 
prosecution's objection to a motion to suppress, Defendant argues that rule 12(c)(l)(B), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure required the prosecution to raise this issue at least five 
days before trial. Id Defendant also asserts that exclusion of the animation and 
photographs contradicted the trial court's earlier ruling allowing Gaskill's testimony. Jd. 
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The prosecution properly objected to the foundation for Gaskill's animation and 
photos when Defendant offered them. Rule 12 requires a party to file a motion to 
suppress at least five days before trial. See Utah R. Cri. P. 12(c)(l)(B). Here, the 
prosecution was not seeking to suppress illegally obtained evidence. Rather, it was 
challenging the foundation for Defendant's exhibits. Therefore, rule 12's deadline is 
have raised its objection five days before trial. Defendant did not provide the finalized 
animation until the Friday before the Tuesday trial, and did not provide the photos until 
the day after trial began. See R1921:1;1926:140;148. 
The prosecution's foundation objection could not have unfairly surprised 
Defendant. As the party offering the exhibits, Defendant had to establish adequate 
foundation for them. See Barrientos ex rel. Nelson v. Jones, 2012 UT 33, ~ 31, 710 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 35 (holding that under Utah R. Evid. 901, party seeking to admit exhibit has 
burden to lay proper foundation for exhibit). Defendant was therefore on notice that he 
had to be prepared to establish sufficient foundation. 
Nor did the trial court's ruling excluding the exhibits for lack of foundation 
contradict its earlier ruling that Gaskill could testify about his theory of the case. The 
could not comment on other witnesses' credibility. R1917:39-40. As explained, the trial 
court allowed Gaskill to testify about his theory. R1926:213-25. The trial court did not 
rule pre-trial that the animation and photos were admissible. See id. Therefore, its later 
exclusion of those exhibits did not contradict its earlier ruling. 
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D. The trial court did not improperly limit the expert's testimony. 
In one sentence, Defendant asserts that the trial court "gutted" Gaskill's testimony 
by allegedly "repeatedly prohibiting him from testifying about any facts if they 
contradicted witness testimony." Br. Aplt. at 22. On the contrary, Gaskill testified to 
facts that contradicted other witnesses' testimony. As explained, he testified that he 
believed there were shooters in the carport and likely inside the white car, and that the 
bullets that hit Esquivel and Nevarez could not have been fired from the SUV. 
R1926:213-25. To the extent that the trial court refused to allow Gaskill to comment on 
other witnesses' credibility, those rulings were correct. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
388, 392 (Utah 1989) (Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(l) "bars admission of an expert's testimony 
as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion"). 
E. The trial court acted well within its discretion to admit State's Exhibit 
89 showing bullet trajectories. 
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted State's Exhibit 
89, a diagram of the crime scene with bullet trajectories drawn in, because the diagram 
was not exactly to.scale. Br. Aplt. at 22-23. The trial court properly admitted the exhibit 
because Defendant did not object to admitting the crime scene diagram that Exhibit 89 
duplicated; that exhibit was as close to scale as the State's witness could make it. 
Based on measurements from the crime scene, an investigator prepared a diagram 
that, although not precisely to scale, was as close as possible. R1923:78-79. The 
diagram was admitted as State's Exhibit 2 without objection. R1923:79-80. After 
Gaskill testified, the prosecution had its ballistics expert take a copy of exhibit 2 and 
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draw in three bullet trajectories. R1927:57-58. That diagram was admitted as State's 
Exhibit 89. ld. (a copy of Exhibit 89 is in Addendum I). 
In addition to the five bullets that hit the victims, one bullet shattered the rear 
passenger window of the white car in the driveway and then likely struck the car's 
windshield.Il R1923:89,92;1927:59. A second bullet traveled through the open window 
lodged in the dashboard. R1923:64;1927:59-60. The trajectories for these two bullets 
are shown in State's Exhibit 89. R1927:59. A third bullet ricocheted off the white car's 
fender, denting it. R1923:90;1927:59-60. That possible trajectory is shown as a yellow 
triangle on Exhibit 89. R1927:59-60. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibit 89 because it was 
based on the crime scene diagram admitted as State's Exhibit 2, which Defendant did not 
object to. R1923:79-80;1927:57-58. That diagram was based on measurements from the 
scene and, although not precisely to scale, was as close as the investigator could make it. 
R1923:78-79. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted State's Exhibit 89. 
F. Any error was harmless. 
Even if the trial court en·oneously excluded Defendant's exhibits or admitted 
E:x_hibit 89, Defendant has not shown harm. '"An erroneous decision by a trial court 
Il Although the State's expert could not say for certain that the bullet hit the 
windshield, the windshield damage was consistent with a bullet impact, the w·indshield 
was undamaged before the shooting, and the hole in the rear window aligned with the 
windshield damage. R1923:14;1927:59. Crime scene investigators did not find a bullet 
inside the white car, but were not surprised because bullets ricochet, disintegrate, and can 
disappear in a car's air vents. R1923:86-88,102. 
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"cannot result in reversible etTor unless the error is harmful.~"'~ State v. Honie~ 2002 UT 
4, ~ 54, 57 P .3d 977 (citation omitted). "An error is hannful if it is such that absent the 
error, there is a sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome, undermining our 
confidence in the result." Jd. Defendant has the burden to show harm. Id. 
Defendant argues that the exclusion of the animation and photos "drastically 
limited" his defense. Br. "A..plt. at 17. But as explained, the trial court allowed Gaskill to 
testify about his version of the shooting. R1926:213-25. Viewing the brief animation 
and photos depicting that theory would not have changed the jury's verdict, especially 
where no physical or other evidence corroborated Gaskill's theory. Likewise, excluding 
State's Exhibit 89 would not have affected the jury's verdict where they heard the 
testimony that the exhibit illustrated. Moreover, Defendant's confession and the 
corroborating eyewitness testimony provided overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Any 
error regarding the exhibits was therefore harmless. See Honie, 2002 UT 4, ~54. 
v. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO 
EXCLUDE DEFENSE WITNESSES WHEN DEFENDANT REFUSED TO 
ALLOW POLICE TO INVESTIGATE THEIR STORIES 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously refused to allow him to call 
certain unnamed witnesses who allegedly would have provided exculpatory testimony, 
thereby denying him a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. Br. Aplt. at 63-76. 
He argues that the trial comi erroneously ruled that he "could only call these witnesses if 
he allowed law enforcement to investigate their claims." Br. Aplt. at 64. Because of 
alleged threats of gang retaliation, Defendant asserts that the trial comi should have 
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required him to disclose the witnesses' identities only if the police could not, in tum, 
disclose the witnesses' identities to others as pm1 of investigating the witnesses' stories. 
Br. Aplt. at 63-64. Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to take "critical steps" 
necessary to protect these witnesses, like closing the courtroom or allowing them to 
testify anonymously. Br. Aplt. at 64-67. 
The trial court acted 'x1ell '~vithin its discretion in rulinQ that these alleged \~litnesses 
'-' ~ 
could testify only if the police could investigate their stories. The prosecution, the trial 
court, and the public have a vital interest in the integrity of the trial process. Rule 16, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, also requires disclosure of information necessary to 
allow the prosecution to prepare its case. Investigating these alleged witnesses' stories 
was essential because their credibility was a crucial issue. Moreover, Defendant 
proffered no evidence of any specific threats to these witnesses. Regardless, any error 
was hannless because Defendant never proffered the witnesses' specific testimony and 
because the evidence that Defendant was the shooter was overwhelming. 
A. Factual background. 
Before trial, Defendant moved to allow four witnesses to testify without revealing 
their identity to anyone, including the prosecution or law enforcement. R733 at 
4; 1686,1915:15-16 (the trial court's order-R1686-88-and the relevant transcript pages 
are in Addendum H). Defense counsel said that two of the witnesses would testify that 
Defendant "is not the one that shot the gun from the car.'' R1915:16. The other two 
witnesses would testifY that "someone else, not [Defendant] admitted to them that they 
had done the shooting." R1915:16. Counsel believed that revealing these witnesses' 
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identity would result in gang retaliation against them. !d. Defense counsel proffered that 
instances of gang retaliation had already occurred against a "Mr. Ashton" and 
Defendant's family. R1915:14. 
Defense counsel offered to reveal the witnesses' names to the prosecution and 
police, but only on the condition that the police not reveal the names to anyone. R733 at 
4;1915:18-19,26-27,37-38. Defense counsel explained that he did not want poliee to be 
able to ask others "Jane Doe just told me that so and so confessed to this. What do you 
say about that?" R1915:38. In other words, defense counsel did not want police to be 
able to investigate by asking others about the witnesses' stories, or whether the witnesses 
were present at the crime scene. R733 at 4;1915:37-38. The trial court was surprised that 
defense counsel allegedly had four witnesses who could clear Defendant, but would not 
allow police to verify their stories. R1915 :41. 
The trial court was unwilling to allow the alleged witnesses to testify without 
giving police an opportunity to investigate their stories. R1686-87;1915:58-62. The 
court explained that "if these people are not willing to give their identity to the 
prosecutors and [allow] law enforcement [to] follow up on what they are going to say, 
then they are not going to testify." R1915:62. Therefore, the trial court directed defense 
counsel to see if the vvitnesses were willing to testify if the police could investigate their 
stories, and to report his findings within two weeks of trial. R1687; 1915:58-62. 
Ifthe alleged witnesses were willing to testify, trial court offered to consider any 
steps necessary to protect them, including allowing them to use an alias while testifying 
and closing the courtroom. R1915:36,57-58. The court thus took those matters under 
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advisement. R1688;1915:57-58. At subsequent hearings, detailed below~ the trial court 
reemphasized that it was willing to protect the witnesses if they were willing to testify. 
R1916:41; 1919:40-42. 
Two weeks before trial, defense counsel filed a "response on discovery order," 
stating that he had been able to find only two of the witnesses and that neither was 
State moved to disqualify defense counsel for a conflict of interest because he was 
placing the four witnesses' interests above Defendant's. Rl098-1113. A hearing on the 
disqualification motion was held eleven days before trial. R1916:1,3. 
At that hearing, defense counsel contradicted his earlier proffer of the witnesses' 
testimony, stating that three of the alleged witnesses would testify that they were present 
at the scene and "that things happened differently than some of the State's witnesses 
testified to." R1916:44. Counsel alleged that the fourth witness would have testified that 
someone told the witness that he-the other individual-was the shooter. I d. Counsel 
told the court that the two witnesses he could not locate "are the two lesser quality." 
R1916:36. Counsel later told the court that the nvo witnesses he could not locate were 
two of the three who would say that they were present. R1916:44. 
R1916:44-45. Counsel agreed to do so, id., but nothing more is in the record. 
Defense counsel reaffinned that the two witnesses he did find were not willing to 
testify if the police could investigate their stories. Rl916:19,41. He then explained that 
he had made a "tactical decision" not to call either witness because he believed that if he 
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called them despite their unwillingness to testify, then they would deny any knowledge of 
the case and ever having talked to defense counsel, and that would make counsel "look 
bad in front of the jury." R1916: 19-20. 
Defense counsel argued that the conflict of interest issue was moot because he had 
decided not to call either witness. R1916:19-22. Counsel also represented that another 
attorney had discussed the issue with Defendant and that Defendant was willing to 
proceed with the trial as scheduled without the witnesses. I d. 
The trial court wanted to ensure that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived 
any conflict of interest. R1916:25-35. It therefore appointed conflict counsel to inform 
Defendant about the issue and detennine whether he was willing to waive any conflict 
and proceed without the witnesses. R1916:25-35;1919:11-12. 
Five days before trial, conflict counsel testified that he had discussed the issue 
with Defendant, that Defendant fully understood it, and that Defendant was willing to 
waive any conflict of interest and proceed with his current counsel and without the 
alleged witnesses. R1919: 13-23. Defendant testified and confinned conflict counsel's 
testimony. R1919:26-34. Defendant also signed a written "waiver of conflict or 
potential conflict of interest." R 1919:3 2-34; Defense Exhibit 1 received 3 I 411 0 (in 
unpaginated manila envelope) (Add. H). The trial court therefore found that Defendant 
had knowing and voluntarily waived any conflict or potential conflict. R1919:35-43. 
The trial court reemphasized that its ruling regarding the witnesses was based on 
its responsibility "to insure a fair trial." Rl919 :3 7. The court believed both sides should 
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have the opportunity to investigate the "background" and "check on the story" of any 
witness who would testify at trial. R1686-88;1919:37. 
B. The trial court properly exercised its discretion. 
Defendant argues that the alleged threat of gang retaliation justified allowing him 
to call his alleged witnesses anonymously without the police having the opportunity to 
investigate their stories. Br. Aplt. at 63-76. He also asserts that the trial court 
erroneously refused to take precautions to protect the witnesses, such as closing the 
courtroom or allowing them to testify using pseudonyms. Br. Aplt. at 68, 71-72. 
The record refutes Defendant's argument that the trial court refused to take 
precautions to protect the witnesses. The trial court repeatedly stated that it was willing 
to consider protective measures like closing the courtroom or allowing the witnesses to 
use a pseudonym. R1688;1915:36,57-58;1916:41. The alleged witnesses ultimately 
chose not to testify because they did not want the police to be able to investigate their 
stories, not because the trial court was unwilling to protect them if they testified. 
R1915:57-62;1916:41;1919:40-42. Therefore, Defendant's claim that the trial court 
erroneously refused to protect his witnesses lacks merit. 
The trial court acted well within its discretion in ruling that Defendant's alleged 
witnesses could testify only if the police could investigate their stories. "A defendant's 
right to present a defense ... is not absolute." United States v. Serrano, 406 F .3d 1208, 
1215 (lOth Cir. 2005). Rather, a criminal defendant's right to present relevant testimony 
'"may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the 
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criminal trial process."' Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (quoting Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). 
One such interest is the integrity of the criminal trial process itself. See Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-18 (1988). In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court 
affinned the exclusion of a defense witness as a discovery sanction, where the defendant 
offered no justification for failing to timely identify the witness. See id. at 401-0 5. The 
Court held that a defendant's right to present witnesses "cannot automatically and 
invariably outweigh countervailing public interests." See id. at 414. Rather, "[t]he 
integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable 
evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient 
administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of 
the trial process must also weigh in the balance." ld. at 414-15. 
The Supreme Court recognized that "[ d]iscovery, like cross-examination, 
minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even 
deliberately fabricated testimony." ld. at 411-12. The Court further expiained that the 
'"State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense' is merely one 
component of the broader public interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts." 
!d. at 412 (quoti11g Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970)). Discovery rules 
"minimize the risk that fabricated testimony will be believed." Id. at 413. And "the 
court, as well as the prosecutor, has a vital interest in protecting the trial process from the 
pollution of perjured testimony." ld. at 417. 
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The United States Supreme Court has also held that discovery rules are proper to 
insure "both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts 
crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80 
(1970). Thus, the Court affinned the constitutionality ofFlorida's notice-of-alibi rule and 
rejected the defendant's claim that he had "the right to surprise the State with an alibi 
defense." !d. The Court held that the "adversary system of tria! is hardly an end in itself; 
it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their 
cards until played." !d. at 82. 
A jury cannot accurately judge the truthfulness of a witness's testimony unless the 
opposing party can conduct a thorough cross-examination. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 
129, 130-32 (1968). In Smith, the Court held that the prosecution's refusal to reveal the 
name of a witness who participated in a controlled drug buy violated the defendant's 
confrontation and due process rights. !d. at 130-33 & n.3. The court explained that 
"[p ]rejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper 
setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the 
jury cannot fairly appraise them." !d. at 132. 
Threats to a witness's safety cannot justify completely barring an opposing party 
from investigating the \Vitness's story. See Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 221 
(Cal. 2000). In Alvarado, a county jail inmate was murdered by order of the Mexican 
Mafia. See id. at 206-08. Credible threats were made against three inmates who 
witnessed the murder. See id. The prosecution sought to call the three inmates at 
Alvarado's trial but, given the threats, refused to reveal their names. See id. Instead, the 
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prosecution provided the defense with transcripts of the witnesses' grand jury testimony, 
their custodial status, criminal histories, police reports of their prior crimes, and 
infonnation about their cells. See id. at 207 & n.2, 220. The trial court refused to require 
the prosecution to disclose the witnesses' names, despite the defendanfs arguments that 
the names were necessary to allow him to investigate their stories. See id. at 207-08. 
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecution could not 
withhold the identities of "crucial witnesses whose veracity and credibility are likely to 
be central to the prosecution's case." Id. at 220. The court noted that United States 
Supreme Court and California court decisions "establish that whenever nondisclosure of 
a witness's identity will prevent the effective investigation and cross-examination of a 
crucial witness, the confrontation clause precludes the prosecution from relying upon the 
witness's testimony at trial while refusing to disclose the witness's identity." !d. at 205. 
Given the foregoing authority, the trial court acted well within its discretion in 
refusing to allow Defendant's alleged witnesses to testify unless the police could 
investigate their stories. The vital "interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical 
facts" at a criminal trial required that the prosecution have the opportunity to investigate 
these witnesses. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 412. These witnesses' credibility was crucial. 
Their alleged testimony bore directly on the identity of the shooter and contradicted not 
only the testimony of seven eyewitnesses-whose stories the police were able to 
investigate-but also Defendant's confession. The alleged witnesses could have easily 
fabricated testimony that they saw someone else shooting or that someone else had 
confessed to them. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow 
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Defendant to withhold these witnesses' identify, because nondisclosure would have 
significantly impaired the prosecution's "ability to investigate or effectively cross-
examine them." Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 220. 
Moreover, rule 16( c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowed the trial court to 
order Defendant to provide any infonnation that the prosecution required to prepare its 
case. See Utah R. Crim. P. 16( c). Rule 16( c) provides that "[ e ]xcept as otherwise 
provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor ... any ... item of 
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to 
the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case." Id. Given the 
nature of the alleged witnesses' testimony, the trial court properly found good cause for 
requiring disclosure of the alleged witnesses' identity. See id. 
Additionally, Defendant did not show that any threat to these witnesses was 
sufficiently credible to justify precluding the prosecution from even investigating their 
stories. Defense counsel proffered that a "Mr. Ashton" and members of Defendant's 
family had experienced gang retaliation. R1915:14. Counsel also proffered that the 
alleged witnesses believed that they or their families could be killed if they testified or if 
their identities were disclosed, and that they feared even the police talking to others about 
their stories. R733 at 3;1915:36-38. But defense counsel never proffered any specific 
evidence substantiating the alleged threats. The trial court therefore had no evidence that 
the alleged witnesses were in any actual danger. 
Defendant argues that Alvarado is inapplicable because it is based on a criminal 
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, and the prosecution possesses no such 
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right. Br. Aplt. at 75. While the prosecution has no constitutional right to confrontation, 
it does have a procedural right to cross-examine defense witnesses. See State v. Young, 
853 P.2d 327, 357 (Utah 1993) ("the right to testify may be conditioned on the right of 
the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant"); see also United States v. Gwy, 74 F.3d 
304, 309 (1st Cir. 1996) (recognizing prosecution's procedural right to cross-examine 
defendant's witnesses). The "interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts" at a 
criminal trial also justified the State's need to investigate. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 412. 
Defendant contends that other courts have allowed the prosecution to call 
witnesses whom defendants could not investigate. Br. Aplt. at 67-72. Those cases, 
however, are distinguishable. Defendant cites Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799, 802-03 
(Fla. 1992), for the proposition that merely having a witness's true name "may be enough 
of a basis to allow for adequate cross-examination." Br. Aplt. at 72. But Marshall held 
that a witness could testify using a number, rather than a name, because the procedure 
"did not hamper cross-examination or the defense's ability to investigate the background 
of the witness." See 604 So.2d at 803. 
Defendant cites Nelson v. Crowley, No. 07 Civ. 849 (RJS), 2009 WL 498909 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2009), for the proposition that a witness's identity is not always 
" · • 1 -f. • • " n A 1 l cntica~ .._or cross-exammat10n. nr .. ~p.t. at 72. In Ne.son, the prosecution was allowed 
to withhold the name of a confidential infonnant. See 2009 WL 498909 at *5. That 
procedure did not prejudice Nelson, however, because he wanted the infonnant's name to 
discover only prior testimony and could not "articulate a reason why the Undercover's 
name was relevant to developing evidence of specific bias." !d. at *6. 
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Defendant argues thatin People v. Wheaton, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1348, 47 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 418 (Cal App. 1995), a Califomia Comi of Appeal held that the prosecution could 
withhold witnesses' names "until the moment they took the stand." Br. Ap1t. at 67. 
Defendant C01Tectly represents the holding. See 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423. However, the 
Califomia Supreme Court arguably overruled Wheaton in Alvarado, discussed above, 
\Vhen it held that the prosecution could not withhold the identity of crucial witnesses. See 
Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 223. 
Finally, Defendant argues that the D.C. Circuit affinned the govemment's use of 
anonymous witnesses at a murder trial in United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). Br. Aplt. at 72. But the defendants in White complained only about the 
government's use of anonymous witness testimony at a pre-trial hearing to detennine the 
admissibility of hearsay testimony from a witness that the defendants had murdered. See 
116 F .3d at 911, 914. Moreover, the court held that the defendants failed to establish any 
"special reason in favor of disclosure" of the witnesses' identities. See id. at 919. 
As explained, several reasons favored discovery of Defendant's alleged witnesses' 
identities here because investigation and thorough cross-examination of these alleged 
witnesses was critical to the trial's integrity. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410-18; Alvarado, 5 
P.3d at 220. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
witnesses where Defendant refused to allow the police to investigate their stories. 
C. Any error was harmless. 
Any enor in excluding Defendanf s alleged witnesses was hannless g1ven 
Defendant's failure to proffer their specific testimony and the overwhelming evidence of 
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Defendanfs guilt. Defense counsel never proffered any specifics about the alleged 
testimony despite the trial court's direction to do so. R1916:44-45. Rather, counsel only 
explained that some witnesses would testify that they were present and that Defendant 
was not the shooter, while others would testify to hearsay statements that someone other 
than Defendant had confessed to the shooting. R1915:16. Counsel offered no other 
details about hmv these witnesses could lc11ow that Defendant was not the shooter, or why 
their hearsay statements were sufficiently reliable to be admitted. Counsel could locate 
only two of these witnesses, but was unclear about which witnesses those were. 
Defendanf s failure to provide any specifics about these alleged witnesses' testimony 
belies his claim that exclusion of their testimony harmed him. 
l\1oreover, defense counsel's unwillingness to allow the police to investigate the 
witnesses' stories raises serious questions about their reliability. Given the general 
proffer and questionable nature of the alleged testimony, Defendant fails to demonstrate 
that exclusion of these witnesses hanned him, especially in light of the overwhelming 
evidence of his guilt, including his confession. 
VI. 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
Defendant argues that his L WOP sentences are unconstitutional because the 
sentencing statute, section 76-3-207.7, is vague under the state and federal constitutions, 
violates Utah's unifonn operation of laws provision and the Federal Constitution's Equal 
Protection Clause, and allows a judge to impose sentence in violation of Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Br. Aplt. at 79-85. Defendant also argues that sentencing a 
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mentally immature person to L WOP for aggravated murder violates the Utah 
Constitution's unnecessary rigor provision and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Federal Constitution. Br. Aplt. at 86-98. 
A. Factual background. 
At sentencing, the trial court heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the 
potential sentences, including evidence regarding Defendant's character, background, 
history, and mental and physical condition. R1928:37-168. The trial court also received 
a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report detailing the facts of the offense and Defendant's 
criminal history, background, and life history. R1476. 
The State emphasized the facts of Defendant's crime: he fired ten shots at a 
wedding party, killing two people and seriously injuring two others. R1928:40. The 
State also emphasized Defendant's lengthy criminal record: 44 entries on his juvenile 
record alone over a nine-year period. R1421-24;1928:39,161. Defendant was on 
PI()bation for possession of concealed dangerous weapons-a sawed-off shotgun and a 
.22 caliber revolver-when he committed the murders. R1928:40. Time spent on 
probation and in treatment programs had not deterred his criminal activity. R1928:39-40. 
The State also argued that Defendant's loyalty to the gang culture justified L WOP. 
R 1928:45-46. While incarcerated, Defendant wrote several letters to family and fellow 
gang members manifesting his loyalty to the gang. R1407-08,1445-48,1928:45-46. One 
letter, addressed to "Tha Assasin [sic]," praised a fellow inmate for committing a drive-
by shooting that led to five counts of attempted murder. R1408,1451-53. After his 
conviction in this case, Defendant composed and performed a "rap" during a phone call 
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from jail. R1928:48-52. The song included these alarming lyrics: "So it's destined for 
me to burn in hell or live my life in a cell. So what does it matter, to cock it, squeeze it, 
and make your brain splatter .... I'm so [unintelligible] f----d and ready to shoot. I don't 
pack a strap to look cute, I pack a strap to kill you. See I stay true." R1928:50,52,159-
64;State's Sentencing Exhibit 2. 
The State also emphasized Defendant's remorseless and callous attitude toward his 
victims. R1928:43-44. Defendant told the pre-sentence investigator that he was not 
responsible for the murders. R1476 at 10;1928:43-44. Defendant also stated, "I did feel 
sympathy for the family, but now I can [h]onestly care less." !d. Defendant believed that 
the police had allowed the victims' family to retaliate against his family. !d. Defendant 
added, "So f--- their family and these lying, crooked cops. I'm innocent, I don't give a 
f--- what the jury says." !d. 
In arguing against LWOP, Defendant played video statements from his mother and 
wife. Rl928:69-70,121-43. He also presented testimony from a mitigation expert and a 
mental health expert. R1928:61-75,76-120. The mental health expert believed that 
Defendant had the "ingredients" for rehabilitation, but that it was impossible to determine 
at sentencing whether he could be rehabilitated. R1928:106-09. The expert believed that 
Defendant's attitude '.X.'ould be an important factor in the likelihood of his rehabilitation, 
and acknowledged that Defendant's attitude in his "rap" song and his statement about the 
victims was "disturbing." R1928:112-13. The expert also acknowledged that Defendant 
had engaged in a "lifelong process ofcriminality." R1928:116-17. He also agreed that 
Defendant had displayed "a chronic pattern and inability to obey society[' s] rules" and 
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suffered from antisocial personality disorder, a disorder "characterized by a disregard of 
the rights of others." !d. 
Most tellingly, Defendant's expert agreed that Defendant was "dangerous to the 
community" and had a "high risk of repetitive criminal conduct.'~ R1928: 118. 
Defendant's "global assessment functioning" score was 10, "as low as you can go." 
The expert agreed that Defendant was "an extremely dangerous person." R1928: 119-20. 
As explained, Defendant's expert had conceded in an earlier hearing that 
Defendant did not fit Utah's definition of "mentally retarded." R1909:101-02. The 
expert also admitted that he did not administer any "validity or effort testing," in 
conjunction with the I.Q. testing. R1909:75. 
Before imposing sentence, the trial court delineated the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. R1567-68;1928:158-164. It found the following mitigating factors: (1) 
Defendant was relatively young-19 years and 9 months-when he committed the 
murders; (2) Defendant lacked formal education, having finished only the 9th or 1Oth 
grade; (3) Defendant had a low I.Q. and learning disorder; and (4) Defendant was polite 
during the trial. R1909:22,1928:158-59. 
'T'l...a ""'"rt f"Annrl "<> lnt of ~o-n-r~:r<l~tino- f'irf'Hm<:t::lnf'f':<:"• (1_/) n_ e_~e_nda .. n.t. killed two 
.ill""' VVU.l. ~VUJ.~U U.. .1VL .l. ""'bt::r.._,...._y~"..~..a. ... 0 -.a..a._._...._,... ... .._.,.,_..._...._ __ ....... .. , 11 ..... -
people who were also both young-22 and 29-and seriously injured two others; (2) 
Defendant emptied his gun into a crowd; (3) Defendant's actions had far-reaching effects 
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for all the victims' families/ 2 (4) despite his youth, Defendant had a lengthy criminal 
record; (5) Defendant remained loyal to a gang lifestyle; (6) Defendant's own expert 
agreed that Defendant was a danger to others; (7) Defendant was on probation when he 
committed the murders and had absconded from supervision; (8) Defendant showed little 
hope of rehabilitation because he refused to accept responsibility for his actions, 
demonstrated no remorse, and manifested "a horrible attitude about this case"; (9) 
Defendant's expert diagnosed him with an antisocial disorder; and (10) Defendant's "rap 
song" was "troubling." R1928: 159-64. 
The trial court found that "the aggravating circumstances outweigh[ ed] the 
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt" and that L WOP was justified under 
the circumstances. R1928:164,167. It therefore imposed LWOP for the two murders. 
R1569;1928:164. 
B. Defendant lacks standing to challenge section 76-3-207.7 as 
unconstitutionally vague; regardless, the statute was not vague as 
applied to him. 
Section 76-3-207.7 allows a sentence of LWOP or 25 years to life for non-capital 
aggravated murder. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7 (West Supp. 2011). It states: 
I d. 
(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony 
aggravated murder under Section 76-5-202 shall be sentenced by the court. 
""'' 'T"'. t . 1 t' . . 1 11 b 1' c . . . t.. 1 ~L) 1ne sen ence unaer 111s sectiOn Stlau e 111e m pnson w1tuout paro1e or 
an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for 
life. 
12 One of the deceased, Rocendo Nevarez, planned to marry his girlfriend; she 
gave birth to his daughter just weeks after his death. R1928:159. 
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Defendant argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague under the state and 
federal constitutions because it gives no guidance about when L WOP is merited and no 
standard of proof for imposing that sentence. Br. Aplt. at 79-83. Defendant lacks 
standing to raise this claim. In any event, the statute was not vague as applied to him. 
1. Defendant lacks standing. 
'" [B ]efore a party may attack the constitutionality of a statute he must be 
adversely affected by that very statute."' State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 
1998) (quoting Sims v. Smith, 571 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1977)). Defendant lacks standing 
to challenge section 76-3-207.7 as vague, because the alleged statutory deficiencies he 
identifies did not adversely affect him. The sentencing court imposed L WOP only after 
finding "that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt" and that LWOP was therefore justified. R1928:157-64,167. 
This was not a standardless or arbitrary sentencing proceeding. Therefore, even if 
Defendant has correctly identified a deficiency in the statute, he lacks standing to raise 
the issue. See Munson, 972 P.2d at 421. 
2. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant. 
For these same reasons, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
Defendant. Because Defendant does not claim infringement of a First Amendment right, 
he can challenge the statute only as applied to him. See State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, ,-r 27, 
174 P.3d 628 ("[W]here, as here, a defendant's claim does not concern an alleged 
infringement of a First Amendment right, the defendant must first show that the statute is 
vague as applied to his conduct."). This Court will '"presume the legislation being 
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challenged is constitutional, and [will] resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality."' State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ~ 9, 233 P.3d 476 (quoting Wood v. Univ. 
of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ~ 7, 67 P.3d 436). 
A sentencing statute is vague only if it does "not state with sufficient clarity the 
consequences of violating a given criminal statute.'' United States v. Batchelder, 442 
U.S. 114, 123 (1979). \Vhen the deatl-I penalty is not at issue, a sentencing statute need 
not establish "fonnal rules of procedure" for detennining the appropriate sentence. See 
State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988). For example, this Court found no vagueness 
in a sentencing scheme that allowed a court to select between sentences of differing 
severity when "the sentence of highest severity is dependent upon a determination of the 
existence of aggravating circumstances, while imposition of the sentence of lowest 
severity is dependent upon a determination of the existence of mitigating circumstances." 
See State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1987). 
For the same reasons that Defendant lacks standing, Defendant cannot 
demonstrate that the statute was vague as applied to him. Section 76-3-207.7 clearly 
established the applicable penalties for non-capital aggravated murder and the trial court 
imposed sentence only after finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Defendant's vagueness 
challenge is meritless. 13 See Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123; Bell, 754 P.2d at 58; Egbert, 
748 P.2d at 559. 
13 To supp011 his vagueness claim, Defendant selectively quotes from a legislative 
committee hearing on section 76-3-207.7 to give the appearance that the legislature 
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C. Section 76-3-207.7 does not violate Utah's uniform operation of laws 
provision or the Federal Equal Protection Clause. 
Defendant also argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the Utah Constitution's 
unifonn operation of laws provision and the Federal Equal Protection Clause because, 
according to him, the statute disparately treats similarly-situated offenders-aggravated 
murderers where the prosecution is not seeking death-without any rational basis for the 
disparate treatment. Br. Aplt. at 83-85. Defendant argues that the statute "creates two 
subclasses: (1) persons sentenced to the presumptive life without parole; and (2) persons 
sentenced to the lighter sentence of twenty-five years to life." Br. Aplt. at 84. 
Defendant's equal protection and uniform operation of laws claims fail because 
section 76-3-207.7 does not create separate classifications; rather, it treats all similarly-
intended the bill to make L WOP a foregone conclusion in every non-death aggravated 
murder prosecution. Br. Aplt. at 79-80. He quotes the bill's sponsor as stating 
'"everyone knows' that the defendant will receive life without parole and 'we're just 
required by case law and statute to do it this certain way. It does not make sense."' Br. 
Aplt. at 80 (quoting Aggravated Murder Amendments: Hearing on S.B. [114} Before the 
H Jud. Comm., 2007 Leg., 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007) (statement of Sen. Gregory 
Bell)). This alleged legislative history is irrelevant because Defendant does not claim 
that the statute is ambiguous. See Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ~ 15, 227 
P.3d 256 (legislative history is relevant "only if the statutory language is ambiguous or 
unclear"). Regardless, Defendant misrepresents the bill's history. 
The sponsor was not explaining that section 76-3-207.7 would make LWOP a 
foregone conclusion. Rather, he was explaining the need for the bill by relating a new 
district court judge's complaint that in an aggravated murder case he tried under the 
unamended statute, he had to follow the procedures for a capital case-providing 
specially qualified defense counsel and a twelve-member, death-qualified jury-even 
though the prosecution sought only LWOP. House Jud. Comm., 9 February 2007, 
hearing on S.B. 114 at 00:20-01:50, available at http://le.utah.gov/av/smil?int=55591 
(last visited 13 July 20 12). The sponsor explained that the bill was intended to avoid 
these costly death-penalty procedures in non-death cases. See id. The legislative history 
therefore does not support Defendant's vagueness claim. 
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situated defendants-those convicted of aggravated murder-the same. The comi' s 
sentencing decision, not the statute, creates the classification that Defendant identifies. 
In analyzing a statute under Utah's uniform operation of laws provision, this Court 
asks (1) "what, if any, classification is created under the statute," (2) "whether the 
classification imposes on similarly situated persons disparate treatment," and (3) whether 
'"the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.'" State v. Drej, 
2010 UT 35, ~ 34, 233 P.3d 476 (quoting State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ~ 12, 63 P.3d 
667). This Comi looks "to the plain language of the statutory scheme to determine what 
classification is created by a legislative enactment." Id. at ~ 35. If a statute survives 
scrutiny under Utah's unifonn operation of laws provision, it is also constitutional under 
the Federal Equal Protection Clause because "the Utah provision is at least as rigorous as 
the federal guarantee." Id. at~ 33 n.5. 
Section 76-3-207.7 does not create any classification. Rather, the aggravated 
murder statute creates a class of non-capital murders who are subject to sentencing under 
section 76-3-207.7. The aggravated murder statute provides that if the prosecution does 
not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, then "aggravated murder is a 
noncapital first degree felony punishable as provided in Section 76-3-207.7." UTAH 
CODE A.l'~,J. § 76-5-202(3)(b) (\Vest Supp. 2011). 
Section 76-3-207.7 then treats all non-capital aggravated murderers the same. It 
provides for one of two sentences: L WOP or 25 years to life depending on the 
circumstances of the case. See id. § 76-3-207.7(2). The classification between those who 
receive the two sentences arises from the judge's sentencing decision, not the "plain 
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language of the statutory scheme." See Drej, 2010 UT 35, ,-r 35. Because the statute 
treats all non-capital aggravated murders the same, Defendant's equal protection and 
unifonn operation of laws claims fail. 
But even if the statutory language did create a classification, it does not violate 
equal protection principles. The differences in the sentences received are attributable to 
t..~e unique circumstances of each case. Defendants \:vith more wei2:htv.~ a2:2:ravating 
- -- -
circumstances than mitigating circumstances will receive LWOP and vice versa. 
Therefore, similarly situated offenders are not treated differently, and reasonable 
objectives merit the difference between the two sentences. See Drej, 2010 UT 35, ,-r 34. 
In State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 262 (Utah 1986), this Court rejected an equal 
protection challenge to the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme for child sodomy. 
Bishop argued that by requiring minimum mandatory sentences for child sodomizers but 
not for other felonies, the statute violated equal protection principles. See id. at 265-66. 
This Court rejected that argument, holding that "[ e ]qual protection of the law provisions 
do not preclude people from being treated differently under the law as long as there is a 
reasonable basis for the difference." See id. at 266. The Court held that a sentencing 
statute needed only to "have a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest" 
because criminal offenders are not a suspect class, nor is the opportunity for parole a 
fundamental constitutional right. See id. at 266. Given the State's interests in protecting 
children from sexual abusers, the Court had no difficulty finding that the sentencing 
statute in Bishop did not violate equal protection principles. See id. at 266-67. 
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Likewise, the L WOP statute is reasonably related to the legitimate state interests 
of dete1Ting murders and protecting society. Our regard for human life justifies a serious 
sentence for aggravated murder. And where the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, as in this case, the State has a 
legitimate interest in pennanently removing that more dangerous offender from society. 
Therefore, the LWOP statute does not violate equal protection principles. See id. 
D. Section 76-3-207.7 does not violate Apprendi. 
In one cursory paragraph Defendant argues that his sentence violated the rule of 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
Br. Aplt. at 85. In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that "any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. In Ring, 
the Court held that Arizona's death-penalty scheme violated Apprendi because the 
maximum sentence that could be imposed based on the jury's verdict was life 
imprisonment, and death became a possibility only after a sentencing judge found at least 
one aggravating factor. 536 U.S. at 596-97. 
"The 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted 
by the defendant." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Apprendi applies 
only to sentencing findings that involve "facts historically found by the jury.'' Oregon v. 
Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 169 (2009). Thus, Apprendi did not apply to an Oregon sentencing 
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statute that required a judge to find certain facts before imposing consecutive sentences. 
Id. at 163-65. 
Here, Defendanfs sentence complies with Apprendi because the trial court was 
not required to find any additional fact before L WOP was permissible. Rather, the 
prescribed statutory maximum sentence that could be imposed based on Defendant's 
conviction for aggravated murder \Vas "life in prison \Vithout parole." See UTi\H CODE 
ANN.§ 76-3-207.7. Defendant therefore demonstrates no Apprendi violation. 
E. Defendant's sentence does not violate Utah's unnecessary rigor 
provision or the Federal Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause. 
Defendant also argues that sentencing someone with his particular characteristics 
to LWOP for aggravated murder violates the Utah Constitution's unnecessary rigor 
provision and the federal constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Br. 
Aplt. at 86, 96-98. He argues that this Court should regard him as a juvenile because he 
was only 19 years old at the time of the murders and his I.Q. test results equated to the 
perfonnance of someone much younger; he is borderline mentally retarded \Vith an I.Q, 
of only 77; and he has ADHD. Br. Aplt. at 86-96. He further asserts that his sentence is 
unconstitutional because he has the potential to refonn and change. Br. Aplt. at 94-96. 
To support his federal constitutional claim, Defendant relies on United States Supreme 
Court precedent that categorically prohibits death sentences for juveniles and the 
mentally retarded. Br. Aplt. at 96-98. 
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1. The unnecessary rigor clause is inapplicable. 
Defendant's unnecessary rigor claim fails because that clause applies only to 
conditions of confinement, not to the terms of a sentence itself. Article I, section 9 of the 
Utah Constitution states: "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or 
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9. "[T]he 
last sentence makes section 9 broader than its federal counterpart." State v. Lafferty, 
2001 UT 19, ~ 73, 20 P.3d 342. However, that provision does not apply to challenges to 
the proportionality of a particular sentence. See Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ,-r 17, 184 
P.3d 592. Rather, "the cruel and unusual punishment clause ... is directed to the sentence 
imposed." Jd. 
Defendant challenges his sentence solely under Utah's unnecessary rigor clause. 
Br. Aplt. at 86-96. Because that clause applies only to conditions of confinement, his 
unnecessary rigor claim is meritless. See Dexter, 2008 UT 29, ~ 17. 
But even if Defendant had challenged his sentence under Utah's cruel and unusual 
punishment clause, his claim would fail because he was eligible for a death sentence. A 
punishment is cruel and unusual under the Utah Constitution only "if it is 'so 
disproportionate to the offense committed that it shock[ s] the moral sense of all 
reasonable [persons] as to what is right and proper under the circumstances."' Lafferty 
2001 UT 19, ~ 73 (quoting State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ~ 18, 993 P.2d 854). "Only 
rarely will a statutorily prescribed punishment be so disproportionate to the crime that the 
sentencing statute is unconstitutional. Since sentencing statutes are necessarily based on 
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numerous, imprecise considerations, substantial deference must be accorded to the 
prerogatives of legislative power 'in determining the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes."' Bishop, 717 P.2d at 269 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)). 
Because a death sentence for Defendant would not have been cruel and unusual, the 
lesser LWOP sentence cannot be so. 
Neither Defendant's low LQ. nor his alleged mental immaturity would have 
precluded a death sentence in this case. The federal constitution prohibits execution of 
the mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). But Defendant's 
own expert conceded that Defendant was not mentally retarded. R1909: 101-02. 
Nor would Defendant's alleged mental immaturity have disqualified him from a 
death sentence. The evidence of Defendant's alleged mental condition was highly · 
suspect. Defendant's expert based his findings of low I.Q. and corresponding mental 
immaturity on Defendant's I.Q. test results. R1909:33,58,74. But the expert did not 
administer any effort testing to measure the validity of those scores. R1909:75. 
Defendant's expert also conceded that Defendant's failure to complete school would 
negatively affect his I.Q. score. R1909:96. The State's expert observed "very, very 
strange anomalies" in Defendant's I.Q. test results and he explained that any I.Q. testing 
without effort testing is "meaningless." Rl909:172,195-96. The State's expert also 
noted several factors that undermined Defendant's ADHD diagnosis. R1909:151-54,175-
78. Therefore, no solid evidence established Defendant's alleged mental immaturity or 
ADHD. 
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Second, a defendant's chronological age, not his alleged mental age, is the 
relevant inquiry for detem1ining death penalty eligibility. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 574 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that 18 is "the age at which the 
line for death eligibility ought to rest" because that is the age "where society draws the 
line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood." The Court recognized that 
thi~ hriP"ht line mle was subiect "to the obiections alwavs raised against categorical rules" 
----- ---o-- . -~ - -.., J ., _. -
and that "[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an 
individual tums 18." Id. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that "a line must be drawn," 
and that age 18 was the proper place to draw that line. Id. 
Other courts agree that under Roper, the crucial factor is chronological age. See, 
e.g., State v. Campbell, 983 So. 2d 810, 830 (La. 2008) ("Roper established a bright-line 
demarcation for application of the standard announced therein, rather than a standard 
which could be applied to a defendant's 'mental age' on a case-by-case basis."); Hill v. 
State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006) ("Roper only prohibits the execution of those 
defendants whose chronological age is below eighteen"); United States v. Mitchell, 502 
F.3d 931, 981 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a 20-year-old defendant was eligible for a 
death sentence despite his claim of emotional immaturity); Parr v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 
245, 261 (51h Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant who was 18 years and 4 days old when 
he committed murder was eligible for the death penalty under Roper); Rogers v. State, 
653 S.E.2d 31, 35 (Ga. 2007) (rejecting 19-year-old murder defendant's claim that a 
death sentence was unconstitutional because he possessed the "attributes of a juvenile 
offender"). 
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The death penalty is not a cruel and unusual punishment for aggravated murder 
under either the federal or the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 
~~ 137-39, 20 P.3d 342; State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278-79 (Utah 1989) (listing 
cases). Here, Defendant was 19 years and 9 months old when he cmmnitted aggravated 
murder and therefore eligible for a death sentence. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. If the 
death penalty would not have been a cruel and unusual punishment for Defendant's 
crimes, then his lesser sentences of L WOP cannot be unconstitutional. 
Defendant argues that L WOP is as harsh as death, especially for a young person. 
Br. Aplt. at 95-96. On the contrary, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court 
have held otherwise. This Court has recognized that the death penalty "is different from 
all other penalties." State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986). This Court has also 
explained that the "death penalty is 'the most solemn and final act that the state can take 
against an individual."' Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ~ 113 (quoting State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 
71, 80 (Utah 1982)). According to this Court, '"[ d]eath in its finality, differs from life 
imprisonment more than a hundred-year prison term differs from one of only a year or 
two."' Wood, 648 P.2d at 81 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 
(1976)). In Roper, the United States Supreme Court held that "the death penalty is the 
most severe punishment." See 543 U.S. at 568. As these cases recognize, death is a more 
severe punishment than L WOP. 
Even if Defendant's alleged mental age were relevant and he truly possessed the 
mental age of a juvenile, that fact would not have precluded L WOP. The United States 
Supreme Comi recently recognized that L WOP can be an appropriate punishment for a 
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juvenile murderer. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). In Miller, the 
Court held that a mandatory L WOP for a juvenile murderer is unconstitutional. See id. 
But the Court declined to "foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in 
homicide cases," provided that the sentencer is allowed to consider the juvenile's 
individual characteristics. See id. As explained, the judge here considered Defendant's 
individual characteristics. 
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that murder 
requires more serious punishments than other crimes. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2026-27 (2010). In Graham, the Court prohibited LWOP for juveniles who-
unlike Defendant-commit non-homicide crimes. See id. In so holding, the Court 
explained that juveniles who kill are categorically more deserving of the most serious 
fonns of punishment because the "'severity and irrevocability"' of murder renders it 
unique among crimes "'in tenns of moral depravity and ofthe injury to the person and to 
the public."' !d. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008)). 
Moreover, 46 jurisdictions ( 44 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
government) allow LWOP for juvenile murderers. See id. at 2034-35. Only six states 
forbid it. See id. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions agree that 
L \VOP is a proportionate punishment for a juvenile who commits murder. 
In this case, Defendant's LWOP sentence for killing two people, almost killing 
two others, and endangering several others does not "'shock the moral sense of all 
reasonable [persons] as to what is right and proper under the circumstances."' Lafferty 
2001 UT 19, ,-r 73. Defendant showed no regard for human life when he fired ten shots 
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into a crowd. He unequivocally boasted of his lack of empathy for his victims and his 
loyalty to the gang lifestyle that motivated the murders. Defendant also had a lengthy 
criminal history and previous rehabilitation efforts had failed. Defendant's own expert 
admitted that Defendant was an extremely dangerous person with a high risk for 
repetitive criminal conduct. Furthermore, the trial court heard all the evidence of 
Defendant's background and history, including evidence of his age and mental state, and 
still concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Given these circumstances, Defendant's 
L WOP sentence is not cruel and unusual under the Utah Constitution. See id. 
2. Defendant's sentence is not cruel and unusual under the federal 
constitution. 
Defendant also contends that his sentence is cruel and unusual under the United 
States Constitution. Br. Aplt. at 57-58. For the reasons explained above, that claim fails. 
See Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ~ 73 (recognizing that Utah's provision is "broader than its 
federal counterpart"). 
VII. 
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE 
Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error 
doctrine. Br .. A1plt. at 108-109. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict under the 
cumulative etTor doctrine only 'if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines 
... confidence that a fair trial was had."' State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ~58, 191 P.3d 
17 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ~ 73, 28 P.3d 1278 (omissions in original)). 
As demonstrated, Defendant has not shown any error. His cumulative error claim 
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therefore fails. See id. (rejecting a cumulative error claim where the defendant failed to 
demonstrate any error). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affinn. 
Respectfully submitted on August 1, 2012. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
As~ stant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
amendment VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be req~ired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
amendment XIV 
§ 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 9. [Excessive bail and fines-Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor 
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or 
hnprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7 (West 2011) First degree felony aggravated 
murder- N oncapital felony- Penalties- Sentenced by court 
(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony 
aggravated murder under Section 76-5-202 shall be sentenced by the court. 
(2) The sentence under this section shall be life in prison without parole or an 
indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 12. Motions 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, 
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with 
this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a 
memorandum unless required by the court. 
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. If neither party has advised the court of the 
filing nor requested a hearing, when the time for filing a response to a motion 
and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the motion for 
decision. If a written Request to Submit is filed it shall be a separate pleading so 
captioned. The Request to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the 
motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the 
date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If 
no party files a written Request to Submit, or the motion has not otherwise been 
brought to the attention of the court, the motion will not be considered submitted 
for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, including 
request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by 
written motion. 
(c)(l) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(c)(l)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or 
information ; 
(c)(l)(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
(c)(l)(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(c)(l)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; 
(c)(l)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy; or 
(c)(l)(F) motions challenging jurisdiction, unless good cause is shown why 
the issue could not have been raised at least five days prior to trial. 
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 76-3-402(1) shall be in writing and filed at least ten days 
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prior to the date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing 
within ten days of the entry of conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal 
offense pursuant to Utah Code Section 76-3-402(2) may be raised at any time 
after sentencing upon proper service of the motion on the appropriate 
prosecuting entity. 
(d) Motions to Suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall: 
(d)(l) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; 
( d)(2) set fort11 the star;.ding of the rrlo1.rant to rr1ake the applicatior1; ru~d 
( d)(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the 
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to 
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them. 
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by 
the non-moving party is required, unless the court orders othenvise. At the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable 
time for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the 
motion and at the hearirLg. 
(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court 
for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where 
factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record. 
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall 
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
(g) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings 
at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law 
as are made orally. 
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be 
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new 
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense 
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant 
to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor 
has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to 
the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at 
least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to 
1nake disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make 
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be 
inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. The 
prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further 
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent 
ilnproper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from 
harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the 
further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological 
or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or 
inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further 
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dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall 
be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the 
appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
'f 'f - o • o • 'f , I • I I I I I 
rnay oraer sucn parry to penrLit tne mscoverj or mspecnon, grant a conniluance, 
or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter 
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other 
bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the 
alleged offense. Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required 
for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such 
appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the 
accused to appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless 
relieved by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for 
revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's 
case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt 
of the accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court 
should deem appropriate. 
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Utah R. Evid. 608. A Witness's Character for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness 
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. A witness's credibility may be attacked or 
supported by testimony about the witness's reputation for having a character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about 
that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the 
witness's character for truthfulness has been attacked. 
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 
609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's 
conduct in order to ai..i..ack or support tl-te witr1ess' s character for b.·uthfulness. But 
the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are 
probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: 
(1) the witness; or 
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has 
testified about. 
By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege against 
self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness's character for 
truthfulness. 
(c) Evidence of Bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by other 
evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 702. Testimony by Experts 
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis 
for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or 
methods that are underlying in the testimony 
(1) are reliable, 
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(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the 
underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and 
the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by 
the relevant expert community. 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEB __ ..,. 
STATE OF UTAH 
··---..; 
STATE OF UTAH, FINDINGS OFF ACT, CONCLUSION 
OF LAW AND ORDER OF THE 
COURT ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 
CONFESSION 
Plaintiff, 
vs. CASE NO. 071901847 
Nov- 6 2aag 
RIQO MARIANO PEREA, 
Defendant. JUDGE ERNIE W. JONES 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress the 
Confession. There are two issues to be decided in this Motion. First, was Defendant in 
Custody when he indicated that he wanted to talk to a lawyer, and second, was the 
confession the product of coercion or duress. 
Both parties prepared briefs and testimony was he~d on July 2, 2009 and July 1 7, 
2009. Having reviewed the evidence, the briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court makes 
the following findings and rulings. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 4, 2007, Ogden Police were summoned to a report of shots fired. 
Two people were killed and two people injured. 
2. During the investigation, Officers received Defendant's cell phone number and 
Detective Thomas placed a call to him on August 5, 2007. 
·mr-lllr -llfrlrll.IH lfll·--
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3. At that time, the Defendant's physical location was unknown to the officers. 
4. Detective Thomas asked Defendant if he would agree to meet with.police and 
give them his story. 
5. Defendant indicated that he wanted to speak with his la\V-yer first because the last 
time he spoke with the police he had "gotten screwed." 
6. Defendant was not in custody, nor were there any indicia of arrest during this 
conversation. 
7. Defendant "·vas arrested t'v\ro days later on .i\u~..1st 7, 2007. 
8. Upon his arrest, Defendant was given Miranda warnings at least twice. 
9. Defendant waived his right to an attorney and agreed to speak with the officers 
on August 7, 2007. 
10. After giving a verbal statement, Defendant assisted Officer Gent in preparing a 
written confession to the murders and attempted murders. 
11. Defendant was once again given Miranda warnings and the warnings were printed 
at the top of the written statement. Defendant if'..itialed the warnings and the 
waiver and signed the written confession. 
12. Defendant did not ask for an attorney after his arrest despite multiple A1iranda 
warrungs. 
13. There was no physical or psychological force used to induce the Defendant's 
statements. 
14. There is no evidence that Defendant was coerced, pressured, or threatened to give 
the statements. 
15. The duration of the interrogation was less than two hours and included breaks 
during which Defendant was offered food and water. 
16. An officer was sent to get Defendant a burger and the detective offered to wait 
until Defendant had eaten before starting on the written statement. 
17. Defendant indicated that he would eat while the detective typed. 
18. Defendant was offered and given bathroom breaks as needed. 
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19. Defendant's chronological age was 19 years and nine months at the time of his 
confession. 
20. The evidence that Defendant has a below-average IQ and symptoms of ADHD 
are not sufficient to establish that he did not understand or appreciate what he 
was doing when he talked with the detectives. 
21. Defendant had the intellectual ability to understand the questions and give the 
answers that he did. This determination is based on all of the testimony, 
including th.at of the Defendant on July 17, 2009. 
22. Defendant specifically testified that he was not afraid of either Detective Gent or 
Detective Thomas. 
23. Defendant testified that his fear was from gang retaliation, not from law 
enforcement. 
24. Defendant's testimony that he was not given Miranda warnings was not credible, 
particularly in the face of the written statement with the printed Miranda warning 
initialed by Defendant acknowledging that he understood and waived his rights. 
25. In listening to Defendant's testimony during the evidentiary hearing, it was clear 
that he understood all the questions put to him, both on direct and cross-
examination. 
26. Defendant gave appropriate answers to all the questions, tracked the questioning 
well and seemed to be focused. 
27. Based on the observations of the Defendant's testimony, the Court concludes that 
Defendant understood and understands the nature of the proceedings. 
28. TI1e Defendant's IQ is not so low that he could not understand the question and 
answer of the interrogation that took place. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. Miranda is not required for non-custodial interviews. 
2. Defendant was not in custody during the telephone conversation. 
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3. Miranda requires two factors: that the person is in custody and that he is being 
questioned. Absent custody, there is not an effective invocation of Miranda rights. 
4. Defendant gave a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights after his 
arrest on August 7, 2007. 
5. Defendant's statement to the police on August 7, 2007 was not coerced, forced or 
threatened. J /. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, and based on all the testimony, documents, briefs, and the 
preliminary hearing transcript, the Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
/\('i .. y 1 
Dated this _.....,3=-- day of ~er, 2009 ,.---·<s:' // __ 
~~-v~v~-· 
--E{rue W. Jones \ 
District Court Judge 
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OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
STATEMENT 
OFFENSE: Homicide 
CASE: 07-62701 
TIME/DATE: 8-7-07 1840 hrs 
STATEMENT OF: Riqo Perea 
DOB: 11-7-87 
SSN: 529-71-5236 
ADDRESS: 315 32nd 
PHONE: 
EMPLOYMENT: 
WORK PHONE: 
1) You have the right to remain silent. 
2) Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
ORIGINAL 
3) You have the right to talk with a lawyer and have him or her present with you while you are being 
questioned. 
4) If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one can be appointed to represent you before y questioning, if you 
wish. 
5) Do you understand each of these rights that have been explained to you? --"4--I:---T'-7F~~+--
6) Having these rights. in mind, do you wish to speak to me and give a statement? _____,____,~~~-
You are notified that statements you are about to make ma:y be presented fo a magistrate or judge in lieu of your 
sworn testimony at a preliminary examination. Any false statement you make and that you do not believe to be 
true may st~u to criminal punishment as a "class A misdemeanor. I have read and understand the above 
statement: . . 
Following is a voluntary statement given by Rico Perea, to Detective Jim Gent Ogden City Police Department. 
Q. Can you tell me what happened on the evening of 8-4-07? 
A. We went and got some beer and liquor from the store. We went to the view for a minute and looked at the fire 
works. After that we didn't want to stay so we went to 20th and get beer at the Chevron. We went to my Aunt 
Christina's and we stayed for a minute but people started arguing. We went to the truck to see if the kids were 
okay. After that I heard some one say fuck you punks big time Norte. A shot was fired and glass was breaking I 
panicked and got scared for the kids and I shot back to protect the kids. I didn't think I was pointing that low I 
didn't mean to kill anybody. After that we drove off and I told Nicky to drive off she told me no and I told her to 
drive off. So we drove off and I told her to drop me off on 7th street and to take the kids home. From there I have 
just been on the run. I just kept running. 
Q. Who was with you in the SUV at the View? 
A. Me and Nicky and the two girls and Chris. 
Q. Who was in the red car at the View? 
A. Demon, Misty, Flaco and Nadine. 
Q. Were the same people in the same vehicles when you went to by beer? 
A. Everyone was the same as always. 
Q. Which vehicle arrived at Christina's first? 
A. Mine did. 
Q. Was the red car right behind you? 
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07-62701 
Q. Who got out of your car? 
A. Me but when I got back Chris wasn't in the car. 
Q. Do you know where Chris was? 
A. No I wasn't paying attention to him I was worried about the kids. 
Q. When you got out of the SUV where did you go? 
A. I went into Christina's house to use the bathroom. 
Q. Did anyone else go into the house with you? 
A. No Flaco was in there already. 
Q. Was anyone with him? 
A. Just his girlfriend. Sarah and Sabrina were in the door way. 
Q. Did anyone say anything to you inside the house? 
A. Sarah said that Aunt Christina didn't want anyone in the house why she wasn't there. 
Q. Did Sabrina say anything to you? 
A. No she didn't. I just gave her a what's up glance. 
Q. Have you ever had trouble with Sabrina before? 
A. No I haven't. 
Q. What did you do when Sarah told you to leave? 
A. She didn't tell us to leave. 
Q. Did you talk to Sarah about not being allowed in the house? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Flaco? 
A. Yes because he was in the house. He said he had permission from Christina to be in the house. He told her 
that and that's why she let me in. 
Q. Did Sarah and Flaco get into an argument? 
A.No. 
Q. When you came out of the bathroom was anyone in the house? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you know where they all went? 
A. When I came outside everyone was in the street. 
Q. What was happening out there? 
A. Nicky and Flaco were arguing about being in the house and that we didn't have permission. Flaco told her 
Christina gave us permission. Flaco then told her you know what were leaving we don't want no trouble. 
Q. This Nicky is different then the Nicky that was driving the SUV correct? 
A. Yes. We can say that it's Nicky Valencia. 
Q. Did Flaco walk away from Nicky V.? 
A. Yes he did. 
Q. Where was Nicky V and Flaco standing when they were arguing? 
A. I'm not sure but I'm guessing they were in the driveway at the wedding party across the street. 
Q. Did you go over there? 
A. No I didn't. 
Q. Did you see anyone else standing near Nicky V or Flaco? 
A. Just the whole crowd I'm guessing. When we pulled up there was people all in the driveway and around the 
house. 
Q. Was Chris back in the SUV? 
A. No. 
Q. Were the kids okay? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened next? 
,----, • I . I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 3. 
07-62701 
A. People I was with were getting ready to walk back to the cars and then some dude from their party came out 
of nowhere and said fuck you punk's big time Norte. After that there was a bunch of commotion and then a shot 
was fired. I ducked and checked on the kids. I started to hear glass break and I grabbed the hand gun I had and I 
got out of the truck and standed up and I let off a couple of rounds to scare everyone away. 
Q. When you say you stood up what do you mean? 
A. I stood up from the passenger seat and leaned over the top and I thought I was just shooting in the air. I didn't 
aim at anybody. 
Q. Was the SUV moving when you were shooting? 
A. I was getting ready to. 
Q. Did you shot any more? 
A. No I didn't. 
Q. Did anyone else shoot? 
A. I wasn't paying attention I was just trying to get out of there. 
Q. Was anyone in your SUV hurt? 
A. After we stopped and check no no one was hurt. 
Q. Was there any damage to your SUV? 
A. Not sure I didn't check to look. 
Q. DO you know how many rounds you fired? 
A. I don't. 
Q. What type of gun to you use? 
A. A .22 
Q. What color was it? 
A. Black. 
Q. Was it a revolver or a semi-automatic? 
A. A semi. 
Q. Do you know how many rounds were in the gun? 
A. No I don't. 
Q. Do you know how many rounds it holds? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Can you tell me where the gun is now? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Did you give it to anyone? 
A. I would rather not say. 
Q. Once everyone was checked and they were okay what did you do? 
A. I got dropped off on 7th street and kept running. 
Q. Was anyone with you? 
A. I ran by myself. 
Q. Where did Chris go? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did anyone else run from the SUV? 
A. I wasn't worried about anyone else so I'm not sure. I told Nicky to take the kids home and I jumped out and 
started running. . 
Q. Did you stop any place? 
A. In a back yard. I called someone to come pick me up and after that I just went and hid out. 
Q. Have you talked to anyone that was there that night since you have been hiding? 
A. No I haven't. 
Q. Going back to the shooting. Did you see where the person was that shot the first shot? 
A. All I know was it was behind me. 
/I 
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Q. 'Where do you mean. Was it behind your SUV. Or was it by Christina's house. Or was it from the Norte 
party? 
A. It wasn't by Christina's. It wasn't directly behind me. I'm guessing it came from the Norte party. 
Q. Did you see anyone get hit by your gun fire? 
A. No I didn't. 
Q. When did you learn that people were shot? 
A. When people started to call my phone. 
Q. Did you think about calling the police to tell your story? 
A. I did but I didn't think anybody would believe me. 
Q. Did you try to call for help for the people that were hurt? 
A. No the help was already there. 
Q. How did you feel when you heard that two people died? 
A. I felt like I was dead myself. 
Q. Did you know the victims? 
A. Yes I did. One was my cousin. I didn't know but my family called and asked why I shot my cousin. I didn't 
mean to shot anybody. 
Q. What do you think should happen to someone that shots two four people and kills two of them? 
A. It depends on what the situation is.- I mean if it was intentionally then I think they should go to prison. I was 
scared and I was trying to protect her children_ 
Q. Do you mean Nicky's kids? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What if a person kills people but didn't mean it. \Vhat should happen to them? 
A. I think they should go to prison to but not for as long as people think they should. If it's to protect somebody 
is what I'm saying. 
Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement? 
A. I apologize to the victim's families. I didn't mean for anything to happen to them that nighL If I could take it 
back I would. I will accept the consequences for my actions for protecting someone_ I'm just like them I will 
have to live with this for the rest of my life. 
Your signature below indicates that you have read the above statement and it is true and correct to the best of 
your knowledge and belief. 
TYPED BY: Detective Jim Gent 
TIME: 1930 hrs 
' Date 
2J-- ?-o? 
Date 
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SECCH> JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR WEBER COUNTY I STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
case No. 071901847 
RIQO M. PEREA, 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE HON:>RABLE ERNIE W. ~ 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
2525 GRANT AVENUE 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
M:>TION HEARING 
MARCH 04, 2010 
REPORTED BY: KATIE HARMJN, CSR, RPR 
(801) 634-5549 
APR 0 6 2010 
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Noteworthy Reporting Case No. 071901847 
) 1 purposes for the finding, is specifically that the Court finds 
2 that Mr. Perea has concurred with both conflict counsel and 
3 Mr. Richards now and he has made a direct statement that he 
4 believes it's in his best in'terest to go forward, specifically 
5 in way of any conflict or potential conflict. 
6 THE COURT: I will make that finding. I think it's 
7 appropriate. All right. 
8 Anything else then on the motion, Mr. Richards? 
9 
10 
MR. RICHARDS: No. 
MR. SHAW: No, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Can we move -- I don't know if maybe you 
12 have a preference, but I thought maybe we could deal with the 
13 State's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Dr -- how 
14 do you say it? Ofshe. I don't know if you want to deal with 
15 one or if you prefer to 
16 
17 
MR. HEWARD: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Well, I did get State's request for 
18 discovery notes, but I -- my question is, and I almost think we 
19 could dissolve this issue without that. But I don't know how 
20 the State feels about it. 
21 MR. LYONS: I guess it depends on how Your Honor is 
22 going to rule. We might be able to --
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. LYONS: Your Honor, what I want to do is just lay 
25 out in summary briefly the State's reasoning why Dr. Ofshe 
43 
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1 needs to be excluded. And then I want to talk specific in more 
2 detail under the specific rules in cases why he needs to be 
3 excluded. 
4 At the outset, Your Honor, already knows this but the 
5 defense does have the burden of proof -- in a situation like 
6 this to prove that the testimony of an expert witness is 
7 admissible. And Your Honor knows that you are granted wide 
8 latitude in performing this gate keeping function. It would be 
9 reversed only if you were having to use discretion and that you 
10 are to view expert testimony as the Court has put it with 
11 "rational skepticism." 
12 The first reason under this is Rule 608, Dr. Ofshe 
13 can't testify that this confession was coerced as he puts it in 
14 his report. That is a legal conclusion. And that is for the 
15 Court to determine only. He can only testify that this is 
16 unreliable. However, if he testifies that it is unreliable, 
17 it's the State's opinion it's the same thing as commenting on 
18 the credibility of the witness. And determinations of 
19 credibility of a witness are the exclusive function of the 
20 jury. 
21 Next under 702, his research is sharply contested. 
22 This is not research that is generally accepted within the 
23 scientific community in which he operates. He has no 
24 scientific data to back up his conclusions. His theory and 
25 methodology have never been tested in a random sampling of 
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1 criminal cases. Because he has no data his methods and 
2 theories have not been tested by other independent researchers, 
3 there is no peer review of his data and his conclusions do not 
4 meet Rimmasch's inherent reliability standard. 
5 Under 403 his testimony should be also excluded. He 
6 is not going to be commenting on the credibility of the 
7 witness. He has little to no relevance under 401. The State's 
8 opinion is due to the unfair danger -- due to the danger that 
9 his testimony would unduly influence the jury. The prejudicial 
10 affect of his testimony precludes him from testifying. 
11 Finally, we believe that much of his testimony would 
12 include hearsay. And as Your Honor look at carefully his 
13 reports he makes many, many statements about -- I guess, he 
14 makes many findings in his report about statements that he --
15 in conversations that he has with Mr. Perea -- or is it Perea? 
16 Now I'm confused. 
17 
18 
MR. RICHARDS: It's always been Perea. 
MR. LYON: Mr. Perea notes conversation. And it's 
19 the State's position you can't use Dr. Ofshe and an end run to 
20 get in the Defendant's version of the facts before the jury. 
21 And that's essentially what he would be doing. 
22 Going into more detail, Your Honor. As Your Honor 
23 well knows, Rule 608(a} allows testimony concerning a witness's 
24 general character and representation for truthfulness or 
25 untruthfulness, but prohibits any testimony as to a witness's 
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1 truthfulness on a particular occasion. The case law is very 
2 clear that you can't have someone come in and try to act as a 
3 human lie detector. 
4 The concern that we have and, frankly, the concern 
5 that the courts have expressed in situations like this, they 
6 don't want a battle of the experts corning in and trying to help 
7 with the fact finding and credibility. That is the exclusive 
8 role of the jury. You can't have an expert come in and assert 
9 that role of the jury. Rirnrnasch made is it very clear that 
10 this sort of testimony is categorically barred under Rule 608. 
11 And frankly, there is a large body of case law that 
12 shows it's error for an expert witness to come in and comment 
13 on the truthfulness or untruthfulness of a witness on a 
14 particular occasion. This problem is particularly compounded 
15 when you have an individual like Dr. Ofshe who has, frankly, 
16 impressive credentials. He is well educated. He had taught at 
17 a well respected university. The problem is the danger of 
18 these credentials still substantially sway in telling the jury 
19 how they should view this evidence, which offends the very 
20 purpose of Rule 608. 
21 The testimony of Dr. Ofshe doesn't add anything to 
22 this case. The jury can already do what he is purporting to 
23 come in and do, and that is to assess the credibility of the 
24 profession. As such, his expert testimony would amount to only 
25 a lecture to the jury. 
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1 Next, under 702 as Your Honor knows Rimmasch is 
2 really the seminal case on this issue. There are two ways to 
3 get in scientific evidence. One is the court may take judicial 
4 notice of the sciences inherent reliability or that can be 
5 established through testimony. I don't think that the Court in 
6 this situation can take judicial notice of this sort of expert 
7 testimony. It's not generally accepted like something like 
8 DNA. 
9 Therefore the only avenue they can get it in through 
10 is through this testimony. The appellate courts say that 
11 there is a high threshold for admissibility in order to insure 
12 that evidence is sufficiently reliable to go to the jury. 
13 What's guarded against is the tendency for the jury to abandon 
14 it's role as the fact finder and adopt the judgment of an 
15 expert without ever assessing the validity of the scientific 
16 under opinions of its conclusions. So the proponent of this 
17 evidence must show that the science is inherently unreliable or 
18 it must be excluded . 
. 19 Now, in this situation they have proffered some of 
20 his testimony and I guess the relevant question is: Is it 
21 reliable? And the case law seems to suggest some factors in 
22 determining reliability of scientific evidence. Some of them 
23 are application of generally accepted principles in the 
24 scientific community, conclusions based upon data gathered 
25 through acceptable research methods, imperial studies that show 
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1 a clear trend or data over numerous tests. Hypothesis that is 
2 easily replicated and consistent over time. 
3 And as we look at these -- those sort of factors and 
4 Dr. Ofshe's testimony, it's clear that he doesn't meet these 
5 criteria. Dr. Ofshe's conclusions are not generally accepted 
6 in the scientific community. In the case that we cited in our 
7 brief, the Commonwealth versus Robinson the -- that trial court 
8 excluded the testimony of another kind of cohort of Dr. Ofshe, 
9 and that's Dr. Paul or excuse me Dr. Saul Kassin. 
10 And part of the reasoning for excluding that 
11 testimony is because that he admitted presently there is no 
12 scientific basis for distinguishing true and false confessions, 
13 more research is sorely needed in this area of research, and in 
14 mock jury experiments jurors were able to accurately 
15 distinguish between false and true confessions. 
16 So if there is no scientific basis how can it be 
17 verified through other studies? The principles that Dr. Ofshe 
18 and his cohorts propose have been verified through study and 
19 replication by independent review because there is no data for 
20 individuals to study or compare to. They can't send data for 
21 independent review because he -- even Dr. Ofshe admits that he 
22 can't tell exactly how false confessions happen without this, 
23 some sort of independent verification, these principles 
24 aren't -- certainly aren't going to be accepted within the 
25 scientific community. 
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1 Moreover, Dr. Ofshe isn't adding something that the 
2 jury can't already do. Their research shows that mock juries 
3 can distinguish between false and true confessions just as well 
4 as they can. So he has nothing to be adding to this. In 1997 
5 Dr. Ofshe admitted that there wasn't -- it wasn't possible to 
6 quantify the number and the frequency of false confessions or 
7 the rate at which they lead to miscarriages of justice. 
8 And recently he still admits that they can't make 
9 that determination. They don't know how frequently false 
10 confessions occur. And without an established innocence rate 
11 and nexus between empirical data there is no basis for Ofshe to 
12 testify that the police in this case produce a specific result, 
13 namely a false confession. If he can't -- if he can't 
14 accurately distinguish between true and false confessions or 
15 calculate the rate at which false confessions occur, how can he 
16 tell this court and this jury the likelihood of a false 
17 confession? His data to -- he lacks data to support his theory 
18 and show that his methodology is correct and absent meeting 
19 this threshold his testimony is not admissible. 
20 Further, Dr. Ofshe's conclusions aren't founded on 
21 proper research. Professor Paul Cassell, who, Your Honor 
22 probably knows and teaches up at the U, he has studied and 
23 responded to many of Ofshe's papers and publications. He notes 
24 that Ofshe had never taken a randomized sample to determine how 
25 often false confessions occur. Professor Cassell, on the other 
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1 hand has randomly sampled cases in the Salt Lake City Area and 
2 · he has never found one false confession. 
3 Because Ofshe has got no real data, he has to rely on 
4 the sweeping conclusions and generalizations about all 
5 confessions about his study to specific cases. Specifically, 
6 as I read through this article that was attached and I'm 
7 assuming that Your Honor received it, as well. 
8 
9 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. LYON: He sites transcripts from actual 
10 interviews where police have interrogated individuals and he 
11 cites these as examples for this is a technique that police use 
12 to produce a false confession. Well, the problem is he never 
13 says whether these interviews did, in fact, produce a false 
14 confessions or not. 
15 And just out of curiosity, there was one that was 
16 in that was listed in there, a Salt Lake case, it was that 
17 was Calvin Shane Myers. This is back in, I think about, '94. 
18 I did just a little bit of research on it. And they cite to 
19 that -- he sites to that case for the proposition of techniques 
20 that they produce false confessions. I looked up his case, did 
21 some shepardizing. Interestingly enough, he confessed in that 
22 case to killing his ex-girlfriend who was, in fact, pregnant at 
23 the time. He was charged with capital murder. He had no 
24 direct appeal. He only raised it for the first time on a 
25 habeas review that he should have been charged with aggravated 
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1 murder basing it upon his pregnant girlfriend, I believe he 
2 wasn't he didn't know that she was pregnant or --
3 But what's really interesting to me is that there 
4 were no challenges to his confession. There was nothing. 
5 Which seems to me and, I mean, obviously, I have to admit I 
6 don't know all the details of this case, but if that's not even 
7 raised, that seems to strongly suggest that he gave a true 
8 confession. So these examples that he sites are completely 
9 misleading to the court. 
10 And much of the research that is -- that he bases 
11 his -- that he bases his papers on are secondary references 
12 like newspaper articles and reports. And with all respect to 
13 the media, we know that they frequently sensationalize stories 
14 and don't give the full report. 
15 Dr. Ofshe sites to 29 false confession cases, nine of 
16 which are undisputed. They require no specific or particular 
17 knowledge in order -- for him to make the conclusion that this 
18 was a false confession which leaves 20. Nine of the those 
19 cases are highly disputed based upon Professor Cassell's 
20 research. Professor Cassell has taken a lot of time to go back 
21 and review original court documents. 
22 One of the examples that Professor Cassell has looked 
23 at is -- that Dr. Ofshe sites as a false confession, the 
24 federal trial judge looked at that case on habeas review not 
25 once but twice. He watched a video of the confession and the 
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1 judge made very specific findings, very lengthy, that this, in 
2 fact, was a valid and reliable confession. 
3 Interestingly enough, that's not ever given to us by 
4 Dr. Ofshe. Giving Ofshe the benefit of the doubt off these 
5 remaining 11 cases, there is only a 55 percent average, which 
6 is as we know is just barely better than flipping a coin. With 
7 an error rate that high how can his expert testimony be 
8 admissible? His failure to follow acceptable research methods 
9 and his error rate absolutely precludes his testimony from 
10 coming into this court. 
11 In Lyons versus State, the Georgia Supreme Court 
12 recently reviewed that Dr. Ofshe's theories quote had not 
13 reached the verifiable stage of scientific certainty and that 
14 his false confession theory was inadmissible at trial. He 
15 doesn't have the research to back up his theories and therefore 
16 he can't give an opinion. He basically is wanting to rely on 
17 the -- his resume for him to come in and testify. There is no 
18 nexus however between his credentials and his opinion. 
19 I guess, one other point to his research methods, he 
20 really is only relying on a handful of false confession 
21 proponents in order to advance his research. There is a 
22 handful of these individuals that are researching this and they 
23 are all citing to one another; none of them are doing proper 
24 research but they continue to publish more and more articles 
25 citing to one another. I mean, it's just -- it just seems a 
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1 little absurd to the State. They all lack empirical data and 
2 in the State's opinion that is not valid and proper research. 
3 Moving on under Rule 403, his testimony should 
4 certainly be excluded as well. And Rimmasch there were three 
5 criteria in determining the admissibility of expert testimony 
6 under Rule 403. And that is that the scientific proof is based 
7 upon undeniably valid scientific premises, has a high degree 
8 and power of accurately determining the existence or 
9 non-existence of a fact at issue. 
10 In this case we certainly can't determine with a high 
11 degree of certainty whether there is or is not a false 
12 confession. There is at least a 45 percent error rate. And 
13 they admit, Ofshe and his other individuals that they 
14 researched this, they can't that they can't assess with any 
15 degree of accuracy the rate at which false confessions occur. 
16 The final prong is that it is easily replicable and 
17 it's application to similar situations has been tested and 
18 validated often. No studies have been done and no one has 
19 validated these methods and theories. His testimony is not 
20 going to help the jury make their ultimate determination. He 
21 is just wanting to comment on credibility. So under this 
22 situation the danger of unfair prejudice is extremely high. 
23 When he comes in and he wants to tout his credentials, the 
24 danger that the jury is going to defer to him based upon his 
25 credentials is extremely high and his testimony would not out 
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1 weigh the probative value. 
2 Finally, the defense can't use Dr. Ofshe as an end 
3 run to get in their version of the events in front of the jury. 
4 And when Your Honor looks at the report by Dr. Ofshe, he says 
5 that he based a lot of his conclusions upon interviews, an 
6 interview that he has with the Defendant, his version of the 
7 facts that he says notes that the Defendant gave to him. The 
8 problem is that he can't come up and sit in that chair and then 
9 tell this jury, well this is what the defendant says, this is 
10 his version of the events. They can't use that as an end run. 
11 The Defendant has an absolute right to testify but he has to 
12 get up and tell those versions of the events to the jury. They 
13 can't put it in through Dr. Ofshe. 
14 With regards to the reply that Mr. Richards filed, he 
15 sites to the State versus Clopten, which is that recent case 
16 that came out about eyewitness identification. That case is 
17 very different from what he have here. In that case both sides 
18 agreed that the eyewitness identification expert met the 
19 Rimmasch standard. Here we do not agree that he meets that 
20 standard. They cite to Professor Gross, his article for 
21 exonerations in the United States. 
22 First of all, we haven't had a chance to even look up 
23 and verify these statistics and assertions that he makes. More 
24 importantly though, those are not -- the statistics and the 
25 things they cite in Professor Gross, Dr, Ofshe doesn't rely on 
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1 in his conclusion, that's completely irrelevant. They also 
2 cite to the case of State versus Griffin, where Judge Hatfield 
3 allowed them to use -- I think it was either Ofshe or Leo, one 
4 of these individuals, if they wanted to in their trial. 
5 As Your Honor knows, we cite to the Maughan case 
6 where Judge Hatfield recently decided as well -- interestingly 
7 enough, Judge Hatfield specifically states in his ruling on the 
8 Maughan case that he allowed that testimony if they so desired 
9 during Griffin, it carne up in the course of a five-week trial. 
10 And it appears to the State that this is kind of an error on 
11 the side of letting it in situation. But he specifically 
12 states in the Maughan case that's had a further chance to 
13 reflect carefully and consider based upon briefs and data and 
14 he has rejected the testimony of Dr. Leo or Dr. Ofshe, 
15 whichever of the two is going to testify. • 
16 He stated that he would be willing to give a jury 
17 instruction on this. And the State doesn't have a problem with 
18 that. I think the jury instruction would certainly cover the 
19 situation here. There is -- we could base on -- as Judge 
20 Hatfield indicated, we could base it on Utah case law and they 
21 can still argue that the jury they can still -- the jury will 
22 still have a chance to assess the credibility of the witnesses 
23 and decide whether this confession is unreliable. But they 
24 don't have to have it from Dr. Ofshe. 
25 They simply want Dr. Of she to come in and testify as 
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1 to the likelihood of a false confession or the likelihood of 
2 false confessions in general. As I have already stated, theres 
3 is no data to suggest at what frequency these false confessions 
4 occur. So how is he going to opine as to the likelihood of a 
5 false confession in this case? It's pure speculation. He's 
6 Moreover, he is implicitly telling this jury if he 
7 were to come in and testify that the defendant's confession 
8 wasn't true and to disbelieve the police. 
9 Here again, that's in direct violation of the rules. 
10 It's also they cite to numerous cases in which some courts 
11 have allowed Dr. Ofshe to testify. I think it's very important 
12 to note that as the Supreme Court said in State versus Crosby, 
13 the standard put forth in Rimmasch is more stringent then what 
14 is put forth in Daubert and some of these other cases which 
15 these other courts may have been relying. 
16 So Utah has a more stringent standard in order to 
17 admit this. The State is asking to grant this motion because 
18 Dr. Ofshe concedes that it's impossible to estimate within 
19 reliability the rate at which false confessions occur, without 
20 reliable estimates, the frequency of false confessions, if it's 
21 possible to derive a meaningful evidence for the degree with 
22 which particular interrogation techniques may be associated 
23 with false confessions. 
24 And due to the lack of statistically reliable 
25 evidence the current research doesn't -- does not form a 
56 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
No~eworthy Reporting Case No. 071901847 
1 sufficient basis for definite conclusions regarding the 
2 existence of a causal relationship or even a significant 
3 correlation between any coercive police interrogation 
4 techniques and a false confession. 
5 The few cases that Dr. Ofshe sites in his article are 
6 not based upon randomly selected cases, but are rather selected 
7 for study because they are deemed to have a high probability of 
8 being false, bearing -- because they bear some of the hallmarks 
9 of what they perceive to be false confessions. Therefore, 
10 citing to go those sort of cases appears to be more antedotal 
11 than reliable empirical data. 
12 So it's the State's position, Your Honor, that under 
13 Rule 608, 702, 403, the Rules of Hearsay, Rirnmasch, and on his 
14 progeny, that the State's motion should be granted. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Lyon. 
16 Mr. Richards, before we hear from the defense can we 
17 just take a short recess? Is that okay? 
18 
19 
MR. RICa~JIDS: That would be great. 
THE COURT: Let's take about a 15 or 10 minute 
20 recess. And then we'll hear from the defense. 
21 
22 
(Break taken.) 
THE COURT: Court is again in session. All right. 
23 We are back in session State versus Perea. 
24 Did I get it right? I think I've mispronounced his 
25 name the whole time. I know -- I have it should be Perea and I 
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1 keep saying Perea. 
2 MR. RICHARDS: I thought you said it right most of 
3 the time. 
4 THE COURT: Did I? Tell me if I say it wrong. 
5 MR. RICHARDS: I will but I think you have done it 
6 correctly all the way. 
7 THE COURT: Oh, have I? 
8 You know, I was going to say you know you're getting 
9 old when you find the attorney citing cases that you tried 
10 years ago. That Crosby case that was Mr. Lyon cited. 
Yeah, go ahead, Mr. Richards. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
11 
12 
13 At the outset I think it's important to note that we 
14 are not here on a Rimmasch hearing. The State has an 
15 opportunity, they could have requested one; they haven't. And 
16 so, we are not really taking testimony and the studies or the 
17 articles that Mr. Lyons sites to I think are primarily an 
18 article written by Paul Cassell. And I don't know that we can 
19 take that as an authoritative thesis. I certainly don't think 
20 it's the ultimate authority on it. He just has his opinion. 
21 And we know that Mr. Cassell's opinions are not always followed 
22 by the Supreme Court. 
23 I point specifically to the case of State versus 
24 Dickerson, which is the case that he argued to the Supreme 
25 Court asking that the Miranda be overturned and we know the 
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1 result on that. So, the fact that we cite to Paul Cassell as 
2 some sort of an authoritative figure on this issue, I don't 
3 think holds a whole lot of water. 
4 I think that one thing that does hold a whole lot of 
5 water is some Utah Supreme Court decisions. And I point 
6 specifically to -- and I note, specifically, the absence of the 
7 citations to these two cases in the State's brief. Those two 
8 cases which I have included kind of stiffen up in my brief are 
9 the State versus Retenberger, a 1999. Which coincidently is 10 
10 years after Rimmasch. So this is the, I guess, newer Rimmasch 
11 case. 
12 But, in State versus Retenberger the court cited 
13 substantially to the study done by Dr. Ofshe and also his 
14 colleague, who was mentioned Dr. Leo in determining the 
15 validity and reliability of false confessions. Retenberger 
16 sighted to those and acknowledged the importance in the 
17 authoritative position that those studies take. 
18 Furthermore, even in a more recent case that of State 
19 versus Mauchley. I hope I said that right. M-A-U-C-H-1-E-Y. 
20 That's a 2003 Utah Supreme Court decision, as well. The Utah 
21 Supreme Court in that case cited to Dr. Ofshe studies, 
22 specifically mentioning those studies in their decision quoting 
23 to go to the decision, "To confess falsely rational choice and 
24 irrational action" a Denver law review article authored by 
25 Of she and Leo. 
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1 So those are two recent Utah Supreme Court decisions 
2 that decided and accepted Ofshe as an expert in this particular 
3 field. We have a number of other cases and I did a Westlaw 
4 search and admittedly I haven't had a whole lot time and I had 
5 Brittany do some work on it. And J. Richards also did some 
6 research on it. 
7 We found some cases. We included some of those, but 
8 certainly not all. I think I have done a previous search on 
9 this and found over 60 appellate decisions which have upheld 
10 Ofshe's testimony of these kind of cases. We have cited a 
11 number of them kind of in a sprinkling of different 
12 jurisdictions, but included two from Utah, as well. 
13 Dr. Ofshe has been admitted in over a 100 cases where 
14 he's testified in the United States specifically on false 
15 confessions, specifically on what we are asking that he be 
16 allowed to do in this case in this trial. And he's been 
17 accepted by them. 
18 The fact that there are some courts that may have 
19 denied him we don't know the reasons. I guess we should have a 
20 Rimmasch hearing or should have had one to determine that. But 
21 at this point, the Court's appointed him as an expert. We're 
22 asking that he be able to testify as an expert and ask for some 
23 sort of Rimmasch that could show that he's not reliable, I 
24 think that it would be incumbent upon the Court to allow his 
25 testimony. 
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1 I speak specifically and it troubles me a little bit 
2 that they quote from Paul Cassell's article that there is 
3 really no empirical studies and no findings of exonerations. 
4 They ignore my reference to the article on false confessions, 
5 exonerations in the United States. And I realize Mr. Lyons 
6 briefly mentioned that. 
7 But under is that decision -- or excuse me under that 
8 article by Professor Gross they have done some empirical 
9 studies. Number one, they found 51 of the 328 exonerations 
10 since 1989, so 15 percent of them the defendant's confessed 
11 falsely to a crime that they did not co~~it, 15 percent. And I 
12 don't know that we can accept a 15 percent fail rate in a death 
13 penalty case. I mean, we are not talking about sending 
14 somebody to jail for a year or even to prison for five years. 
15 We're talking about executing someone. 
16 And I think under all of the rules that the Supreme 
17 Court has come down with and all the decisions that the Supreme 
18 Court has come down with, they certainly recognize that death 
19 is different. And I think a 15 percent fail rate -- while, 
20 that may be okay with the State, I don't know; it shouldn't be. 
21 It certainly is not okay with me and is certainly not okay with 
22 this Court to have a 15 percent fail rate. 
23 The false confessions go up even higher when we are 
24 talking about individuals who are under 18 at the time of the 
25 crimes at which they confessed to. And = recognize Riqo is 19, 
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1 but he also has the AD/HD and you've heard the previous 
2 testimony of Dr. Houston on that issue. Those come into play 
3 that there was a 44 percent rate of false confessions with 
4 people under 18. Riqo is barely over that. If you take into 
5 action the AD/HD he was under it. 
6 Ones that are mentally retarded and I understand my 
7 client is not that either, although there is a significant 
8 deviation in his IQ, they have a 69 percent rate. So talk 
9 about empirical studies, there have been. And there are 
10 statistics. And these kind of statistics bode very heavily 
11 against allowing false confessions in the courtroom. 
12 It's interesting to note that counsel in their brief 
13 even states that they acknowledge that people confess falsely, 
14 and I'm reading on page 11. Quote Dr. Of she advances a 
15 proposition that virtually everyone accepts. And I'm presuming 
16 that that means counsel, Mr. Lyons, himself, some criminal 
17 defendants falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. 
18 That's a universal-- everybody accepts that. 
19 He then goes on and this troubles me. From this 
20 Dr. Ofshe makes a second suggestion, so venial as to command an 
21 assent, that the persons involved in or interested in the 
22 criminal justice system should review such cases with the view 
23 to the systematic improvement of the system. Why in the world 
24 if we know there are false confessions and people are convicted 
25 on false confessions, why would we want to review cases with 
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the view of the systematic improvement of the system? 
I mean, if we are looking for truth that's exactly 
what this court has always done, and that what we'll continue 
to do, don't we want to do something that's going to assist the 
trier of fact in arriving at the truth, this systematic 
improvement of the system, is counsel apparently against. 
As far as the rules allowing the admission of this 
8 evidence I think are clear. That if an individual has 
9 expertise and certainly Dr. Ofshe does, he has been doing this 
10 for years, he's testified in a hundred-plus cases. He's been 
11 cited in numerous cases, including those by the Utah Supreme 
12 Court. I think that kind of assistance is beneficial to the 
13 Court and certainly benefinical to the trier of fact, the jury 
14 in this case. 
15 I think it's important --well, again, coming back to 
16 that, everybody recognizes that there are false confessions. 
17 The problem is getting to it. And I want to go through kind of 
18 
19 
an analysis of the Clopten case. And that's boy, this one 
is hot off the press December of 2009. You can't get a more 
20 recent case than Clopten. And that's also a Utah Supreme Court 
21 decision. It was cited if you want it but I don't have the 
22 cite it's in my brief. 
23 THE COURT: Right. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: I have a copy if you want it. 
25 Clopten covered an issue of false eyewitness 
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1 identification. And the Court in Clopten recognized as has the 
2 court previously in the Long decision and it's progeny that 
3 there are significant deficiencies in eyewitness testimony. 
4 And there are a number of people that have been convicted in 
5 eyewitness testimony inappropriately -- or wrongly, I should 
6 say. 
7 They cite these same studies these percentages of the 
8 exonerations in coming to that conclusion. That is, the court 
9 is well aware the -- over 50 percent of the people that have 
10 been exonerated off death row of 159 have been exonerated on 
11 death row over 50 percent were -- there was false eyewitness 
12 identification. 
13 Now, 50 percent versus 15 percent I still think 
14 that's a significant figure and one that certainly would 
15 suggest that the Court allow the testimony of Dr. Ofshe to 
16 instruct and to give information to the jury. 
17 Going through the Clopten decision they made several 
18 specific findings. Number one, is that there was -- there are 
19 a number of bad confessions. We know that happens -- excuse 
20 me, bad eyewitness identifications. Similarly in confessions 
21 we also know that there are a number of bad confessions. The 
22 State acknowledges that ln their brief. It's a well-known 
23 fact. They go through and cite -- I will read a little bit of 
24 their article -- excuse me or the decision. 
25 "In the absence of expert testimony, a defendant is 
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l left with two tools, cross-examination and cautionary 
2 instructions with which to convey the possibility of mistaken 
3 identification to the jury." And then here is the significant 
4 part: "Both of these tools suffer from serious shortcomings 
5 when it comes to addressing the appearance of eyewitness 
6 identification." And I think we have the same problem here. 
7 The problem is that the jury says Oh, Mr. Perea 
8 confessed we don't need to listen to anything else. It's the 
9 same thing as -- and maybe even more so, on eyewitness 
10 identifications, they say, well, somebody identified him we 
ll don't have to go any farther. And the court had recognized 
12 that cross-examinations doesn't help or isn't effective and 
13 it's -- jury instructions as you say, is recommending are also 
14 ineffective. And I would submit that their equally ineffective 
15 in a false confession case. 
16 The Court goes on to say quote such testimony 
17 performs two beneficial functions and he's been talking about 
18 testimony of an expert witness to point out the deficiencies in 
19 eyewitness identifications. And this would be Dr. Dodd at --
20 that they used in that case or wanted to use. It teaches the 
21 jurors about certain factors, such as weapon focus, and weak 
22 correlations between competence and accuracy and has a strong 
23 but counterintuitive impact reliability an eyewitness. In 
24 other words, the testimony enables jurors to avoid concern 
25 common pitfalls. And it goes on. 
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1 Secondly, it assists jurors by quantifying what most 
2 people already know that an expert -- an expert may discuss, 
3 for example, the degree to which an accuracy was affected and 
4 then it goes through some additional criteria. 
5 The case is almost identical on a false confession. 
6 You people know that periodically there is false confession. 
7 The problem is, is cross-examination isn't effective, jury 
8 instruction is ineffective and having an expert witness to get 
9 up and testify that there is that problem is something that 
10 would be extremely beneficial to obtaining the truth in the 
11 verdict, which is the ultimate goal in this case. 
12 One more quote I would like to get and this is a very 
13 short one. Subsequent research however has shown that 
14 cautionary instruction does little to help a jury spot mistaken 
15 identification. I would submit unquote. And I would submit 
16 that the same would be true in a false confession case. 
17 Based upon that, we're asking the Court to do two 
18 things. Number one is allow Dr. Ofshe to testify specifically 
19 as to Mr. Perea. And that given his examination of Mr. Perea, 
20 his review of the records, his tremendous background and 
21 knowledge in this area, that Mr. Perea's confession was tainted 
22 or false. 
23 Secondly, if the Court won't do that, we would ask 
24 the Court to allow Dr. Ofshe to at least come in and testify 
25 similarly to what was allowed in Clopten, to allow him to come 
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1 in and say, hey, there is such a thing as false confession, 
2 there is a number of things that lead up to false confession, 
3 and these are some of the items. Because we know that 
4 cautionary instruction does little according to the Utah 
5 Supreme Court, and we know cross-examination probably does even 
6 less, according to the Utah Supreme Court. 
7 So based upon that we are asking the Court to allow 
8 the full testimony of Dr. Offshe as requested. And if not, as 
9 a fall back position allow him at least to testify as 
10 generalities. Thank you. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Unless you have any questions? 
THE COURT: No. Thank you, Mr. Richards. 
Mr. Lyons, any rebuttal or response? 
MR. LYON: A few things, Your Honor. 
The defense's arguments seems to be based on one more 
16 of emotion. Though the State wants this Court to rule 
17 according to the law and what the law and what the rules state. 
18 First, the defense cites to Retenberger and is that Mauchley or 
19 -- I don't know I'm not sure how to pronounce that. 
20 
21 
22 
MR. RICHARDS: Mauchley. 
MR. LYONS: I'm not sure how to pronounce that case. 
For the proposition that Dr. Ofshe has been cited by 
23 our Utah Supreme Court, I have, in fact, read those cases, and 
24 Mauchley or Mauchley or however you pronounce it, I dealt with 
25 the corpus delicti rule, Retenberger which is completely 
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1 different from what we have here, they cited to as well for 
2 general propositions. 
3 In both of those cases they cite -- they use Dr. 
4 Ofshe for general propositions, stuff that frankly, I think is 
5 common sense. Such as, when an interrogator interrogates a 
6 defendant what they confess to should match the facts of the 
7 case. I mean, honestly, I mean, it's --this is not 
8 groundbreaking research that they are giving here. I mean, 
9 this is really common sense. 
10 The fact that Ofshe had testified in other courts and 
11 in other states doesn't really hold much weight for the State. 
12 As I've indicated before, I think Rimmasch has a much more 
13 stringent standard than perhaps these other states where they 
14 are testifying too. They have cite again, talking before the 
15 Gross study. I think as I have pointed out before, it's 
16 important to note that Ofshe doesn't include this in his 
17 analysis. There is no empirical data that Ofshe relies on that 
18 would suggest that he can testify. 
19 Talking about Clopten, that case is completely 
20 different than what we have here. Both parties agree that 
21 there was a large body of research to show there is a 
22 fallibility in eyewitness identification, both parties agreed 
23 that that met the Rimmasch standards. The trial court still 
24 gave the Long Instruction instead of allowing an expert to come 
25 in and testify. We are -- that is completely different from 
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1 what we have here. We do not agree that Dr. Ofshe meets the 
2 Rirnrnasch standards. Clopten has no precedent in this case. 
3 The defense is wanting you to allow Dr. Ofshe to come 
4 and testify that the defendant's confession was false. Here 
5 again, that goes back to commenting on the credibility of a 
6 witness, which is strictly forbidden. In the alternative they 
7 want you to allow him to come testify as to generalities of 
8 false confessions. And as we've noted in one of our briefs, 
9 Your Honor, that is United States versus Binalli, this is a 
10 situation where -- that they encountered and they found that 
11 the thrust of this sort of testimony is the same. Because some 
12 individuals have falsely confessed then confessions are just as 
13 likely to be false as true. The prejudicial effect of this 
14 testimony substantially outweighs the minimal probative value. 
15 And that is the State's position. 
16 For him to come in and testify -- well, about false 
17 confessions in general, then that's the thrust of his testimony 
18 and that's --the prejudicial effect is --substantially 
19 outweighs the probative value. The State believes that there 
20 is sufficient evidence before this Court based upon the proffer 
21 of these experts for the Court to exclude Dr. Ofshe. Should 
22 the Court disagree the State would request a full Ri~masch 
23 hearing to further question Dr. Ofshe. 
24 Unless the Court has any questions I'll submit. 
25 THE COURT: No. All right. 
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1 Anything else? I think I'm ready to rule on the 
2 issue. 
3 Just by way of background, of course, the Defendant 
4 filed notice that they intended call Dr. Ofshe Dr. Ofshe? 
5 Anyway, we were going to call him as an expert on the subject 
6 of coerced confessions and then the State has filed a motion in 
7 limine to exclude his testimony from coming in. 
8 I guess, the first thing and I don't know how 
9 significant it is, but, you know, originally the defense filed 
10 a motion to suppress the confession. And we did a hearing on 
11 that. And the Court found that the confession was not coerced 
12 and was not involuntary. I don't know how much weight that 
13 carries, but for example I know that I have made that finding. 
14 I know we don't let the jury know that. And there is no way 
15 that either party can let the jury know that the Court has 
16 ruled against the Defendant on a suppression of the confession. 
17 And the reason we don't let them know is that it 
18 would carry way too much weight for the jury. If the jurors 
19 knew that the judge had ruled on this very subject and then 
20 found that the confession was not coerced, I mean, a lot of 
21 them, well, when we're done we find that there is some 
22 legitimacy to the confession. 
23 And I guess, I think that's the right ruling that we 
24 don't let jurors know that. But I'm having trouble with this 
25 concept that somehow we allow an expert to come in and comment 
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1 on the same confession. To say, I find that the confession was 
2 coerced. And I'm just having trouble with slapping this label 
3 on somebody that they are an expert on the subject. I just --
4 I worry that it carries way too much weight with the jury on an 
5 issue that is so critical to the case. 
6 The next thing is I just question whether or not we 
7 need an expert opinion on this subject. I mean, we have almost 
8 reached a point now where we're allowing experts to testify --
9 first of all, we make them an expert and then they testify on 
10 everything. And I know that that is not counsels' fault, but 
11 it's just to me we've turned into, like you say, a battle of 
12 the experts. 
13 You know, the real question here is: Is this 
14 something that really requires expert testimony to assist the 
15 jury in arriving at a decision? I mean, I know we allow 
16 experts on DNA, and fingerprints, and autopsies, and 
17 ballistics. But boy, I just have a tough time believing this 
18 is the type of subject that requires expert testimony. The 
19 problem I'm having is rule 702 that talks about the testimony 
20 of experts. And I just don't think that we can meet the 
21 threshold requirement here, which as read under 702(b) it says: 
22 "If the science or other principles underlying the testimony 
23 meets a threshold showing that they are reliable and are based 
24 upon sufficient facts or data and have been reliably applied to 
25 the facts of the case." 
71 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Noteworthy Reporting Case No. 071901847 
1 And so, I guess I agree with Mr. Lyons. I just don't 
2 know how much reliability this has when we're talking about 
3 whether or not the confession was coerced. I just don't see it 
4 as being a scientific study in that sense. You know, it just 
5 seems to me that a jury of lay people can decide the question 
6 as to whether or not a confession is reliable, involuntary, or 
7 coerced without having an expert testify on that issue. 
8 I just think it's really impossible as I read through 
9 the briefs and the studies. Really it's just impossible to 
10 estimate with any degree of reliability the rate at which false 
11 confessions occur. I think that's really the heart of what 
12 we're talking about. There is just no statistical reliable 
13 evidence. There is no empirical data between the research and 
14 the opinions about the false confessions. 
15 I guess, I put a little more weight into what 
16 Professor Paul Cassell did in his study. As you know, he did 
17 that in 1999 when he was professor of Law at the University of 
18 Utah. Of course, he then went on to become a federal judge. 
19 And then he decided he didn't like doing that so he went back 
20 to teaching law school. But I just thought it was significant 
21 when he said that the success rate to identifying false 
22 confessions is no better than 55 percent. And as Mr. Lyon 
23 pointed out, the likelihood of it being a false confession is 
24 no greater than if we flipped a coin. It's just --to me that 
25 just stuck my mind as being something very significant. And I 
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1 just don't think this is science. I do agree it's -- it may be 
2 his opinion and he's done some studies and he has testified in 
3 other courts. But he's also been excluded from testifying in a 
4 number of courts, too. And I don't know what the percentage is 
5 and I'm not sure that it makes any difference. I don't know 
6 that it makes it right or wrong or admissible or not 
7 admissible. 
8 It just seems to me that certainly cross-examination 
9 of the officers available to the defense to expose the 
10 officers' conduct in obtaining the confession. And certainly 
11 the defense can develop their theory of whether it was a 
12 coerced confession in the argument. I do think that a jury 
13 instruction is appropriate here. And I will give one that 
14 concerns coerced confession. 
15 So based on what I have read in the briefs and also 
16 the oral arguments, the Court is going to grant the State's 
17 motion in limine. And I won't allow Dr. Ofshe to testify 
18 either in generalities about coerced confessions or about the 
19 confession in this particular case. All right. 
Anything else I need to address on 20 
21 MR. RICHARDS: I need to just make a record, if I can 
22 do that real quick. 
23 THE COURT: Sure. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: I just wanted to make sure that the 
25 Court has in the file Dr. Ofshe's opinion letter. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
THE COURT: I do, yeah. 
MR. RICHARDS: And I would like to make that --
THE COURT: Part of the record. 
MR. RICHARDS: part of the record. And that would 
5 be what he would testify to if he were called. 
6 
7 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RICHARDS: I would also like to make a proffer 
8 that if he were called to testify in generalities. He would 
9 lay out some of the stuff he has in the letter that in essence 
10 instruct the jury that there are false confessions. He would 
11 instruct the jury specifically that there are number of factors 
12 that go into that. And then the jury would at least have that 
13 metirum of knowledge. 
14 THE COURT: You attached that to your brief or memo? 
15 MR. RICHARDS: I thought I filed it. 
16 MR. HEWARD: No, there 
17 MR. RICHARDS: I filed it with the expert witness 
18 notice is what I did. If I could submit that I would 
19 appreciate it. 
20 THE COURT: Yeah, look at the file. I think it's 
21 there. But certainly, I don't have any problem with it. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: I filed the expert witness notice with 
23 his cv with his report, I believe. 
24 THE COURT: I thought it was there, too. I don't 
25 have the file here in front of me. 
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1 Does the State have any objection to that? They just 
2 want to make it part of the record. 
3 
4 
MR. SHAW: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else on that, 
5 Mr . Richards? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
MR. RICHARDS: I think that's that on that one. 
THE COURT: Now, 
MR. RICHARDS: Could we visit marital privilege? 
THE COURT: That was the next one I was going to go 
10 to. Well, let me ask. I don't know -- I'm glad to hear from 
11 both sides. But it sounded to me like when I read Mr. Heward's 
12 response he said, number one, they weren't going to use it 
13 unless the Defendant testified or if somehow in all of that 
14 they found a confession. I don't does that help maybe 
15 shorten this? Does it just placate it? 
16 MR. HEWARD: I think you are actually referring 
17 specifically to the jail recordings and that is listed in our 
18 facts. I thought Mr. Richards was going to talk about spousal 
19 privilege. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Let me tell me you what I'm 
21 thinking, before -- and I'm glad to hear from both sides first. 
22 But it just seems to me that -- do I eve~ need to get to the 
23 marital privilege if we're finding that this isn't privileged? 
24 I mean, if it's not-- there is an expectation of privacy. 
25 To me, the real issue here is whether or not when you 
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NATHAN D. LYON,# 10171 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., STE 230 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
JUN td Lll!tl 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COUP"'" 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE DR. OFSHE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUN 0 3 2U1!J 
RIQO MARIANO PEREA, Case No. 071901847 
Defendant. Judge: ERNIE W. JONES 
In preparation for trial, Defendant filed a notice of expert witness stating that Dr. Richard 
Ofshe would testify at trial that the Defendant falsely confessed to police. TI1e State filed a 
motion in limine, requesting that this Court exclude Dr. Ofshe's proposed testimony. Defendant 
filed a response to the State's motion, and this matter came before the court on March 4, 2010. 
Having read the briefs, the studies and applicable literature referenced in the briefs, and heard 
argument, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Dr. Richard Ofshe has a background as a professor of sociology, teaching at the 
University of California from 1981 to 2003. 
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2. Dr. Ofshe has authored several books and numerous articles in the field of 
sociology. 
3. Dr. Ofshe has also authored several articles dealing with the topic of false 
confessions. 
4. In research and writing these articles, Dr. Ofshe relies on specific cases where a 
false confession has been given. These false confession cases, however, are not 
uniformly accepted within the scientific community as being valid false 
confession cases. 
5. Based upon these cases, Dr. Ofshe identifies police tactics and common signs 
amongst suspects who allegedly falsely confessed. 
6. The methodology employed Dr. Ofshe in identifying false confessions is not 
generally accepted within the scientific community. 
7. Dr. Ofshe has never conducted a random sample of suspects interrogated by 
police to verify whether these factors he identifies as producing a false confession 
did in fact produce a false confession. 
8. Beyond identifying common characteristics of alleged false confessions, Dr. 
Ofshe has never attempted to quantify his theories through any sort of empirical 
data. 
9. Dr. Of she has not relied on any studies analyzing empirical data gathered from a 
random sample of suspects interrogated by police regarding false confessions. 
2 
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10. Dr. Ofshe's hypothesis that certain police interrogation methods produce false 
confessions lacks support from any empirical data and have not been adequately 
studied. 
11. Professor Paul Cassell is a professor oflaw at tt~e University of Utah and a retired 
federal district court judge. 
12. Professor Cassell has researched and studied the area of false confessions. 
13. Professor Cassell has reviewed and critiqued researched and writing done by Dr. 
Ofshe. 
14. In reviewing cases cited by Dr. Ofshe as a false confession, Professor Cassell 
concludes that Dr. Ofshe was only able, at best, to correctly identify a false 
confession 55% of the time. 
15. Professor Cassell has performed random samplings of criminal cases in efforts to 
determine the rate of false confessions. In this random sampling, not a single case 
showed any evidence of a false confession. 
16. Dr. Ofshe formed an opinion in this case based upon the Defendant's written 
confession to police, the testimony of the interrogating detectives from the 
hearing for the motion to suppress, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, 
transcript of a phone conversation, selected portion of the police report, Detective 
Gent's handwritten notes, handwritten notes of Defendant, an interview 
conducted with Defendant. 
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17. Based upon this material, Dr. Ofshe opined that the detectives coerced and 
psychologically manipulated Defendant into confessing to a crime he did not 
commit. 
18. The Cou...-1. finds Dr. Ofshe's opinion to be unreliable. 
19. The Court finds the research and conclusions ofProfessor Cassell to be more 
reliable. 
20. Given the research performed by Dr. Ofshe and Professor Cassell, it is impossible 
to estimate with any degree of reliability the rate at which false confessions occur. 
21. There is no empirical data or credible research that supports Dr. Ofshe's opinions 
regarding false confessions. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has previously ruled that Defendant's confession was voluntary. Dr. Ofshe's 
proposed testimony that Defendant's testimony was coerced is a legal conclusion 
previously rejected by the Court and invades the fact finding function of the jury. 
2. Dr. Ofshe's proposed testimony comments on the reliability or unreliability of the 
witnesses. Witness credibility determinations are reserved exclusively for the jury, and 
thus violates Utah Rules of Evidence 608(a). 
3. Dr. Ofshe's conclusions do not meet the Rimmasch standard because they are based upon 
principles not generally accepted within the scientific community. 
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4. Dr. Ofshe's conclusions do not meet the Rimmasch standard because they are not based 
upon data gathered through acceptable research methods. 
5. Dr. Ofshe's conclusions do not meet the Rimmasch standard because there have been 
insufficiet1t studies regarding the area of false confessions to sho\v a large enough sa.111ple 
to establish a clear trend over numerous tests. 
6. Under Rimmasch and its progeny, Dr. Ofshe's opinions do not meet the inherent reliably 
threshold. 
7. Because Dr. Ofshe's testimony does not meet the standards set forth in Rimmasch, and 
his testimony would comment on the credibility of the witnesses, permitting his 
testimony regarding generalities of false confessions violates Utah Rules of Evidence 
401. 
8. The jury is capable of making determinations of witness credibility and Defense Counsel 
has an opportunity to cross examine witnesses regarding the reliability of Defendant's 
confession. 
9. Because the jury can make these determinations, permitting Dr. Of she to testify as to the 
characteristics of false confessions and false confessions in general amounts to an 
unreliable and irrelevant lecture. 
10. Given Dr. Ofshe's impressive credentials, even permitting Dr. Ofshe to speak in 
generalities about false confessions creates a danger that his testimony would unduly 
influence and invade the jury's exclusive role as fact finder, and thus the prejudicial 
5 
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Rules of Evidence 40 I. 
ORDER 
Based on the Court's foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court 
grants the State's Motion in Limine and hereby prohibits the proposed testimony of Dr. 
Richard Ofshe. · 
/1 
DATED ~day ofMay, 2010 
6 C01Gl4 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7 ~ 
In some situations, an individual might falsely confess to committing a 
crime that was never committed or was committed by someone else. Therefore, a 
defendant cannot be convicted solely on the basis of statements made out of court, 
without corroborating evidence of the reliability of the statements. It is the duty of the 
jury, in evaluating the defendant's statements, to determine for itself whether the 
defendant's statements are sufficiently trustwmihy for consideration. The jury must 
independently decide what weight, if any, it wishes to give to the defendant's 
statements in making its decision. 
The jury may consider whether or not the defendant's statements fit or are 
consistent with the known facts and circumstances of the crime. 
The jury may also consider whether or not the defendant's statements 
demonstrate that the defendant had specific personal knowledge of details of the crime 
that were not made public or suggested by police, and would not be easily guessed. 
The jury may also consider the following factors, or any other factors it 
deems appropriate, in determining the credibility of the defendant's statements: 
1. Evidence as to the spontaneity of the statement; 
2. Whether deception, trick, threats, or promises were used to obtain the 
statement; 
3. The defendant's physical and mental condition, including age,. . 
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education, and experience; and 
4. Whether an attorney was present when the statement was given. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
Februa:z:y 26, 2010 
PROCEEDINGS 
* * * 
THE COURT: All right. We 1 re back in session. I 
5 always forget about the court reporter. She 1 s over there 
6 frantically working. If you need a break, make a signal or 
7 give me a sign. Okay? 
8 :MR. HEWARD: There is one --
9 THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 
10 :MR.. HEWARD: There is one issue I 1 d like to address 
11 just before M,... Shaw goes into the other motion or some of the 
12 other motions. 
13 There was a discussion earlier about Mr. Richards 
14 having already consulted with Mr. Cole. Based upon -- on this 
15 case. And based upon that we would object to Mr. Cole being 
16 considered. I think there needs to be truly independent sides, 
17 someone who has no notice, no relationship, no allegiance to 
18 anyone. And I believe by Mr. EUc.~ds making that 
19 representation, that that would not qualify. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me talk to Mr. Balis and 
21 Mr. Cole. That might solve the problem. 
22 :MR.. HEWARD: Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: Did you want to deal then with the motion 
24 in limine on Mr. Gaskill? 
25 MR. SHAW: That's fine, your Honor. Let me also mark 
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1 this if we may as No. 2. And if I might hand this. to the 
2 court. It 1 s Exhibit 1. That is the report that we received 
3 from counsel dated February 4th, 2010 from James H. Gaskill, 
4 consultant in forensic science. 
5 Your Honor, talking with Mr. Richards, my proposal 
6 would be that we address our motion in limine as follows: 
7 First, I want to address the content of Mr. Gaskill 1 s report 
8 generally, and that 1 s why I think it 1 s irrportant to go through 
9 this. And then we recognize in looking at this that 
10 Mr. Gaskill is likely going to be qualified to testify to 
11 certain tb~ngs. 
12 
13 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SHAW: The problem I have at this jU-"'l.cture 
14 primarily is with the way some of these opinions are phrased in 
15 this report. And I think it 1 s improper for Mr. Gaskill to 
16 testify as to this report reflects in certain circumstances. 
17 l'.nd if I might, I would just like to go through the report and 
18 point those issues out to the court. 
19 T'ne first paragraph talks about the information that 
20 Mr. Gaskill reviewed. The first sentence after that says, "My 
21 investigation leads me to question the accuracy of statements 
22 made by several witnesses in this case. " 
23 An expert does not get to take the witness stand and 
24 start questioning the accuracy of witnesses. He cannot testify 
25 in the fo:r:m. of an expert opinion as to a witness 1 s credibility. 
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1 And so we want a very clear instruction relative to that. 
2 Mr. Gaskill can tell this court and this jw:y what he 1 s done in 
3 investigating this case, he can talk about his qualifications 
4 and he can render opinions, but to phrase an opinion in that 
5 context is improper. It 1 s an improper characterization of his 
6 opinion, and it is essentially telling the jurors don't believe 
7 these witnesses because I don't. And that's clearly improper. 
8 And so that' s our objection, number one. 
9 If you look -- if you look down at the second-to-last 
10 paragraph on page 1, it says, "Several of the witnesses also 
11 claim to have seen the Defe..T'ldant well e..T'lough to recognize 'him 
12 and see a gun in his hand. This event occurred at night and 
13 the area's not well lit" -- well light -- well lit it should 
14 say. "In a reconstruction conducted by me and several persons 
15 associated with your office," this is talking to Mr. Richards, 
16 "on a night similar of the one in question we found it 
17 impossible to distin~Jish an individual more than five to 
18 six feet away, let alone describe a gun in someone' s hand at 
19 that distance. n 
20 Again, that opinion is couched in a claim essentially 
21 questioning the credibility of witnesses. When he phrases tl-~t 
22 opinion saying several witnesses said this, that's improper. 
23 Again, that's a characterization of witnesses' testimony. And 
24 that should not be allowed under any of the rules of evidence. 
25 Again, the next paragraph, one of the cLoceased 
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1 victims was shot in the chest as she was running away from the 
2 roadway and the second surviving victim was shot in the back 
3 while his testimony clearly states he was facing the shooter. 
4 Again, Mr. Gaskill is presumably reviewing 
5 preliminary hearing testimony and making assumptions which he 
6 is prepared to testify about regarding that witness's 
7 credibility at the preliminary hearing or at trial. And that 
8 is clearly not the proper realm of an expert witness. 
9 Again, now look at the second page, we have more of 
10 the same, last sentence, "There are numerous ways this shooting 
11 could have happe..11ed but t..'l,e one presented by the ~'litnesses 
12 seems impossible. " Again, I just want to make this very clear, 
13 Mr. Gaskill cannot render opinions in that fashion such that he 
14 questions credibility of witnesses in his statements in front 
15 of that jury. He can say, my investigation leads me to fonn an 
16 opinion thus and so, but: he cannot attack the witnesses in his 
17 statem.e..'""lts. And that's our primary objection to tt~t. 
18 We would -- we would propose to just put 
19 Mr. Gaskill -- Mr. Richards may want to respond first, but we 
20 would propose to have Mr. Gaskill take the stand and I would 
21 like to question t.d.m reg-eliding his resume, CV and some of his 
22 qualifications and then readdress the court. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: Why don't we do that, and I can just 
24 address it all, or however you want me -- do you want me to 
25 address the issue? 
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1 THE COURT: Well, why don' t we have Mr. Gaskill 
2 testify so we can get him out of here and have he won't have to 
3 spend all day waiting. I mean, it' s up to you. 
4 :MR. RICHARDS: It doesn't matter to me. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Gaskill, did anybody notice you've 
6 become a T.V. celebrity? If you want to know what he does on 
7 weekends he was up at the Gorge. That was good, Jim. You 
8 looked really good. 
9 THE WITNESS: Well, not that I saw anybody about 
10 that. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
THE COURT: So now he's an expert on fisr..ing too. 
* * * * 
JAMES H. GASKILL, 
cal.led by the State, having been dul.y 
Swo.:rn, is examined and testifies as follows: 
* * * 
17 :MR. SHAW: Let's offer also Exhibits 1 and 2 
18 fonnally. 
19 THE COURT: Any objection? One is the report. I 
20 believe No. 2 is his curriculum vitae. 
21 MR. RIC'dARDS: No objection. 
22 THE COURT: I '11 ac:hni t Exhibits P-1 and P-2 . 
23 (State's Exhibit Nos. 1 & 2 
24 
25 I 
Were received into evidence. ) 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHAW: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Good morning, Mr. Gaskill. 
Good morning. 
State your full name for the record. 
James H. Gaskill. 
How old are you? 
68. Almost 68 . 
Okay. And can you explain your current occupation? 
CUrrently I'm semi-retired. I have an adjunct 
professor position at Weber State University, and I do a little 
consulting. 
Q. Okay. Do you have a copy of your resume in front of 
you or do you need one? 
A. I have one with me. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Do you have one? 
I can give you one. That's a copy of what's been 
19 marked as Exhibit 2 in this case, which is your resume, is it 
20 not? 
21 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Okay. And how current is it? 
I'm not exactly sure when I last updated it. Last 
24 year or so. 
25 Q. Okay. CUrrent within the last year? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Probably. Yeah. 
Okay. I want to ask you just same ver.y general 
3 questions about it and then same specific questions about it. 
4 Your education is indicated as a Master of Science in Biology 
5 at the University of Utah, right? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Attained in 1970? 
Yes. 
Q. You also have a Bachelor of Science Zoology, 
University of Utah in 1967. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Then you list same specialized training 
courses in that resume starting in 1971 and then continuing 
14 down through 2005. Do you see where I am looking? 
15 A. I do. 
16 Q. Okay. And I would like to know specifically in the 
17 general sense whether any of these specialized trair..ing 
18 courses, and if you recall and can point out specifically which 
19 ones, whether or not they dealt with crime scene investigation. 
20 A. Virtually all of them dealt with crime scene 
21 investigation. 
22 Q. How do you define crime scene investigation? 
23 A.' I define crime scene investigation as examining what 
24 went on in a crime in attempting to reconstruct or detennine 
25 what occurred in the commission of that crime. 
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Q. Okay. And is crime scene investigation different 
than forensics? 
A. Crime scene investigation is part of forensics. 
Q. How does it differ? 
A. I don 1 t, I don 1 t know that we can -- forensic is a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
very broad ternt. It includes civil matters, it includes 
criminal matters, it includes every science from psychiatry to 
chemistry to physics to biology. Anytime scientists attempt to 
evaluate a legal issue from a scientific point of view, that 1 s 
forensics. 
Q. All right. And specifically what I am interested in 
12 is your qualifications because you carry yourself as a 
13 forensics scientist, do you not? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
I do. 
And what I am interested in is the difference that 
16 you perceive in this case as a forensic scientist versus the 
17 person on the ground at the crime scene. Jl...re t'lere 
18 differences? 
19 A. The person on the crime scene is a forensic 
20 scientist. By definition that 1 s part of the umbrella of 
21 forensic scierJ.ce. That po-rson may have a specialized area in 
22 which he or she only takes photographs, for example, or only 
23 collects fingerprints, for example. Or that person may have a 
24 general knowledge of many areas, so it may take photographs, 
25 may collect evidence, may actually conduct examinations, 
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1 chemical or physical examinations on the scene. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 I 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
So the idea that somehow only the person who goes to 
the crime scene is a crime scene investigator, or only someone 
who -- doesn't do anything else is a crime scene investigator, 
many forensic scientists go to an occasional crime scene. Many 
go to lots of crime scene. Sometimes people who go to crime 
scene, that' s what they what they do. They don' t do 
anything else. So it's not like we can unentangle that crime 
scene investigator from the rest of forensic science. 
Q. And since you bring that up, when is the last crime 
scene t.'h.at you investigated or physically appe= .. red at during 
the course of the crime scene investigation itself? In other 
words --
A. Well, as I would define that, the last time --
Q. I 'm not asking you to define it. I'm asking you when 
~cifically was the last time you personally were on a crime 
scene as law enforcement or CSI processing the scene? When is 
the last time that happened for you? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
January of this year. 
January of this year? 
That's correct. 
Where -- where and when ~cifically? 
In fact, it was at the scene of the crime we're 
discussing today. 
Q. Well, but I 'm talking about when, when law 
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1 enforcement is processing the scene, when's the last time you 
2 were out on a crime scene contemporaneously with law 
3 enforcement as they processed the scene? When did that happen 
4 last for you? 
5 A. I don't know. That would be quite a few years ago 
6 that I went with law enforcement. Just because I went with law 
7 enforcement doesn't-- or didn't go with -law enforcement, 
8 doesn' t mean I wasn't investigating the crime scene. 
9 Q. Objection to that response and move that it be 
10 stricken. The question was, how many years for you? 
11 A. I don't :know. 
12 Q. I want a ruling, your Honor, first. 
13 THE COURT: Sustained. 
14 MR. SHAW: It was not responsive. 
15 THE COURT: I' 11 sustain the objection but 
16 Q. (BY MR. SHAW) When was the last time for you? 
17 A. I don't recal.l the last time. It would have been 
18 several years. 
19 Q. Several and several years meaning more than five, 
20 more than 10, more than 15? 
21 A. Probably, probably five. I -- it would have been a 
22 long time ago because I -- my official capacity has changed in 
23 those years. So I don't typically go with law enforcement 
24 anymore. 
25 Q. Okay. It's true, is it not, that you were relieved 
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1 of your duties at the crime lab, former Weber State Crime Lab 
2 in 1994 or five? 
3 A. I think that it was -- it may have been '93. 
4 Q. Okay. I 'm looking at your resume, page 2, where you 
5 say, Crime Lab Director Weber State University. And so I am 
6 correct, 1972 to 1994? 
7 A. Yeah, I 1m saying there may be -- that may be 
8 incorrect. It may be 1 93. 
9 Q. It may be 1 93. Okay. While we 1 re on that subject, 
10 can you tell me the circumstances of your leaving or of the 
11 cri.'Ue lab demise at Weber State? 
12 A. In -- in the early nineties, 1 93, 1 94, somewhere in 
13 that time period, t.l-:te Weber State University Crime Laboratory 
14 was part of the State Department of Public Safety umbrella, 
15 although we were never actually completely affiliated with 
16 them. They didn 1 t control us. They didn 1 t -- they weren 1 t our 
17 bosses so to speak. That relationsi".ip dissolved. I don 1 t know 
18 how much detail you want. 
19 Q. .P..s much as you recall. 
20 A. Well, it was a pretty big part of my life for several 
21 months. I don' t know that everything I recall would be 
22 relevant to this, but it was a mutual agreement. We agreed to 
23 let the state do all the crime lab work officially, and Weber 
24 State would get out of the business. It was a matter that was 
25 done administratively, and I didn 1 t do it, nor did I object to 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
it. But I'd always been a member of the faculty, so I simply 
stopped doing crime lab work and started full-time teaching. 
Q. Was there an event or were there events that 
precipitated the crime lab's demise --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- specifically that you recall? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Several. 
can you tell us what those were? 
I think they were primarily budgetary. The state 
10 didn't want to fund us adequately. And Weber State said we 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
can't continue to ~..Jbsidize t.'l-).e operation of t.'l-).e laboratory. 
And there were some allegations which were never proven or 
established. 
Q. Allegations of misconduct? 
A. I think you could say that there were some 
allegations of some misconduct and there were some allegations 
of misconduct is as good a word as a..?J.y, I g'..less . 
Q. I 'm sorry. I didn't hear your answer. 
A. I said misconduct is probably as good a word as any. 
Q. Were there also allegations of being incompetent? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Excuse me? 
Not -- I was never confronted 
Not that involved you? 
-- with allegations of incompetence, no. 
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1 Q. Not that involved you. Is that fair? 
2 A. I don 1 t know of any that alleged the lab was 
3 incorrpetent. 
4 Q. You were responsible, however, for all activities at 
5 the crime lab according to your resume. Is that correct? 
6 A. That is correct. 
7 Q. And responsible for all personnel at the crime lab, 
8 correct? 
9 A. That is correct. 
10 Q. Okay. I want to go back to page 1 of your resume. 
11 You 1 ve indicated that virtually all of t.~ose special training 
12 seminars would have included same crime scene investigation 
13 type instruction. Is that correct? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you able to look at those seminars and tell us 
specifically what agendas were on each of those at this point 
in your career? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have any certifications, certificates of 
completion for those specialized training seminars? 
A. I might r.ld.ve a few, but not many. The FBI Academy 
training, I probably could produce a certificate. I could 
certainly produce a report card that says I passed, but most of 
24 t.."lese, there were not certifications generated. Certification 
25 was pretty much a non-issue in the early years. So we went and 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
we learned and we discussed and we moved on. 
Q. Okay. So as I understand your testimony then, you 
might be able to produce one certificate of completion or a 
report card for that seminar? 
A. Yeah, I might be able to. These are pretty old, and 
I'm not one that saves everything .in my life. 
Q. Okay. So you have no agendas, correct, for any of 
these s~s? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You have -- you have one certificate of completion or 
report card? 
A. 
Q. 
I think so. 
Okay. And I'm not going to hold you to that. You 
14 think so. That' s fine. But have you -- as you s.i t here today, 
15 you can't recall the curriculum for these particular seminars 
16 from 1971 to 2005 --
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
That's right. 
-- or can you? 
No, I cannot. 
I had a question relative to the number of times 
21 you've testified. You indicate on page 2 of the resmne that, 
22 again, looking at previous employment, if you want to refer to 
23 that with me, you talk about the crime lab director, and I 
24 believe the third full sentence or maybe the fourth full 
25 sentence you say approximately 2000 cases were processed each 
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1 year ranging from misdemeanor to capital homicides. And you 
2 say, "I've testified more than 1500 times in cases from simple 
3 drug possession to one which involved Ted Bundy. " Can you give 
4 me the ~ifics of the case in which you testified involving 
5 Mr. Ted Bundy? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Go ahead. 
8 A. This is a case I believe that the state prosecuted 
9 him for aggravated kidnapping. I'm not sure of the charge. It 
10 involved a young woman who was in a shopping mall in Salt Lake 
11 and was confronted by a.'l ;ndividual and a str.1ggle e..'lsued, to 
12 make things brief, in which blood was transferred onto this 
13 woman 1 s coat. I typed the blood and subsequently typed the 
I 
14 blood of Ted Bundy. Testified in court that they were the 
15 same, the same blood. 
16 Q. Okay. Then again, looking at page 3 of your resume 
17 under legal ex:p:=o_rience, you indicate you 1 ve testified more than 
18 2000 times. And I'm not, I'm not ti:ying to be nasty here, but 
19 which is it, 1500 times or 2000 times? 500, that's a lot of 
20 difference in my view. 
21 ... ~. You know, I 1 ve really -- I've tried a couple of times 
22 to figure out exactly how many times I've testified. And 
23 it's -- certainly it's much closer to 2000 than 1500. It's 
24 more than likely more than 2000. 
25 Q. Over what period of time? 
JAMES H. GASKILL - Direct by MR. SHAW 19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 A. 1971 to the present. 
2 Q. Okay. And your testimony from '72 to '94 would have 
3 been primarily for the state? 
4 A. Primarily but not exclusively. 
5 Q. Okay. You testified for defense on occasion then? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. And in the last, what, 15, 16 years from '94 
8 through the present has your testimony been for the state or 
9 for the defense primarily? 
10 A. PrObably 50/50. 
11 Q. Okay. Do you keep an ongoing +-=!.] ly as to the cases 
12 you've testified in for the state versus the defense? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
You've never kept a record such as that? 
No. 
So there's no way to check that? 
It would be pretty laborious. A lot of courts. 
No way for counsel to check it certainly, right, 
19 because you haven't kept a record? 
20 A. I haven' t kept a record. Courts keep records . If 
21 you wanted to go back to all the courts a.1'1d go through every 
22 case, you could figure it out. But I've testified in 28 of 29 
23 counties in Utah and testified in Idaho and testified in 
24 Wyoming and testified in Nebraska, and so I don't know that 
25 there' s any way that realistically you could do that. 
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'· 
You could have, of course, kept track? 
I could have, but I didn 1 t. 
1 
2 
3 
Q. 
A. 
Q. Okay. Now, do you, do you consider yourself to have 
4 an area of expertise in forensic science that you consider 
5 yourself better trained at than other areas? 
6 A. I -- there 1 s same areas that I would think that I 1m 
7 stronger in than other areas, yes. 
8 Q. Tell me what those are. 
9 A. I don 1 t do any toxicology; that is, analysis of body 
10 fluids and tissues for the presence of toxins. I don 1 t do 
11 hand\'Iriti.."lg compariso!".s. So those would be two areas +hat are 
12 generally forensic science areas. 
13 I think bloodstain analysis, firea.nn.s comparison and 
14 generally trace evidence would be my strongest areas. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Bloodstain, firear.ms and trace evidence? 
Correct. 
Are you a certified associate or member of 14-.FI'E? 
No. 
Okay. You know what AFrE is, right? 
I do. 
What is AFTE? 
Association of Firear.m and Tool Mark Examiners. 
Have you ever been certified? 
No. 
Do you know what it takes to be certified? 
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1 A. No, not offhand. I think I've looked at those 
2 qualifications before, but I've ·never -- I haven't memorized 
3 them. 
4 Q. Okay. Do you teach firearms examination at Weber 
5 State College? 
6 A. I teach it as part of a class that I teach. It's not 
7 a class that we devote the entire semester to, but, yes, I do. 
8 Q. What class specifically? 
9 A. CUrrently it's Criminal Justice 1350. 
10 Q. Criminal Justice 1350? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. And that aspect of firear.ms training in the context 
13 of Criminal Justice 1350 is what percentage of the course? 
14 A. Maybe 15 percent. 
15 Q. 15 percent, maybe? All right. Do you teach at Weber 
16 State presently classes involving the examination of bullet 
17 impact on glass? 
18 A. I deal with that somewhat in the same class, but 
19 I again, the class, the upper division classes which I started in 
20 which I taught for 30 years, we spent a lot more time then than 
21 I do now on an adjunct basis. 
22 Q. And is that -- is glass examination part of that 
23 Criminal Justice 1350 or not? 
24 A. It is. 
25 Q. Okay. And what percentage? 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Oh, 5 percent. 
Okay. Since you add -- since you added, how long ago 
since you were a full professor or a retired professor? 
A. I am originally retired in 2000. And then I was 
hired back for a couple of years. So I'm thinking 2004, 2005. 
I'm not really sure exactly how that -- I'm not exactly sure 
what years I stopped being full time and became part time. 
Q. Over the years in your employment at Weber State as a 
professor full time, did your teaching of classes relative to 
criminalistics and criminal justice ever involve, say, more 
t.~"'l 15 percent delegated to firearms examination or training? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Can you tell me what specific classes would 
14 have involved more than that? 
15 
16 
17 
A. The classes that are currently being taught would be 
Q. I mean, b-.f you, what you 
18 A. Right. I'm saying those classes evolved over the 
19 years. 
20 Q. Okay. 
21 A. So originally there was a class, an upper division 
22 class that we called crim.inalistics; about a fourth of that 
23 would have been fireanns training. That evolved into now a 
24 class in which about 50 percent is firearms and tool marks and 
25 impressions . 
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1 Q. Do you teach that class? 
2 A. Not currently but I have, and I started it. 
3 Q. Okay. When was the last time that you taught that 
4 class? 
5 A. Several years ago. I don't remember exactly what 
6 years I did or did not teach a class. 
7 Q. Okay. And I understand. More than five, though, or 
8 more than 10? Can you tell me? 
9 A. Not more than 10, but maybe more than five, maybe 
10 right around five. 
11 Q. Okay. N0\'-1 ra"l you tell me what specific trair.ing you 
12 have relative to reconstruction of a crime scene? 
13 A. Well, I started my career with the state medical 
14 examiner. 
15 Q. And let me do this. Let me do this because I 'm 
16 interested to know training relevant to this particular case 
17 a."'ld your opir..ions form_~ ~"'l this case. Okay? If tr..a.t helps 
18 you in your answer. I don't, I don't expect you to go through 
19 ev~~thing, just what you've done with regard to reconstruction 
20 of this case and the training that you believe supports your 
21 opinions. 
22 A. Okay. I received training at the State Medical 
23 Examiner's Office in gunshot wounds and trajectories and 
24 general homicide investigation techniques. 
25 Q. When was that? 
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A. Sixty-seven through 1 70. I went to Santa Clair 
County Laboratory Criminalistics as a research associate. I 
trained there for three months in the summer of 1970. Received 
training in all the general areas of crime lab including crime 
scene investigation, went to crime scenes, went to other 
laboratories, went to the California State Crime Lab, received 
training in firea.nns, received training from the people in the 
Santa Clair County Lab, which included same of the pre-eminent 
forensic scientists of the day Lo Phong and Alfred Besoy 
(phonetic), to name two. 
The..'rl e\T9..."'Y H me 'tle I d go to a SE!I'.inar I a."ld these are 
the major seminars that I attended that are on my resumes, then 
we received additional training, workshops and so forth. And 
as I said before, I can 1 t tell you exactly which one of these. 
Same of them I might recall but not -- I can 1 t give you 
specifics. So it 1 s been -- it 1 s been a 40-yea.r training. 
Q. Okay. How do you define reconstruction for pw:poses 
of your forensic expertise? 
A. Well, reconstruction is when you attempt to after the 
fact dei:el:mine things that occurred. 
Q. Okay. Is it inportant after the fact to base your 
ultimate reconstruction opinion on evidence, physical evidence 
found at the scene? 
A. Absolutely that 1 s part of it. 
Q. Also important to base your opinion on testimony? 
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1 A. Everything we can find out about it is what we base 
2 our opinion on. 
3 Q. Okay. And you've really listed, I guess, in your 
4 reports same of the things that you would consider in 
5 reconstruction, correct, by listing those eight items at page 1 
6 of your report as things you examined in this particular case, 
7 right? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
Right. 
Is it also important, though, to fonn an opinion 
10 based upon all of those factors, physical evidence, witness 
11 testi.'!'.ony, autopsy reports? I mean in other words, you don't 
12 just came up with opinion randomly, you want to base it on 
13 underlying facts and data, correct? 
14 A. Exactly. 
15 Q. And you think you've done that in this particular 
16 case? 
17 A. I do. 
18 Q. I want to go to your report a little bit. Do you 
19 have a copy of that? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
I do. 
You note in your report -- let' s see -- you note in 
22 your report at 12 , the big paragraph in the middle of page 1 
23 that you have not seen any evidence that the cases, that is the 
24 22 caliber cases recovered from the scene were examined for 
25 fingerprints, right? 
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1 A. That's what it says. And at that time I did not have 
2 reports from the Weber County CSI. Subsequent I received those 
3 reports. 
4 Q. That' s what I wanted to know. Have you received 
5 those yet? 
6 A. I have. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And you looked at that data? 
I have. 
Do you have any problems with that particular data? 
No. 
11 Q. Do you think it was done campeta~tly and correctly? 
12 In so far as you can tell from the report at least? 
13 A. Yeah. These are all my students. I trust them. 
14 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, I'm going to object at 
15 this point. My understanding of this hearing is that we are 
16 looking at his qualifications. I don't want this to turn into 
17 a practice ~Tt'..ir..ation of Professor Gaskill. I don't have that 
18 opportunity to depose, or whatever you want to call it, their 
19 expert witnesses. I don' t think they should have that 
20 opportunity at this point to do the same with my experts. They 
21 got the report. They can go through the qualifications . We 
22 can argue the qualifications . Most of it goes to weight or 
23 credibility rather than qualifications, but I don't want it to 
24 at least evolve somehow into cross examination of Mr. Gaskill. 
25 MR. SHAW: That's fair. That's fair enough with 
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1 respect to the last question. 
2 THE COURT: But I guess one of the questions that I 
3 have, is your motion to preclude him from testifying or just 
4 restrict what he testifies? 
5 MR. SHAW: Restrict. Yeah, we -- and I thought I 
6 made that clear early on. That's the motion. 
7 THE COURT: You're not objecting to him testifying as 
8 an expert; you're just saying 
9 
10 
MR. SHAW: Right. 
THE COURT: -- you want it limited to what he 
11 testifies to? 
12 MR. SHAW: Right. As I reviewed the memorandum we 
13 filed in support of our initial motion and then had a further 
14 opportu.."li. ty to review this, that's our position. But with 
15 regard to the last question, that's fine. I '11 strike that. 
16 
17 
18 
THE COURT: So I' 11 sustain the objection. 
MR. SH.~: That's fine. 
THE COURT: We' 11 sustain your objection. 
19 Q. (BY Mt<.. SHAW) :VJOving down, though, relative to your 
20 report, I do want to know upon what facts and data you relied 
21 to detennine as you say in the last paragraph on page 1, "One 
22 of the deceased victims was shot in the chest as she was 
23 running away from the roadway, and a second surviving victim 
24 was shot in the back while his testimony clearly states he was 
25 facing the shooter. " 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: And I 'm going to renew my objection. 
2 I guess we're getting into his deposition area. I don't think 
3 that's appropriate in this case in this --
4 THE COURT: Well, I agree this isn't a dry run, but I 
5 do want to give you a little leeway on trying to explore the 
6 issues as to what he can or can't testify. 
7 MR. SHAW: Yeah, I just want to know what facts 
8 specifically with regard to that statement that he relied on. 
9 MR.. RICHARDS: Well, would I have an opportunity to 
10 examine all their experts? 
11 
12 limine 
THE COURT: Well, I guess you can file a motion in 
that's what it is designed for to figure out whether 
13 or not the witness can testify and if so to what. 
14 Go ahead, Mr. Shaw. 
15 MR. RICHARDS: These are really trial objections 
16 rather than --
17 THE COURT: I agree wi ~"1. your ~"leo:cy that this is not 
18 a dry run; it's not a mini trial but 
19 MR. SHAW: And so do I. 
20 THE COURT: -- that's why we do the motion is to 
21 figure out where we're going with r.Lis testimony. So go ahead. 
22 Q. (BY MR. SHAW) Can you answer that question? 
23 A. Do you want to repeat the question? 
24 Q. Yeah. What facts and data did you rely upon for the 
25 opinion reflected in your last -- in the last paragraph of 
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1 page 1? 
2 A. The location of the gunshot wounds I relied on the 
3 report from the state medical examiner on the deceased victim 
4 and medical reports which I received regarding the second 
5 surviving victim. And as far as their position, I relied on 
6 testimony of the preliminary hearing testimony from an 
7 individual with the deceased who testified they were running 
8 away. And the second surviving victim testified that he was, 
9 in fact, facing the roadway and watching the shots being fired. 
10 So that 1 s what I relied on. 
11 Q. Okay. You made same stateme.'1ts on page 2 about the 
12 directionality of the glass shatter in the white Cavalier. Do 
13 you recall that? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell me the facts and data upon which you 
base your opinion in that the right-rear passenger window of 
t."le Cavalier was broke.."'l from a shooter shootL'""lg from the inside 
out? 
:MR. RIC"'.dA...'RDS : Again, your Honor, I 1m going to renew 
20 my objection. Mr. Shaw says, no, I realize I can 1 t do that and 
21 then he does it. It's a d1:y run of the trial. 
22 THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
23 A. If you 1 11 allow me to mention the report, I said 
24 photos indicate that the hole in the passenger window was made 
25 from the inside of the car, not the outside of the car. So it 
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2 
3 
may be somewhat of a mischaracterization to say I call it a 
bullet hole. 
Q. Okay. 
4 A. But, but I relied on the photos --
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. -- for my decision. 
7 Q. Simply photographs, correct? 
8 A. Correct. And 40 years of experience. 
9 Q. Okay. But what I am asking for is you are looking at 
10 photos. Clearly you would agree, would you not, that on-site 
11 exa1nination would be better than photograp1ls? 
12 A. Depends on who is making the examination. I would 
13 certainly prefer to see firsthand. If you are asking me would 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
I rather see firsthand than see a photo, of course. 
Q. Okay. So there are -- you would agree that there are 
limitations with regard to photographs being take."l of glass 
shatters tl'-.Leit may or may not support t.'l-}e opinion? 
MR. RICHARDS: I renew my objection. 
MR. SF..AW: W.:::oil, wait a minute. T'nat's clearly --
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. 
21 A. Certainly you could take, you could take a photograph I 
22 that wouldn' t show you anything. You could take a photograph 
23 that would be perfectly clear that would, that would answer the 
24 question just as well as being there. Photographs can be done 
25 that are fine. Everyone would agree with that. If you don't 
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1 have the window, then you look at what you have. That's what 
2 we do as forensic scientists; we look at what we have and we 
3 always wish we had more and we always wish we'd been there to 
4 see it happen, but we never are, so we have to use what we 
5 have. 
6 Q. Okay. So do I understand your testimony then 
7 relative to that window shatter, is you are not saying that it 
8 was a bullet hole? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't have any evidence that it was a bullet hole. 
Okay. Could have been anything? 
It had to be something travelling very fast. 
Okay. And the likelihood is -- I mean are you able 
to give us a probability as to the likelihood of what could 
have caused that window shatter other than a bullet? 
A. Well, the likelihood is it's a bullet. What I am 
saying I don' t have any evidence it was, and I don' t believe 
a.""ly evide."lce was collected ~~ere by the cri...""ne scene people tr..a t 
establishes that it was a bullet. 
Q. 
A. 
A bullet wasn't found, right? 
Well, unless I get another report that indicates it 
21 was. 
22 
23 
24 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
We'll stipulate that it wasn't. 
Okay. 
All right. So wit."l regard to the glass itself and 
25 photographs, do you also -- do you agree or disagree that --
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well, strike that. That' s asked and answered. 
Did you have any involvement with the reconstruction 
animation that defense counsel has provided us a week or 10 
days ago, whenever it was? 
A. I consul ted with them. I didn't have anything to do 
with the actual making it, but I consulted with them, the 
individual who prepared it. 
Q. Okay. But you had nothing to do with its actual 
production? 
A. That' s correct. We met a couple of times and we 
talked it over, a."ld I told him w:P.at I t.lLought. Jl..nd he 
proceed-Ad to make it. 
Q. Okay. What about the videotape of the scene I 
believe in January, early Janua....-y, did you have anything to do 
15 with that? 
16 A. I was there, but I did not operate the camera. I was 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
an obseJ:Ver. 
Q. You have no knowledge as to. the hilux capabilities of 
the camera that was used? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Okay. In your forensic expertise do you know wheb..,_er 
or not lux capability of a camera 
MR. RICHARDS= Your Honor --
MR. SF..AW: Well, wait a minute. This is --
MR. RICHARDS= Can I make an objection before he 
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1 argues? 
2 THE COURT: We don't know what the question is, do 
3 we? 
4 MR. RICHARDS: I 'd like to renew my objection, and 
5 I'd like a standing objection if you are going to overrule me. 
6 THE COURT: We' 11 make a standing objection if you'd 
7 like. There really wasn't a question other than --
8 MR. RICHARDS: Well, it's the series of questions 
9 that's been going on and on and on. And I move to strike all 
10 of them, and I guess I'm overruled. 
11 THE COURT: We'll note the objection. 
12 Q. (BY MR. SHAW) You're a forensic scientist. You've 
13 had experience with photograph and video in your 40 years, 
14 right? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And do you agree that the lux capability of a video 
camera, or still camera for that matter, can determine the 
outcome on what is seen on videotape? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Okay. And you didn' t have anything to do with the 
production of that video? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A. I was there and we all discussed how we were going to 
set this up, where should the vehicle be, etcetera, etcetera, 
and where should the camera be etcetera, etcetera. I did not 
25 operate the camera, but I stood a few feet away from it as the 
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video was prepared. Was made. 
Q. Okay. Did you participate in assessing the 
climatological data on the evening that the videotape was taken 
such that it could have reflected or should have reflected what 
was occurring climatologically on August 5th, 2007? 
A. I did not determine any of that climatological data 
other than to ask is this the same moon phase, etcetera. So I 
asked questions, but I did not make determinations. 
Q. Okay. So, and you asked whether or not moon phase 
was the same but nothing else? 
A. I asked about the weather. Was it rair..i.."'l.g? Was it 
snowing? Obviously it wasn't snowing but 
Q. Yeah. Okay. That's all. 
THE COURT: Mr. Richards, any questions? 
MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, I 've just a couple. And maybe I 
can short circuit this. Are you saying that he's not qualified 
in any area, ~"ld if you are, t..'lj,e."'l. I '11 address those areas. 
MR. SHAW: No. I've told the court very clearly that 
I think Mr. Gaskill can testify on certain areas regarding 
firearms. He can probably talk about glass, those kinds of 
things. But, but I don 1 t think he can testify regarding the 
creclibili ty or phrase his opinion so that it affects a jury's 
determination as to the credibility of the witness. That 1 s a 
jury question. That 1 s what I object to. 
MR. RICHARDS: That's the only issue we're discussing 
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1 at this point then? Because then I don 1 t have any questions. 
2 MR. SHAW: At this point, yes. 
MR. RICHARDS: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. 
3 
4 
5 MR. RICHARDS: At a later point, I mean do I need to 
6 ask other questions? 
7 MR. SHAW: Well, we need the court 1 s ruling on my 
8 view of his report and some direction from the court. Then I 
9 can address it further if we need to. 
10 
11 
MR. RICHARDS: I don 1 t have any questions then. 
THE COL'IRT: All right. Do you \i'a."lt to have 1'-..im 
12 excused then at this time? 
13 
14 
15 minute 
16 
17 
18 
19 issue? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. SHAW: Sure. 
MR. RICHARDS: Well, could I have him stay for just a 
just in case something else arises? 
THE COURT: Okay. So you want to step down? 
THE WITNESS: This one is yours . 
THE COURT: All right. So any other evidence on this 
MR. SHAW: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there any argument on the matter or --
MR. SHAW: I think I 1Ve argued it sufficiently. 
MR. RICHARDS: I 1 d like to argue. 
THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 
MR. RICHARDS: I guess as I understand the State 1 s 
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1 objection or problem to Professor Gaskill's testimony is the 
2 way that he phrases things. I believe that an expert witness 
3 can observe people to testify, he can read reports of testimony 
4 and then he can opine it given the facts on the ground, and I 'm 
5 able to determine I don' t believe that it could have happened 
6 the way the witness says that it happened. That' s what 
7 experts, CSI individuals testify to, they do it all the time. 
8 Let me give you a couple of examples. 
9 If an individual defendant, let's say, says I have 
10 never touched that gun and, therefore, I didn 1 t shoot the 
11 p=>-rson, if the CSI indi vid"P=- 1 then testifies, a"l ex,pc-._rt, he can 
12 say, well, that couldn't be correct because I have his 
13 fingerprint on the trigger. That's what experts do. 
14 If an individual comes in in a personal injury case 
15 and says I complain of pain somewhere in my body, an expert 
16 witness physician can get up and testify, well, I've looked at 
17 all t..'l-te reports, we 1 ve done the x-rays, we don 1 t see any 
18 evidence that would cause that kind of pain, so I diSJPUte that 
19 he has pain. I mean, those are the kinds of things that 
20 experts do. 
21 He c•ai"l certainly say I've done wr1ate-ver groundwork 
22 regarding the lighting. That's one of the items that counsel 
23 brought up. The knife, I can say a person could not see more 
24 than five feet. And if this person is saying he saw something 
25 30 or 40 or 50 feet away, he could say, well, that would be 
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1 impossible. That is something experts do. And that's what we 
2 hire them to do. 
3 I -- sometimes we get into semantics, I guess, but I 
4 think an expert can say I 've heard the testimony and the facts 
5 on the ground would suggest that's the way the witness 
6 testified would be impossible. I think he can do that. 
7 I would sul:mi t it with that. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Shaw? 
9 MR. SHAW: Do I need to further respond, I guess? 
10 THE COURT: If you want to, you can. I don' t know if 
11 you wanted to ,..,.,.. ,.....,..,. .... ....,_ ................ 
12 MR. SHAW: I think I made a record clearly enough at 
13 the beginning of what the State' s position is. I think it's 
14 wholly inproper for an expert to opine regarding credibility 
15 and make statements like I question the accuracy of witnesses. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. SHAW: It's what it com.es down to. 
18 THE COURT: I think I 'm ready to rule. T"nese are 
19 difficult because you are dealing with part of the case. You 
20 don't know how the witness is going to shake out, what the 
21 witnesses are going to say. 
22 So having said that, obviously, you know, the defense 
23 has to lay a foundation as to Mr. Gaskill' s qualifications and 
24 what he did and everything, but some of this I think goes more 
25 to weight than admissibility. You know, experts are always 
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1 called to give an opinion based on their examination of the 
2 crime scene or reconstruction. They may or may not have it 
3 right. Sometimes it's very difficult to reconstruct a crime 
4 scene. And again, that all goes to the weight of the evidence. 
5 The scene may be very different when Mr. Gaskill went there 
6 than when it actually happened. I don't know. But again, this 
7 all goes to the weight and let the jury decide whether or not 
8 he really observed the same thing that the witnesses observed 
9 at the time of the events. 
10 But I mean, I don't think there's any question he can 
11 testify t.~t he -vre.."lt there at r'.ight, t.lJ.e lighting conditions 
12 were such and such, and based on his observation, it would have 
13 been impossible to see somebody five feet away or whatever. 
14 But again, it may not r~ve been the same for him as it was for 
15 the eyewitnesses. I don't know. 
16 I think he can testify based on his examination, you 
17 know, somebody in his opinion was shot in t.~e back or shot in 
18 the stomach or shot in the front, or whatever. He can talk 
19 about the angle of the shots. He can talk about looking at the 
20 photographs and not seeing evidence of residue or whatever. 
21 I guess I kind of agree with both of you. I don't 
22 think even as an expert on that opinion, I don't think he can 
23 say based on my examination I don't find these witnesses to be 
24 credible. I don't think he ca...""l say that. I do think, however, 
25 he can say that based on my examination, you know, this gun was 
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1 fired from a particular position or an angle and that' s in 
2 conflict with what some of the witnesses testified to. 
3 So I do think he can testify that based on his 
4 examination he doesn't agree with the conclusion that was 
5 reached by some of the witnesses, assuming they testify 
6 differently than he does. But I also agree with the State, he 
7 can' t get in the business of talking about credibility, that 
8 this witness isn't credible. So 
9 MR. RICHARDS: Okay. 
10 THE COURT: All right. So that' s my ruling. 
11 MR. RICU.J.\RDS: J1..ll right. 
12 THE COURT: Like I say, sometimes these things change 
13 as the trial goes on and the witnesses testify differently than 
14 what we thought. So I guess what I am going to do, I' 11 grant 
15 the motion in limini as to this issue of credibility, but deny 
16 the motion in limine to preclude James Gaskill from testifying. 
17 MR. P.ICHF>.RDS: But you a..."'"e allowing him to say that 
18 my examination of the evidence is in conflict with my 
19 witnesses' statements? 
20 THE COURT: Assuming that's the evidence that comes 
21 1 forward. Otherwise, why would you put on an expert? That's 
I . 22 the whole reason for an expert ~s to say my opinion is 
23 different than somebody else' s testimony. 
24 MR. RICHARDS : Perfect. Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Anything else on that issue? 
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1 Did you want to have Mr. Gaskill excused then? 
2 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, we can have him excused. 
3 THE COURT: Are you all right with that, Mr. Shaw? 
4 MR. SHAW: Yes , your Honor. 
5 (This portion of the motion was concluded. ) 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 break, the same as if it were presented now? Would that be 
2 okay? 
3 
4 
MR. RICHARDS: That's fine. I can do that. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Do you want to call 
5 your first witness then? 
6 MR. SHAW: We need to approach the bench, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 (Whereupon a conference was held at the bench. ) 
9 THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, we need 
10 to take up a matter out of your presence. So if you will go 
11 with the bailiff and give you just another short recess. It 
12 should just take a few minutes. 
13 (TI-...e following proceedirtgs were rteld in open court after the 
14 jury left the courtroan. ) 
15 THE COURT: You may be seated. Let's have the record 
16 reflect that the jury is not present. 
17 Do you want to deal with your first motion first? 
18 MR. RICHARDS: I would, Your Honor. And at this 
19 juncture the defense would move to dismiss the case, Your 
20 Honor. And I will make some brief arguments. I know you have 
21 heard the evidence. I just want to make several points. 
22 Number one is the CSI evidence that actually ties my 
23 client to this. We don't have fingerprints. We don't have a 
24 gunpowder residue test. We have no CSI information that ties 
25 it to him versus anybody else either in the SUV or elsewhere. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
So now we're left down to statements. And we have 
statements from Sarah which is internally inconsistent, Sarah 
Valencia. She certainly couldn't see according to all the 
other witnesses, that far away. She is the only one that 
actually puts the gun in his hand. We have Christopher and you 
heard his testimony. That again, he's inside the car can't see 
where where Riqo is, assuming you believe his testimony; 
which is a stretch. You -- he doesn't see where he is 
shooting, whether he is Bhooting in the air or not. 
You have Angelo, also -- if you believe his testimony 
11 or not, interesting call. But he never sees the shooting, 
12 whether Riqo is shooting in the air if, in fact, he is. In 
13 Riqo 's testimony -- well, at least his statement that \·le have 
14 is that he was shooting in the air. Dominique clearly said she 
15 saw Riqo didn't a gun. 
16 So when you boil it down to that, there is certainly 
17 a prima facia case to go forward. We ask the Court to dismiss. 
18 THE COURT: All right. State want to be heard on 
19 that? 
20 MR. SHAW: Briefly, Your Honor. 
21 Sarah Valencia, Elias Christopher, and Angelo 
22 Gallegos all say the Defendant was the shooter, all say the 
23 Defendant was shooting while leaning up over the right front 
24 passenger side of the car through the window, out the window, 
25 out the door, standing on the floor somehow leaning and 
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1 pointing and shooting at the direction of the party. 
2 Keri Garcia also testified she doesn't identify the 
3 shooter. Lacey Randall also testified the that shooter was in 
4 the right front passenger seat. The CSI physical evidence at 
5 the scene, contrary to what counsel says, puts the shooter in a 
6 location that would allow for those bullet -- or excuse me, the 
7 .22 casings to be recovered in the roadway from a location 
8 having been shot from that vehicle. Counsel is asking this 
9 Court to enter into the :iury' s province. And we would ask the 
10 Court to deny the motion. 
11 THE COURT: All right. 
12 Anything else, Mr. Richards? 
13 MR.. RICHARDS: Nope. Submit ~ ..... .LL... 
14 THE COURT: All right. I think Mr. Shaw just pointed 
15 out the question of the credibility of witnesses, of course, is 
16 for the jury. That's their job to decide whether or not they 
17 believe a particular witness who testifies. It seems to me 
18 based on the testimony that the Court's heard clearly there is 
19 enough evidence for this case to go to the jury. And so I'll 
20 deny your motion to dismiss. All right. 
21 Now we have another matter that we wanted to take up 
22 out of the presence of the jury. I guess, concerning 
23 Mr. Gaskill's testimony is that--
24 MR. LYON: Your Honor, the State has prepared a trial 
25 brief for the Court and for counsel. We would at this time 
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\ 1 make a motion to exclude Mr. Gaskill. So we can argue this, 
! 
2 please. 
3 If the Court would like a moment to read through the 
4 brief that's fine. It's a little bit lengthy. 
5 THE COURT: It's 15 pages. Why don't you at least 
6 tell me what your position is or what the issue is. 
7 MR. LYON: The State would like Mr. Gaskill excluded 
8 while we argue this. 
9 THE COURT: You want him to leave the courtroom? 
10 MR. LYON: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: Can we do that then for just a few 
12 minutes. If you' 11 wait outside. 
13 MR. LYON: Your Honor, the defense has given us, we 
14 received on Friday morning when we came into court there were a 
15 number of videos that were given to us. Some of these are 
16 computer animations that are -- what appears to be 
17 reconstructions, according to Mr. Gaskill, of the crime scene 
18 and how these events took place. 
19 The second issue is of what appears to be a homemade 
20 video of the defense counsel and Mr. Gaskill and members of the 
21 defense team. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: We are not going to use that one. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. The homemade we're not. 
25 MR. LYON: Then I guess we just have to talk about 
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1 the computer animation. 
2 
3 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LYON: As well, there is numerous photographs 
4 that the defense counsel has provided to us, I think, on 
5 Wednesday that we would also like excluded. If the Court I 
6 can just address first the computer animation then I' 11 be 
7 happy to talk about the photographs. 
8 
9 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LYON: As we note in our brief, Your Honor, 
10 citing AR, "Computer generated animation is a powerful 
11 evidentiary tool that must be used with great care because it's 
12 of dramatic power. Animation then must be carefully 
13 scrutinized for proper foundation, relevance, accuracy, and the 
14 potential for undue prejudice." 
15 And that's really the standard that we would like the 
16 court to take in looking to see whether this computer animation 
17 starts to even approximate what has taken place. It's the 
18 State's position that --based upon the testimony that we have 
19 heard in this court from these witnesses, that the computer 
20 animation doesn't even start to approximate what we've heard. 
21 Mr. Gaskill has obviously read police reports and 
22 some witness statements and he's put together a computer 
23 animation that in essence shows a second and a third shooter. 
24 One of the shooters would be back in the carport area right 
25 back in --and I'm referring to State's Exhibit No. 2, 
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2 
3 
4 
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8 
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10 
11 
somewhere around this vicinity in front of the blue van and 
silver car. There is also another shooter that's depicted to 
be inside the Chevy Cavalier. The animation and maybe it 
would be helpful to the Court to take a look at this first and 
so you know what we're talking about. 
THE COURT: How long is it going to take? 
MR. LYON: I think they are about 30 seconds each. 
THE COURT: The animation is 30 seconds? 
MR. LYON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do we have that here? 
MR. RICHARDS: Yes. Do you want me to look at it? 
12 MR. LYON: We have looked at it. I'm just saying 
13 would it be helpful for the Court to look at it or would you 
14 like me to just explain it? 
15 THE COURT: Well, you know, the whole problem is just 
16 exactly what I have been fearing. You know, you've got a jury 
17 of 10 people waiting and here we are doing things that I think 
18 should have been done before the trial. I'm not necessarily 
19 blaming you, Mr. Lyon, but this is what I always worry about. 
20 We get in the middle of trial and now we ask the jury to go sit 
21 and twiddle their thumbs while we decide whether to admit 
22 evidence or not. 
23 
24 Friday. 
25 
MR. LYON: And for the record, we received this on 
THE COURT: I guess that's my biggest concern, 
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1 Mr. Richards. Is that true? 
MR. RICHARDS: No. 2 
3 
4 
5 
THE COURT: When did you give it to the prosecution? 
MR. RICHARDS: I believe 
MR. LYON: Your Honor, we have looked at a previous 
6 version over at Mr. Richard's office a few weeks ago. He 
7 indicated that things were going to be changing. He didn't get 
8 the final version until Friday. 
9 THE COURT: So is this one different though than the 
10 one you saw a couple weeks ago? 
11 
12 
MR. RICHARDS: And the only --
MR. HEWARD: I'm sorry. May I make the record 
13 because I'm the one who received it? 
THE COURT: All right. 14 
15 MR. HEWARD: When we walked into this courtroom -- I 
16 walked in 7:45 Friday morning. Mr. Richards had sitting at 
17 where I sit a stack of disks, 7:45 last Friday. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. And is it different than the one 
19 you saw before? I mean, I guess that's my question. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: The only difference, Your Honor, is 
21 that the -- there is an additional car out front, based upon 
22 what information we had and a couple of the models, or whatever 
23 you want to call them, people in the thing have blue clothing 
24 on and dark hair rather than white everything. That's the only 
25 difference. 
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1 THE COURT: Let me ask: Is Mr. Gaskill the witness 
2 though that's got to leave tomorrow? 
3 
4 
MR. RICHARDS: Yes. 
THE COURT: So here we are -- what do we do wait 
5 until Thursday now to 
6 
7 Honor. 
8 
MR. LYON: Well this will just take a moment, Your 
THE COURT: Well, it may be a moment to look at it 
9 but it may take longer than that for me to decide whether or 
10 not this comes in. That's what I -- I mean, you are just 
11 literally dumping this in my lap in the middle of the trial. 
12 And I know sometimes that can't be avoided but, boy, I don't 
13 understand why this wasn't taken care of before we started the 
14 trial like all the other motions. I don't think you can expect 
15 this jury to just sit and wait while we try to sort through 
16 this kind of thing. 
17 To me the issue is much bigger than just looking at 
18 30-soundbite or, you know, recreation of the scene. Obviously, 
19 I'm going to have to look at this and decide whether it comes 
20 in or not. So where do we go? Kind of put me in a box, here I 
21 think. 
22 MR. LYON: Well, if Your Honor would like to look at 
23 it we would like to just show Your Honor. 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead really quickly. 
MR. LYON: And then we would like to argue it. I can 
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1 just bring it up to the Judge. We have all seen this. 
2 MR. RICHARDS: Here is the two -- here is the two 
3 that are really -- Oh, you got it. Okay. 
4 THE COURT: What we are about to see, is this the 
5 most recent animation? 
6 MR. LYON: That's correct. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 (Whereupon the Judge views the animation.) 
9 THE COURT: That's it. All right. So I guess we 
10 should have the record reflect that you've shown me two 
11 different, I guess animations. Is that right? 
12 MR. LYON: That's right. Two different animations. 
13 One of them is marked as defense. It's the aerial view-- it's 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
an aerial view of the crime scene showing different shooters. 
The second video is what's labeled by the defense as "shooter's 
view." And it's shows from the perspective of who they 
believe to be the shooter in the carport facing north out 
towards 1050. 
THE COURT: All right. And how does this differ than 
20 the one you received some time ago? I assume the ones you just 
21 showed me were the ones you received on Friday, right? 
22 
23 
MR. LYON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: How does that differ than the one you 
24 received earlier? 
25 MR. LYON: It's mostly the same. There is some minor 
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1 differences as far as they've changed -- they put a vehicle in 
2 front of that blue truck out front. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. LYON: And I think that they've tweaked a little 
5 bit, I think, some of the trajectory of the bullets. To be 
6 honest with you, Your Honor, I've watched it once at 
7 Mr. Richard's office. He indicated they were going to be 
8 making changes and that's when it was brought here. I don't 
9 remember 
10 THE COURT: And Mr. Richards what are the 
11 differences --
12 
13 
MR. LYON: -- all the differences .. 
THE COURT: -- between the one you got some time ago 
14 and the one you've got here? 
15 MR. RICHARDS: There are two differences. One is 
16 that the white -- well, there is a car out front. 
17 
18 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RICHARDS: Which would be the pick-up truck, the 
19 blue pick-up truck. Because there were witnesses who testified 
20 to that. Second, is the two at the very end of the -- the two 
21 girls in blue, it used to be white dresses. And then instead 
22 of having dark, which is what they have, it used to be white 
23 hair. So those are two differences. 
24 THE COURT: All right. So just for the record, you 
25 supplied that to the prosecution when? The first time when 
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1 Mr. Heward is 
2 MR. RICHARDS: Just looking at my calendar I think it 
3 was the first or second Monday in February, as I recall. 
4 THE COURT: So early February? 
5 MR. RICHARDS: That was -- yeah. But I'm not sure 
6 exactly when date was. But I think it was 
7 THE COURT: All right. So you sent that over or 
8 Mr. Heward went over to pick that up in early February? 
9 MR. RICHARDS: Yes, February one. They carne to my 
10 office at 9:30. 
11 MR. HEWARD: We didn't pick it up at that time, Your 
12 Honor, he showed it to us at that time. 
13 
14 know? 
15 
16 
17 
THE CO~~T: Okay. When did you pick it up, do you 
MR. HEWARD: I didn't pick it up. 
THE COURT: You never did or --
MR. RICHARDS: We had it there, but I don't know if 
18 they had a --
19 THE COURT: So you've had a chance to look at it in 
20 early February, the State did. 
21 
22 
MR. RICHARDS: February 1. 
THE COURT: And then you have made the most recent on 
23 February the 12th available to the prosecution? 
24 
25 
MR. HEWARD: No. The most recent was last Friday. 
MR. RICHARDS: It was Friday. 
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1 
2 
THE COURT: Oh, last Friday. 
MR. RICHARDS: That had the two changes. I mean, 
3 nominal changes. 
4 THE COURT: Well, last Friday the 12th. 
5 MR. HEWARD: But not February, the 12th of March. 
6 All right. 
7 MR. SHAW: Can I step in as long as everyone else is. 
8 MS. SIPES: I'm not. 
9 MR. SHAW: Well, I just want to -- I just want to 
10 show Mr. Richards, I got a defendant's response to a motion for 
11 reciprocal discovery on February 19th. And that's when the 
12 video and these animations, the rough animation, came on that 
13 day February 19th. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 right? 
19 
20 
21 
MR. RICHARDS: February 19th. 
THE COURT: So February 19th? 
MR. RICHARDS: A month ago. 
THE COURT: And then the last one was March 12th, 
MR. RICHARDS: Yes. 
THE COURT: So the State's position is what? 
MR. SHAW: The State's position is there is not a 
22 foundation to show these videos. When --Your Honor has just 
23 taken a look at these. It shows a shooter from the carport, a 
24 shooter from the Cavalier. There has been absolutely no 
25 evidence presented in this court to suggest that there are 
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1 there is a second shooter back in the carport or in the 
2 Cavalier. 
3 The testimony is all to the contrary. Every witness 
4 that's taken the stand has testified that they only saw one 
5 shooter. One shooter only and that was from the maroon Denali. 
6 We have asked specifically, Lacey Randall, Keri Garcia, Sarah 
7 Valencia, Richard Esquivel, they all say there was no one 
8 shooting back from the home. 
9 Lacey Randall was leaning up against her Cavalier for 
10 an hour and testified that no one was inside that vehicle, yet 
11 they want to somehow put a shooter inside of that vehicle. I 
12 mean, she testified she was standing up against that car until 
13 she got pulled down. 
14 There is absolutely no one that's going to be 
15 testifying that there was any sort of shooting coming from that 
16 backside of the home. Also, when you look at the animation 
17 they show the shots coming from that shooter view. For 
18 example, the shot that I'm assuming is Sabrina Prieto, the 
19 shooter is standing directly in front of Ms. Prieto, she comes 
20 running by and the shot comes, enters perpendicularly into her 
21 chest. There is no slope whatsoever to the angle in which the 
22 shooter was firing. The medical examiner has testified 
23 in order for the trajectory that bullet traveled inside of 
24 Ms. Prieto that that individual would have had to have been 
25 standing above her or she would have to have been ducking down. 
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1 That video doesn't depict anything like that. 
2 The same thing goes for Mr. Nevarez's. Which gets 
3 into rule 702B. As Your Honor knows there are the three 
4 requirements in order for expert testimony to be admitted into 
5 a court before a jury. The -- again, the testimony or the 
6 report, the autopsy reports, that Mr. Gaskill had that he 
7 relied upon in making his expert opinion and in creating 
8 computer animation is completely wrong. I mean, it's 
9 it's-- he arrives at these gross errors and he wants to 
10 present that to the jury as if that's the way it is. 
11 The reality is, the medical examiner has already 
12 testified that it's completely contrary to the evidence. What 
13 he is trying to put forward to the jury is completely in 
14 contradiction to the evidence that's been presented in this 
15 court. He obviously hasn't relied on sufficient facts and data 
16 and obviously has not applied this 
17 he -- this, I guess, science. 
the information to what 
18 Additionally, the witnesses haven't have testified 
19 that the what's depicted in this animation is completely 
20 contrary to that. There is absolutely no one to put on any 
21 sort of foundational testimony that there was another shooter 
22 in the back. Mr. Gaskill can't just come in and rely upon 
23 hearsay statements. Now, he might have read some statement or 
24 something in a police report that, obviously, made him think, 
25 well, there might have been a second shooter. 
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1 The problem is what's before the Court is that there 
2 is not a second shooter. He can't come in and rely on hearsay 
3 statements to put forth his opinion. So there is no foundation 
4 for that.· 
5 THE COURT: Didn't we have a hearing though on 
6 whether or not Mr. Gaskill could testify? I thought we did 
7 this several weeks ago. 
8 MR. LYON: Well, we had some preliminary questions 
9 about Mr. Gaskill we didn't have anything specific about these 
10 videos. 
11 
12 
13 this 
THE COURT: Right and I understand that. 
MR. LYON: Apparently we have been requesting who 
who is going to lay the proper foundation for these 
14 videos and we have yet to hear who is going to be laying that 
15 foundation. 
16 
17 too. 
18 
THE COURT: You said something about photographs, 
MR. LYON: There is some photographs that we 
19 received, for the record, on -- would be last Wednesday would 
20 be the 10, I believe. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LYON: These photographs were -- I'm not sure who 
23 has taken them. But they've gone out to the crime screen they 
24 have parked a big truck -- I'm not quite a truck expert; it 
25 looks like some sort of large Ford 350 -- about where the blue 
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1 truck would be. They then trying to take -- they've taken 
2 pictures from -- looks like standing on top of a car or 
3 something which would be for Your Honor somewhere around in 
4 here in front of this blue truck referring to State's Exhibit 
5 No. 3 going back -- looking back towards the Nava horne. 
6 The problem with these photos is -- I mean, the 
7 photos show Mr. Richards and I think it's Mr. Gaskill --you 
8 can just see the tops of their heads. There is absolutely 
9 no -- there no one going to be -- going to be able to lay 
10 foundation as to -- that these photo correctly and accurately 
11 depict what the individual inside that SUV would have been 
12 seeing. 
13 THE COURT: All right. So you are objecting 
14 photographs also? Do you know how many there are? 
15 MR. LYON: I don't know. 
16 Do you have copies for us? 
17 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. 
18 THE COURT: How many are there? 
19 MR. RICHARDS: The ones they are complaining about I 
20 think, there are two. 
21 THE CLERK: I just marked from 9 to 27. So I guess 
22 that would be 18. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: Well, there is -- There would be --
24 THE CLERK: Nineteen. They are numbered. Oh, you 
--
' 
,:-' 
25 you know what? You skipped 18. So this it 18. 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. See there was two and then 
2 there is another four or five. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lyon, anything else that 
4 you want to put on the record. We can hear from Mr. Richards, 
5 I think, on this, too. 
6 MR. LYON: Well, I guess, in summary, Your Honor, 
7 there is not an adequate foundation for this to come before the 
8 jury. Mr. Gaskill's animation and these pictures or --his 
9 animation isn't based upon sufficient facts and isn't reliably 
10 applied and therefore can't come in as expert testimony. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Richards. 
MR. RICHARDS: Just briefly. 
11 
12 
13 
14 I haven't had a chance to read the State's brief on 
15 this. I got it the exact same moment you did 10 minutes ago. 
16 We have given them this copy of this video. As I say, there 
17 were a couple of minor changes after Mr. Gaskill viewed it. He 
18 asked that those be done. I told counsel on the first of 
19 February that those changes were corning and I specifically told 
20 them what the changes would be. And it took our video person 
21 forever to produce it. The moment it -- the day I got it I 
22 gave -- the next day I gave it to counsel. 
23 The foundation is going to be laid through 
24 Mr. Gaskill. He is going to get up and testify that he's 
25 listened to the evidence. He's listened to all of the -- you 
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1 know, read through the transcripts. He's read all the 
2 witnesses statements. And based upon all of those he's put 
3 together this reconstruction video. That's how reconstruction 
4 videos are done. That's how they are always done. 
5 If I point the Court to State versus Hodge, which is 
6 a 008 case 196 Pacific 3rd 124 where the State is out of 
7 Ogden hereby, too, by the way. I did the appeal. I'm very 
8 well aware of video reconstructions. In that case, State 
9 versus Hodge, the police produced a reconstruction video and 
10 that was introduced over the defendant's objection. The video 
11 was produced and the victim testified, well -- as the video was 
12 being played as to what she thought had happened. So that's 
13 not unusual. These are done all the time. 
14 As far as getting it at the late day, I would remind 
15 the Court that we received such a huge stack of information at 
16 a late date that it's not even comparable to how much we have 
17 given them. We -- get this. The recording that Gent did with 
18 Duran, he records that testimony doesn't tell anybody about it, 
19 and, no, he didn't tell counsel about it. That was produced so 
20 long ago. We get that on the Wednesday before trial begins. 
21 That critical tape the only tape recorded conversation of 
22 all of their stuff we get the Wednesday before trial begins. 
23 And I know it's not counsel's fault so I want to be very clear 
24 I'm not complaining about them. It's apparently Gent that 
25 didn't give it to them. 
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1 We get information -- well, Wakefield testifies about 
2 the gun. We had no knowledge about the -- all of those types 
3 of things and the Court let that in. 
4 As far as this being accurate, I think the evidence 
5 clearly would indicate that it is very accurate. Number one, 
6 the car was moving; that's important. Wakefield testifies that 
7 the gun would have -- had to have been stationary for it to 
8 give out the casing patterns. Yet the Court allowed that in. 
9 So I think that there is no question that we have 
10 provided this information to them. They have plenty of time to 
11 object to it. Professor Gaskill is going to talk about all of 
12 the foundation, how he came up with this. If they don't like 
13 it, if they think it doesn't adequately represent they can 
14 certainly cross-examine him as long as they want. 
15 THE COURT: Let me just ask, Mr. Richards: What is 
16 the relevance of the photographs? What is your theory? Or 
17 what is it you are going to testify to concerning 
18 MR. RICHARDS: What he is going to say, Your Honor, 
19 is if --
20 MR. LYON: Your Honor, we would like you to look at 
21 these photographs. 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: Let me I've got a copy for the 
24 Court. Most of the photographs in that stack are ones that the 
25 State produced in their discovery so they were taken at the 
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1 scene. 
2 What they are going to testify to on some of the 
3 photographs, the ones of the pick-up truck that were put there, 
4 that according to Mr. Gaskill -- Professor Gaskill, the person 
5 to produce this kind of a pattern of bullet casings, would have 
6 had to have been stationary here. And what he is going to 
7 testify to is if we take a line from where it would have to be 
8 stationary to where the bodies -- where the people were at that 
9 were shot, Mr. Nava and Mr. Esquivel, that they would have had 
10 to have gone right through the cab of that truck. That's one 
11 thing he is going to testify to. 
12 The other one which are -- also just trajectory and 
13 these are very recent of out the front window where that ends 
14 up and he'll testify about that. If you were to follow the 
15 bullet either way, that would be the angle for it. And so 
16 that's really what those pictures show. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
18 MR. RICHARDS: That's all I have. 
19 THE COURT: State want any response? 
20 MR. LYON: Yes, Your Honor. Has Your Honor had a 
21 chance to look at those photos? 
22 THE COURT: I have. 
23 MR. LYON: First as to the animation, Your Honor, 
24 again, going back to foundation, this was one of the questions 
25 asked by Mr. Shaw in the hearing with Mr. Gaskill on 
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1 February 26th, page 33, line two. "Did you have any 
2 involvement in the reconstruction animation that defense 
3 counsel has provid~d us a week or 10 days ago, whenever it 
4 was?" 
5 Answer: "I consulted with them. I didn't have 
6 anything to do with the actual making of it. I consulted with 
7 him, the individual who prepared it." 
8 He hasn't even been in the process of creating this 
9 video. He was going to be laying the foundation for that. 
10 Additionally-- again, it's 403, whatever minimal relevance 
11 this video has it's outweighed by prejudicial value. As to 
12 these photos, I mean, here again, Your Honor, this is 
13 misleading stuff. We're looking at page 12 of their photos. 
14 This is completely misleading to say that this is what the 
15 individual in that Denali would have looked like. This is --
16 trying to put this -- recreate a crime scene and without anyone 
17 laying proper foundation that this is what the view would have 
18 been like, this is how large the truck would have been. This 
19 is completely misleading information, Your Honor. There is no 
20 one that can lay a foundation that this is an accurate 
21 representation of the crime scene as it was. 
22 And as to the impossibility of shooting over a truck, 
23 we don't know how big that truck was at the scene relative to 
24 what's here. There is no one that can lay a proper foundation 
25 that these pictures accurately depict the way the crime scene 
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1 was on the day of the shooting. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well I guess the only 
3 way to resolve it is to hear from Professor Gaskill. So I 
4 guess you will just have to take your chances with him on the 
5 stand. And you can call him as a witness and if he doesn't lay 
6 the foundation than the animation doesn't come in. If he 
7 doesn't lay a foundation for the photographs then they don't 
8 come in. Okay? 
9 
10 
11 witness? 
12 
13 
MR. RICHARDS: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. He is going to be your next 
MR. RICHARDS: He will be. 
THE COuitT: Let's bring in the jury then. 
14 (The following proceedings were held in open court after the 
15 jury entered the courtroan.) 
16 THE COURT: Let the record reflect that the jury is 
17 now present. 
18 Mr. Richards, do you want to call your next witness? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. RICHARDS: Professor James Gaskill. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
* * * 
PROFESSOR JAMES GASKILL, 
Called by the Defense, having been duly 
sworn, is examined and testifies as follows: 
* * * 
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1 DIRECT EXAMINll...TION 
2 BY MR. RICHARDS: 
3 Q. State your name, please. 
4 A. My name is James Gaskill. 
5 Q. And Professor Gaskill, would you tell us what you do? 
6 A. Currently, I'm mostly retired. I do some consulting 
7 work. I still teach some classes at Weber State University in 
8 the Department of Criminal Justice. 
9 Q. And your focus as far as profession through all the 
10 years has been what? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
.. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I'm a forensic scientist. 
And you have heard the term "CSI"? 
Yes, I have. 
What is that? 
Stands for crime scene investigator, crime scene 
16 investigations. It's a term used to describe the people or the 
17 process of collecting and preserving evidence and analyzing it 
18 to reconstruct what occurred during that incident. 
19 Q. What I would like to do is ask you what your 
20 certificates and training have been as far as this profession 
21 as a forensic scientist. 
22 A. I have a Bachelor's and a Master's Degree from the 
23 University of Utah in biology. Subsequent to that I went to 
24 work for the State Medical Examiner doing autopsies and 
25 investigations of dead bodies. And I worked there until 1970. 
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1 I went to Santa Clara County and worked as a research 
2 associate in Santa Clara County Crime Lab. And subsequent to 
3 that I came to Weber State, was hired to teach and to start and 
4 operate a crime laboratory. At that time there were no crime 
5 laboratories that did -- excuse me -- that did sophisticated 
6 kinds of analysis. There were fingerprint people and people 
7 who collected evidence, of course, but as far as the State 
8 Crime Lab there wasn't a functioning laboratory. 
9 And so I started a laboratory at Weber State as part 
10 of my faculty responsibilities. So I ran the crime laboratory. 
11 I examined evidence. I went to crime scenes. I testified. 
12 And at the same time I taught forensic science and have 
13 continued to teach since then. 
14 In 1994 we divested Weber State University of the 
15 crime laboratory. It became Department of Public Safety Crime 
16 Lab. So I then was faculty who didn't do the crime laboratory, 
17 but I still continued to do consulting, officers would call me 
18 with questions, attorneys would call me. And so I have 
19 continued to be a practicing scientist. 
20 I have been a meiT~er of the American Academy of 
21 Forensic Science and have attended many, many seminars 
22 workshops and meetings with that organization. Also with the 
23 California Association of Criminalists, the NorthWest 
24 Association of Forensic Scientists, and the Utah Chapter of the 
25 International Association for Identification. 
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1 I have been to FBI laboratory training in Quantico, 
2 Virgina. I have been to training in places all over the United 
3 States in the last 40 years. I have taught forensic science at 
4 Weber State University, at Brigham Young University, at Wyoming 
5 Community College. I have been certified as an instructor from 
6 the Wyoming Police Academy Organization and the Utah Peace 
7 Officer Standards and Training. So I have taught at those 
8 police academies. 
9 Q. Let me ask a few other questions. You heard some of 
10 the prosecution's crime scene investigators testify over the 
11 last couple of days; is that right? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
ever been 
trials? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And they mention knowing you. Did you know them? 
Sure. They are my students. 
So you taught them? 
Yes. 
All right. As far as testifying at trials, have you 
qualified as an expert witness to testify in criminal 
Yes. 
How many times? 
2000 to 2500 times. 
By the defense or by the prosecution? 
Both. 
Okay. How much of each or do you know? 
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1 A. Well, when I was working for the State Crime Lab --
2 when I was operating the State Crime Laboratory I would say 
3 that the bulk of the cases that I testified in were testimony 
4 for the prosecution. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
But you still did some for defense during that time? 
Yes. 
Okay. 
But since then it's probably-- maybe a few more 
9 prosecution than defense, but certainly a higher percentage of 
10 defense since I retired from the crime lab. 
11 Q. Okay. Have you testified in murder trials for the 
12 prosecution before? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I have. 
How many? 
I don't know a number. 
Been more than one or two? 
Certainly. 
Okay. And have you testified recently for the 
19 prosecution for the State of Utah as an expert witness within 
20 the last 10 years? 
21 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Oh, certainly within the last 10 years. 
Within the last five? 
I'm trying to think about the last time I testified 
24 for the prosecution in Utah. I don't remember the last time it 
25 was, but it's been certainly the last few years. The last time 
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1 I testified for the prosecution was in Idaho. 
2 Q. And I want to talk specifically about areas of your 
3 expertise in the forensic science business. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
I guess, that was a lousy question, wasn't it? 
Couldn't tell if it was a question. 
Could you tell us what your areas of expertise are? 
I have been qualified as an expert in many areas of 
9 forensic science. I've testified as a crime scene 
10 reconstruction expert, blood expert, a fingerprint expert, a 
11 firearms expert, hairs, glass, paint, soil, shoe prints. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. Specifically though glass --
Glass. 
-- and firearms? 
Firearms. 
And general crime scene reconstruction? 
Yes. 
Now, you were hired by me to investigate this case; 
19 is that correct? 
20 A. Yes, it is. 
21 Q. At least from a crime screen investigator standpoint? 
22 A. That is right. 
23 Q. Or a forensic science standpoint? 
24 A. Yes. I don't really there is no one who just is a 
25 crime scene person and doesn't do other kinds of things. We 
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1 have to -- you have to have an understanding of what it is 
2 you're doing. So all crime scene investigators are forensic 
3 scientists and to a large extent all forensic scientists do 
4 some crime scene reconstruction and investigation. That's how 
5 we try to tie this whole package together so it's not just a--
6 somebody working over here, and somebody working over here, and 
7 we are not communicating. Somebody who has just this expertise 
8 and some of this. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
To try to put together the whole picture? 
Exactly. 
Having those general areas of expertise is important? 
Right. 
Okay. And in this particular case, the one we're 
14 talking about today, what information did you utilize in coming 
15 up with your opinions? 
16 A. Well, I have been to the crime scene, itself, severnl 
17 times. I have read police reports. I have read interviews and 
18 reports from the officers as to what they did. I've read the 
19 information from the CSI from Weber County CSI, people -- some 
20 of whom testified here. I read the medical examiner report. I 
21 have read some medical reports of those persons who were 
22 injured but didn't die. I have made measurements and taken 
23 photographs and done some of my own investigation. 
24 Q. You have been out to the crime scene here on 717 East 
25 1050 North? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
How many times have you been out there? 
I think four, maybe. Four or five. 
Have you gone day time or nighttime? 
Both. 
And during those times that you have gone out, did 
7 you have someone taking pictures for you? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And you had an opportunity to examine those 
10 photographs? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And would they be accurate representations of what 
13 you saw there? 
14 A. I think within the limits of the enviromental 
15 conditions they were accurate. I would say that they -- they 
16 accurately represent what we could see. 
17 Q. Okay. Now, specifically were you able after your 
18 examination of everythin~r that you have looked at -- and did we 
19 forget anything else? Is that about what you looked at? 
20 A. Well, I might be forgetting something, but if I am I 
21 don't know what it is. 
22 Q. I guess, you sat through all of the testimony so far; 
23 is that right? 
24 A. Certainly, the testimony of the preliminary hearing. 
25 I looked at those -- at that transcript. And I have also been 
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-' 1 in the courtroom, I think with the exception of opening 
2 exercises, I think, I have been --
3 Q. Open statements? 
4 A. Opening statements. I have been here all the time. 
5 Q. So you have listened to the testimony of the 
6 witnesses from the stand? 
7 A. I have very carefully. 
8 Q. Okay. And as you have examined all of this evidence 
9 have you come up with some opinions? 
10 A. 
11 Q. 
12 
13 
Yes. 
Okay. And what would the opinions 
MR. SHAW: Your Honor, may I voir dire the witness? 
THE COtJRT: A,, .L.L right. 
14 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. SHAW: 
16 Q. Mr. Gaskill, I'm interested first to know about an 
17 animation that you may have had some part in. I want to ask 
18 you questions about that. You did not create that animation? 
19 A. I'm not. I'm not the person who created. I'm not 
20 the computer specialist who created that. 
21 Q. Who created it? 
22 A. I'm not exactly sure if there was more than one. A 
23 man named Josh. And I don't remember Josh's last name. I 
24 think is the primary person. 
25 Q. Do you even know the company that created it? 
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1 A. The name of the company I don't know. I know that 
2 I know two of the people who are involved and one of them is 
3 Brown and the other one is Josh. 
4 
5 
Q. 
A. 
Where is the company located? 
I don't know if they have a headquarters. I don't 
6 know where it is. 
7 Q. Did you deal with them personally? 
8 A. I dealt with Josh personally, yes. 
9 Q. Talk to him face to face? 
10 A. Yeah. 
11 Q. What about the other person? 
12 A. Not in this case. I have dealt with him in other 
13 situations . 
14 
15 
Q. 
A. 
16 this case. 
17 Q. 
Talked to him on the telephone? 
I don't know that I talked to him on the telephone in 
Okay. In consulting with those individuals, did 
18 you -- do you know their backgrounds to whether or not they 
19 have any education in physics? 
20 
21 and 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't. I have worked with Josh on one other case 
The answer to the question is: I don't know. Right? 
The answer is 
Do you have if they have any background in 
25 bioengineering? 
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1 A. I don't know. 
2 Q. Do you know if they have any background in 
3 biomechanics? 
4 A. I don't know. 
5 Q. Do you know if they have any background in forensic 
6 pathology? 
7 A. I don't know. 
8 Q. Do you know if they have any background in 
9 videography, videography as opposed to animation? 
10 A. Can you clarify? I'm not sure that I know the 
11 difference between those two. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Moving pictures as opposed to animation. 
I don't know if they have any videography -
Do you know if they have background in kinesiology? 
I don't know. 
Do you know what kinesiology is? 
I think I do but 
Tell us what it is. 
It's the study of motion. 
Study of muscle and body movement? 
Correct. 
Do you know what biomechanics is? 
Study of the mechanics of biological organisms. 
Would you agree that it is the application of 
25 mechanical forces to living organisms? 
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1 A. Certainly. 
2 Q. Okay. And you don't know whether these two had any 
3 background in those things, right? 
4 A. I don't. 
5 Q. All right. The animation that you created, did you 
6 show these individuals the medical examiner's report relative 
7 to the trajectory of the wounds that Sabrina Prieto suffered 
8 and Rosendo Nevarez suffered? 
9 A. We discussed that. If I showed them the specific 
10 report or if they had a copy of it I don't recall. But that 
11 was a topic of discussion between me and Josh. 
12 Q. As you sit here today, you don't know whether they 
13 had a copy of the medical. examiner's report for each of these 
14 two victims; is that fair? 
15 A. I don't personally remember if they had a copy or 
16 not. 
17 Q. You didn't give it to them? 
18 A. I don't -- I don't remember if I did. 
19 Q. Okay. And do you know whether or not you showed them 
20 any photographs. Crime scene photographs? 
')1 A. I believe I did. ~ ... 
22 Q. Believe you did or did you? 
23 A. Well, my memory is not perfect in that area so I'm 
24 going to say that I believe I did. But they had -- they had 
25 knowledge of that. 
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-, 
1 Q. Taking from your response then, Professor Gaskill, I 
2 take it that you cannot tell this Court which specific 
3 photographs from the crime scene you may have showed these two 
4 individuals; is that fair? 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
Now, in this animation that you created, and for that 
7 matter in the photographs that you created, did you do anything 
8 to try to replicate the size of the blue Ford truck in Exhibit 
9 2, parked on the south side of 1050 North? 
10 A. I don't think that we specifically tried to replicate 
11 that. We used a pick-up truck that was the same -- half ton 
12 pick-up, three-quarter ton pick-up, general size. 
13 Q. You don't even know if the blue truck was half ton or 
14 a three-quarter ton, do you? 
15 A. No, I don't. 
16 Q. And the photos that you have produced are late 
17 model is a late model large Ford at least three-quarter ton, 
18 maybe one-ton truck, isn't it, Mr. Gaskill? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Well, that's fair to say. 
Is that fair? 
I wouldn't quibble whether over it was a one-ton, 
three-quarter ton, or half ton. 
Q. lmd with respect to any vehicle that may have been 
parked in front of that truck -- and, again, may have been 
parked in front of that truck, you have no description of that 
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1 particular vehicle to rely on, correct? 
2 A. 
3 there. 
4 
5 
6 yes. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 horne. 
14 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I have a description from another party who was 
Did they identify it as to make, model, or size? 
That person did identify it as to make and model, 
What did they say? 
They said it was a Lincoln Towncar. 
Lincoln Towncar? 
Right. 
Who was that person? 
That person, I believe, lived next door to the Nava 
I see. The blue Ford truck in the photograph -- and 
15 in the photographs -- crime scene photographs and the 
16 photograph that you -- and then the photographs that you took 
17 sometime this winter, that is clearly a different make and 
18 model of vehicle, correct? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
You did nothing to try to assure -- you did nothing 
21 to try to contact the manufacturer and replace that blue Ford 
22 with an accurate replica of it; is that fair? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Is it also fair to say that the animation that you 
25 created does not show a proper angle of entry to the female 
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~, 1 victim that is approaching the carport? 
2 A. 
3 right. 
4 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I don't think it's absolutely accurate that we get it 
So that's not accurate? 
Well, I believe it's not precise, that's correct. 
Okay. And you would concur, would you not, 
7 Mr. Gaskill, that as a crime scene reconstructionist you want 
8 to try to make things accurate. 
9 A. Within the limits of what we can do that's exactly 
10 right. 
11 Q. Okay. Moving for the photographs that were taken, 
12 when were they taken? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 is? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Which photographs are you referring to? 
Oh, the ones that counsel has shown the court. 
I don't believe I know which ones they are. 
MS. SIPES: He wasn't there. 
MR. RICHARDS: Exhibit 9. 
THE COURT: Could we have the record reflect what it 
MR. SPJ\W: It is Exhibit-- Defendant's Exhibit. 
MR. RICHARDS: No. 9-27. 
MR. SHAW: Oh, you got them marked separate? 
THE COURT: Each one of these is marked separately. 
Just take a moment and look at those. Make sure you 
25 are familiar with them. Have you looked over those 
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1 photographs? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And it looks to be photographs taken on different 
4 dates because some have snow in the picture and some do not, 
5 right? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
That's right. 
There are a couple of crime scene photographs in 
8 those, correct, in that Exhibit, Exhibit 9-27? 
9 A. They are -- by that do you mean that there were a 
10 couple that were taken by --
11 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
CSI. 
Yes. Yes. 
Okay. But the photographs -- and I want to be 
14 specific about this. Were you present when all photographs 
15 were taken in Exhibits 9-27 other than the CSI photographs, you 
16 were personally present? 
17 A. They are -- if I cannot answer yes can I elaborate a 
18 little bit? 
19 
20 
21 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Well, I think you need to answer yes or no first. 
The answer is no. 
Okay. Now, I want you to identify which specific 
22 photographs you were not present for -- and I don't want those 
23 to be -- I want to go through the exhibit and identify 
24 specifically the ones that you were not there for. 
25 A. I was not there for 9. I was not there for 10. I 
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1 
1 was not there for 11. I was not there for 12. I was not there 
2 for 13. I'm not sure-- 17, I'm not sure exactly what that 
3 photograph is. Eighteen 
4 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Excuse me. Let me stop you right there. 
So whether I was there or not I'm not sure. 
Let me just see if I can approach the witness and see 
7 which one you are referring to. Mine don't have numbers. 
8 A. Yeah, 17 is page nine. If you have the same form 
9 that I have, the same pages that I have. 
10 
11 
12 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. So 17 is a maybe, you don't know? 
Correct. 
I'm not sure about 18. I was not present for 19. 
13 Was not present for -- excuse me. I was not present for 19. 
14 And 25, 26, and 27 are not photographs so --
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
MR. SHAW: Let me approach and make sure I --
Those were three that were part of the animation. 
Okay. So 25, 26, are 27 are not photographs? 
Yeah. They are part of the animation. So I wasn't 
19 present when they were made either. 
20 Q. Are there any other photographs here or is this 
21 exhibit at the end? 
22 A. The ones that I didn't mention I was present for. 
23 Q. Okay. So the ones that you were not present for you 
24 cannot tell this Court whether or not they fairly and 
25 accurately reflect what's depicted in the photographs because 
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1 you weren't there? 
2 A. In so far as the way it still looks, I can certainly . 
3 say whether it does still look like that or not. 
4 Q. My question though is: You didn't do the 
5 photography, correct? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
And you were not present when they were taken? 
That's correct. 
So you have no knowledge specifically as to who took 
10 the photographs, correct? 
11 A. Aside from having listened to the witnesses in this 
12 trial I don't. 
13 Q. Okay. Or how the photographs were taken relative to 
14 lighting conditions, zoom quality of the lens, whether the lens 
15 was zoomed or not? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
Okay. Now, the photographs that depict snow on the 
18 ground, when were those --- you were present for those, I guess? 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, I was. 
When were those taken? 
I think there were two different times when they were 
22 taken, and I think since January of this year. 
23 Q. Now, albeit you were present, you did not take the 
24 photographs yourself personally, right? 
25 A. That's correct. 
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1 
2 
3 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Someone else did? 
Right. 
So, in fact, some of those photographs have you in 
4 the picture? 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, they do. 
Okay. The photographer then operating the camera 
7 when those photographs were taken, was the one who clearly 
8 created it, snapped the photo, right? 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
Sure. 
Did you have any involvement in telling him how to 
11 take the picture? 
12 A. Yeah, we discussed the -- yeah, we discussed how we 
13 were going to take the pictures. Yeah. 
14 Q. Did you direct him specifically as to his placement 
15 and what you wanted him to show on those photographs? 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
All right. Those were day time? 
There may be one that he took at night in there but 
19 I'm not sure about that one. The ones that we are talking 
20 about now were daytime ones. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Who took the pictures, Mr. Gaskill? 
Michael Stuart. 
He is not a photographer, is he? 
I don't know his background with whether or not he 
25 was -- had training in photography or not. 
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1 Q. He is an investigator for the defense. 
2 A. He is an investigator. 
I 
3 Q. More specifically, with respect to the photographs 
4 that were taken while you were present, you don't know that 
5 they accurately and fairly depict the view of a shooter from 
6 the Yukon Denali? You can't say that to this Court, can you? 
7 A. I have not taken pictures from a Yukon Denali. So I 
8 can say that they reasonably accurately depict the information 
9 that I have acquired regarding that shooting. 
10 Q. But you weren't standing on a Yukon Denali taking 
11 those photographs while they were being taken, correct? 
12 
13 
A. 
" 'a!::• 
Correct. 
So you don't know the exact or precise height of the 
14 shooter at the time this incident occurred standing on that 
15 Yukon Denali, right? 
16 A. That's right. 
17 Q. So you don't know whether that shooter was standing 
18 on the floorboard or the seat for that matter? 
19 A. There has been some conflicting testimony about that 
20 as a matter of fact. 
21 MR. SHAW: That's all. 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 Mr. Richards. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: Thank you. 
25 MR. SHAW: And, Your Honor 1 based on that the State 
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1 would move to exclude 9-27. 
2 
3 
4 
THE COURT: I don't think he has offered them yet. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. Well, I just want to make sure. 
THE COURT: I will give a chance to be heard on that 
5 at that particular time. 
6 
7 
8 
MR. RICHARDS: I don't know where it went. 
MS. SIPES: The one you gave to him. 
THE COURT: He's got your exhibit. 
9 DIRECT EXAMINATION (cent 'd.) 
10 BY MR. RICHARDS: 
11 Q. Let me go through real briefly. And maybe we're 
12 beating a dead horse, but let me go through this. So 9, 10, 
13 11, 12, and 13 are all crime scene investigation photos that 
14 you received from Sandy Ladd; is that correct? 
15 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I received them from you. 
Well, from me but 
But they were, in fact, portrayed to me as 
18 photographs taken by Sandy Ladd. 
19 Q. Okay. And then on 14 and 15, those were taken just 
20 this last week; is that correct, last Friday? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. And you were there? 
23 A. I was. 
24 Q. And Mike Stuart took the pictures? 
25 A. That's right. 
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1 Q. And you directed him where to be and what to shoot? 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. And do they accurately reflect what you intended them 
4 to reflect? 
5 A. Yes, they do. 
6 Q. Exhibit 16 is a Google picture; is that right? 
7 A. It could be. I don't -- it says it's a Google 
8 picture so I have to go along with that. But I wasn't there 
9 when it was taken. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
... 
.11.. 
Q. 
You were not there when it was taken, were you? 
No. 
You have been to the scene? 
I have . 
Does this accurately reflect what the scene looks 
15 like in a daytime photo looking from the east toward the west? 
16 A. Yes, it does. 
17 Q. All right. And Exhibits 17 and 18 were both taken 
18 from the reconstruction video that you had produced, correct? 
19 One is kind of hard to see because it's so dark. 
20 A. Seventeen and 18, yes. Excuse me. Are you talking 
21 about page 17 and 18? 
22 Q. Exhibit 17 and Exhibit 18. 
23 A. Okay. 
24 Q. Exhibit 17 is this one here. 
25 A. Yes, 17 and 18. I just want to make sure that I know 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
what I'm talking about. So, yes, that --
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
were taken 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
depict? 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Well, that's my understanding. 
Nineteen is, again, a photo from Sandy Ladd? 
Yes. 
And 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 are all photographs that 
while you were present a couple of weeks ago, 
Yes. 
And do they accurately depict what you wanted them to 
Yes. 
All right. And then 25, 26, and 27 --~ _,, ~+-~11 O..l..C: 0.-L...J... .;:;::.l.-..J.....L....J... 
14 shots out of the video that you had produced, correct? 
15 A. That's --yes, that's my understanding and that's 
16 what they look like. 
17 Q. And the purpose of these photos, particularly, the 
18 reconstruction ones of the video is to at least give an 
19 indication of what you believe may have happened this night? 
20 A. Right, I think it's easier to understand pictures 
21 sometimes than it is word descriptions. 
22 Q. All right. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: I'll move for admission of 9-27. 
24 THE COURT: Any objection? 
25 MR. SHAW: No objection to 9-13 and 19, since those 
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1 are CSI. We do renew our objection with regard to 14 and 15. 
2 THE COURT: Let's hold on. So no objection to 9-13. 
3 And what was the other one? 
4 
5 
MR. SHAW: Nineteen, I believe is the CSI photo. 
THE COURT: So 9-13 plus 19 there is no objection. 
6 All right. And the ones you did object to were --
7 MR. SHAW: 14 and 15. 
8 THE COURT: Did you want to make a. record as to why 
9 you are objecting? 
10 MR. SHAW: Yes. Those are photographs taken as I 
11 understand it, last Friday or some Friday here in the recent 
12 last couple of weeks. 
13 
14 
~fit. RICHARDS: Last two, three weeks, yeah. 
MR. SHAW: Snow on the ground, vehicles present that 
15 clearly are not the same as the crime scene depicted by CSI, 
16 investigators on scene. You have a newer model large Ford 
17 truck in the photograph. You have another white car in the 
18 driveway. Apparently, intended to replicate the Cavalier. It 
19 is not a Cavalier. Those are photographs that do not 
20 accurately reflect the scene counsel has indicated or asked the 
21 witness whether they accurately reflected what the witness 
22 wanted them to reflect. But the issue here is: Do they 
23 accurately reflect the scene of the crime such that they have 
24 value for this jury. Our objection is that they were not an 
25 accurate depiction of the scene on the night of August 5th 
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1 2007. 
2 There are also individuals placed in the photograph 
3 that we have no foundation for their being placed in particular 
4 locations. We have no foundation for their height, they can be 
5 seen over and above the roof of the truck. Professor Gaskill 
6 has testified that he doesn't know exactly how high Mike Stuart 
7 was standing when he took those photographs. No one has made 
8 an attempt to replicate a shooter's view over the top of the 
9 truck depicted in 15 -- 14 and 15, they don't know. They can't 
10 replicate that. No one made an attempt to take a photograph 
11 standing from the same position of the shooter. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Richards, do you want to tell us why 
13 we should -. .....J-..: .t- 1 A 1 C::. ctUllL.L \.. .L "± f .L J • 
14 MR. RICHARDS: I would be happy to. Maybe just a 
15 couple of questions. 
16 Q. So 14 and 15, but 14 specifically 
17 MR. SHAW: Let me clarify, 'cause I'm not done. 
18 MR. RICHARDS: Oh 
19 THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry I just --
20 MR. SHAW: Well, I misspoke with regard to numbers. 
21 Mine, again, aren't numbered, Your Honor. And the photos that 
22 I was speaking of specifically are: 20, 21, 22, 23, 24. Those 
23 are the photographs taken here in the snow with vehicles placed 
24 and so on. So my record with respect to 14 and 15 was wrong 
25 initially. It should be 20-24. 
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1 THE COURT: What about 14 and 15, what are you 
2 objecting to? 
3 MR. SHAW: Fourteen I am -- this is one where. 
4 THE COURT: This is one that shows somebody standing 
5 by the white car in the driveway. 
6 MR. SHAW: Yes correct. And that clearly is taken 
7 during the snow. 
8 THE COURT: So it's 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24; 
9 is that right? 
10 
11 
12 
MR. SHAW: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any others? 
MR. SHAW: And the animations, 25, 26, and 27. And I 
13 can make a further record on those if you want me to. 
14 
15 
THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Richards then. 
MR. RICHARDS: Well, Your Honor, the photos that 
16 Mr. Professor Gaskill directed to be taken are depictions of 
17 the scene of the crime at a later date, no different than 
18 State's Exhibit No. 1, the big board where they had the Google 
19 picture from the sky. That certainly wasn't taken the night of 
20 the crime. And these are no different than that. I' 11 get 
21 into Professor Gaskill exactly what he was trying to get at in 
22 these pictures. Maybe we need to do that before we have them 
23 admitted. I don't have any problem doing them individually. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I think the key here is whether or 
25 not these photographs accurately depict what happened or where 
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1 things were positioned or what the situation looked like at the 
2 time of the crime back in August '07. And what I'm hearing 
3 Professor Gaskill say is I don't know that they depict what it 
4 looked like back in August of '07. 
5 
6 
MR. RICHARDS: Any more than Exhibit 1 depicts that? 
THE COURT: But Exhibit 1 is an aerial showing the 
7 street and all. 
8 MR. HEWARD: Nobody has tried to put cars or people 
9 in anybocty's position in Exhibit No. 1. 
10 THE COURT: It's a huge difference between Exhibit 1 
11 and 14-24 so --
12 MR. RICHARDS: Well --
13 THE COL~T: &1yway I'm going to exclude photographs 
14 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24. They just do not accurately 
15 depict what it looked like at the time of the -- occurred at 
16 the crime. Exhibits 25, 26, 27 I'm going to exclude. It just 
17 seems to me that Professor Gaskill can't lay any kind of a 
18 foundation for the animation here. He didn't prepare it. We 
19 don't know what went into it. We don't know who was involved 
20 in it. 
21 
22 
MR. RICHARDS: Well, he testified as to who did it. 
THE COURT: Well, he can testify as to his theory of 
23 the case. But the animation doesn't -- you are not even close 
24 to laying a foundation to get the animation in. There is just 
25 no basis for showing that it has any semblance to what we are 
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1 talking about in this case. So anyway, that's my ruling. 
2 Go ahead. 
3 MR. SHAW: Your Honor, if I may interrupt just 
4 briefly. 
5 THE COURT: All right. 
6 MR. SHAW: Seventeen is also a still of the animation 
7 we've objected to that. 
8 THE COURT: The animation is out. 
9 MR. SHAW: And I don't know what 18 is. 
10 MR. RICHARDS: That's also animation. 
11 THE COURT: It's animation. 
12 MR. SHAW: Eighteen is animation and we've objected 
13 to 
14 THE COURT: Seventeen and 18 are both out. 
15 MR. RICHARDS: All right. We'll do without pictures. 
16 Q. Are there some you've testified previously as to 
17 all of the information that you used in corning up with your 
18 opinion; is that correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. All right. And were there some things that would 
21 have helped you, you know, perfect world, had certain items 
22 that would have helped or assisted you in corning up with your 
23 expert opinion, Professor Gaskill? 
24 A. Of course. 
25 Q. Can you describe to the jury what that is, what they 
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1 are? 
2 A. we don't have the guns. We don't have the tests that 
3 might have been done on the vehicles regarding the presence or 
4 absence of gunpowder. We don't have the window from the white 
5 car. In fact, as far as I know, we don't have the white car 
6 that was in the driveway. 
7 Q. And let me interrupt. On the window of the white 
8 car, could that have been saved? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Sure. 
How would that be done? 
Tape. 
Just put some tape? 
Yeah, we have extra wide tape that we can put on that 
14 so that it wouldn't fracture any further and then preserve 
15 that. 
16 
17 
18 
19 is. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
But to the best of your knowledge that wasn't done? 
To the best of my knowledge it wasn't done. 
The gunpowder testing, could you explain what that 
20 A. Well, first I think I need to define a couple of 
21 terms. There is a term that we use "GSR" which stands for 
22 gunshot residue. It really applies very specifically to 
23 residue that comes from the primer. That is the little part of 
24 the cartridge that the firing pin strikes, which initiates the 
25 burning of the gunpowder. The gunpowder constitutes a lot more 
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1 material than the primer does. 
2 And sometimes we use GSR, gunshot residue, to test to 
3 see if someone has perhaps fired a gun. The other tests that 
4 I'm going to refer to is to look for the gunpowder. When you 
5 shoot a gun the projectile comes out the barrel and then there 
6 is a cloud of gunpowder. Let's some of it's burned. Some 
7 of it's partially burned. Some of it is smoke. And that will, 
8 of course, contact the area near where the barrel of the gun 
9 is. So we can test for that. That's an entirely different 
10 test. It's not as sophisticated as the GSR test. And 
11 certainly, not as difficult to do. So we could do that 
12 gunpowder residue test on, for instance, the top of the SUV, 
13 that wasn't -- as far as I know it wasn't done. 
14 Q. That was not done. What would that have. shown had it 
15 been done potentially? 
16 A. Well, if a gun is laying across the top of the 
17 vehicle so that the barrel is reasonably close to the top of 
18 the vehicle --
19 MR. SHAW: Objection. Your Honor, that assumes fact 
20 not in evidence. 
21 
22 ahead. 
23 
THE COURT: Well, no. I'm going to allow it. Go 
MR. SHAW: Can we have some foundation then for how 
24 he is able to place the gun in a relatively close -- in a close 
25 position to the vehicle and have 
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1 
2 Q. 
MR. RICHARDS: I will ask him. 
(BY MR. RICHARDS) You listened to the testimony in 
3 court here these last several days? 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I did. 
And did you hear any testimony regarding the shooting 
6 of a weapon from the SUV? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I did. 
And based upon that testimony were you able to at 
9 least understand what they were trying to say was happening 
10 with the gun or where it was being shot from or at? 
11 A. Well, the problem is that there is some conflict. 
12 They don't all agree. 
13 
14 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
And so it's the job of the forensic scientist to see 
15 if he can come up with a way to see which, if any, of the 
16 statements are correct or incorrect. 
17 MR. SHAW: Objection, Your Honor. 
18 A. So that's what we are talking about here. 
19 MR. SHAW: That's responsive to the question. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: No, I think it was very 
21 MR. SHAW: Hove that it be stricken. 
22 THE COURT: I think he needs to stick with the 
23 science rather than trying to comment on the credibility of 
24 witnesses. That's what I'm worried about. That's not his job. 
25 He is reconstructing the scene of the crime. 
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1 I'm going to sustain the objection. 
2 MR. SHAW: Record may be stricken? 
3 THE COURT: Yes. 
4 Q. (BY MR. RICHARDS) Well let me ask it this way: You 
5 heard the testimony of Sarah Valencia, did you not? 
6 A. I did. 
7 Q. And she testified that she thought she could see my 
8 client shoot the gun toward the people in the yard, correct? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And if you had gunpowder residue testing, assuming 
11 that that was accurate, would you -- would that assist you in 
12 this analysis? 
13 
14 
15 
.... 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, it would . 
In what way? 
The presence of gunpowder on the top of the car would 
16 indicate that. 
17 MR. SHAW: I want to renew the objection. There is 
18 no foundation yet still insufficient foundation laid for that 
19 response. 
20 MR. RICP~S: I think he has testified as to what 
21 their witness said and now he can explain why the gunpowder 
22 test --
23 THE COURT: Again, I think he needs to stick to the 
24 physical evidence. That's my concern here is he is being asked 
25 to reconstruct the scene of the crime. He is not here to 
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1 comment on the credibility of witnesses and whether he agrees 
2 with their conclusions or not. So I think you need to stay 
3 with the physical evidence, if you would. 
4 MR. RICHARDS: Okay. 
5 Q. (BY MR. RICHARDS) In any event, there was no 
6 gunpowder testing done? 
7 MR. SHAW: Asked and answered, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: No, go ahead. One more time. 
9 Q. (BY MR. RICHARDS) How about about a sodium 
10 rhodizonate? I butchered that. 
11 A. No, you did just fine. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. And as far as 
14 rhodizonate, which ever way, tomato, tomato. As far as I know 
15 none of those tests were done in the testimony that I have 
16 heard. 
17 Q. How would that have assisted us, the sodium 
18 rhodizonate test? 
19 A. It's a test to detect the presence of lead. So if 
20 lead is there that's a strong indication that a bullet was 
21 there. And if it's not done then we're simply without that 
22 information. 
23 Q. Let me show you what's been marked State's Exhibit 
24 No. 38. What is that? 
25 A. This is a picture of the white vehicle that was in 
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1 the driveway at the scene. And it shows a defect in the 
2 windshield of the vehicle. 
3 Q. Okay. And if you had a sodium rhodizonate test on 
4 that what would that have been able to tell us? 
5 A. It would have been able to tell us whether there was 
6 residue of lead in -- or in that defect. 
7 Q. Okay. So that wasn't done? 
8 A. Excuse me? 
9 Q. That was not done? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Okay. And then there was also testimony of an dent 
12 of some sort in a fender on the same vehicle; is that right? 
13 'II. ...... 
14 Q. And I think it's Exhibit 36? 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Richards, do you want him to show the 
16 jury so they know which photograph you are referring to? I 
17 don't know if they have been able to see -- any I know they saw 
18 it earlier but --
19 MR. RICHARDS: I can certainly hold it up. 
20 THE COURT: Why don't you so they can see the 
21 photographs you are referring to. 
22 Q. So 38 is this one here, correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. That's this one here. And in 36 which is the dent in 
25 the car? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
A sodium rhodizonate test would have helped us in 
3 what way on that one? 
4 A. Same thing. It would have said that there was --
5 there was not lead in that defect, in that dent. 
6 Q. Now, you have heard the testimony of --well, let's 
7 see. Is there anything else that you would like to add, other 
8 than the actual video at the scene or something. 
9 A. Well, sure. Well, those are things that physical 
10 evidence wise, I felt were very important, would like to have 
11 had. 
12 Q. 
13 correct? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
You know, you heard the testimony of Mr. Wakefield, 
Yes. 
And about the 10 cartridges. What conclusions did 
16 you reach on the 10 cartridges. 
17 A. Well, I concurred with David on that, that all 10 of 
18 those cartridge cases were fired from the same weapon. 
19 
20 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
I conclude that those were fired from a quite 
21 stationary position, that is, the person firing that gun was 
22 not moving very much. 
23 Q. So you agree with him that the person firing that 
24 would have had to have been stationary? 
25 MR. SHAW: Well, objection. That's a 
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1 mischaracterization of his answer. "Not moving very much" was 
2 what he said. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
MR. RICHARDS: Excuse me. "Not moving very much." 
Right. You know, so certainly not down the street. 
MR. RICHARDS: All right. Could I get that screen? 
You also don't disagree with -- in other words, you 
7 agree with Dave Wakefield regarding the two slugs that they 
8 the bullets that were taken from the two victims bodies? 
9 A. Yes, I agree that those two -- I have examined those 
10 microscopically using the same procedure that Mr. Wakefield 
11 did. And I agree that those two bullets were fired from the 
12 same gun, but there is no way to determine whether those two 
13 bullets in those 10 cartridge cases were fired from one gun or 
14 two guns. We can't match the bullet to a fired case. 
15 Q. Are you familiar with this picture? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And this is a picture of the street that we're 
18 talking about looking from east down westward, correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Can you tell us which Exhibit that is? 
21 MR. RICHARDS: That that would be Exhibit 16, 
22 Defense. 
23 THE COURT: Defense 16? 
24 MR. RICHARDS: Yes. 
25 Q. And you heard the testimony of the shooting from 
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1 various witnesses on the stand, correct? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And if what can you tell us about the evidence on 
4 the ground from the CSI photographs in comparison to where you 
5 would expect shell casings? 
6 MR. SHAW: Well, objection without further 
7 foundation. I don't -- I think he has to give us on what 
8 testimony he is relying. 
9 
10 
11 
Q. 
THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. 
Did you listen to the testimony of Sarah Valencia? 
MR. SHAW: Well, wait a minute that's a leading 
12 question. Ask the witness what it is specifically that he 
13 wants to rely on and have him tell us, not have counsel lead 
14 him. 
15 
16 
17 Q. 
THE COURT: All right. Sustained. 
MR. RICHARDS: All right. 
Whose testimony did you listen to regarding the --
18 where you would expect the bullets to be? 
19 A. I listened to all of the testimony of all of the 
20 prosecution witnesses. 
21 Q. And what did they say regarding the shooting that 
22 would be of importance to your analysis? 
23 A. There is consistency in -- on several areas of their 
24 testimony. One is that an initial shot or shots --
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. -- followed by some relative1y short period of time. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. And then more shooting. 
4 Q. All right. 
5 A. There is also pretty consistent testimony from the 
6 witnesses that the vehicle, the SUV, was traveling down the 
7 street as the shooting was occurring. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. And that the shooting ended when the vehicle took 
10 off. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. So those are three that are pretty consistent things. 
13 And assuming that the shell casings -- assuming it 
14 was a semiautomatic .22 pistol that was being fired, and given 
15 that the shooting occurs in a moving ve~icle, where would you 
16 expect the shell casings to end up? 
17 MR. SHAW: Wel1, objection as to foundation. Speed 
18 of the moving vehicle. We don't have anything laid relative to 
19 allow him to --
20 THE COURT: Sustained. 
21 Q. Let me give you a hypothetical. Assuming that there 
22 was a vehicle moving at a rate of speed of five to 10 miles an 
23· hour down the road shooting a .22 caliber semiautomatic pistol, 
24 where would you except the shell casings to be? 
25 MR. SHAW: Objection. There is no facts in evidence 
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-. 1 to allow that hypothetical unless they can link it up in the 
2 future. There is no facts in evidence to allow that 
3 hypothetical. 
4 
5 
6 A. 
THE COURT: No. Overruled. Go ahead. 
MR. RICHARDS: You can answer that question. 
Well, if the vehicle, and therefore the gun, is 
7 traveling down the road, then there should be cartridge cases 
8 
9 
strewn along the path of the vehicle. 
Q. And we have tried to present that here. 
10 back. So you would expect 
Let's go 
11 MR. SHAW: Well, at this point I want to object and 
12 approach the bench, if I may. 
13 THE COuttT: Why don't we give the jury a little 
14 recess here. We've been going for a while. 
15 Members of the jury, if you'll go with the bailiff 
16 and take a short recess. 
17 (The following proceedings were held in open court after the 
18 ju_ry left the courtroan. ) 
19 THE COURT: Let's have the record reflect that the 
20 jury has now left. 
21 
22 
Mr. Shaw, you were about to say something. 
MR. SHAW: Yes. When I looked at the Goggle 
23 photograph in this picture it was unclear to me what it was 
24 trying to show. There is -- what they try to do here is 
25 misrepresent the facts in evidence. This No. 16 appears to 
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1 have shell casings is what they are showing down the road 
2 starting at a location way east of the Nava home, which no one 
3 has testified to, and continuing in succession all the way 
4 home. That is clearly not the state of the evidence in this 
5 case, clearly not. 
6 THE COURT: I think you can cross-examine him. That 
7 may not -- I mean, there is evidence about shots being fired 
8 from the SUV whether it was stationary. At some point it does 
9 pull out and leave. And I think you can cross-examine as to 
10 that. But I realize your evidence may be different than 
11 Mr. Gaskill's conclusion or theory. But I think he is entitled 
12 at least to give us his theory of the case and you certainly 
13 can cross-examine as to that. 
14 MR. SHAW: Then my objection would be he has to find 
15 a starting point for the second group of shots. He has to tell 
16 us what that foundation is; I mean where it starts. 
17 THE COURT: I do think we need to lay a little better 
18 foundation, rather than just having him give a conclusion all 
19 the way down. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: Well, Your Honor, I have tried to do 
21 that. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: And I get cut off and objected to and 
24 I can live with that. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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) 
1 MR. RICHARDS: But we have a witness here that's an 
2 expert witness. He can listen to the testimony. He's 
3 testified that he's done that. He can then comment that based 
4 upon the testimony that I heard on the stand, which is what he 
5 was trying to do that I would expect to see this. But instead 
6 I see this. I think that's not commenting on the 
7 THE COURT: Okay. I just think he needs to be 
9 
10 
11 
12 
8 careful. Because what I'm concerned about is him rendering an 
opinion that he doesn't believe these witnesses. And I think 
that's a comment on their credibility. That's for the jury to 
decide. He can stick to the facts and the physical evidence 
and render an opinion based on that. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. RICHARDS: If I have a witness that says that the 
car is shooting -- car is moving, shots are being fired with a 
semiautomatic weapon-- and that's their witnesses, that's not 
ours, that's their witnesses -- I can have him comment and say 
based upon the evidence I heard I would expect to see shell 
casings according to this. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. RICHARDS: I wouldn't expect to see them all 
grouped into a 15 --
THE COURT: I don't have any problem with that. What 
I'm concerned about is him starting to comment on the 
credibility of the people who have testified. I think you need 
to stay away from that. 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: And maybe he is not going there. But I 
3 got the impression he was trying to. 
4 MR. SHAW: And for the record, so it's clear, each 
5 and every witness has one shot -- I'm using Exhibit 2 --
6 somewhere behind -- one shot somewhere behind the Yukon Denali, 
7 essentially or at least in line with the red vehicle parked on 
8 the street somewhere in here. 
9 MR. RICHARDS: One or two. 
10 MR. SHAW: One or two, right. And then -- then the 
11 shooting doesn't commence until some period of time goes by and 
12 it commences somewhere out in the roadway. That's what people 
13 are saying. This Exhibit depicts shell casings following 
14 THE COURT: Right. And again, I think you can 
15 cross-examine him as to the discrepancy between his conclusion 
16 and what you have got by way of physical evidence. 
17 Before we break though, Mr. Richards, I wanted to 
18 ask: Did you mark the animation as an exhibit has that been 
19 MR. RICHARDS: I haven't yet. I can do that. 
20 THE COURT: You probably should. 
21 MR. RICHARDS: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: And because I know -- I'm not going to 
23 let it in based on what I've heard so far. But we probably 
24 need to mark that as an exhibit. Do we know what number that 
25 is going to be? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 Honor, --
5 
6 
MR. RICHARDS: No. I've got four of them here. 
THE COURT: Defendant's 28-32 was that --
MR. RICHARDS: And while we have the break, Your 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RICHARDS: I would like to argue one more 
7 time. I mean, I didn't want to do it in front of the jury, 
8 certainly. But I think he can lay foundation that would 
9 support his theory as to what happened. And then the animation 
10 just puts life to that or gives effect to it. And that's no 
11 different than what the State is doing with their bringing in a 
12 gun that wasn't at the scene and you let that in. 
13 THE COu~T: Well, what the problem is: There is no 
14 foundation here. That's the problem. 
15 MR. RICHARDS: There is no foundation for the gun 
16 either. That wasn't 
17 the size of the gun. 
we didn't know that's the kind of gun, 
18 THE COURT: I think that's a different story. But 
19 what I heard him say is I don't know who created it. I don't 
20 know how it was created. I don't know what they relied upon in 
21 creating it. I'm not sure the background of the people who 
22 created it. I mean, you can't just throw an animation up 
23 there. You have got to lay a foundation for it. 
24 From what I heard from Professor Gaskill, the 
25 foundation is totally incomplete here. So it may and he 
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1 certainly can testify to his theory. I'm just not going to let 
2 the amination come in at this particular time. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: And yet, we let in all of the 
4 testimony of these witnesses that is so contradictory and so 
5 impossible. 
6 THE COURT: Well, but that's --the difference is 
7 there you are talking about their credibility as witnesses. 
8 And that's for the jury to decide, whether not they believe a 
9 particular witness. That's --
10 MR. RICHARDS: And the State can cross-examine 
11 Professor Gaskill. 
12 MR. SHAW: We plan to. 
13 THE COt.i"RT: Well, yeah. I just don't think you can 
14 just put up an animation and say, you know, this is our theory 
15 of the case. There has got to be some foundation for it. I 
16 mean, I don't know how they arrived at any of the stuff in the 
17 animation. I mean, the animation has got the shooter up in the 
18 carport. And I --that's got to be a first, doesn't it? 
19 MR. RICHARDS: Well, I'm going to have Professor 
20 Gaskill talk about that. 
21 THE COURT: And I guess, he can testify to it. I'm 
22 just saying there is no foundation for the animation that's --
23 MR. RICHARDS: Well, maybe it was premature for the 
24 State to voir dire on that. I wasn't going to get into that 
25 one until he had given all his foundation. But anyway, we will 
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1 proceed and --
2 
3 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. RICHARDS: Should we take a break? We are 
4 obviously going to have to go beyond 2:00. So his testimony 
5 can finish. 
6 You are not going to be available tomorrow? 
7 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
8 THE COURT: All right. So we may have to go a little 
9 later in the day. 
10 
11 
12 
MR. RICHARDS: That's okay. 
(Break Taken. ) 
THE COURT: I'll have the record reflect we're back 
13 in session. Anything before I bring in the jury? 
14 
15 
MR. RICHARDS: We just need our client. 
THE COURT: Let's have the record reflect then 
16 Mr. Perea is present. 
17 Want to bring in the jury then? 
18 (The following proceedings were held in open court after the 
19 jury entered the courtroom.) 
20 THE COURT: Let's have the record reflect that the 
21 jury is now present. 
22 Go ahead, Mr. Richards. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 Q. Now, we were -- before we broke we were talking about 
25 the shell casings. And you've listened to the witnesses 
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1 testify and, specifically, you testified just a moment ago 
2 about the first one or two shots. To the best of your 
3 knowledge where were those -- at least according to the 
4 witnesses, where were those fired from? 
5 MR. SHAW: Again, Your Honor. He is asking this 
6 witness to comment on what the witnesses have said. That's an 
7 improper question for an expert. 
8 THE COURT: Well, I think he can testify as to what 
9 his recollection is as far as the location of the first shots. 
10 Overruled. 
11 Q. Would you go up to Exhibit No -- whatever that is 
12 2, and point to us where, to the best of your knowledge 
13 according to the witnesses, those shots were fired? 
14 A. According to the witnesses the first shots were fired 
15 somewhere in the roadway on the other side of the red car by 
16 the mailbox in that area to the east of the home in the 
17 roadway. 
18 Q. Okay. And were there any shell casings found in that 
19 area after examining all of the reports you got from CSI? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
And have you had an occasion to go out to the scene 
22 and measure the distance between where the front of that car 
23 would be and where the nearest shell casing is? 
24 
25 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could you explain to the jury how you did that? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
With the tape measurer, measure along the roadway. 
How far was that? 
About 75 feet. 
Okay. You can have a seat. Thank you. 
Thank you. 
In your experience could a shell casing from the .22 
7 travel that far? 
8 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
Why not? 
There is not enough energy. They don't travel that 
11 far when they eject. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
How far do they normally travel? 
It varies; 10, 15 feet. 
Seventy-five feet would be possible or not? 
Not in my opinion. I have never heard of any weapon 
16 that casts its empties 75 feet. 
17 Q. Okay. And did you have an occasion to determine the 
18 levelness of the road? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. When did you do that? 
21 A. At the same time that I measured the length of the 
22 road, the distance. 
23 Q. And could you describe to the jury the grade of the 
24 road? 
25 A. From east to west our level indicated it's almost a 
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1 flat dead level road from east to west. There was no -- there 
2 was not a hill. There is no incline. It's a pretty flat road. 
3 
4 that? 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And you did that with a -- how did you determine 
A regular construction level. 
Thank you. I want to go to -- well, and then to the 
7 best of your recollection as far as what the witnesses were 
8 saying about the SUV, you heard testimony it was coasting or 
9 driving at normal speed, correct? 
10 A. That was -- coasting or moving, that's what I recall 
11 the witnesses saying. 
12 Q. And assuming that it was coasting or moving, where 
13 would you expect a forensic scientist -- where would you expect 
14 shell casings to be located? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
MR. SHAW: Objection. Foundation, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No. Overruled. 
Go ahead. 
If -- can I stand? 
Please do, yes. 
If the vehicle pulls out into the road from behind 
21 the white car on the north side of the road across the street 
22 from the Nava house, if it pulls out and the shooting begins 
23 somewhere in front of the driveway and continues on to where 
24 the cartridge cases are found in front of the driveway west of 
25 the Nava home, then I would expect that cartridge cases would 
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1 be strewn along the pathway of the vehicle. That's what they 
2 do. You fire, it ejects, vehicle moves a little bit further~ 
3 You fire it, it ejects, so the cartridge case would be about as 
4 far away as you have moved, give or take. They certainly do 
5 there is variation. They don't go exactly the same place. 
6 They don't -- they can roll around a little bit. But we would 
7 expect a pattern of cartridge cases along the roadway. 
8 Q. All right. Let me show you what's been marked 
9 Defense Exhibit 19. This is a photograph -- where did we get 
10 this photograph? 
11 A. You gave it to me and Sandy Ladd testified that I 
12 believe she took those photographs so we got them from the CSI. 
13 Q. And what does this particular Defense Exhibit 19 
14 depict? 
15 A. Each of those yellow markers depicts the location of 
16 one of the cartridge cases that were found in the roadway and 
17 this is on the -- can I? 
18 Q. Please do, yes. You don't need to ask permission you 
19 can just go up. 
20 A. Okay. So this area here in the driveway on the west 
21 side of the Nava home, which is the -- the Nava driveway is on 
22 the east side. So this is the driveway to the adjacent house. 
23 The cartridge cases are found in the roadway, in the approach 
24 to the driveway, and out of the roadway, and in front of the 
25 driveway. And each of those yellow tabs depicts one of those 
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1 cartridge cases and those tabs are there so that you can see 
2 where they are and locate them when you go further away and so 
3 forth. 
4 Q. And can you give an opinion as to where a 
5 semiautomatic .22 caliber shooter would be to result in a 
6 pattern such as in Exhibit 19? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 that? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I can. 
Please do for the jury, please. 
We don't know. 
MR. SHAW: Objection. Where is the foundation for 
MR. RICHARDS: Probably the same that --
THE COu~T: Yeah. Based on the testimony he's heard. 
14 This is his opinion as to where he thinks the shooter was or --
15 
16 A. 
Go ahead. Over-ruled. 
Well, we don't know exactly what gun was used. So we 
17 don't know exactly the range. But most weapons 
18 Mr. Wakefield and I agree on this, most weapons eject the 
19 cartridge case to the right. So the gun is facing this way, 
20 then to the right, and typically from about this far in front 
21 to about maybe a little bit in back. So we -- based on these 
22 cartridge case locations if they -- if they are where they 
23 fell, then the shooter had to be back in the area west of the 
24 blue pick-up and likely in the roadway or not on the other side 
25 of the road but from maybe the middle of the road or to -- into 
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1 the driveway area. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
that 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
you 
A. 
Q. 
trying to 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. Now, you went to the scene; is that correct? 
Yes. 
And you examined locations based upon CSI photographs 
had; is that correct? 
It is. 
And you put another vehicle and pick-up truck in in 
set this up; is that correct? 
Yes. 
And where would you have located that? 
Located it about where the blue pickup truck is there 
12 based on the photographs that we have from CSI and --
13 
14 
15 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Including Exhibit No. 10? 
Yeah, that's exactly right. 
And did you -- were you able to get a vantage point 
16 from where you would expect a gun to be shot to result in 
17 cartridges being where they are at and going toward where the 
18 victims Mr. Esquivel and Mr. Nevarez ended up? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. Let me show you what's been marked Defense 
21 Exhibit No. 8. And I ask you if you recognize this picture. 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
I do. 
And that's an exhibit that we have put together from 
24 an aerial photograph, correct. 
25 A. That's what-- yes, that's what I have been told. 
Professor James Gaskill- Direct cont'd by MR. RICHARDS 205 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Q. About 717 East 1050 North. 
A. Right, it is. 
Q. Does it appear to be the same? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
Obviously, they 
A. Right. 
Q. Would 
to the pictures 
A. Yes. 
And 
were 
they 
that 
ther·e are four cars put on there. 
added since the photograph? 
be in the approximate positions according 
you have such as 19 and others from CSI? 
11 MR. SHAW: Well, let me -- for the record, make an 
12 objection with respect to the white car parked on the south 
13 side of the street in front of the truck. There is no evidence 
14 in the record as to where that was precisely. They have got it 
15 west of the mailbox. There is no evidence in record that it 
16 was west of the mailbox. No evidence that it was east of the 
17 mailbox. There is simply no evidence where it was parked 
18 exactly. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. It's got to depict what happened 
20 at the time of the murder. It's just you can't just --
21 unless you can lay a foundation that that is where the vehicles 
22 were . I mean 
23 MR. RICHARDS: Well, we'll ignore the white car in 
24 front of the blue truck. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. SHAW: Well, but wait a minute. How can it be 
2 ignored? It is thrown in front of the jury with no foundation. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: Well, he already testified, Your 
4 Honor, that one of the witnesses said that or -- he talked to a 
5 witness. 
6 THE COURT: If you are going to use a diagram it's 
7 got to be accurate, that's all I'm saying. It's going to 
8 reflect what happened on August 5th 2007. If it doesn't, it's 
9 not corning in. 
10 MR. RICHARDS: May I just have one moment? 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, Keri Garcia testified that 
13 she didn't park there because there was a car there. She got 
14 there right before the shooting occurred so she testified. 
15 That's their witness 
16 THE COURT: Again, I'm not going to get in an 
17 argument over what the witnesses or did or did not say. The 
18 jury can decide who testified to what. But it just seems to me 
19 if you are going to put up a diagram it better be accurate as 
20 to where the vehicles were located. That's all I'm saying. 
21 ~iR. RICHARDS: Well. 
22 THE COURT: It's not admissible. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: But the problem, Your Honor, is that 
24 the State's exhibit --that's no more accurate because we know 
25 there was a car here. 
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1 MR. SHAW: Well, wait just a minute. The State's 
2 exhibit is what was depicted by the CSI when they got there and 
3 took photos at the crime scene. What Mr. Richards intends to 
4 do is create a scene that was not there and there is no 
5 foundation for that car. 
6 THE COURT: This is just a suggestion. Can't you 
7 just use Exhibit 2, which has already been introduced? 
8 MR. RICHARDS: I'll use Exhibit 2, that's a better 
9 idea. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. 
10 Q. You heard the testimony of Richard Esquivel as to 
11 where he was located in relationship to the white car that was 
12 in the driveway; is that correct? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Could you with those stickers put on Exhibit --
15 State's Exhibit No. 2 where his testimony was that they were 
16 located? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Q. 
A. 
I will use a red one if that's okay. 
That's great. Any color you would like. 
MR. SHAW: Well --
And how about where Mr. Nevarez was located? 
I don't think it's entirely clear to me were 
22 Mr. Nevarez was located but it was next to Mr. Esquivel. 
23 MR. SHAW: Exactly. If it's not clear to the witness 
24 where --
25 THE COURT: Then he can't put --
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1 MR. RICEUL~S: -- then he shouldn't be marking the 
2 exhibit. 
3 THE COURT: If he doesn't know where they were. 
MR. RICHARDS: Well, we will take off that one. 4 
5 Let's just talk about Mr. Esquivel then. 
6 THE COURT: Can we have the record reflect what color 
7 dot you are using. 
8 THE WITNESS: I'm taking the yellow one off, if I 
9 can. 
10 THE COURT: If you can. 
11 MR. RICHARDS: Red dot. 
12 THE WITNESS: If I can. Pretty good sticker better 
13 than I expected it to be. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
A. The red dot then would be the location of 
Mr. Esquivel. 
Q. All right. Now, did you -- using the pick-up truck 
that you put at the same place as the blue truck was, and in 
going back to where the -- you would expect a shooter of a .22 
caliber semiautomatic, where they would be as a result in the 
casing pattern that was depicted in Exhibit 19, were you able 
to determine whether or not a shooter would be able to actually 
shoot Mr. Esquivel from that location? 
A. If Mr. Esquivel is here, from my view here, you 
24 couldn't see Mr. Esquivel; we'd have to look through the truck. 
25 MR. SHAW: Objection. This witness was not on scene 
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1 looking through the truck that night. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. I will let you cover that on 
3 cross. I think he's entitled to give his opinion based on what 
4 he observed. Overruled. 
5 Q. Now Mr. Esquivel also testified that maybe he went 
6 down on his knees. 
7 A. That's what I was-- that's what I'm basing my--
8 with Mr. Esquivel down on his knees if --
9 
10 
Q. 
A. 
Would it --
I couldn't see someone down on their knees from this 
11 vantage point over the truck. The truck was in the way. 
12 Q. And so would it~ have been possible for Mr. Esquivel 
13 to have been shot from somebody in the S~J at that location? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
I couldn't see. So that's what I can say. 
Okay. Now, Mr. Nevarez was somewhere right next 
16 beside Mr. Esquivel according to Mr. Esquivel's testimony. 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
According to Mr. Esquivel's testimony. 
And would you have been able to see someone next to 
19 Mr. Esquivel and shoot them from that SUV located where you 
20 would have to be to result in that casing pattern? 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
I couldn't see anyone if they were in that position. 
Okay. You can have a seat for now. I want to talk 
23 about the darkness and it's effects on the witnesses. Did you 
24 happen to go to the scene at nighttime? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. And you had an opportunity to see the CSI photo which 
2 we have depicted as Exhibit No. 9 Defense. 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And that's a picture of what? 
5 A. It's a picture of the white car in the driveway. 
6 This same white car next to the red dot in -- yeah, State's 
7 Exhibit 22. That's the white car in the driveway. 
8 Q. Now, you went out to the scene on a night in January; 
9 is that correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Did you check the moon phases? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Would the moon phase be ~- well, tell us what the 
14 moon phase was the night of the --
15 A. The night of --
16 Q. Of the incident. 
17 A. of the incident -- the night of the -- that we 
18 went out the moon phases were similar and according to the 
19 calculations the moon was almost certainly not over the top of 
20 the mountain when this incident occurred. So it would have 
21 been a dark night, a dark moon. 
22 Q. And looking at that particular picture, Exhibit No. 
23 9, defense, would that be about how -- tell us after having 
24 visited the scene at night how far you could see. 
25 A. The night we were there it was a little darker than 
Professor James Gaskill- Direct cont'd by MR. RICHARDS 211 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 that picture. And in order to recognize someone for example 
2 they would have to be within 4 or 5 feet, in other words you 
3 could see a shadow or a silhouette. But to recognize someone 
4 they had to be pretty close to him. 
5 Q. Let me show you what's been marked Defense Exhibit 
6 No. 10. Now, that's a-- virtually the same p~otograph, 
7 correct, as 9? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
From the same location, yeah. 
Go back to -- now back. After having visited the 
10 scene at nighttime, which photograph most accurately reflects 
11 what the sighting condition would be? 
12 A. The first one, the dark one, is a certainly lot -- a 
13 lot closer to what I observed than the second one. The second 
14 one appears to have been -- and I believe Sandy testified that 
15 she either overexposed it or used an artificial light. 
16 
17 
18 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I think she testified on this one she used a flash. 
(Witness nods head.) 
Okay. And so you are saying it would have been even 
19 darker than that? 
20 A. Yeah. When I was there it was a little darker than 
21 that. 
22 Q. And let me talk -- if we could go down to Exhibit No. 
23 11. This is another pict~ure of that same vehicle taken from a 
24 different angle; is that correct? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. And this, again, is one that's illuminated by 
2 artificial light? 
3 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
6 testimony. 
7 Q. 
8 correct? 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Fair statement? 
I'm sure it was and that's reinforced by Sandy's 
Now, there was a window broken in that car; is that 
Yes. 
And let's go to the next slide, Exhibit No. 12. What 
11 is that a picture of? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
It's a close up of that rear passenger window. 
And were you able to view and make any opinion 
14 regarding that window? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
17 determine? 
18 A. 
Yes. 
Could you describe to the jury what you were able to 
Well, that -- from the photographs it is pretty clear 
19 that there is a partial circle there in the broken edge of the 
20 window, which is consistent with a projectile penetrating the 
21 window at that point. 
22 Q. Let me give you this. You can just push this little 
23 button and get a little red button. And so what was the --
24 caused by a projectile. And so that appears to be a bullet 
25 hole? 
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1 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
It certainly could be. 
Is there anything else it could be? 
It could be a lot of things. If they were traveling 
4 really fast. 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
In a parked vehicle however, probably a bullet hole. 
I wouldn't dispute it's a bullet hole; I just don't 
7 have any proof that it is. 
8 Q. All right. Were you able -- if you had had the 
9 window would that have been of assistance to you? 
10 A. Certainly. 
11 Q. In what way? 
12 A. Well, we could have tested it, as we spoke about 
13 earlier, for the presence of lead, for example, and could 
14 have always better to have it in hand than have a picture. 
15 Q. Okay. But we didn't get that and I understand that 
16 that may be one that just wasn't picked up in all of the 
17 picking up. 
18 Are you able to utilize these photographs and are 
19 there a couple -- there are other ones; is that right? There 
20 is another view, that's Exhibit 13. Were you able to make a 
21 determination based upon examination of the photographs? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
I made some determinations, yes. 
Could you describe to the jury what that 
24 determination is? 
25 A. Well, I think I have already mentioned that I believe 
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1 that the -- there is a -- some projectile that apparently 
2 penetrated the window from, you know, at this point in the 
3 window. 
4 Q. Can you tell from which direction that bullet 
5 penetrated? 
6 A. Well, I can look at the photograph and tell you what 
7 it looks like. But I can't -- I wasn't able to observe that so 
8 I'm looking at a photograph. 
9 Q. Okay. Using the photograph, which is the best 
10 evidence that we have, what did you determine? 
11 A. This is -- can I explain -- do a little explanation? 
12 Q. Yes, please. 
13 A. This is what is called a "tempered 
_, __ .;. 
II Ar1d <::J.LCl;J.::>. 
14 tempered glass is designed so what when it breaks it's under 
15 tension. And instead of just breaking like an ordinary window 
16 pane, it will shatter into lots and lots of little pieces. 
17 And so you can see that there are lots of fracture 
18 lines in this. And if you give it a little tap, all of those 
19 would probably separate and maybe a few of them would stay 
20 together. But there is a whole bunch of other little pieces 
21 that are shattered down in there. 
22 But when glass is penetrated by a rapidly moving 
23 projectile, the projectile will punch some of the glass out in 
24 front of it as it goes through. And very commonly, when it 
25 does that instead of just making a straight hole right through 
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1 the glass it will make, like, a crater so that one side of the 
2 glass will be 
3 side will may 
maybe the hole will be this wide and the other 
this way it kind of catered out like so. 
4 And in this case if you look in this area right in 
5 here, there is what appears to be a tapering edge. The taper 
6 is on the exit side. So the bullet goes -- or other 
7 projectile, when they go through the entrance side is narrower 
8 than the exit side. So if you look at that it appears that, in 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
this photograph at least, that the taper is on the side we are 
facing which is the outside of the window. 
Q. Which would indicate? 
A. If, in fact, that is the case, if, in fact, that 
taper is where it appears to be from the photograph that would 
indicate that the projectile came from inside and exited out 
the window and not from the outside into the vehicle. 
Q. Is there any other evidence from CSI that would 
support that conclusion? 
A. I don't --
Q. 
A. 
The slug for instance? 
Well, there is a lack of evidence that would indicate 
21 maybe that's the case. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Bad question. Is there any lack of evidence? 
Yes. 
Could you explain that to the jury? 
Well, if the bullet -- if a projectile bullet, for 
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1 example, went in, then we should be able to find it in the car. 
2 We didn't find it in the car so that's kind of negative 
3 evidence and doesn't really prove that that's the case. But 
4 certainly it makes me wonder where is the bullet and they have 
5 searched pretty throughly. I have a lot of faith in my 
6 students. 
7 Q. All right. You know Sandy Ladd and you have faith ln 
8 her? 
9 A. Oh, yes, absolutely. 
10 Q. She is a good CSI? 
11 A. She is. 
12 Q. But you can't be certain from these two items of 
13 evidence or lack thereof which way +-"h---l.,.l.l.C bullet ,.....'!lT'nO \,_.,I,..U.~L\_.. frorr1·? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 Q. It's just one of those things that's a question mark 
16 maybe? 
17 A. That's right. 
18 Q. Okay. Now, you heard the testimony of the location 
19 of Mr. Esquivel. And you testified to that just a minute ago 
20 in the red dot. You also heard testimony from Sarah Valencia 
21 and Keri Garcia as to the location of Sabrina Prieto when she 
22 was shot; is that correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And if you could maybe with a blue -- with a yellow 
25 sticker put on the board there on Exhibit No. 2, where you 
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1 believe that she was at based upon that testimony, if you can. 
2 MR. SHAW: Wel1, and I'm going to object. 
3 THE COURT: He's got to be a 1ittle more definite 
4 than he's got to know exactly where they were, otherwise 
5 it's just a waste of time to put it on. 
6 Q. Well, let me have you describe to the jury what 
7 evidence we have as far as where she was at and what position 
8 she was in. 
9 MR. SHAW: Well, wait a second. That's a comment on 
10 the evidence. 
11 THE COURT: Well, again, the question is: Does he 
12 know where they were standing at the time they were shot? 
13 If he does, he can put the sticker on Exhibit 2. If 
14 he doesn't he is not going to be able to. 
15 MR. SHAW: The Court asked a better question but I'm 
16 okay with that. But not with just --
17 THE COURT: That's what I'm getting at. Is he 
18 apparently knew where the first person was but not the second. 
19 Now we are asking for two more. I think he's got to be sure 
20 about their location. 
21 Q. Do you have any evidence that you have heard from the 
22 stand that would indicate where Sabrina Prieto was at when she 
23 was struck by the bullet? 
24 
25 
A. Yes. 
MR. SHAW: Well, again, isn't that -- Your Honor, 
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1 isn't that a cormnent on this evidence? This jury --
2 THE COURT: Well, he is trying to reconstruct the 
3 scene. If he wants to rely upon what somebody else said, 
4 that's fine. I don't have any problem with that. 
5 MR. SHAW: That's okay. But he has to say it's his 
6 understanding. It's not a conclusion that is to be drawn as 
7 correct. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 Q. Is this your understanding from listening to the 
10 witnesses where was she at when she was struck? 
11 A. The witnesses indicated to me, at least, that the 
12 witness was on the side of the east side of the Nava 
13 MR. SHAW: I 'm g-oing to object to 
14 characterization of the witness's testimony. That is 
15 completely inaccurate and unsupported by any record period. 
16 THE COURT: Unfortunately, nobody bothered to mark 
17 that originally where they were. So I don't know. But if he's 
18 got an opinion based on the testimony where he thinks they 
19 were, then I don't have any problem with that. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: Okay. Go ahead. 
21 THE COL~T: So go ahead. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: And there is various witnesses would 
23 put it in a range that was made. 
24 A. You can put it in a range. But on the side of the 
25 house under the carport leading to or near the side entrance of 
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1 the house. 
2 
3 
4 
Q. Okay. And 
MR. SHAW: Again, I have --
THE COURT: And I'm going to give you a chance to 
5 cross-examine. This is his explanation. This is what he 
6 believes as to where they were standing when they were shot. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Q. 
A. 
12 house. 
13 
MR. SHAW: But that -- okay. 
THE COURT: Okay? 
Go ahead. 
What direction was she facing when she was shot? 
The testimony was that she was running towards the 
MR. SHAW: Objection. That was not the testimony. 
14 This has to be clear 
15 THE COURT: Well, and, again, you will have a chance 
16 to cross-examine him as to whether that was the testimony. The 
17 jury knows what the testimony is. They have been taking notes. 
18 You know what the testimony is and if he's wrong you can point 
19 that out on cross. But for right now, this is his theory of 
20 what he believes where they were standing when they were shot. 
21 Okay? Overruled. 
22 
23 
24 Q. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
So there is a range there by the side of the house 
25 and you were saying which direction you believe that the 
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1 witness said she was facing? 
2 A. The witness said she was running to get into the 
3 house. 
4 
5 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. So she would have been facing south? 
Either facing east or facing south depending on 
6 whether she had rounded the corner or not. 
7 Q. Did you have an opportunity to review the medical 
8 examiner's report? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Where was she shot? 
In the chest. 
Okay. Assuming that she was shot in the chest facing 
13 south or southeast, could someone from a Su~ driven along the 
14 roadway there have fired the fatal shot? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Okay. You heard the testimony of Richard Esquivel, 
17 as far as where he was at when the shots were fired or when he 
18 got hit; is that correct? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And could you describe would it have been possible 
21 for him to be hit by somebody in the SUV based upon his 
22 testimony? 
23 A. Well, certainly someone -- someone here. As long as 
24 we don't have a truck in front of him. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. Then somewhere along in here and he -- someone 
2 standing here or driving here could have shot him easy. Or 
3 someone back here or someone over here. 
4 Q. Depending on which way he was facing? 
5 A. Exactly. 
6 Q. Okay. And you heard his testimony that he was always 
7 facing the street? 
8 A. Yes, I did. 
9 Q. Until he kneeled down. 
10 A. Correct. 
11 Q. Once he kneeled down would he have been able to have 
12 been shot from the street? 
13 
14 
15 
.,.. 
....... 
Q. 
A. 
Well, as long as this truck doesn't obscure him . 
But you --
That means that he has to -- everything I know about 
16 it says we have to -- the bullet is not going to come around 
17 and circle him and shoot someone from behind him. And I don't 
18 think that requires much expertise. 
19 Q. You can have a seat. So given all of the evidence 
20 that you have examined, the testimony that you have heard, the 
21 witnesses statements that you have read, the medical examiner's 
22 reports etc., everything, have you been able to form an opinion 
23 as to how this crime may have occurred? 
24 A. Well, I really can't say exactly how this crime 
25 occurred. 
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1 Q. Okay. Can you -- given the best evidence, your best 
2 or most logical explanation? 
3 A. I can tell you some things that I -- in my opinion 
4 are correct. 
5 Q. Okay. Why don't you do it that way. 
6 A. In my opinion there was another weapon. There wasn't 
7 just one weapon. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. And that's based on the fact that we have shots fired 
10 here and no cartridge cases. Now, if a semiautomatic is fired 
11 in this area we should find cartridge cases. So that would 
12 indicate that -- since this one indicates there were shots that 
13 it was -- in all likelihood, as far as I'm concerned was a 
14 weapon that doesn't eject, which could be a revolver, could be 
15 a single shot, could be lots of things. 
16 So if someone here gets shot, someone here has been 
17 shot, I am not able to come up with a good way that someone 
18 gets in the car, drives along here, shooting as they go along, 
19 stopping, or not stopping, and then shooting over the car or 
20 through the truck, and hitting someone here, or hitting someone 
21 who is around the corner. That's --that's -- so there are 
22 lots of things that could have happened. I can't tell you 
23 which one it is. I can only say what I have done and what my 
24 experience tells me and what my investigation of this tells me. 
25 Q. And what is that? 
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1 A. And that is that a vehicle or a person standing right 
2 here has almost an impossible shot to hit someone around the 
3 corner of this house and with no damage to the vehicle to shoot 
4 someone here that's kneeling down. I can't draw a line that 
5 matches that. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. If I draw a line from the front damage in the white 
8 car windshields 
9 Q. Yes? 
10 A. to the damage in the back window it comes out here 
11 in the area, again, in front of the mailbox maybe give or take 
12 a little bit. But certainly not here. 
13 How far from the shell casings was that? 
14 A. Oh, a minimum of 25 feet. 
15 Q. Okay. And your experience has been that .22 wouldn't 
16 kick out a shell that far? 
17 A. They don't. 
18 Q. How do you explain then the pattern of shell casings 
19 in Exhibit 19? 
20 A. I explain this pattern the same way that 
21 Mr. Wakefield did, that there is a more or less stationary 
22 shooting from right here. 
23 Q. Okay. You can have a seat. Just one last question: 
24 If Sabrina were running towards the backyard or toward the 
25 backdoor or side door, and she was shot in the chest, from 
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' 1 which direction would the shooter have to have been placed? 
2 A. She is running -- if she is running along the east 
3 side of the house to the south, if she shot was in the chest 
4 the person has to be in front of her. 
5 Q. Which would be? 
6 A. South from the backyard area. 
7 Q. In the carport? 
8 A. In the carport, backyard. 
9 Q. Okay. And assuming that that was -- well, would 
10 there be another explanation for the assuming that's what 
11 happened for the shell casings to then be out on the road? 
12 A. I don't know how the shell casings got through either 
13 they got there --
14 MR. SHAW: Calls for speculation then, Your Honor, if 
15 he doesn't know. 
16 
17 
18 
MR. RICHARDS: That's what he is here to do. 
MR. SHAW: Speculate? 
THE COURT: 11\7ell, yeah, he can't speculate. If he 
19 doesn't know then he can't render an opinion on that. So 
20 sustained. 
21 MR. RICP~S: All right. Okay. That's all the 
22 questions I have. 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Shaw. 
MR. SHAW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. SHAW: 
3 Q. Mr. Gaskill, it is true, is it not, that you do not 
4 know whether any vehicles were parked in front of the blue Ford 
5 truck? 
6 A. Well, I wasn't there and I don't have any 
7 photographs. All I have is a persons' statements. 
8 Q. That's a simple yes or no, right? You don't know 
9 that. You don't know where any vehicles were parked, right? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. In front of the blue Ford truck. 
12 A. No, I don't. 
13 Q. All we have is the crime scene investigators that 
14 take photographs to accurately depict the scene as they find 
15 it, correct? 
16 A. Right. 
17 Q. All right. Now, if I were to put this straight edge 
18 up against that shot 
19 THE COURT: Let's see, Mr. Shaw, I don't think the 
20 jury can see. You are kind of blocking their view. 
MR. SHAW: I'm sorry. Why don't you and I stand up 
22 then. 
23 THE COURT: Why don't you maybe move that. 
24 MR. SHAW: Put it right out here. Let me stand over 
25 here. 
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1 Q. If I were to put this straight edge up against that 
2 photograph at a point somewhere between the blue Ford and the 
3 window -- well, wait a minute you don't mark it, I do. 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
Oh, I'm sorry. Excuse me. 
If I put it here and it hits the window, right, it 
6 can hit the rear window, right? 
7 A. If you put it there it can, yes. 
8 Q. If you put it here it can hit Richard Esquivel, 
9 right? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And that same bullet path goes immediately over 
12 Richard and into the Ford truck in the garage next door, does 
13 it not? 
14 A. Well, yeah, it certainly can. I mean, that's the 
15 path you have got. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Shaw, again, I'm not sure the jurors 
17 on this end can see what you're demonstrating. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
Q. 
MR. SHAW: I am blocking everybody? 
THE COURT: I think you are blocking their view. 
Go through that again straight on. 
THE COURT: Maybe we have got a marker on something. 
If I put this straight edge lined up with the front 
23 edge of that blue Ford and the rear window of the Cavalier, 
24 there is a clear path, is there not, to the Cavalier? 
25 A. Yes, there is from the back of the blue truck. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Q. Okay. I can move it ever so slightly and still get a 
clear path to the Cavalier, can I not? 
A. Absolutely. You can move it to the east as far as 
you want and as long as you don't get passed it, of course, you 
can still hit the Cavalier, sure. 
Q. And, in fact, on that edge as it's depicted here, 
further ahead of the blue Ford truck and into the Cavalier you 
also have a line that lines up with the top left part of the 
windshield on the Cavalier, do you not? 
A. Well, I wouldn't line it up that way. That's not the 
11 way I line it up. You have it lined up a little bit -- am I 
12 
13 
okay to move it now? 
Q. I'm just saying, on this particular edge it lines up 
14 with the 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
The way you have it, yes. 
And then if we go slightly further it lines up with 
17 the -- you can line it up with the Ford truck and Richard 
18 Esquivel, can you not? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Sure, as long as we can clear the truck I'm happy. 
Right. And in the location of the car that is 
21 parked, allegedly, in this location is further or closer to the 
22 driveway entrance or driveway approach -- closer to the 
23 driveway approach in this location, you are going to have a 
24 gap, are you not, between that car and the front edge of the 
25 blue Ford? 
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1 A. This -- actually, as Sandy testified, this is not 
2 drawn to scale. And if you put two vehicles, a pickup truck 
3 and a full-sized sedan in front of the Nava home, there is very 
4 little extra room. 
5 Q. Well, do you know the distance right here from right 
6 there on the westerly edge of the Nava home to the front edge 
7 of that Ford truck? Did you measure that distance? 
8 A. No. We don't have pictures of the front. We only 
9 have pictures of the back. 
10 Q. You didn't measure the distance though, is what I'm 
11 saying? You didn't measure right here or try to get any 
12 measurements as to what that distance might have been. 
13 A. No. We only had photos of the back of the truck. We 
14 don't have photos of the front of the truck. But from the back 
15 of the red vehicle to the -- about the middle of this pattern 
16 is a little over 75 feet. 
17 Q. 
18 truck? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. Do you know the length of that blue Ford 
Not exactly. 
If -- I mean, if we were to step it off, I mean, 
21 what's the coR~on length of a vehicle? Are you familiar with 
22 that in your experience? 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
A little over 20 feet. 
Twenty feet for a vehicle? 
Well maybe that. 
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1 Q. Twenty feet? 
2 A. Well, I don't know how long that truck is. 
3 Q. Well if I were to step here and assuming my feet 
4 are --my steps are about 3 feet, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 15 feet maybe 
5 at max? Okay? 
6 A. Yeah, I don't know the length of this truck. 
7 Q. You don't know the length of the car? 
8 A. No, but we parked two cars there for that very 
9 purpose. So I could maybe get kind of a --
10 Q. I understand. But you don't know that you placed 
11 that car that you parked there in it's proper location, do you, 
12 Mr. Gaskill? 
13 ... A, I wanted to know how much -- about how much room have 
14 we got if we parked two cars there total. That's what I did. 
15 I parked a truck and not a large sedan but a regular-sized 
16 sedan right there. There is not much room. This is a bit 
17 shorter than this blue truck would indicate. 
18 Q. The question was, Mr. Gaskill: You don't know the 
19 proper location of any parked car relative to the blue truck 
20 A. That's right. 
21 Q. -- on the night in question? You don't know where it 
22 was parked; could be two or three feet either way? 
23 A. Sure. 
24 Q. Exactly. So there could be a gap right here, too, 
25 right? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Well, there would be a gap, but not a big one. 
Well, now wait a minute. If you don't know where 
3 it's parked how do you know the length of the gap? 
4 A. Because I know -- I parked two cars there and I 
5 looked at it. 
6 
7 
Q. 
A. 
You didn't park it right here, did you? 
Well, the gap would be the same if I parked it here 
8 or if I park 
9 long, and so 
I mean, the space is "X" long, the cars are "X" 
10 
11 
12 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Assuming 
-- it's going to have extra space. 
Assuming you park the correct type of vehicle. You 
13 don't know what type of vehicle it was and I'm not giving you 
14 numbers. 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
There is not a lot of room there. 
Fair enough. Now, with respect to the height of that 
17 vehicle that was allegedly parked in that location. You know 
18 nothing about the height -- you can have a seat. 
19 
20 
21 you? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Thank you. 
You know nothing about the height of the vehicle, do 
No. 
Okay. And as you testified earlier during that voir 
24 dire examination, you didn't stand up on a Yukon Denali in the 
25 doorjamb and look over that car that was parked in that 
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1 location, did you? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
No, I did not. 
Okay. Recognizing.there is a damage to the Ford 
4 truck parked in the neighbor's garage, you saw those 
5 photographs, right? 
Yes, I did. 6 
7 
A. 
Q. Those are on the same basic line, that damage to that 
8 truck is on the same basic line, is it not, as Richard Esquivel 
9 standing in the location he was? 
10 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I don't think so. 
Well, let's do it again. 
I don't think that we can say exactly where that 
13 window is in --
14 Q. Again, let me get out of here so I don't block the 
15 jury. Have you got the little pointer? 
16 A. I do. 
17 Q. But look, if we were to line up the Ford truck front 
18 window with the area with Mr. Esquivel you put on the map is 
19 hit, we have a straight line, do we not, to a space between the 
20 Ford truck and any vehicle parked in front of it? 
21 A. I have not actually done a trajectory from the truck. 
22 Q. This is a very simple question, Mr. Gaskill. 
23 A. What I'm saying is that I can't answer that. 
24 Q. Looking at what I'm doing right here. I'm lining up 
25 the middle of that circle with the front edge of the right 
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1 window in the Ford truck, looking at that line you have a 
2 straight line through Richard Esquivel into the Ford truck, did 
3 we not? 
4 A. You have it, as you placed it now, you absolutely 
5 have a straight line. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
A. 
Thank you. 
My the only thing that was --
Is that --
it may not 
THE COURT: Let him answer the question. 
-- it may not be a straight line because I haven't 
12 done that straight line. So didn't -- my preliminary 
13 indication was that that line was more over into the area where 
14 the cartridge cases are. 
15 Q. So you didn't even check that line in your 
16 examination, is that what you are telling this jury? 
17 A. Yeah, but I didn't do it precisely. But when I 
18 looked from the window out and kind of figured out where that 
19 truck was and when I get there the truck is not exactly in the 
20 same place and no photographs that I could precisely do that. 
21 But, it came -- that bullet appeared to come more from where 
22 the cartridge cases were, that was my opinion. 
23 Q. Point is: You didn't examine it on the night in 
24 question, right? 
25 A. I didn't examine any of this on the night in 
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1 question. 
2 Q. Exactly. And what I just did here in lining up those 
3 two trajectories from Richard Esquivel to that Ford truck 
4 clearly shows the shooting could have commenced in that 
5 location immediately in front of the blue Ford truck, does it 
6 not? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
Your depiction of it shows that, yes. 
I'm sorry I didn't mean to interrupt. And you did 
9 not test that particular theory, did you? 
10 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
What theory? 
That the shooting occurred on this line right here. 
I think that I testified that as long as it clears 
13 the truck the shooting could be anywhere. 
14 Q. While we are on it in that location right there, you 
15 testified that you expected .22 casings to go traveling a 
16 distance of 15 -- 10 to 15 feet, correct? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
Maximum. 
Assuming that truck is roughly 15 feet we have shell 
19 casings starting at the end of the rear of the Ford truck, 
20 right? 
21 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
This truck depiction is not accurate. 
Let's look at a photograph then. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask though. Can the jurors 
24 on this end see what he was referring to? Just want to make 
25 sure. 
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1 Q. Let's look at a photograph. Nathan, can you pull it 
2 up. Now there is a photograph marked State's Exhibit 5 -- I'm 
3 standing in front of people -- showing the location of the blue 
4 Ford truck relative to the Nava horne, the horne to the west, and 
5 the mailbox, right? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Right. It also shows the height of that Ford truck, 
8 right? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Right. And you -- are you saying that the diagram 
11 that Ms. Ladd from CSI prepared is not reflective of Exhibit 5? 
12 A. According to her testimony. 
13 Q. It's not? 
14 A. According to her testimony it's not drawn to scale. 
15 Q. Well, she testified that it was pretty close to 
16 scale, did she not? 
17 A. I don't recall that she said -- what I recall is she 
18 said this is not drawn to scale. 
19 Q. That's what you recall? 
20 A. That's what I recall. 
21 Q. Okay. You can have a seat. Not drawn to scale, huh? 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. When I talk about for instance the Cavalier 
24 photograph. Let's look at that one. 
25 MR. SHAW: Can you find that one Nathan in 38, 
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1 Exhibit 38? 
2 Q. That window right there. And then you looked at --
3 that's 33, correct? And you went to 34 and counsel asked you: 
4 According to the best evidence that photograph then depicts in 
5 your opinion someone shooting from the inside? Do you recall 
6 that question? 
7 A. I recall that question but that's not --that's not 
8 my exact answer and I'd like to clarify that. 
9 Q. And I'll give you credit. You didn't say that you 
10 are testifying in front of this jury that the shot came from 
11 inside the car, right? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Exactly. 
Okay. You don't know, right? 
I don't know. If I had the window, I would know. 
But in order for you to opine that it came from 
16 inside the car you would have to ignore the best evidence, that 
17 being the statements, the witness testimony from Richard 
18 Esquivel and Lacey Randall. 
No. Why would I have to ignore that? 19 
20 
A. 
Q. They were standing right in front of the car both of 
21 them said that there was no one in the car. You heard that 
22 testimony, didn't you? 
I did. 23 
24 
A. 
Q. Okay. And so assuming their testimony is accurate, 
25 your opinion would be that that bullet or that projectile or 
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~ 1 whatever made that hole, that carne from the outside in, if you 
2 were to factor in their testimony. 
3 A. There is no reason why it couldn't have come from the 
4 other side of the car? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
9 it was. 
10 
11 
12 
Q. 
A. 
There is no damage to the other side of the car. 
The other side, as I recall, the window was open. 
It was? 
I believe it was. The photograph indicate to me that 
You believe it was? 
Based on photographs I looked at. 
MR. SHAW: Well, we may not have that one, Nathan. 
13 If you could just find that for later. 
14 Q. So do -- you are not telling this jury that that shot 
15 carne from inside or outside you simply don't know? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
I believe that's my testimony. 
Okay. Now, when you talked about where the shooting 
18 actually starts, you're not trying to tell this jury precisely 
19 where they started shooting-- and I'm not talking about the 
20 first two shots. I'm talking about the shots that are being 
21 shot as the vehicle -- as the SUV is traveling westbound. You 
22 are not trying to tell this jury precisely where they started, 
23 are you? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
No, I can't do that. 
Okay. So if, in fact, are you familiar with the 
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1 mathematic equation that 1.478 per second, per mile, per hour, 
2 are you familiar with that as an indication of how far you 
3 travel on a feet per second basis which is calculated using 
4 miles per hour. 
5 A. So were just converting miles per hour to feet per 
6 hour? 
7 Q. Feet per second. 
8 A. Feet per second. 
9 Q. Are you familiar with that? 
10 A. Yeah. 
11 Q. Okay. And so if, in fact, someone was 
12 traveling -- this vehicle was traveling 1 mile per hour, at 
13 1.47 feet per second, times 1 mile per hour, the vehicle 
14 literally moves essentially one and a half feet in the time 
15 period of 1001, right? 
Yep, pretty close. 16 
17 
A. 
Q. And you can extend that out. For instance at 2 miles 
18 an hour it moves 3 feet per second 1001, correct? 
Pretty close. 19 
20 
A. 
Q. Okay. And at 5 miles an hour it moves roughly 7 feet 
21 per second, right. 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
Pretty good math. 
At 10 miles an hour it moves roughly 14.7 --well, 
24 exactly 14.7 at 10 miles an hour, right? 
25 A. Pretty close. 
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1 Q. Are you familiar with the standard of human 
2 perception and reaction time? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Don't know anything about that? 
Not enough to testify about it. 
Okay. Fair enough. You know, however, that the 
7 witnesses have testified that these shots were in rapid 
8 succession. 
9 A. I don't remember a good characterization. I think 
10 one said, "Pop. Pop. Pop." And another one said that it was 
11 shooting as it was moving. I don't -- no one ever attempted, 
12 that I heard, to say how many seconds between the first shot 
13 and the last shot, which I would have been interested to hear. 
14 Q. You didn't hear anybody say they were in rapid 
15 succession when witnesses testified that --
I don't recall that. 16 
17 
A. 
Q. You have, have you not, experienced firing a handgun 
18 in rapid succession? 
Many times. 19 
20 
A. 
Q. And is it fair to say that you could empty a 10-round 
21 magazine in a second and a half? 
22 A. Pretty quick. Yeah. Depending on the weapon, of 
23 course, pretty much pull the trigger it fires. You can pull 
24 the trigger quite a few times in a short time. 
25 Q. So the point is that if these shots are fired in 
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1 rapid succession and they are fired in a location slightly in 
2 front of or between the two cars in front of the blue truck or 
3 between the two cars, they can get of out that handgun very 
4 quickly, can they not? 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
Absolutely. Absolutely. 
If this vehicle is moving, coasting somewhat 
7 westbound at some speed, those casings might be struck by the 
8 vehicle and moved further to the west, correct? 
9 A. I wouldn't move them to the west. They could bounce 
10 back out into the road, certainly. 
11 Q. Well, let's just say that the Nava home is going to 
12 sit here, okay? This is the truck. This is the area that the 
13 shell casings are found in, somewhere in there, right? 
14 A. (Witness nods head.) 
15 Q. Mailbox is here. 
16 A. (Witness nods head.) 
17 Q. Now, you know, that this road -- this SUV had pulled 
18 out from the north curb, correct? 
That's the testimony, right. 19 
20 
A. 
Q. Let's just-- I know this isn't exactly accurate, but 
21 it pulled out into the street and somewhere in here it then 
22 travels in this direction, right? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Right. 
Did you hear witnesses say that the SUV was 
25 essentially in the middle of the road as it went westbound, did 
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1 you remember that? 
I remember that yeah. 2 
3 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. So it's middle of the road westbound, right. 
Right. 
Q. And as that vehicle travels westbound those shell 
6 casings are ejected, you presume, it's right hand eject, right? 
7 Most of them are. 
8 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yeah. 
They are rejected out to the right, correct? 
Yeah, I think we can pretty well assume they are 
11 ejected from the right because it's pretty unusual for one to 
12 not be. 
13 Q. In order for this shooter from the front passenger 
14 seat to shoot he has to be shooting back this way, right? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
Exactly. 
So the angle if perpendicular to the gun if he is 
17 shooting backwards is right there, isn't it, Mr. Gaskill? 
18 A. Well, if I wasn't accurate --
19 Q. That is a yes or no question. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, I ask that he --
21 THE COURT: No. No. No. Let him answer the 
22 question. 
23 A. If I'm not accurate in my depiction I'm certainly 
24 going to say that that is an accurate photograph but or 
25 precisely what it is. The cartridge casings are all to the 
not 
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1 west of the vehicle and some of them are up into the drive 
2 area, the curb, the approach. I can't see any way that we're 
3 going to get all those cartridge cases in that area unless the 
4 vehicle is further to the west. 
5 
6 
7 
8 too. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And maybe it was. Well, maybe it was slightly --
Yeah, I think it was. 
Maybe it was slightly further. It could be here, 
9 A. We don't want to hit the truck. There was no damage 
10 to the truck. So start getting back there too far and then the 
11 truck gets in the way. That's --
12 Q. Truck is not damaged, I agree. Back to issue of the 
13 casings being struck by the moving Yukon. If they are going 
14 out in this direction they are going to come out over the 
15 windshield over the hood, are they not, in that location or 
16 they may even clear the vehicle? 
17 A. Sure. They probably clear the vehicle but we don't 
18 know that 'cause we don't know the gun. 
19 Q. Exactly. But they could be struck and moved by the 
20 vehicle, couldn't they? 
21 A. That's not likely in my opinion at all. They are 
22 going to bounce off the vehicle when they hit it. The forward 
23 motion of the vehicle is, I don't believe, going to in part 
24 much of a trajectory to the cartridge. They are going to 
25 bounce and bounce where they bounce, you know, depending on if 
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1 they hit this way or hit this way. That's why they are spread 
2 out a little bit. 
3 Q. Now, shell casings can also be picked up and moved, 
4 right? 
5 A. Certainly. 
6 Q. They can be moved by tire tread, in fact. You've 
7 seen that, where a tire drives over a shell casing, picks it up 
8 and kicked it down the road? 
9 A. Oh, yeah, sure. Why not? 
10 Q. You've seen that. You've seen, in fact, people step 
11 on the shell casing with some sort of a vibrant-type sole, get 
12 caught in the shoe and it's moved, right? 
13 A. Well, I don't think I have ever seen that but 
14 certainly within the realm of possibility. 
15 Q. Okay. Those shell casings that are found in the 
16 street if the diagram is correct -- and we can look at the 
17 photograph again. If the diagram is correct, all but two of 
18 them are in the street, right? 
19 A. Well, I don't -- do you want me to go look at the 
20 diagram again? I can't see it from here. But as I recall some 
21 were in the street some were in the drive approach. And there 
22 were certainly none in front of the blue vehicle. There was 
23 certainly none much further west than the driveway, itself. 
24 Q. Right. And I think the diagram 
25 A. As I recall the diagram is pretty good, yeah. 
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1 Q. Diagram is a fair depiction of what was seen in the 
2 photographs, right? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
regard 
parked 
to 
in 
Yeah. They wanted it to be so I'm sure it is. 
Okay. One question -- let's see, one question with 
the Cavalier. That's a front view of the Cavalier 
the driveway and the fact that --
THE COURT: Which Exhibit are you referring to? 
MR. SHAW: Excuse me, 3 71 Your Honor. The fact that 
no projectile or bullet was found inside the Cavalier, right? 
A. 
Q. 
Right. 
That projectile, there is no way to know what 
12 happened to it? 
13 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Correct. 
It could have gone out the same way it came in? 
I don't think it came out the same way it came in but 
16 we don't know. 
17 
18 
19 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Could have actually gone down the vents in the dash? 
I have no idea. 
Right. So you don't find anything unusual about the 
20 fact that it wasn't found? 
21 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Well --
You lose bullets all the time, don't you? 
We have -- bullets are tricky to find but inside a 
24 car we're usually pretty good. It's not that huge of a space 
25 inside a car. If we're in a house or we're outside then easily 
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1 we lose track of bullets. But I'm thinking we find bullets in 
2 cars most of the time. 
3 
4 
Q. 
A. 
Sometimes you don't, fair enough? 
I don't remember any inside a car that I didn't find 
5 but I couldn't rule out the possibility. But I would expect to 
6 find a bullet in the car and I'm very surprised that they 
7 didn't. 
8 Q. Now, when you went out -- and counsel showed you a 
9 photograph I think it was Defense Exhibit 9, with the dark 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
Yeah. 
Cavalier. Yeah, that is that one. There is the 
12 one with the flash. You did not check ambient light in the 
13 neighborhood, did you? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
A. I didn't use a light meter but my eyes were certainly 
testing the ambient light when they were there. 
Q. By that I mean, you did not do anything to try to 
determine which lights were on in Nava house the date of the 
18 shooting, did you? 
19 A. Other than just the photographs and by that time --
20 you know, the time that the photographs were taken lights could 
21 have been turned on or off. In fact, in some of the pictures 
22 there is a light on under the carport that's not on in another 
23 picture. The light in that carport is off. 
24 Q. What I'm asking though is, the fact of the matter is, 
25 is you couldn't replicate ambient light from the Nava house 
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1 from the date that you took -- or on the Exhibit 9, defense 
2 showed you, could you? 
3 A. The lights in the house were on when we were there 
4 just like the lights were on in the pictures. That's what I 
5 can say. 
6 Q. Did you look around the neighborhood and see whether 
7 streets lights were working, did you? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I did. 
You did or did not? 
I did. 
Did you look at the Christina Rivera house and see 
12 what lights were on there? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Okay. Are you telling this jury that you personally 
15 checked the moon phase on -- when by the way did you go out in 
16 January? 
17 A. I don't recall the exact date. It's in my notes, but 
18 I don't have it. But it was somewhere in the first week, I 
19 believe, of January, the first 10 days of January. 
20 Q. Okay. Did you personally check the moon phase or did 
21 someone else do that? 
22 A. Someone else did that. 
23 Q. Someone else did that? 
24 A. I reviewed it. 
25 Q. So what you did is you relied on information from 
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1 someone else relative to whether or not the time that you went 
2 out in January actually depicted the same moon phase on 
3 August 5th, right? 
4 A. Yeah. I reviewed that information. You know, it's a 
5 weather report that the US Weather Service puts out. The 
6 weather service puts out the reports of moon phases --
7 Q. What time? 
8 A. -- in the paper and so forth. 
9 Q. What time did you visit the scene in January, what 
10 time of day? 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
... 
~. 
About 9: 0 0, 8: 0 0, 9: 0 0. 
At night? 
Right . 
14 Q. The shooting occurred at 10 minutes to 1:00 roughly. 
15 A. 12:30, 1:00, yeah. 
16 Q. I want to talk to you about some things that you 
17 agreed on with Mr. Wakefield. First of all, so the record is 
18 clear, you are not an AFTE certified firearm examiner, are you? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Do you know what AFTE stands for? 
21 A. I do. 
22 Q. What does it stand for? 
23 A. Association of Fire and Tool Mark Examiners. 
24 Q. You have been never -- never served as a firearm 
25 examiner, have you? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
You recognize Mr. Wakefield as an expert in his 
3 field, don't you? 
4 
5 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I do. 
You have respect for Mr. Wakefield in his opinions? 
Certainly. 
Okay. You testified, as did Mr. Wakefield, that the 
8 casings came from the same gun, correct? 
Yes. 9 
10 
A. 
Q. Two projectiles that were recovered, one from Sabrina 
11 Prieto and one from Rosendo Nevarez, also came from the same 
12 gun, correct? 
13 Yes. 
14 
A. 
Q. But you were unable to tell us if the projectiles and 
15 the casings came from the same gun because that important 
16 missing link, the weapon, was never found, right? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
19 yourself? 
20 
Right. 
So you agree you would like to see that weapon 
Absolutely. 
21 
A. 
Q. That's an important piece of evidence that was never 
22 found? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Right. 
You are familiar, are you not, with the ballistics of 
25 a .22 long rifle? 
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1 A. Well, yeah. I don't consider myself a mathematician, 
2 but certainly, I'm familiar with the basic ballistics of a .22 
3 rimfire, yes. 
4 Q. Let me just approach, if I might. The casings that 
5 were recovered would be similar to what you are seeing here 
6 where are those casings, let's see. These are the 10 shell 
7 casings that were recovered. You had an opportunity to examine 
8 these, right? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 not? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Those are .22 long rifle shell casings, right? 
Yes, that's the name of the cartridge. 
And they are Winchester Super X Cartridges, are they 
Yes, they are. 
The .22 long rifle that's not a rifle caliber, 
16 necessarily, that's a caliber that can be shot from a 
17 semiautomatic handgun? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. Yeah. Pretty much any kind of gun you name has been 
chambered in a .22 in a rifle. 
Q. Handguns or rifles, right? 
A. Right. 
Q. Now, do you know the bullet weight that the 
projectiles were that were recovered from Rosendo and Sabrina? 
A. The fragments? 
Q. No. Yeah, the bullet projectiles that were recovered 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
from the two deceased? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. 
A. 
Did you look at Mr. Wakefield's report on --
I did but I don't recall the bullet wounds. 
Q. Let's show it to you. 
right here. 
Got to get through his notes 
A. I'm not sure that I ever saw his notes. I saw his 
8 report. 
9 Q. Look right here. You have BSl and BS14, those were 
10 the bullets that were recovered from the two deceased parties. 
11 Do you understand that? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Showing .22 caliber, caliber and weight. 
Right. 
.22 caliber, 40 grain bullets, right? 
Well, that's the way I would interpret it, yes. 
Okay. So forty grain bullet is sort of the standard 
18 for a .22 long rifle caliber, isn't it? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, pretty standard. 
And are you familiar with the standard velocity of a 
21 .22 caliber long rifle 40 grain bullet? 
22 A. There is a pretty good range because it depends on 
23 the weapon. And it depends on, you know, the cartridge in 
24 question. But there is a range of velocities. 
25 Q. So is it fair to say that somewhere between a 
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1 1050 feet percent second and say 1150 feet per second for the 
2 standard 40 grain .22 caliber bullet? 
3 A. I think that you could get them to go faster than 
4 that and some slower than that but I wouldn't argue with you. 
5 Q. Are you familiar also, Mr. Gaskill, with your 
6 experience with the term "Energy foot pounds"? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. What are energy foot pounds? 
9 A. Foot pounds are-- it's just a measure of the energy 
10 of the bullet. Typically it's measured at the muscle. But it 
11 can be measured. or calculated at any range of the bullet. A 
12 measure of the energy. 
It a fair statement to say that the lighter the 
14 bullet and slower the speed the lower the foot pounds of 
15 energy? 
16 A. Yeah, that's how it's calculated. 
17 Q. Okay. And the heavier the bullet and the faster the 
18 speed the higher the foot pounds of energy? 
19 A. Right. 
20 Q. Are foot pounds sometimes referred to as "knock down 
21 power." 
22 A. Somewhere erroneously, but they are sometimes 
23 associated with that. 
24 Q. And knock down power is a layman's term, isn't it? 
25 A. Not a very good one but, yeah. 
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1 
2 
3 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
"Stopping power" that's a layman's term, isn't it? 
It is. 
And you are familiar with the fact that one struck 
4 with a 40 grain .22 caliber bullet in the chest, let's say, is 
5 not going to be knocked backwards to the ground as we sometimes 
6 see with shotgun blasts in the movies? 
7 A. Absolutely correct. 
8 Q. And so someone hit with a 40 grain bullet from a .22 
9 long rifle cartridge can continue to remain upright, correct? 
10 A. Yeah. Whether you fall immediatly or whether you 
11 don't fall immediately, you know -- the television depiction is 
12 incorrect. You may fall instantly. You may not fall 
13 instantly. 
14 Q. You may be able to walk, or run. Quite a distance 
15 with a bullet in your chest or your back? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, that's correct. 
And so given that information, isn't it true there is 
18 nothing unusual about individuals being in front of the swamp 
19 cooler on the grass area as depicted in Exhibit 2? You can 
20 step up and look with me so I can see where you're pointing. 
21 Okay. Nothing unusual about someone being able to 
22 stand in this area located in front of the swamp cooler or the 
23 north in the grassy area and then being able to travel, or 
24 walk, or run to the area of the carport door? 
25 A. It could happen. 
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1 Q. And is it also true with respect to a .22 long rifle 
2 cartridge fired from a handgun that there is very little 
3 recoil? 
4 A. That's true. 
5 Q. And by "recoil" what are we talking about? 
6 A. We're talking about the force of the weapon in 
7 opposition to the force of the bullet going out. So it's 
8 Newton's third law of motion: For every action there is a 
9 reaction. So the bullet goes out with a certain amount of 
10 force; there is the same certain amount of force in the 
11 opposite direction. 
12 So if you have a powerful force going forward, you 
13 will have a powerful force going backward. 
14 Q. And that force forward can be effected by the bullet 
15 weight and powder charge behind that bullet weight? 
16 A. Absolutely. As well as the weight of the weapon. 
17 Q. As well as, the weight of the weapon. And the force 
18 backward, again, is effected by the bullet weight and the 
19 powder charge behind the bullet? 
20 A. It's equal and opposite. 
21 Q. And so when we talk about a .22 caliber weapon having 
22 very little recoil that means it's not -- it's not bouncing 
23 much, is it? 
24 A. That's right. It depends on the shooter, but you can 
25 hold it pretty steady. Sure. 
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1 Q. So a .22 caliber can be held relatively firm with one 
2 hand, can it not? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
It can. 
And as opposed to say someone handling a .45 ACP the 
5 recoil forces are much different, are they not? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
Sure. 
And so while a .45 ACP may be more difficult to keep 
8 on target, a .22 caliber semiautomatic, if you would, would be 
9 less difficult to keep on target from recoil. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Fair enough. 
Sure. 
You taught Sandra Ladd? 
I did. 
You taught Paul Rimmasch? 
I did. 
I believe you testified under direct that you had 
18 faith in their abilities as criminal crime scene investigators? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
I do. They are very good. They really are. 
Mr. Gaskill, you were the director of the crime lab 
21 at Weber State University from 1972 until it's demise in late 
22 1993; is that accurate? 
23 A. There was a short period I actually resigned from the 
24 crime lab and went back to teaching for a short time before the 
25 laboratory was turned back over to the Department of Public 
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1 Safety. And then the laboratory remained at Weber State, still 
2 under the direction of the Department of Public Safety for a 
3 period of time after that, before it moved to the present 
4 location out in the BDO. I was not director of it during the 
5 time that was under the direction of DPS. 
6 Q. Sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt you. Do you mean 
7 when the crime lab closed at Weber State University? 
8 A. 
9 Q. 
10 A. 
11 Q. 
12 A. 
13 occurred. 
14 
15 
Q. 
Yes. 
Was it within months of your resigning? 
Well, months. Yeah, but I don't know how many. 
Certainly within the year though after you resigned? 
You know, I don't know exactly when that sequence 
Well, let me --
THE COURT: Mr. Shaw, would this be a good time to 
16 take a break? 
17 {Break taken. ) 
18 THE COURT: All right. We'll back in session in 
19 State versus Perea. 
20 Anything before we bring in the jury? 
21 MR. RICHARDS: Just one thing, Your Honor? I know 
22 that you ruled fairly early in the game as far as our 
23 reconstruction video. Based upon all the evidence that's been 
24 produced at this point we are asking that Your Honor reconsider 
25 and allow us to put in the reconstruction video. 
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1 THE COURT: Let's see. You are talking about 
2 Exhibits 28-31. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: Exactly. 
4 THE COURT: State's position. 
5 MR. SHAW: I haven't asked questions that would open 
6 up that as being admissible now. 
7 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to deny the 
8 defense's request. It just seems to me that the foundation is 
9 just not sufficient. Sc I'll exclude Exhibit's 28, 29, 30, and 
10 31. 
11 MR. SHAW: And before this Exhibit goes back, we need 
12 to pull the ones that were disallowed. 
13 THE COURT: Yeah. 
14 MR. RICHARDS: They have not been flagged in this. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. We've got those numbers. 
16 MR. RICHARDS: We moved to enter -- I guess I did 
17 move to enter all of those. 
18 THE COURT: I think we admitted: 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 
19 16, and 19. 
20 MR. HEWARD: Is Venna going to pull those out, Judge? 
21 THE CLERK: I'm doing it right now. 
22 THE COURT: Anything else then before we bring back 
23 the jury? 
24 MR. HEWARD: No. 
25 (The following proceedings were held in open court after the 
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1 
2 
ju_ry enta.-red the courtroan. ) 
THE COURT: Let's have the record reflect the jury is 
3 now present. 
4 Go ahead, Mr. Shaw. 
5 
6 Q. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Mr. Gaskill, I started to ask you about your 
7 experience at the Weber State Crime Lab back in the early 90's. 
8 The Weber State Crime Lab was not -- it wasn't really a 
9 affiliated with the State of Utah; is that correct? It wasn't 
10 managed by the State. 
11 A. It was funded by the State partially but not managed. 
12 It was -- it was managed and partially funded and administered 
13 at Weber State University. 
14 Q. So you were the lead administer of that crime lab; is 
15 that correct? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
And you talked about the fact that you left the crime 
18 lab, resigned your position. Do you recall specifically what 
19 date you resigned? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Isn't it true that as part your resignation -- your 
22 resignation one reason was because the crime lab had been 
23 accused of some impropriety and misconduct? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
That was not the reason I resigned. 
Was the crime lab itself accused of some impropriety 
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1 and misconduct during your tenure as its director? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
4 correct? 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And you resigned after that accusation carne forward, 
Yes. 
And you were the person responsible for all of the 
7 employees, crirninalists, workers in the Weber State Crime Lab; 
8 is that correct? 
That's correct. 9 
10 
A. 
Q. Isn't it also true that there was an investigation of 
11 Weber State Crime Lab conducted by the Utah State Attorney 
12 General's office? 
13 
14 
15 not? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And you were part of that investigation, were you 
I was. 
Mr. Gaskill, is it also true that in a case 
18 criminal case, State versus David Valken-Leduc, you 
19 misidentified a fingerprint -- two fingerprints actually, from 
20 that case as having come from the defendant suspect. When, in 
21 fact, those fingerprints came from the victim who was killed. 
22 A. That's close. I did misidentify two fingerprints. I 
23 don't know who they ended up matching. 
24 
25 
MR. SHAW: That's all. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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1 Mr. Richards. 
2 MR. RICHARDS: Just one moment. 
3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. RICHARDS: 
5 Q. Did the attorney general in their investigation ever 
6 find you at fault at anything? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Okay. And have you testified since that time for the 
9 State of Utah, the prosecution, in prosecuting crimes since 
10 that date? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. How many times? 
.. ., A. ('\, ., ..;- +- t::'l. "' -F O.taT ....... ~U....Lt-\:... u. ..L "- YV • 
14 Q. Okay. You have the exhibit book up there; is that 
15 correct? 
16 A. You are referring to this black one? 
17 Q. Yes. And let me have you go to State's Exhibit No. 
·18 5. 
19 A. Okay. 
20 Q. If may just show the jury so they can see that right 
21 there. I can pass that around. And then I want you to look at 
22 also Exhibit No. 16 and 17 if you would. 
23 MR. SHAW: Do you want to make a record of what you 
24 are holding up? 
25 MR. RICHARDS: This is Exhibit No. 5. And are you 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
going to verify to the fact that the witness is looking at the 
same picture? 
at? 
Q. Is that the same as Exhibit 5 that you are looking 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. That Exhibit No. 5 shows at least a pretty 
7 good prospective as where the truck was and distance between 
8 the front of the truck and the driveway of the Nava home; is 
9 that correct? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. I think it does. 
Q. And then go to Exhibit No. 16 and ask if this is the 
same picture? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And Exhibit No. 17? 
And that's the same as the picture that I have, yes. 
Okay. I will just hold those up. And 16 and 17 show 
17 us the location of the back of the truck in comparison to where 
18 the shell casings are; is that correct? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, they do. 
And can you tell from this photograph how far to get 
21 seven shells closest to the front of the truck, how far back 
22 from the front of the truck would that be? 
23 A. So you're asking the seven shells closest to the 
24 truck? 
25 Q. Yes? 
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1 A. Which would be the -- well, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 and then 4 
2 and 5 and 2 are kind of in a line. So how far back that is 
3 from what? 
4 Q. From the front of the blue pick-up truck, assuming 
5 the blue pick-up truck would be 15 feet as Mr. Shaw said. 
6 A. To the back of the seven would be 30 feet. 
7 Q. So to throw the -- if you could come look at this 
8 here real quickly. If someone were in a vehicle located at 
9 this point which is where Mr. Shaw used the straight line of 
10 the other exhibit, that would be at least 30 feet to get to the 
11 seventh shell casing. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. Yeah, I think close. 
~m. RICHARDS: That's all the questions I have. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Any other questions? 
MR. SHAW: Just a couple. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHAW: 
Q. Looking at Exhibit 17--
MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I have one 
21 more. Good thing I have somebody to remind me. 
22 REDIRECT EXAMINATION (cont 'd) 
23 BY MR. RICHARDS: 
24 Q. Based upon all of the evidence that you have 
25 reviewed, do you believe that there was more than one gun used 
Professor James Gaskill- Redirect (cont'd) by MR. RICHARD~61 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 in this crime? 
2 MR. RICHARDS: Objection. It's been asked and 
3 answered. 
4 THE COURT: It has but been go ahead and try it one 
5 more time. 
6 A. Yes, I do. 
7 MR. RICHARDS: That's all I have. 
8 RECROSS-EXAMINATICN (cont 'd) 
9 By MR. SHAW: 
10 A. You wanted me to look at 17. 
11 Q. Sixteen. 
12 A. Sixteen. 
13 Q. Looking at Exhibit 16, it's clear, is it not, that 
14 that photograph was taken from the ground? 
15 A. Well, unless somebody I mean, I don't know. It 
16 appeared that it was taken from someone standing on the ground, 
17 yeah, but I don't know that. 
18 
1~, 
20 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
It's a little tough to tell. 
But looking at that photograph, there a clear line of 
21 site, assuming that the shooting take place somewhere in the 
22 area of the rear of the Ford truck, there a clear line of sight 
23 to the area in front of the swamp cooler, is there not? 
24 A. Yeah, you're talking about like up on the sidewalk in 
25 front of -- directly in front of the house? 
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1 Q. Right? 
2 A. There is, yes. 
3 Q. Right. And of course, this paragraph does not 
4 account for an individual being up in the air standing on the 
5 floorboard of a Yukon Denali, does it? 
6 A. Well, like I said, I don't know where Sandy was 
7 standing when she took this picture. So I can't say how far of 
8 the ground she is. 
9 Q. But even looking at Exhibit 16, you can see from the 
10 ground at a perspective west of the truck, you can still very 
11 clearly see the window of the Cavalier right rear and right 
12 front passenger window of the Cavalier and the Cavalier 
13 extending forward outside blue Ford pickup 
14 truck, can you not? 
15 A. You can see from this angle we can see a little 
16 ways down on the door, the rear door, back to about the back of 
17 the passenger's rear door window. And then we can see from 
18 about the front -- about where the rearview mirror is we can 
19 see forward, we can see the fender of the white car. So 
20 about-- I'm saying, half of the car maybe a little bit more is 
21 obscured in this view. 
22 Q. Again, that photograph was taken on the night in 
23 question by CSI, correct? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. All but -- it appears that all but two of those shell 
Professor James Gaskill- Recross (cont'd) by 263 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 casings are in the street? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
Right. And No. 7 and 8 are up in the approach way. 
Thank you, Professor Gaskill. 
6 Q. The vantage point from this particular Exhibit 16 
7 would be from where? If you could go up to Exhibit No. 2, 
8 please? 
9 A. Okay. This I'm -- depicting this is the mailbox 
10 which is slightly to the ·west of the driveway where the 
11 cartridge cases are, and it appears that the furthest west 
12 cartridge case is about a little bit back from the front of the 
13 this car that's depicted as a yellow car here. And the 
14 photograph is further west of that. 
15 Q. And if you were shooting a gun from that location 
16 were would the shell casings alight? 
17 A. We are back to that issue of we don't know what gun 
18 it was. But if they go to the right then you would expect them 
19 not to be that far forward all -- that would be to me a little 
20 bit surprising. I would expect them to be more back around 
21 this yellow car. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. RICHARDS: That's all the questions I have. 
MR. SHAW: No further questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Can we excuse Mr. Gaskill? 
MR. RICHARDS: Yes. 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEB 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, FINDINGS OFF ACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER OF THE 
COURT ON DEFEDANT'S MOTION 
TO ALLOW WITNESSES TO TESTIFY 
ANONTiviOUSLY FOR SAFETY 
PURPOSES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. CASE NO. 071901847 AUG 0 8 2010 
RIQO :MARIANO PEREA, 
Defendant. JUDGE ERNIE W. JONES 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Allow Witnesses to Testify 
Anonymously for Safety Purposes. 
Oral argument was heard on February 19, 2010. Having reviewed the evidence: the 
briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court issues the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defense counsel has proffered four anonymous witnesses who could potentially 
give exculpatory testimony. 
2. Defense counsel has represented that these prospective witnesses, because of 
concerns for their safety, are \Villing to testify only on condition of complete 
anonymity, which includes testifying in closed court under pseudonyms as well as 
no advance disclosure of their names to police, investigators, and third persons. 
3. Defense counsel has represented that these prospective witnesses fear retaliatory 
attacks on themselves or their family should their names be disclosed. 
vu 
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4. Conditions of complete anonymity would severely hamper the State's ability to 
investigate the prospective witnesses and their versions of events. 
5. Conditions of complete anonymity proposed by the defense would preclude the 
State from adequately preparing for cross examination of these witnesses. 
6. Conditions of complete anonymity proposed by the defense would preclude the 
State from reconsidering the charges brought against Defendant should the 
witnesses' information warrant such reconsideration. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(c) provides: "Except as otherwise provided 
or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor ... any other item of 
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his 
case." 
2. Good cause has been shown that disclosure of the identities of potential 
exculpatory witnesses is necessary for the State to prepare its case. 
3. The Court has the power to order that the identity of all prospective defense 
witnesses be disclosed to the State. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, and based on the Court's rev--iew of the record, the 
Defendant's Motion to Allow Witnesses to Testify Anonymously for Safety Purposes is 
DENIED in part, and RESER\TED in part, as follows: 
1. The names and addresses of all prospective defense witnesses shall be disclosed to 
the State by February 22, 2010. 
2. Any prospective \Vit.11esses whose identities are not rlisclosed to the State by 
February 22, 2010, shall not be permitted to testify. 
3. Defense counsel is permitted to inform the prospective witnesses that they have 
the option not to speak with prosecutors or investigators. 
4. Prosecutors and investigators shall be permitted to investigate the prospective 
witnesses and their versions of events in the way they see fit, including, as 
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appropriate, revealing the names of the prospective witnesses to others who may 
have information concerning this case. 
5. The Court reserves judgment whether witnesses will.be permitted to testify under 
pseudonyms. 
6. The Court reserves judgment whether the courtroom will be closed to the public 
during the testimony of these prospective witnesses. 
7. The Court reserves judgment whether the Defendant can waive his right to be 
Dated this ~'""i '3 day o(Mtry, 2010 
Ra all W. Richard 1 
Cminsel for Defendant ./ 
rnie W. Jones 
District Court Judge 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Februazy 19, 2010; 9:12a.m. 
PROCEEDINGS 
* * * 
THE COURT: Good morning everyone. 
MR. SHAW: Good morning. 
6 THE COURT: This is the time set for the matter of 
7 State of Utah vs. Riqo Perea. It 1 s case ending in 184 7. We 1 re 
8 going to do some motions today. And let 1 s have the record 
9 reflect that Mr. Shaw and Mr. Heward and Mr. Lyon are here for 
10 the State. Mr. Richards and Ms. Sipes. 
11 MR; RICHARDS: .&"'ld Bri tta"'ly too. 
12 THE COURT: Also Ms. Richards, right? All right. 
13 I guess I might indicate, I had a chance to talk to 
14 Mr. Shaw and Mr. Richards yesterday just to try to get a feel 
15 for where we are going in it today. I was hoping we could have 
16 got through a lot more than I believe we are going to 
17 acconplish today. Maybe I could just go through and we could 
18 just make a record of where we 1 re going in teJ:ms of motions 
19 that need to be resolved. 
20 Mr. Richards, you filed a notice that you were going 
21 to put on an expert involving coerced confession. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: And I think Mr. Shaw told me yesterday 
24 that the State was going to file a motion in limine. 
25 MR. SHAW: Yes, we should have that by Monday, your 
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549 
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1 Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. And the idea is maybe to try to 
3 argue that next Friday again? 
4 MR. RICHARDS : Yes . 
5 THE COURT: Evecybody in agreement then? Let's see, 
6 that's going to be, what, the 26th? 
7 MR. SHAW: Yeah. 
8 THE COURT: February 26th. And that will be --
9 9:00a.m. okay to start? 
10 MR. RICHARDS: Good for me. 
11 THE COURT: All right. And then I show t.~e ~.efense 
12 has filed a motion to declare life without parole as being 
13 cruel and unusual, also unnecessary rigor. 
14 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, could I have just a moment 
15 on that with counsel? 
16 THE COURT: Sure. You bet. 
17 (Counsel confer. ) 
18 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, on that motion, I just 
19 talked to couns$1. The basis of that motion is that the 
20 Supreme Court currently has two cases, the US Supreme Court has 
21 two cases before it on the -- not exactly identical but just 
22 saying life without parole on a -- both of these are a non --
23 THE COURT: Death penalty? 
24 MR. RICHARDS: -- death penalty cases. But on Meyers 
25 that that was -- I mean, the argument that it's 
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1 unconstitutional, after reading those, I felt compelled to file 
2 that motion. I understand the court's, and recognize the 
3 court' s already denied that very similar motion on the death 
4 penalty. I presmne that the court would do something similar 
5 on that motion. I preserved that for appellate pw:poses. I 
6 have talked to counsel on that. So we would just be willing to 
7 sul:mit that on the motions -- on the memos I mean. 
8 THE COURT: And I don' t have one fran the state. I 
9 guess that's my ·question, Mr. Shaw, did you want to respond in 
10 writing? 
11 MR. SHAW: We will respond L"l writing, your Honor, 
12 and have that filed -- we're working on that. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: We' 11 just sul:mit that on motion. 
14 
15 
16 
MR. HEWARD: Tuesday, your Honor. 
MR. RICHARDS: Whatever timing --
MR. LYON: I think we can be done by Tuesday. 
17 THE COURT: Well, you know, I think Mr. Richards is 
18 right. To be honest with you or candid with you, I just don't 
19 know how I could ever grant that motion when I've already 
20 denied the motion to strike down the death po-Ilalty and this is 
21 a p:::._nal ty less severe than the death penalty. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, logically. 
23 THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, I guess I'm inclined based 
24 on just looking at the motion, I don't want you to have to do 
) 25 any more work than you already have on the table. 
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549 
5 
Digitized by the H ward W. Hunter Law L brary, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 MR. SHAW: I think what we had planned to do was 
2 simply inco:r:porate some of the prior arguments very briefly 
3 that we've already made in those motions, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right. I definitely want to give you 
5 a chance to respond, but I guess my reaction is just from 
6 looking at the defense's motion, I don't know that it's well 
7 taken. I think _what Mr. Richards is saying is I just want to 
8 be able to reserve that issue for a later day. 
9 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, and I don't want the court to 
10 understand that I don't believe 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. RICHARDS: very solidly in that motion. I 
don't think a person like Riqo should get life without parole. 
I don' t believe he should. 
THE COURT: Yeah, and I'm not asking you 
MR. RICHARDS: I understood --
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
THE COURT: I mean just reading the motion and the 
memorandum, my initial reaction was how can I grant this motion. 
when I 've already ruled the death penalty is not 
20 unconstitutional. 
21 MR. RICHARDS: And that's why I said what I said. 
22 I 'm not abandoning my .motion, nor am I saying I don't believe 
23 that the State needs to respond. I think they need to respond 
24 just so we have that preserved. But I kind of understood where 
25 the handwriting is on the wall on that one, so. 
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1 THE COURT: What I will do then, Mr. Shaw, if the 
2 State wants to respond in writing fine, but I am going to deny 
3 the motion at this time and to declare life without parole as 
4 being cruel and unusual. 
5 Okay. Anything else on that issue or is that --
6 Then we had, the Defendant filed a motion in limine 
7 to exclude certain evidence. I guess the photographs came up 
8 of the defendant' s cell phone camera. And I think Mr. Shaw, 
9 you said you needed some time to respond? 
10 MR. SHAW: We would respond on that, yes, your Honor. 
11 MR. RICP'..ARDS: So we' 11 argue that Friday? 
12 MR. SHAW: Yeah, we could argue that Friday. 
13 
14 Friday? 
15 
16 
THE COURT: So we're going to do that motion next 
MR. SHAW: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. And then I had the 
17 Defendant's motion to prohibit the possibility of the death 
18 penalty. And I think Mr. Shaw indicated that he felt like you 
19 needed time to respond to that one too. 
20 MR. SHAW: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Again, I don't mind it, but I guess my 
22 initial reaction is we've already argued the question of the 
23 constitutionality of the death penalty and isn't this just 
24 another way of saying the same thing? I guess I didn't have an 
25 appreciation for how this differs from same of your earlier 
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1 motions, but --
2 MR. RICHARDS: They are just broad on different 
3 grounds or aspects, I guess. We can argue that -- a different 
4 theory. 
THE COURT: Different theory then? 
MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. So --
5 
6 
7 THE COURT: So you just want to set that over to next 
8 Friday? 
9 
10 
11 that? 
MR. RICHARDS: That would be fine. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Shaw, you are in agreement with 
12 MR. SHAW: Yeah, that's fine. 
13 THE COURT: And you will have a response, I guess, by 
14 the same, maybe Monday? 
15 MR. SHAW: Tuesday, Wednesday. We're -- I don't know 
16 what happened to the motion cutoff. I thought we had a motion 
17 cutoff. 
18 THE COURT: I did too. I know there's a lot of last 
19 I minute flurries, but to me a lot of these motions are ones that 
20 could have been filed a long time ago. 
21 MR. HEWARD: Whatever happened to our cutoff date, 
22 Judge? 
23 THE COURT: That's what we were just talking about. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: Well, in answer to that, your Honor, I 
25 try my best. And I understand the desirability of the cutoff 
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1 date. As you may recall, at every time we tried to set one of 
2 those, I said I 'm going to do my best to do it before that but 
3 I'm not going to be held to that. 
4 The problem is as we get into this stuff, we find 
5 more and more information. And, you know, frankly, the State 
6 is continuing to give me more information. I mean, I just got 
7 an evidence and property report this morning that looks about a 
8 10-page document. I just got this morning 10 CD discs of jail 
9 mail and some other things. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I realize that. I know there's 
11 for example, all of t'lotese motions t.."'lat deal with t.."'le death 
12 penalty, I mean they are not fact intensive that they could 
13 have be=_n filed -- we could have had a deadl; ne for those a 
14 long time ago. And that's one of the reasons I tried to put 
15 this schedule together is so we'd get all those things resolved. 
16 and handled before -- because I know the nature of trial work 
17 is that, you know, as you get closer to the trial date, tl--Lings 
18 start popping up that you didn't realize. And I understand 
19 that. But I'm just a little frustrated that we;re seeing these 
20 death penalty motions being filed on a case that's been pending 
21 for two and a half years. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: And I apologize. It's probably my 
23 lack of intelligence because sometimes things hit me, and when 
24 they hit me, I bring them up. There is no -- I don't know what 
25 you would call it -- I mean, there is no stack of motions that 
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549 
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1 we're told as defense attorneys we file every single one of 
2 these on a death penalty case. I mean, there are· certain ones, 
3 and I filed those as early as I could. And some of these new 
4 ones hit me, and I have to file, and I think I need to preserve 
5 it. What I am saying is, I mean, it would have been real nice 
6 to have a lot of this jail mail. I mean this dates back to 
7 August of 2007. 
8 MR. SHAW: That's ~_n provided, though, Randy. 
9 MR. RICHARDS: I never got these. I have never got 
10 these discs. 
11 MR. SHAW: According on our records you have from 
12 what our list says. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: I have one -- well, I had a bunch of 
14 discs of jail conversations, but I've never got a disc of the 
15 jail mail, never. I've got a stack of maybe 10 discs of 
16 conversations that were intercepted, telephone and visits, but 
17 none other than those. 
18 MR. SHAW: Those are limine motions. That has 
19 nothing to do with death penalty stuff. We 1 re taiking about 
20 responding to two motions on death penalty and life without 
21 parole. And liroine motions come up all the time close to 
22 trial. 
23 THE COURT: Well, let me tell you, we are two weeks 
24 from starting this trial, and I 've got plenty of time if you 
25 need to set things. I know we are set for next Friday, but you 
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1 know, if you need some other days and some other hearings, 
2 let's talk about doing that if we can now because I had a trial 
3 that went off. ·unfortunately I've got the next two weeks I can 
4 help you out as far as trying to argue those, but -- and we're 
5 going to do next Friday which is the 26th. I don't know if you 
6 want to try to set things ahead of that or if you want to go to 
7 the first week in March and start setting things, but, you 
8 know, I just don't want to have you guys show up on March 8 
9 with 200 potential jurors in the wings and say, gee, Judge, we 
10 need more time or we need to argue this or that. · I just don't 
11 \'1ant to keep the jur.{ \'.'aiting. I guess that's t.~e idea. 
12 And I understand that there are times and things that 
13 come up that you don't understand or anticipate, but, boy, just 
14 -- this is getting a little frustrating. We set aside a half a 
15 day with a court reporter. You know, there's a lot of work 
16 that goes to getting this thing ready, and then to find out 
17 that we're going to accomplish virtually nothing this morning, 
18 it's a little annoying I think, but -- so you may want to think 
19 about that. You can call me on the phone or call my clerk. 
20 MR. SHAW: Well, I can respond briefly on the State's 
21 motion, your Honor, or motion. We have filed a motion in 
22 limine regarding the testimony of James Gaskell. We also 
23 intend to file a motion in limine regarding the testimony of 
24 Mr. Aushee (pho~etic) , the defense expert --
25 THE COURT: On the coerced confession? 
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1 MR. SHAW: On the confession. And frankly, those, 
2 those two motions may require a hearing outside the presence of 
3 jury members because, you know, we argue the foundational 
4 expertise of those people. And I don' t know when you want to 
5 do that. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I 'd like to do it next Friday. 
7 MR.. RICHARDS: We can do it Friday. 
8 THE COURT: We already talked about the coerced 
9 confession issue and that we are going to do next Friday. And 
10 I assume the motion --
11 I 
12 
13 Friday. 
14 
MR. RICHARDS: On Gaskell. 
THE COURT: on Gaskell, we can do the same on 
MR. RICHARDS: On next Friday. 
15 MR. SHAW: We can do that. 
16 MR.. RICHARDS: We have the whole day. 
17 THE COURT: All right. The only motion I show that 
18 we are ready to .deal with today is this Defendant's motion to 
19 have the witnesses testify in anonymity, I guess, is that the 
20 best word? 
21 
22 
23 that. 
MR. RICHA..'!:IDS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Let' s go ahead if we can and address 
24 MR. RICHARDS: And your Honor, I do have an affidavit 
25 of Deirdre Gonnan. I think you may have had that by fax 
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1 hopefully? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
THE COURT: And Mr. Shaw --
:MR. RICHARDS: That's the actual one. 
:MR. SHAW: Yes, we have that one, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You want to go ahead and file this, the 
6 affidavit of Deirdre Gonnan? 
:MR. RICHARDS: Yes, if we could, please. 7 
8 THE COURT: Any objection if we make that part of the 
9 record? 
10 :MR.. HEWARD: No objection to making it part of the 
11 record, your Honor. I don't see the relevance of it, but 
12 there's no objection to making it part of the record. 
13 THE COURT: We' 11 go ahead and make it part of the 
14 record. And Mr. Richards, I might indicate I did get a chance 
15 to read your brief on the matter, so go ahead. 
16 :MR.. RI.CHARDS: Thank you. And I 1 11 try to tie in the 
17 relevance of Ms. Gonnan 1 s affidavit here shortly. 
18 This is a difficult case, not only because it 
19 involves the death penalty potentially but also because it 
20 involves gangs. And it involves situations that are relatively 
21 frightening to most people, partic-l.llarly to those that may 
22 witness the situation and to actually be called upon to 
23 testify. 
24 And I would like to believe that retaliation doesn't 
25 happen, but it does. I would like to believe that somehow our 
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1 witnesses could be protected in a normal courtroom setting, but 
2 I don't believe that that's possible. I point to a number of 
3 factors. I mention some of those in my memorandum. 
4 Since this case has arisen, we've had one person 
5 shot, Mr. Ashton, in retaliation. We've had my client's home, 
6 or the home of riis grandmother where he stayed a good portion 
7 of his life who's been shot at least twice and maybe three 
8 times either in retaliation, or we think maybe more accurately 
9 in the warning type shootings. 
10 We had an incident in the courtroom on the day of the 
11 prelimina....'"'Y hearL"'lg in retaliation, in the courthouse, exC'.J.se 
12 me, where my client' s mother and my client 1 s sister were 
13 sev·erely beat.e.."'l in t."'le elevator of the courthouse. I mean of 
14 all places where you would think that there would be some 
15 sanctuary, some safety, some guarantee that people won 1 t be 
16 hurt, you would think it would be in the courthouse. And yet 
17 it didn 1 t happen -- it didn 1 t occur, it didn 1 t ---the 
18 protection wasn 1 t there. Let me put it that way. My client 1 s 
19 mother and my client is sister were beat.a'"'l in retaliation. 
20 I unfortunately opened the paper today, and I read on 
21 the front oaae of the local section -- I brouaht it. 
- - -
I'm going 
22 to ask that this be entered into evidence today. I presume 
23 counsel has seen that. 
24 MR. HEWARD: I haven 1 t seen that, Judge. 
25 MR. RICHARDS: You are welcome to read through it. 
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1 It 1 s an article today. It 1 s entitled Perea 1 s colleagues or 
2 colleague faces charges of aggravated assault for retaliation 
3 in this case against the, apparently the victim 1 s family, the 
4 Prieto family. 
5 It troubles me on a number of levels. Obviously, my 
6 heart dropped when I read that because the jury questionnaires 
7 have gone out, the jurors potentially would read that article 
8 and that certainly bodes poorly against my client. And I 1m 
9 going to try to figure out a way to get around that. I don 1 t 
10 know what to do, frankly. 
11 The a...-ticle also me..."ltions that there have bee."l 
12 retaliatory shootings against my client from the other side and 
13 arrests. I don't know if you 1 ve had a chance to read the 
14 article. It was not very timely, at least not from the 
15 defense 1 s standpoint. 
16 I don 1 t know that the prosecution particularly 
17 disagrees with me that the witnesses in this particular case 
18 are in some danger. And this isn 1 t a fanciful maybe it might 
19 happen danger, this is a very real danger because it has 
20 happened. 
21 I hav~ had the opportunity in preparing for this 
22 trial to talk to several witnesses. Now these witnesses talked 
23 to me on the condition that I not raise their name, and I will 
24 honor that today. These witnesses are incredibly important to 
25 our case. At least two of these witnesses would be witnesses 
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1 that would have been there at the scene and observed a portion 
2 or all of the happenings. Both of those witnesses are 
3 incredibly exculpatory as far as my client is concerned. 
4 Both of those wimesses would testify that the 
5 what infonnation they have and what infonnation that they 
6 observed would 0dicate that my client is not the one that shot 
7 the gun from the car. I have two wimesses that will say that. 
8 Both of them have told me that they will not testify 
9 without being granted some sort of protection. Now I certainly 
10 don't have a wi mess protection program ability. I don't think 
11 the State either cL""es. They would certair..ly have a lot better 
12 chance of getting something of that nature. And so I've tried 
13 to devise some other method. 
14 I have one wimess tl'-..at will -- I have two other 
15 wimesses that I've talked to who will testify that someone 
16 else sul:mitted to them that they had -- someone else, not my 
17 client, admi.tted to them. that they had done the shooting. I 
18 have two of them. Neither one of them will testify because 
19 they are afraid. And it 1 s a very real fear, a very real. fear. 
20 So where that leaves me as a defense attorney in a 
21 capital case is in a situation where I have a client that I 
22 believe is not guilty 
23 MR. HEWARD: Judge, I '11 object to that. 
24 Mr. Richards' beliefs has no business in this courtroom and it 
25 is totally inproper and unethical for him to be saying he 
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1 believes anything about this. 
2 THE COURT: Well, I suppose to a certain extent that 
3 goes without saying. He is defending him and that's what his 
4 job is, but --
5 MR. RICHARDS: And I presume that --
6 THE COURT: -- as far as the motion goes, I 
7 understand you are struggling with trying to figure out how to 
8 put this evidence on and protect the witnesses. So maybe we 
9 just need to focus on that issue rather than --
10 MR. RICHARDS: All right. I've been appointed to 
11 represent my clie.."lt who has plead not guilty 1 and I have 
12 evidence that would indicate that he is not guilty. I have 
13 evidence I just ·laid out to you. Let me put it that way, if 
14 that's all right with counsel. 
15 So I 'm in a dilerm:na, your Honor. I can -- and I 
16 don't know what to do. I on the one hand have a duty to 
17 represent my client. I have a duty to save his life. That's 
18 what I've been appointed to do. And I take that assignment 
19 very seriously. 
20 I have four witnesses that have came to me in 
21 confidence and told me info:r::mation that I think would be 
22 incredibly inq;:>ortant to the -- saving my client's life and to 
23 the d-=-fense case --
24 THE COURT: Let me ask you, what is your suggestion 
25 as far as how we would do this? 
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549 
17 Digitized by the H ward W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 MR. RICHARDS: Well, my suggestion is this. That --
2 and I 've talked to these witnesses. If we can bring them in, 
3 and I propose we bring them in through the back door, maybe, of 
4 the elevator or something, bring them into the courtroom and 
5 have the jury there. I don't mind at that point telling the 
6 prosecution their names, but we agree privately that we assign 
7 them an anonymous name that could be used, a John Doe or 
8 something of that nature. 
9 THE COURT: They would actually come and testify here 
10 in court. 
11 MR. RICHARDS: They actually would came and testify 
12 here in court. Counsel would be told their names. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. RICHARDS: Counsel, as well as myself would be 
15 ordered, as well as all the court personnel, and we would ask 
16 that a minimum of court personnel be present, would all be 
17 instructed that they are not to divulge that name to anyone. 
18 My client has agreed, and he will do so today, agree 
19 not to be present during that portion of the testimony because 
20 of the fear that even he could somehow be forced or coerced or 
21 forced to divulge those names at some later date. And he would 
22 be agreeable not to be in the courtroom. 
23 We would ask that the investigating officers not be 
24 in the courtroani. And I do that for a very real reason. And 
25 that is because I have had experience that if I give these 
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1 names today to counsel, they will then give them to their 
2 investigators who will then go out and start talking to these 
3 individuals and will frighten them off. And I believe that 
4 that will happen. And I don't mean that in any malicious way 
>c 
5 against counsel because I don't think they would ever want that 
6 to happen. But I think it -- in their effort to get 
7 infoDnation about these individuals, they would send out people 
8 that would --
9 THE COURT: What about the courtroan, though? I 
10 mean, if they cane in and testify in front of the jury, you are 
11 not asking me to close the courtroom, are you? 
12 MR. RICHARDS: I'm asking you to close the courtroan. 
13 THE COURT: How can I do that? Is there any case law 
14 or statute that allows a district court judge to close the 
15 courtroan in the middle of a murder trial? I mean, I 
16 understand what you are b:ying to do is to protect their 
17 identity, but --
18 MR. RICHARDS: Well, we do it all the time. We do it 
19 in juvenile court cases every single day. 
20 THE COURT: Yeah, juvenile court is different, isn't 
21 it? 
22 MR. RICHARDS: No. It's different, although the 
23 Supreme Court has ruled that the -- under the 14th Amendment, 
24 the rights under a public trial apply to juveniles; however, 
25 they've carved out these exceptions because of an effort to 
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1 protect the juvenile. 
2 THE COURT: But are you aware of any cases? I didn't 
3 see anything in 'your brief that said that there' s any case law 
4 out there that say it's all right or it's pennissible for the 
5 district court judge to close the courtroom in a murder trial 
6 to the public. I mean, I know we're concerned about protecting 
7 people. That's .why we have security and bailiffs and 
8 everybody. And we're certainly sensitive to try and protect 
9 witnesses and spectators and everybody else, but that's a 
10 pretty drastic move, isn't it, to close the courtroom? 
11 :MR. RICHARDS: It's a ve:r:y drastic move a.."'l.d I 
12 understand that, but I don't see any other way to do it. And I 
13 know that t.'llere are closed hearings in cases. We've :b.ad some. 
14 I had some, some of the other capital homicide cases . 
15 My client is willing to waive his right to a public 
16 trial. And it is a defense right under the Sixth Amendment as 
17 applied to the states under the Fourteenth and also under the 
18 Utah constitutional provision is a defense right to have a 
19 public trial. 
20 And traditionally, and I know you are astute of 
21 histo:r:y as far as legal goes, but that was a right specifically 1 
22 designed to protect the defendants so there couldn't be private 
23 trials with -- and so it's a defense right is what I am saying. 
24 And he's willing: to waive that. He's even willing to not be 
25 present during that portion. 
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1 And I 'm not talking about the whole trial. I 'm 
2 talking about four witnesses. That's it. I don't imagine any 
3 of those witnesses will go more than 15, 20 minutes. So we're 
4 closing the courtroom for a total of maybe one hour, one and a 
5 half hour hours closed, the rest of the courtroom would be 
6 open. 
7 I would also agree that if the prosecution has any 
8 witnesses that they would so desire that we could give them the 
9 same treatment and my client would agree to that as well. 
10 The problem, the dilemma we have, as I mentioned, is 
11 either I put these witnesses on to tr.{ to protect my clie.."lt and 
12 represent him in this manner, or I 'm left with a dilemma do I 
13 put these witnesses on knowing that there's a very good 
14 likelihood they might be hurt or killed because I've put their 
15 info~tion out. 
16 Now I had-- on some of the conversations I did have 
17 an investigator with me, and so I could presumably have 1"-..im 
18 testify, but I ~ought there would be potentially some hearsay 
19 objections on t:.'la.t, but even that, t.'l,.en I'm potentially 
20 relegating them to the retaliation, possible death in order to 
21 save my client's life. So I'm in a Catch-22 position; do I let 1 
22 my client die or do I let the witnesses die? And it's a very 
23 real thing because there have been shootings and we know that' s 
24 occurred. 
25 Now that's what I'm requesting. And I think it's 
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1 doable. I think constitutionally it's okay. And I think the 
2 court can because of these extenuating circumstances order 
3 that. 
4 ·Now as I 've had an opportunity to read through the 
5 State's reply, they cite a number of cases. And I want to go 
6 through those briefly, and then I want to talk about a couple 
7 of other issues. 
8 The cases they cite' the one case' the Alvarado case' 
9 California case that they cite very heavily, that's a 
10 defendant's right case. It's a case where the court came down 
11 , on the cor..frontation clause issue. It' a defendant's right, 
12 not the state's .. It's a constitutional confrontation, Sixth 
13 li..me."l.dment issue. And the court r.a"tt.e do\<l.n on that, that I 
14 understand that's a defendant's right. 
15 And that's in light -- there's also a California 
16 statute, and I have a copy of that. It's California Penal Code 
17 1054. 7 that says the disclosure required, and this is 
18 disclosure of names and witnesses, 30 days prior to trial, 
19 unless good cause is shown why disclosure should be denied, 
20 restricted or deferred. And good cause is limited to threats 
21 or possible danger to the safety of victims or witnesses, 
22 possible loss or destruction of evidence or compromising an 
23 investigation. 
24 And so California has a specific law that deals with 
25 it, under Utah law a similar one. I attempted to approach the 
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1 Rules Committee on that and we're still trying to deal with 
.. 
2 that, but at this point we don't have such the law. But it 
3 would be a good idea. And I think it's one that the court can 
4 at least adhere to in under the circumstances. 
5 They cite a case of US vs. Crockett. Again, that was 
6 a defendant's right case. And the question in that case, the 
7 Crockett decision was the defendant was asked or wanted to ask 
8 the prosecution and the witnesses where they were living at the 
9 time, and they were not allowed to do so. 
10 And the court affirmed the conviction. And so there 
11 was tr.a.at restriction even against the defenda.."".l.t. It was the 
12 defendant that brought this under the confrontation clause 
13 right and even that ~'as denied. That i!"..fonnation was denied to 
14 the defendant and held to be held okay. And that's a case 
15 cited by the State in their brief. 
16 The case of Smith vs. Illinois, the United States 
17 Supreme Court case decision, 390 US 129, that was also a 
18 defendant's right. That was a reversal where they were asking 
19 for the informer' s actual name. And that was reversed. 
20 We're not opposed to him knowing the actual name. In 
21 fact, we intend to give that to him if called as a witness. 
22 But again, this is defendant's right under the confrontation 
23 clause. 
24 The other case they cite, the MM vs. Varis, is a 
25 civil case. I don't think it has any application under 
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1 criminal law. That's a civil case under a 1983 class action. 
2 Let me talk to you about a couple of issues that they 
3 raise in their memorandum. One is they said they want to have 
4 a right to cross-examine. And I have no problem with full 
5 cross-examination. They can cross-examine as long and as hard 
6 as they want. They will have the witness' s names, and same of 
7 these witnesses -- well, they will be able to cross-examine 
8 them as well as I am able to cross-examine same of their 
9 witnesses . 
10 Now, they've complained that they would like to have 
11 a.."'l opportu. .. .ity to talk to these people before..,..&"ld. I guess in 
12 response to that I say kind of welcome to my world. I can 1 t 
13 tell you how many cases I 1 Ve wa.."'l.ted to talk to a state witness 
14 and I've been denied that privilege. I get maybe a police 
15 report, maybe not much in that. And if I -- if they tell me 
16 that I've been told by the prosecution not to talk to you, I 
17 can 1 t do anything further. And that happens all the time. And 
18 it's frankly, happened in this case. I 've tried to talk to a 
19 cou.-ple of their witnesses and they've said, they -- they ire 
20 telling me we don't have to talk to you, Mr. Richards . And so 
21 I I'm unable to talk to them. So as far as giving them the names 
22 beforehand so that they can talk to them, again, welcome to my 
23 world. 
24 I had Deirdre Gorman, one of the premier federal 
25 defense attorneys give an affidavit. And I 1m going to tell you 
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1 why I had her do that. In the federal system, and I do sane 
2 work in the federal system, I've had a number of trials in the 
3 federal court, there are severe restrictions as far as what 
4 defense attorneys get. There's been a grand jury proceeding 
5 where there' s been testimony in many cases, and in most cases 
6 the actual corrq;>laining witness 1 if you have an aggravated 
7 assault or a murder or sanething of that nature, the actual 
8 witness will testify in a grand jury proceeding. 
9 The grand jury brings down an indictment and the 
10 state -- the federal government, excuse me, then puts this 
11 wit••1.ess on the st&"'ld. And they ask the qu.estions and then they 
12 finish with all of their examination, and then they pull out 
13 off their desk a stack of transcripts from the indictment, 
14 grand jury indicbnent hearing. And they do one of these, and 
15 they say, counsel, your witness. And literally I 've had one 
16 this thick, and this is over an inch thick. I 've had one 
17 several hundred pages long, and they drop it on the desk and 
18 they say your witness. 
19 And sq tha"'l sam.e.'i'}ow I'm S1.."PPPSed to be able to put my 
20 hand on that and divine eve....'"'y-thing in there and do an effective 
21 cross-examination, which is a joke. But we deal with it. And 
22 that's the reason for Deirdre Go~'s affidavit. 
23 There's also over in the federal system, and she 
24 talks about that to sane extent, they don't disclose all of 
25 their witnesses. Quite often 1 and I 've been in trials where 
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1 they've thrown on a witness that I have no idea they were going 
2 to throw on. 
3 THE COURT: You're talking federal court, right? 
4 MR. RICHARDS: I 'm talking federal court, yeah, but 
5 they throw on me these witnesses and I 'm expected to 
6 cross-examine them not having any idea. 
7 And so what I am telling you is that' s their major 
8 concern as I read their brief. That' s their major concern. 
9 And I 'm saying that, my heavens, I deal with it everyday. This 
10 is kind of the life of a defense attorney. 
11 And we're willing to give them the r.ame. We wa.."'lt the 
12 court to order that nobody in the court, including the 
13 prosecutors, leak that name out to an:x'body. And we're asking 
14 the courtroom be closed. 
15 I think that handles the issues. I think it allows 
16 us to put on our defense. But without that, I'm in an ethical 
17 bind because I have to make a decision potentially and very 
18 really whose life am I willing to sacrifice. And I don't want 
19 to be i..l'l that position. I think you can understand it. And 
20 there's a very easy solution. 
21 I THE COURT: Can I ask, Mr. Richards, you said you are 
22 willing to give the State the names of these four witnesses? 
23 
24 
25 
MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: When are you willing to do that? 
MR. RICHARDS: The day of trial. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, then there 1 s no way they can 
2 prepare. You are just saying you got to come into this blind 
3 like you do in federal court? 
4 MR. RICHARDS: Just like I am as a defense attorney 
5 in the federal system --
6 THE COURT: Right 
MR. RICHARDS: just as blind. 7 
8 THE COURT: at least under the state rules aren 1 t 
9 we -- the idea is to allow both sides to prepare for trial, to 
10 be able to cross-examine, whether it 1 s on the defense or the 
11 prosec-ution. The idea is -wooe 1 ve gone away from trial by ambush, 
12 right? I mean --
13 MR. RICP..ARDS: I understand that, your Honor. But, 
14 you know, it 1 s really nice on the prosecution 1 s side because 
15 they have the ability to subpoena people and talk to them and 
16 force them to talk to them, and I don 1 t. I mean, you talk 
17 about trial by ambush, even in the state system, and even in 
18 this particular case, there are witnesses that I am unable to 
19 talk to because they won 1 t talk to me. So my preparation --
20 THE COURT: But --
21 I MR. RICHARDS: -- is nominal at best. 
22 THE COURT: Retaliation is a part of every case, 
23 isn' t it, to a certain extent? 
24 MR. RI.CHARDS: No. 
25 THE COURT: I mean every witness who gets on the 
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1 THE COURT: Again, you know, I understand the 
2 predicament you are in, but I'm just almost appalled to think 
3 that there are four witnesses out there who could clear, 
4 potentially clear your client on a capital murder case and 
5 either you or your client don't think that the state or law 
6 enforcement ought to know about that? I mean, I would have 
7 , thought you would be over to the police department in a 
8 heartbeat saying, hey, we've got people who can clear our 
9 client on this murder, save him the trial and the possibility 
10 of a death penalty and we're not going to turn it over to law 
11 eraorcement because --
12 MR. RICHARDS: Well, let me throw you in my shoes for 
13 just a minute. Okay? You have a witness who comes to you and 
14 says, listen, I am talking to you because I think it's the 
15 right thing to do, but I'm afraid because I'm on the side of 
16 the other gang, or on this gang, either one, but I'm afraid 
17 that if my information comes out, that I will be hurt or 
18 killed. 
19 THE CO'l1RT: Okay. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: And I 'm willing to talk to you on 
21 conditions of confidentiality and tell you what I know and I 
22 but they say boo-fore I do that I need the assurance, No. 1, that 
23 you won't tell anybody about my name; and No. 2, that before I 
24 testify, I need to have some assurance that my name won't be 
25 thrown out nor my testimony so other people can retaliate. 
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1 So that person comes and talks to you. And we 
2 already know in ·this case that there's been retaliation. We 
3 know we had at least one shooting, almost potentially fatal, 
4 attempted murder. We've had dri ve-bys. We just had this new 
5 one, agg assault, so it's a very real situation. 
6 And it's even more real because asstnning they are a 
7 member of the opposing gang, not only -- well, it's their own 
8 people. It' s their own people they are going to kill. And 
9 that's a very real situation. 
10 So they've come to me, and I tell them I will talk in 
11 confir..a'"'l.ce and I '11 talk to the court and see if I can get 
12 something done, and that's the situation. So I throw that to 
13 you. 
14 THE COURT: I really understand the situation. What 
15 I don't understand, though, is that there are people out there 
16 that can clear your client, that were there when the murder 
17 took place and can say it was somebody else who did it, and yet 
18 they are willing to not came forward and let Mr. Perea take the 
19 fall on this? I mean, I -- I im having a tough time with that 
20 concept, I guess . These people are willing to tell you and 
21 willing to testify to the jury but they don' t want anybody else 
22 to know about until the day of trial? I mean --
23 MR. RICHARDS: But they don't want anybody to know 
24 about it period, even after trial. 
25 THE COURT: That' s what I am saying. It' s almost 
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1 ludicrous, isn't it, to think we've got people out there that 
2 can clear your client, and they don't want to say anything? 
3 They don't want anybody to know? I mean, if it's true, it's 
4 true. They ought to be breaking down the doors of the police 
5 department saying, look, we have 
6 MR. RICHARDS: Knowing they are going to get killed? 
7 THE COURT: Well, but that' s what I 'm saying. Their 
8 situation I don't think is any different than a lot of other 
9 murder cases, or a lot of other rape cases where people are 
10 worried about retaliation. I just think, my gosh, if I had 
11 been the witness to a murder and I know it was sam.eboct.f ct.."ler 
12 than Mr. Perea, but I'm not going to came forward unless I get 
13 some kind of -- ,it just -- I 'm just kind of puzzled by this 
14 concept 
· 15 MR. RICHARDS: But it's because we live in a 
16 different world, your Honor. We don't live in a gang world. I 
17 think if you had that threat, the very real threat that you 
18 might be killed, you are going: to think twice about it and say, 
19 listen, is it going to be me and my kids a..'l'ld m-y fand.ly that 
20 gets killed, or is it going to be Riqo that gets executed maybe 
21 I sometime down the road? I think I 1 ll let Riqo 
- go. 
22 THE COURT: But I guess --
23 MR. RICHARDS: I can understand that very really. 
24 THE COURT: Why wouldn't you turn this over. to law 
25 enforcement or the prosecutors to give them a chance -- I mean, 
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1 you really think if they can verify if somebody else did the 
2 murder, that they want to go ahead with the prosecution on this 
3 case? I mean, I have --
4 MR.. RICHARDS: If they believe, and I apologize in 
5 advance for saying this, but they believe that my client is 
6 guilty. 
7 THE COURT: Well, yeah, but if they've -- if you've 
8 got exculpatory evidence, don't you think they ought to --
9 MR. RICHARDS: I didn't get an objection. 
THE COURT: Huh? 10 
11 MR. RICP..A..'tiDS: I didn't get a.'"l objection on that one. 
12 If they believe that my client is guilty, and so what 
13 t.~ey do, a..'"ld I believe this is what would happen, is I would 
14 give them the name, John Doe was there and he saw it and that 
15 he's willing to testify. 
16 So then they go and do what they do; and that is, 
17 they turn it over to their police officer, Thomas or Beck, 
18 whoever it is they have working on the case, and they go and 
19 talk to the person. A"ld rrraybe the person tells them, although 
20 at that point they are a little scared because they don't trust 
21 the police any more than most gang members do. 
22 And then they also potentially, and the witnesses 
23 believing it because I think it happens, they then go and say 
24 to Jane Doe or Jim Doe or whoever, and now their witness, well, 
25 you know that John Doe just told me that he was there, he saw 
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1 somebody else do it, Joe do it. 
2 .And so then John Doe, his name is out there, ratting 
3 out somebody other than my client, or claiming that my client 
4 didn't do it either way, and they are afraid of that. 
5 Certainly they ~e. Because they know the police are going to 
6 be talking because police do that. That's what they do. 
7 And we know that from this very case because when we 
8 put Thomas on the stand, he's saying, well we've had statements 
9 from a number of people that you did, Riqo, and they named the 
10 names. And they talked about Flaco said you did and so and so 
11 said you did, and sOir.ebody else said you did. I :mea.."l, we have 
12 their own witness who supposedly claims in the preliminary 
13 hearing at least --
14 THE COURT: So what you are telling me is you don' t 
15 trust the system? You don't trust law enforcement or the 
16 prosecution to do the right thing in this case? So, therefore, 
17 at least, at least your witnesses are saying that, I guess, 
18 they don't trust the law enforcement. 
19 MR. RICHARDS: That's what my witnesses believe. And 
20 I believe that if we give the names today to the prosecution 
21 that thev will send out an officer to qo talk to the person. 
- - -
22 THE COURT: Rightly so, don't you think? I mean, 
23 they need -- don't they need to verify this infonnation, 
24 whether or not it's true, what witness 
25 MR. RICHARDS: So what does the witness do? The 
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1 witness knows -- listen I got Officer Thomas for instance 
2 coming to me now saying this, Richards told me that you have 
3 information that Riqo didn 1 t do it. And they are going to say, 
4 well, let 1 s see I just got screwed by Richards because he told 
5 me he wouldn 1 t do that. I got Thomas who 1 s reeling me real 
6 hard because Thomas thinks Riqo did it. And I know darn well · 
7 that Thomas is going to be telling my buddies, my other gang 
8 members that I did it or that I said that Riqo didn 1 t do it. I 
9 can almost guarantee what the witness is going to say in that 
10 situation. They are going to say, well, you know, forget this. 
11 No, I didn 1 t say that to Ric.~ds. I can guarantee that. 
12 THE COURT: So they are willing to let somebody else 
13 take t-~e fall for the murder that t-~ey wit-~essed and could 
14 testify t:l-...at somebody else did it? Is that --
15 MR. RICHARDS: And you don 1 t think that happens all 
16 the time, your ~onor? 
17 THE COtlRT: I guess if they don 1 t have any moral 
18 courage to step up to the plate and say, hey, you know what, I 
19 saw what happened here and· it wasn 1 t Riqo Perea. I mean, I 1m 
20 just blown away. I mean I know there are people out there that 
21 have no backbone, no SPine. but mv aosh what does it sav about 
. - . - - -
22 their credibility as a witness? 
23 MR. RICHARDS: We have 159 people that have been 
24 exonerated off of death row --
25 THE COURT: Right. Okay. 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: that were proven to be innocent. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: And nobody came forward on any of 
4 them. 
5 THE COURT: I know. 
6 MR. RICHARDS: Nobody. 
7 THE COURT: I don't doubt for a moment, Mr. Richards, 
8 that there are people out there with no backbone, that aren't 
9 willing to come in and testify as to what they saw concerning a 
10 murder. But if ,these people really saw this, I would think 
11 they would came in here and talk to law e..""'..forceme.."'lt about what 
12 they observed. I just-- I don't know how else you do it. You 
13 got to tu._~ it over to law enforcement, don't you? 
14 MR. RICHARDS: No, you don't. We can do it the way I 
15 propose. And what I am saying is that they look at it from 
16 this standpoint. Assuming I'm the person, and I've got a wife 
17 
18 
19 
and I 've got three kids, because I do, and I love them. 
look at it and I'm a gang member and I say, listen, I'm 
I know Riqo didri' t do it. I got evidence ti-..at he didn' t. 
And I 
and 
You 
20 know, I saw it or somebody told me, somebody else admitted to 
21 me. But I know that if I tell that to the police, that's going 
22 to come out. came out in the paper today. Or wherever it is. 
23 Here it is. We .got names and pictures and all that stuff that 
24 came out in the paper. So they know it' s going to come out. 
25 So I'm thinking, let's see, if I do that, my family 
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1 might get hurt or killed, I might get hurt or killed, and maybe 
2 I don't like Riqo that much, but--
3 THE COURT: Isn't it going to came out anyway? 
4 MR. RI"CHARDS : No. 
5 THE COURT: I mean let's assume that we grant your 
6 motion. They are going to get on the witness stand. They are 
7 going to testify. The jw:y is going to hear it. So it's out 
8 there. Right? It's just the question of timing, isn't it? 
9 MR. RICHARDS: Well, no, because two things happen. 
10 No. 1, the jury doesn't know their name --
11 THE COURT: Right. 
12 MR. RICHARDS: -- because we use John Doe. 
13 THE COURT: See, I don't have a.'"'l.y problem with that, 
14 with having a witness maybe using an alias. But what I am. 
15 having trouble with is this concept that we don't want to give 
16 it to the prosecutor or law enforcement ahead of time so they 
17 can at least verify or check out the story. T'ney need to know 
18 something about these people that are going to testify. If we 
19 are going to have a fair trial for both sides, you know -- I 
20 mean, they turned over all the police reports to you, gave you 
21 all the discovery. I signed an order, I think, indicating you 
22 were supposed to turn over whatever you had other than maybe 
23 the defendant's statements, but I thought the idea was we were 
24 going to have a fair trial. Everybody was going to know ahead 
25 of time everything was going to be out on the table. That' s 
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1 what I am having trouble with right now is this concept that we 
2 don 1 t want to let the prosecutors know who you are going to 
3 call. I 
4 MR. RICHARDS: Because what will happen, and I know 
5 what will happen, they are going to send their officer out 
6 there and do exactly what I said. And then my witness is going 
7 to say well, no, it didn 1 t happen, because I 1m afraid. 
8 Because, no, they don 1 t have backbone because they think they 
9 may be --
10 THE COURT: I thought they were afraid of somebody 
11 else rather than law enforcement. I give law enforcement and 
12 the prosecutor a little more credit that than you do. I think 
13 they are honest --
14 MR. RICHARDS: I do too. 
15 THE CQURT: that they are out to try to solve this 
16 case. 
17 MR. RICHARDS : I do too. 
18 THE COURT: They want to put the right person in jail 
19 or prison or whatever for camrr~tting these murders, and that 1 s 
20 what this is all about. 
21 MR. RICHARDS: So what do they -- what do you think 
22 the officer is going to do? 
23 THE COURT: He 1 s going to investigate. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: He 1 s going to go to John Doe and he 1 s 
25 going to say, listen, I got word that you, Mr. J. Doe, I got 
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1 word that you were there and you saw it happen. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: And they'll say, well, where did you 
4 get that from? Well, the defense told us. And at that point, 
5 they are going to say whoa, you know, so much for that 
6 confidentiality, so much for the safety of my family. And then 
7 they are going to say, I 'm not going to say anything on this. 
8 Or they are going to use the tactics that Thomas and Gent used 
9 in examining my client, and that is say other people have said 
10 you've done this. 
11 And so I mea...."l, it's -- and they are going to tell 
12 other persons. They are going to go to the next person. Hey, 
13 Jane Doe just told me that so and so confessed to this. 'h'!f'..at 
14 do you say about that? 
15 And they got -- and so then at that point Jane Doe is 
16 afraid. And that 1 s what I am afraid of. It 1 s not 1musual for 
17 this to happen. It happens all the time in the federal system. 
18 Like I say, it even happens to us. Because a lot of times I 
19 might 1'-..ave a name, but tr..at does me no good if I can't go talk 
20 to them. And I go talk to them all the time. And they say, 
21 you know, from your middle lane, the prosecutors told me I 
22 don' t have to. ,so where' s the fairness and o~_nness of the 
23 trial --
24 THE COURT: I can't comment on what the prosecutors 
25 did or did not say, but that seems so unusual. I mean, I was a 
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13 
prosecutor, and I can tell you what we told the witnesses was 
simply this. You can talk to the defense if you want, but you 
have no obligation to do so. I mean 
MR. RICHARDS: Exactly. 
THE COURT·: that' s a different stor.y than saying 
the prosecutor told me not to talk to you. I don't think most 
prosecutors do that. And I don't think they can do that, to 
tell a witness you don' t talk to the defense. 
MR. RICHARDS: No, but they can tell them you don't 
have to. 
THE CXYv"RT: Tr...at' s right. 
MR. RICHARDS: I can't do that. 
THE COURT: And that's true in this case. They could 
14 go talk to these four witnesses and the witnesses could say, we 
15 don' t want to talk to you, and that's fine. That' s -- that' s 
16 their decision, .so. 
17 MR. RICHARDS: Well, it's not fair, though, because 
18 if I do the· same thing, if I have my witness Jane Doe, and I 
19 say, listen, you don • t have to talk. to the prosecl.ltor --
20 THE COURT: Right. 
21 MR. RICHARDS: -- you don't have to do that if you 
22 don't want to, I 've just cammi tted a felony offense. 
23 THE COURT: Well, it d_.::p=o_nds -- and again, it gets 
24 back to this, witnesses call all the time and say, do I have to 
25 talk to this attorney? And you tell them, look, you can talk 
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1 to them if you want, that's your decision. I 'm not telling you 
•. 
2 you can or cannot, but that' s your decision 
3 MR. RICHARDS: That's not true, Judge. 
4 THE COURT: to talk to 
5 MR. RICHARDS: That's not true, Judge. 
6 THE COURT: What's not true? 
7 MR. RICHARDS: I can't tell Jane Doe you don't have 
8 to talk to the prosecutor. 
9 
10 
11 
MR. HEWARD: That's not what he said. 
THE COURT: It' s the witness's decision. 
MR. RICHARDS: No, but I can't tell her that. I 
12 can't tell her you don't have to talk to them --
13 THE COURT: But you agree it happens all the time 
14 that the police go out to interview a witness and the witness 
15 says, I don' t want to talk to you guys. 
16 MR. RICHARDS: I agree. I agree it happens, but then 
17 they get a subpoena and they bring them into court --
18 THE COURT: Right. 
19 MR. RICHARDS: -- and you say, you testify or you are 
20 going to go to jail. 
21 T"'rlE C01JRT: No. w"'hat happens is they get on the 
22 witness stand and testify. And then the other side says to 
23 them, well, we tried to talk to you about this case and you 
24 refused to talk to us. That's what happens. 
25 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. 
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1 THE COURT: The jw:y decides if they are telling the 
2 truth. 
3 
4 
MR. RICHARDS: So it happens all the time. 
THE COURT: That's right, that they refuse to· 
5 testify, or they refuse to talk to either the defense or law 
6 enforcement. 
7 MR. RICHARDS: So we're just leveling the plane here. 
8 Now the prosecutor has a couple of witnesses they can't talk to 
9 before trial together with the 
10 THE COURT: It seems like it becomes a game now. I 
11 just -- I just can't get beyond this concept that, my God, you 
12 got four witnesses out there that can clear your client, and we 
13 don't want to let t.'llem talk to the police or the prosecutors 
14 because we think they are wrong, they've done a wrong --
15 MR. RICHARDS: Because they won't. 
16 THE COURT: they got the wrong motives . 
17 MR. RICHARDS: You don't think I asked t."'"lem, hey, do 
18 you mind, you and I going to talk to the prosecutor? They said 
19 absolutely not. I won't do it. 
20 THE COURT: I guess again 
21 MR. RICHARDS: They won't. 
22 THE COURT: it says something about their 
23 character, doesn't it, that they are a witness to a murder and 
24 they don't want to talk to law enforcement about it but they 
25 are going to tell 12 strangers in the jw:y box about it? 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: Under the anonymous protection. 
2 THE COURT: Yeah. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: Under the court's protection, sure 
4 they would. 
5 THE COURT: Again, I think it says something about 
6 their character and background. If they are an eyewitness to a 
7 murder and they 'are not willing to talk to law enforcement, or 
8 at least talk to the prosecutors about it? 
9 MR. RICHARDS: Well, could I have an instruction from 
10 you on every witness that I talk to that's refused to talk to 
11 me, an i.."lst...-uction to the ju.....-y that that impinges t..~n t.~eir 
12 character because they won't talk to me? 
13 THE COURT: Well, I think that's what the jury is 
14 there for; they need to decide credibility. They don' t need an 
15 instruction from the judge, they can decide themselves after 
16 listening to the testilnony. 
17 MR. RICHARDS: So why can't the prosecutor do the 
18 same thing that I have to do, and that is say, well, you d.idn' t 
19 came forward to the police, I haven' t had the chance to talk to 
20 you, have I? Why can't they do that? 
21 THE COti'RT: You can ask that question to any witness. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: I know. So now we've leveled the 
23 playing field. They are in the same boat as I am. 
24 THE COURT: I don' t know how -- why you think it' s 
25 leveling the playing field. They turned over all their 
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1 witnesses, all the police reports, all the witness statements, 
2 the preliminacy hearing transcripts, and I signed an order 
3 saying I want the defense to do the same thing. That 1 s 
4 leveling the playing field. 
5 I mean for years it was just like you were saying, 
6 the prosecutors knew absolutely nothing about what the defense 
7 was going to put on because the defense has no obligation to do 
8 so. But the longer they looked at that, the legislature 
9 decided maybe we, need to change this and, quote, level the 
10 playing field. 
11 MR. RICF..ARDS: · But it 1 s okay for the prosecution 
12 witnesses not to talk to me? 
13 THE COt.lRT: Yeah, t..lLey don 1 t have any -- none of the 
14 witnesses can talk to any -- they don 1 t have to talk to 
15 anybody. That's always been the rule. 
16 MR. RICHARDS: But I can 1 t tell them that. 
17 THE COURT: Well, you ca..."'l tell t."lem it 1 s their 
18 decision. 
19 
20 
MR.. RICHARDS : No, I can' t. 
THE COURT: Well, we obviously disagree on that. 
21 MR. RICHARDS: Well, I tell you, I've been threatened 
22 by a number of prosecutors and if I tell a witness, hey, you 
23 don't have to talk to the police, then I'm only at least 
24 obstructing justice and may be t:anp,=ring. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: I 've been told that by a number of 
2 prosecutors in a number of different cases. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
THE CQURT: Okay. 
MR. RICHARDS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I didn't mean to cut you off. 
MR. RICHARDS: That was --
7 THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure I understood 
8 on sane of this what you are asking for and how you want to 
9 proceed on this. 
10 All right. The State, or do you need a short recess? 
.... 
.l..L MR. HE':~'RD: Judge, we 1 ve been going just over a.."'l 
12 hour. The court reporter, I suspect her fingers could use a 
13 short break. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Let 1 s take about a 10, 15 minute 
15 recess then. Okay? 
16 (A Recess is taken by the Cou....~.) 
17 THE COURT: We're back in session in State vs. Perea. 
18 Both parties are present. And Mr. Heward or Mr. Shaw? 
19 MR. HE"IIVA..'RD : It' s me. Thank you, your Honor. 
20 Judge, several things that go to conpel after the 
21 argume..11.t +-hat Mr. Richa-rds made to go +-irrough b=>_fore responding 
22 to his brief, several times there were references made to what 
23 a prosecutor 1 s duty is. That 1 s specifically covered in Rule 
24 3. 8 about the special responsibilities of the prosecutor. As 
25 your Honor alluded to, it is our responsibility to do justice, 
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1 not to convict. And whether Mr. Richards wants to talk about 
2 someone else that he's dealt with, the three prosecutors, four 
3 prosecutors assigned to this case take that responsibility very 
4 seriously. 
5 There is no infonnation that counsel has referred to 
6 that's came to us. There is no infonnation from statements 
7 from witnesses at the scene that don't put the gun in this 
8 defendant's hand. And would the State love to have that 
9 infonnation? Absolutely. Is that infonnation that the State 
10 would investigate diligently in an effort to detennine if this 
11 defendant isn't the person who canmi tted the two murders ~~d 
12 the two attempted murders? Absolutely. And to indicate 
13 anything otherwise is absolute blasphemy. We have 
14 responsibilities to ourselves, we have responsibilities to this 
15 court, and we have responsibilities as prosecutors. 
16 You know, Mr. Richards like to editorialize. He 
17 likes to talk about beliefs, Judge. Beliefs have a place in 
18 our society. And it's in churches. It's in religion. This is 
19 a court of law that we deal with facts aT'ld we deal with 
20 evidence. 
21 The gang problems and the witness problems t."::.e 
22 defense counsel refers to that his witnesses would have, have 
23 equal application as you point out to the state. Are those 
24 people willing to cooperate? Are those people willing to came 
25 in? Are those people perhaps fearful? All of those things 
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1 that he talks about have equal application to the State's 
2 witnesses . 
3 He asks you to close this courtroom, and you ask what 
· 4 authority? And "the response comes back there is none. He 
5 tells you he's had other closed hearings, although, he doesn't 
6 cite to any of them in which what he is asking you to do has 
7 never been done. The reason for that, Judge, is it hasn't ever 
8 been done. 
9 Another very important point that was glossed over 
10 and hasn't been addressed, when we send out a jury 
11. questionnaire, we tell them t.'le witnesses. We do that so when 
12 we impanel the jury we make sure we get a fair and impartial 
13 jury. Defe...'"'l.se counsel would now r~ve you exclude from those 
14 jurors, perspective juror's knowledge and notice who these 
15 witnesses are to see if they know them, to see if they've had 
16 any contact with them, to see if they can be fair and 
17 impartial. In essence he wants to set that up for a reversal. 
18 . Counsel says, welcome to my world. That's 
19 interesting, Judge. And I think you point that out as you go 
20 through with him, he does have the names of the State's 
21 witnesses. He dpes have any statements that they rJ.ave 
22 provided. He does have the ability to talk to them. Whether 
23 he chooses to talk to them is his choice, whether they choose 
24 to respond is their choice, but he knows who they are, he has 
25 the ability to investigate, and the ability to prepare to 
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1 cross-examine them. He has whatever statements that they have 
2 provided be consistent or inconsistent. 
3 I thought it was interesting when he turns and throws 
4 the document, a civil case, at the State cites about not having 
5 any application. When you read the defendant 1 s memorandum, you 
6 see how many civil cases there are. And that would be what he 
7 provides to the court as support for this position. 
8 You know, I thought long and hard about what is the 
9 response to a request that has no basis in our law and no case 
10 support in our country. And that 1 s really where we are at. 
11 Defendant WS-LJ.ts trial kr,i surprise, Defendant wants two sets of 
12 rules; one that applies to the State to their advantage and one 
13 that applies to the Defendant to his advantage. 
14 Defendant cites the Carrier case, (phonetic) 
15 unpublished deci.sion out of the California Court of Appeals. 
16 Read Carrier. Does it deal with t:J:'!..is issue? No. States at 
17 length about a detective talking about a gang issue. T'ne issue 
18 in Carrier, Judge, was whether or not hearsay was admissible. 
19 He cites · a civil case, Lozano vs. the City of 
20 Hazelton that ~cifically dealt with whether or not 
21 I individuals named plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the city of 
22 Hazelton could be anonymous. That would be a civil case, a 
23 case as counsel tells you would have no precedential value to 
24 your Honor in ~ciding this case. 
25 Interestingly enough, the case deals with whether or 
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1 not the captioned. plaintiffs can use pseudonyms, not whether or 
2 not a witness when they came in to testify have to identify 
3 themselves, not whether or not they have to provide that 
4 infonnation ahead of time. 
5 As I thought through these things, I ultimately came 
6 back to the question: What is the law? Defense counsel comes 
7 
8 
9 
in toda.v and he Proffers for vour Honor some SPecific 
- - - .. 
infonnation. I won' t even respond to the issue in regards to 
severely beaten individuals in the defendant's family because 
10 there was no one severely beaten, and there's bailiffs in this 
11 courtroom who w~-e involved in that. A."1d we won't address the 
12 issue whether or not they contributed to there being a problem. 
13 We will focus on what is the law. Counsel comes in 
14 and tells your Honor I have two alibi witnesses. They are 
15 going to came in and tell the court that it wasn't this 
16 d~-Fe.T'ldant, that it was someone else. A.Tld I have two hearsay 
17 witnesses. Interesting how we would get around the rules in 
18 regards to those people coming in and testifying that someone 
19 told me someone else did it. 
20 Interestingly enough, when I come back to what is the 
21 law, there is very specific law in this country in regards to 
22 fair trials r th~e' s very specific law about right to 
23 confrontation, and it applies equally to the State as it does 
24 the Defendant. 
25 There's also a very specific section in the code of 
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1 the State of Utah about alibi and notice requirements. 77-14-2 
2 says, A Defendant, whether or not written demand has been made, 
3 who intends to offer evidence of an alibi shall, shall I '11 
4 emphasize, not less than 10 days before trial or at such other 
5 time as the court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting 
6 attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi. 
7 The notice shall contain specific information as to the place 
8 where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the 
9 alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to the 
10 defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses of the 
11 witnesses b-.f wham he proposes to establish alibi. Names and 
12 addresses. Actually none of that is being done and counsel 
13 would like this court to ignore that statute as well. 
14 The United States Constitution, the Constitution of 
15 the State of Utah very specific, your Honor, about the right to 
16 confront and crqss-examine. In fact, very specific in cases we 
17 cite about cross-examination being the heart of the case that 
18 goes before a court, the ability to test a witness, the ability 
19 to know whether or not they have a partiC"ular bias, whether or 
20 I not they have a particular connection, whether or not they are 
21 in the past cr~le witnesses. 
22 As you went through several times with the defense 
23 counsel and he continued to repeat for you, they don't want to 
24 tell us who that person is until they get here, thereby 
25 effectively elinlinating our ability to prepare for 
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1 cross-examination. 
2 The ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 
3 your Honor, is at the very core of a fair trial, the very core 
4 of a fair trial. And in essence if you were to grant 
5 defendant 1 s motion, you are saying, I 1m going to allow an 
6 unfair trial to take place. 
7 Are their witness problems for the defense? They 
8 claim there are. Are there witness problems for the 
9 prosecution? Yes, there are. 
10 The bottom line is, Judge, when you look at this, 
11 t.~ere is not.~ng, no Utah case, no US case, and they cite to 
12 lots of cases which when you take time to read them, all that 
13 ca...'"1.9s back to are cases where they have said it may be 
14 appropriate for .a court to limit whether or not a person 1 s 
15 address or their residence is disclosed. 
16 Absolutely no case was provided by them that 
17 indicated that you could keep a witness secret, spring them on 
18 the State at the last minute or in reversal that the State 
19 could do that. 
20 Interestingly enough, the Alvarado case, which we 
21 provided for your Honor, in which the california prosecutors 
22 chose to do that, and very rightfully so the California Supreme 
23 Court reversed it. In a case that presents even more 
24 difficulty than the present one. 
25 Factually in Alvarado you have a stabbing that takes 
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1 place inside a jail, witnesses who said we saw what happened 
2 but we cannot be labeled as a snitch. The Supreme Court of the 
3 State of California looked at that and said the very core of 
4 those trials came down to witnesses being in the court, being 
5 able to be cross-examined and people knowing who they are. 
6 The State isn't -- this case isn't about the state 
7 convicting this Defendant, your Honor. It's about convicting 
8 the person who cammi tted the four crimes that he's charged 
9 with. We would ask you to deny the Defendant's motion. There 
10 is no basis in law or fact. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Heward. Z...ny 
12 response, Mr. Richards? 
13 MR. RICHARDS: There are, in fact, cases. I cited 
14 them in my brief. I 'll cite them here. 
15 United States vs. Doe, Ninth Circuit, where it said 
16 that courts have allowed parties to use pseudonyms in unusual 
17 cases where nondisclosure of the plaintiffs -- the party's 
18 identity is necessary to protect a person from harassment, 
19 injury, ridicule and personal embarrassment. T'r..a.t 1 s a case. 
20 It' s a federal case. It's a Ninth Circuit case. And it hasn't 
21 been reversed. There's your case. We've cited others. I 
22 won't waste the court's time. You've read them already. 
23 Counsel brings up a problem with not letting the 
24 jurors know if they -- all of the witnesses. We have four. 
25 That's all, four. We have -- we're proposing four alternates. 
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1 I would suggest if they didn't know anybody else in this group, 
2 it's probably a pretty good guess they won't know these 
3 individuals. But if we do, we have four alternates. If we 
4 need to pick a couple more, we can do that. That would take 
5 care of that issue. 
6 At same point in time the court can say we're going 
7 to have a couple of witnesses. If you know them, then we can 
8 discuss that or solve that problem. That's easy to solve. 
9 Counsel says that I have the ability to talk to 
10 witnesses and I don't want to be--labor that other than saying I 
11 tried i...'"1 this case to tr".f to talk to some of t..~e witnesses a.'"ld 
12 they 1 ve told me they won't talk to me. That's it. They won't 
13 do it. So for somehow it's okay for them not to insist that 
14 their witnesses talk to me, but it 1 s not okay if they can't 
15 talk to. I don'.t see the fairness for same reason there. 
16 Counsel says that we don 1 t have witnesses who were 
17 severely beaten. I tend to disagree with that. I saw this 
18 altercation. I saw Tamra Sherril came out and there was blood 
19 all over her face. I would define that as being severely 
20 beaten. When you have blood all over your face, that 1 s a 
21 severe beating. 
22 Counsel is concerned about alibi witnesses. We don 1 t 
23 have an alibi witness. None of these witnesses are going to 
24 say that Riqo wasn 1 t there. So it 1 s not an alibi witness. 
25 They are just saying they are going to testify that they saw it 
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1 differently. 
2 So that whole argument just needs to be buried right 
3 now. We're not bringing in alibi witnesses. An alibi witness 
4 is one that says, hey, it couldn 1 t have been Riqo because he 
5 was in California at the time. I don 1 t have nobody like that. 
6 He was there. No question about it. So we don't have an alibi 
7 witness. 
8 Finally, the confrontation clause guaranteed under 
9 both the 14th Amendment which applies the Sixth Amendment to 
10 the State's as well Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah 
11 Constitution is a t"'lef~""ldant' s right, an accused right, excuse 
12 me. Both those are entitled rights of the accused, of an 
13 accused oerson. 
.. ' 
14 And this court and every court in the nation has said 
15 that the state does not have that confrontation clause right. 
16 And if it' s admissible hearsay under one of the exceptions, the 
17 defense can put that on and the state can't say well, we have a 
18 right to confront. That's not the law. The law is that that 
19 confrontation clause is a defendant' s right. 
20 I -- it is, and I agree with Mr. Heward that they 
21 r.ave witnesses that are afraid as well. And like I said 
22 earlier r I I m more than happy to allow the same treatment on 
23 those witnesses. T'ney don't have -- we can put them into a 
24 closed courtroom. We can use pseudonyms on them as far as that 
25 goes and not get any of that information out. And like I said, 
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1 my client will stand up today and waive his right to have, to 
2 be in the presence of them. And that can be done. That has 
3 been done in the past. I know it can be done. 
4 I give the court, because I try to accommodate 
5 whatever I can, I would give one proposal, I guess. And that 
6 is and, I mean, I 1 d have to talk to these witnesses, but 
7 potentially if we could at least close the courtroom and use 
8 pseudonyms in the courtroom and have the courtroom closed --
9 excuse me, I 1m getting over a cold -- I have no problem giving 
10 counsel the names of these individuals as long as we have an 
11 order that -- and also I could even deliver and see if they 
12 want to testify, want to talk to the prosecution. But I would 
13 like ~~e following: 
14 No. 1, that the court order the names or identifying 
15 infonnation of these witnesses not be disclosed or given out by 
16 the prosecutor or law en:forcement. In other words, we could 
17 give them the name, and they could have the names so they can 
18 do background checks, those type of things. I qon 1 t mind doing 
19 that. But there be a specific order of the court ti-..at that 
20 infonnation is n:ot then given out by themselves or law 
21 enforcement or by any p=-.rson and so that they feel that they 
22 are not in danger. 
23 I would like an order, because apparently counsel, I 
24 think, believe -.- I guess I e&"'l 1 t use that word. I understood 
25 counsel to say that it would be okay for me to tell a witness 
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1 that they have an option not to talk to the prosecution. If I 
2 could get a specific order of the court to that effect, and 
3 that's the word I would use, they have an option not to talk if 
4 they don't want to, but I'm not going to do that unless I have 
5 an order of the _court that I can say that to because I don't 
6 want certainly to be charged with any kind of crime. And we 
7 will give them the names by, on or before March 5th 
8 March 4th which would give me time to talk to these individuals 
9 and see if that would be satisfactory. That would be an 
10 alternative. It would still require the closing of the court. 
11 And like I say, that is done all the time. It's not 
12 unconstitutional. It's done all the time. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Ric.l-tards, can I just ask you 
14 something else? 
15 MR. RICHARDS: Certainly. 
16 THE COURT: You know, I realize you are kind of in a 
17 bind because people have come forward and you have made a 
18 promise you wouldn't divulge their identity and everything, but 
19 I wonder why couldn' t you at least in the past six months came 
20 to the prosecutors or even the law enforcement and say, you 
21 know, I got infor.mation out there that you need to be looking 
22 at, so and so. >That wouldn't have in any way violated your 
23 promise not to identify them, but it certainly would have given 
24 law enforcement and the prosecutors an opportunity --
25 MR. RICHARDS: I have talked to counsel on that. I 
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1 told them who I believe did this. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. And give them info:onation so they 
3 could at least qheck that? 
4 MR. HEWARD: That 1 s inaccurate. He has not provided 
5 us one name of a person that he said could have --
6 MR. RICHARDS: What I am saying is I talked to Chris 
7 Shaw. 
8 MR. SHAW: Not with names and witnesses. 
9 MR. RICHARDS: Not witnesses. I told you who I --
10 THE COURT: Obviously, these witnesses have came 
11 , forward and r..ave told you that somebody else did it. 
12 MR. RICHARDS: Uh-huh. And I told them who I 
13 believe I mean that I have info:onation tl-.&at a particular 
person has done it. And I 1 ve given them that name. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
MR. SHAW: 
That's nothing new. 
But that's nothing new, if I can respond. 
And--
THE COURT: I 'm just asking Mr. Richards --
19 MR. SHAW: -- with a name without further opportunity 
20 to discuss where and how they got the name and what supporting 
21 evidence there might be; it does us no good. 
22 
23 
MR. RICHARDS: Well --
THE COURT: I was thinking out loud here. 
24 MR. SHAW: Well, and let me say to, that's came about 
25 fairly recently in that sense. We didn't know about this 
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1 issue, Mr. Richards, of anonymous witnesses until fairly 
2 recently. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I was just trying to figure 
4 this out. I'm just figuring if I'm a defense lawyer and 
5 somebody comes to me and says, you know, your client didn 1 t do 
6 it, so and so did it, I would have thought at some point they 
7 would have gone to the prosecutors and said, you know, I 
8 received infonnation that so and so --
9 MR. RICHARDS: I 've had extensive conversations and I 
10 told them who I think there's evidence that did it. 
11 THE eot."RT: Okay. 
12 MR.. RICHARDS: In fact, it's one of the first 
13 suspects in the case. So it's not news to t.'~Lem. These are 
14 suspects. These are one of five names that they have been 
15 investigating all the way along. It's the name of the people 
16 that they did prints against every one of them. So it's not a 
17 sw:prise to them, and I 've been talking to them 
18 THE COURT: All right. 
19 MR. RICHARDS: -- for over a year about that, longer 
20 than that. 
21 T"riE COUK'I': All right. Well, it seems to me on your 
22 motion, what I am going to do is take it under advisement on 
23 the question of whether or not when or if these witnesses 
24 testify they have to use their true identity. 
25 I '11 also take it under advisement on the question of 
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1 whether or not the Defendant can waive his right to be present 
2 and also the question of whether to close the courtroom. 
3 I think before we ever get to any of that, the real 
4 question that needs to be resolved is whether or not you have 
5 to turn over the names of the witnesses. And my thinking is 
6 the burden needs to be on them. I understand you're in a bind 
7 because you've talked to people, you promised you wouldn't 
8 disclose their i,denti ty. I think they need to make the 
9 decision on their own as to whether or not, one, they are going 
10 to testify; and two, if they do, I think they have to I 
11 think the prosecutors r..a .. re to know who they are. And so I 
12 think the burden needs to go back on them. 
13 And I tr..ink what needs to happen, Mr. Richards, is 
14 you need to tell them, the judge you are not violating a 
15 promise. The judge has ordered that if they are going to 
16 testify in this case, their identity has to be turned over to 
17 the prosecutors., Okay? 
18 
19 
20 the end. 
MR. RICHARDS: I'm okay doing that. 
THE COURT: I think that's what you were saying at 
21 MR. RICHARDS: Can I get an order from the court that 
22 says that I can tell them they have an opportunity --
23 THE COURT: Yes. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: to talk or not? 
25 THE COURT: That's up to them. If they don't want to 
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1 talk to the prosecution, that's their decision. 
MR. RI.CHARDS: And I can tell them that? 2 
3 THE COURT: Yeah, you can tell them that 1 s the order 
4 of the judge. You know, if they don 1 t want to talk, I guess 
5 that's 
6 MR. HEWARD: And so Mr. Richards gets to keep the 
7 name secret until the 4th of March as he said? 
8 THE COURT: No, no. I'm going to get to that. I'm 
9 ordering it by Monday. They have to decide. I '11 give you the 
10 weekend to try to talk to these people, but by Monday at 
11 1:00 o'clock t."iey either got to fish or cut bate, so to speak. 
12 MR. RICHARDS: Assuming I can get ahold of them. How 
13 about next Friday? 
14 MR. HEWARD: Monday would be great. 
15 THE COURT: I think we need to get on it. 
16 MR. HEWARD: Monday would be great. 
17 THE COURT: If you can't get ahold of them, you'll 
18 have to tell me that on Monday. But I just, I think, you know, 
19 like I said, wei re two weeks from trial, and I think they need 
20 to know, No. 1, if these people are going to testify then they 
21 are going to have to turn over their identity to the 
22 prosecutors. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: And then can I get an order from the 
24 court that the prosecutor or law enforcement not 
25 THE COURT: Not disclose --
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1 MR. RICHARDS: -- disclose names or identify any 
2 infonnation? 
3 
4 case. 
5 
THE COURT: Except those that are involved in the 
MR. HEWARD: Right. 
6 THE COURT: The prosecutors need to know, of course, 
7 whoever is investigating 
8 MR. RICHARDS: I mean, they couldn't go out and talk 
9 to other witnesses and say, well, John Doe has said this has 
10 occurred. 
11 THE COURT: I don't know how -- I don't know how you 
12 put that kind of limit on it. I think law enforce -- whoever 
13 is investigating the case has got to have some latitude to be 
14 able to talk to these witnesses and follow up on the 
15 infonnation if they get any from them. I don't know what kind 
of infonnation they are going to get. But I --
MR. RICHARDS: Can they do it without all I am 
saying is that they do it without disclosing their names or 
identifying information, that they don; t say John Doe told me 
this. They can say, hey, we have some infonnation. 
T"'rlE COti"RT: Well, I don 1 t know how you --
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 MR. HEWARD: He 1 s asking you to restrict our ability 
23 to go and investigate. 
24 THE COURT: I don 1 t think I can go do that. 
25 Obviously, I don 1 t want law enforcement to just leaking their 
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1 names, as you put it, to other people. But I don't think you 
2 can restrict the investigation to say, law enforcement you can 
3 go out but you can' t do the following. I just think I would be 
4 handcuffing --
5 MR. RICHARDS: I'm not going to get any one of these 
6 witnesses . 
7 THE CO'ORT: They may not. I think that's a decision 
8 they need to make. And like I say, I 'm trying to take the 
9 burden off your shoulders so it doesn't look like you are, 
10 somehow violating confidentiality. I think you need to talk to 
11 them and say the judge has ordered if you are going to testify, 
12 you have to give the names to the prosecutor. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: B".J.t the.."1 I'm stuck with, in the 
14 position that assuming they say, well, if the prosecutors or 
15 law enforcement can give out names or identifying infonnation 
16 to other people; I'm not willing to give you that. 
17 T:riE COURT: I guess that's a decision they've got to 
18 make because it's the same thing that goes for the State' s 
19 witnesses . I just don't see your position is any differe.."'lt 
20 than what the S~te is going through. All these witnesses are 
21 worried about retaliation. All of them are worried about 
22 confidentiality. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah, but if the State's witnesses 
24 don' t testify, Mr. Heward doesn' t get executed. If my --
25 MR. HEWARD: Here we go with Mr. Richards making this 
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1 about us again, .Judge. This is totally inappropriate. 
2 THE COURT: It is. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: No, it's not, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: It's not that --
5 MR. RICHARDS: Well, if my guy dies, if they don' t 
6 know that --
7 THE COURT: We understand that it's a death penalty 
8 case. I don't think anybody is -- in fact, that 1 s why we are 
9 doing what we are doing on this case. I think we go above and 
10 beyond on capital murder cases because of the consequences. 
11 So you ~"'low; I think we're all aware of that. ~.nd 
12 like Mr. Heward said, the State is interested in prosecuting 
13 the right person for this. But it just seems to me if these 
14 people are not willing to give their identity to the 
15 prosecutors and the law enforcement follow up on what they are 
16 going to say, then they are not going to testify. I don't know 
17 how else to put it. 
18 MR. RICHARDS: Okay. I mean, I guess that's your 
19 ruling. I just -- I can understand, because to be honest with 
20 the court, if I were in their position, and I thought there was 
21 a realistic possibility that myself or my family would get 
22 killed, I might not come forward. 
23 THE COURT: Well, that 1 s true. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: Because I 1m a person that doesn 1 t have 
25 any backbone as far as that goes. If it comes to me and my 
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1 family, I don't have a backbone. 
2 THE COURT: Well, I guess, like I said, I understand 
3 that. And I understand people have a different opinion on 
4 what's important and their priorities. But it just seems to me 
5 that if they are going to testify in this courtroom, they have 
6 to divulge their identity either to you or to the prosecutors 
7 . by Monday. And you need, if they are going to give it to you, 
8 then you give it, to them. But they need to make the decision 
9 and let you know. 
10 You don't represent these folks. You represent 
11 Mr. Perea. So there's no confidentiality there. There' s no 
12 attorney/client privilege. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: Oh, I 'm not worried about the 
14 attorney/client privilege. I'm worried about if one of them 
15 gets killed, and their death could be on my shoulders. And I 
16 think I have an ethical duty --
17 T"'rlE COURT: So if one of the State's witnesses gets 
18 killed, whose shoulder does that fall upon? 
19 :MF.. RICH.l\RDS : Well, if there' s anything that they 
20 can do to prevent it, I think they have the duty to do that. 
21 THE COURT: Right. T'nat' s what I am saying, you're 
22 case is no different than the prosecutor's. They've got 
23 witnesses that are worried about being retaliated against and 
24 hurt, injured, killed. It's just not any different for 
25 anybody, really. 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: Well, it is because if they are so 
2 afraid that their witnesses are going to be damaged, No. 1, 
3 they have the opportunity to do a plea bargain -- I 'm sorry for 
4 not standing up. And that happens quite often. We have --
5 particularly in the sex offense cases. All the time they don't 
6 want to have to put their witnesses on because it's going to be 
7 so damaging to them, they offer a phenomenal plea bargain. 
8 THE COURT: That's right. It happens all the time. 
9 MR. RICHARDS: I don't have that ability. I can't do 
10 that. I don't. 
11 THE COURT: Actually it's worse for t.~e State tr.an it 
12 is for the defense. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: No, it's not, no, because if they have 
14 somebody that they think that's going to be killed, or we're 
15 let's assume they had their only witness in this case said, 
16 hey, if I get on the stand, I know I'm going to get killed. 
17 They have the option at that point to say, well, we're not 
18 going to go forward on the case. If they believe that' s the 
19 case, they can dismiss. I don't have that ability. I wish I 
20 did. I don't. 
21 T'"rlE COURT: Okay. Well, I understand the argument 
22 but, you know, it's the same about 
23 MR. RICHARDS: So I'm forced to make that call. 
24 THE COURT: But what good does it do to disclose the 
25 identity of the witnesses on the day of trial if they are only 
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1 going to be on the stand for 45 minutes? There's nothing the 
2 prosecution can do to prepare and cross-examine that witness. 
3 MR. HEWARD: It accomplishes exactly what 
4 Mr. Richards is trying to do, trial by sw:prise. 
5 THE cOURT: It is. It does no good to come in on the 
6 day . of trial and say by the way, my true name is 
7 MR.. RICHARDS: I understand. 
8 THE COURT: The jw:y doesn't care who the witness ' s 
9 name is. They don't know who they are from Adam. So you might 
10 as well use the alias or whatever during the trial, but --
11 MR.. RICHARDS: Your Honor, yeah, counsel brings up a 
12 very good point. We get witness statements all the time where 
13 the wit..'"lesses' names are redacted. We get it all t.~e time and 
14 we have to try to somehow define it. That's not unusual; they 
15 do it to us. 
16 No. 2 --
17 THE COURT: Well, it' s just not going to happo--n. 
18 MR. RICHARDS: I'm saying I'll give the name, but 
19 I just don't want them to go out and blurt it out to evexybody 
20 because 
21 THE COURT: T'ney are not going to leak it to anybody 
22 other than the l:aw enforcement people who are investigating the 
23 case. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: I'm okay with that. If we can get an 
25 order to that, that they get an order that law enforcement not 
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1 leak it out to anybody else, any evidence. 
2 THE COURT: I trust that's not going to happen. They 
3 are not going to. leak 
4 MR. RICHARDS: If I can get an order to that effect, 
5 we are there. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Heward, you okay with that? 
7 
8 
MR. HEWARD: 
THE COURT: 
No, Judge, I'm not okay with that. 
How do you want -- I guess how do you 
9 want the order? Obviously if they are going to give the names 
10 to the prosecutors and to the investigators, and the 
11 investigators are going to go out and do the investigation, 
12 right? That's -- so for same reason I think Mr. Richards is 
13 worried t..~t they are just go:L."'lg to go leak t..~e name --
14 MR. HEWARD: Right. And how does the investigator go 
15 out and investigate whether or not what they are saying is 
16 accurate if they don't have the ability to go up to another 
17 person saying we have reason to believe that Joe Jones was 
18 there? How do you do that? You can't do that. 
19 THE COURT: I'm not going to put that kind of 
20 restriction on law enforcement then. Okay? 
21 All right. Anything else on this issue? 
22 . MR. RICHARDS: Just I would like to sul:mit the 
23 newspaper 
24 THE COURT: The newspaper? 
25 MR. RICHARDS: -- to the court if I could. 
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1 
2 
3 
THE COURT: 
MR. SHAW: 
THE COURT: 
Have you seen that? Any objection? 
No objection. 
All right. So that was the only motion 
4 that we are able to get through. 
5 Let me ask a couple of other things. I know we 
6 talked yesterday about the defense has submitted their expert 
7 . on mitigation. I believe it was Dee Russell. You filed a 
8 notice, his CV is included and I think Mr. Shaw you said you 
9 got a copy of his report? 
10 MR. SHAW: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: So we're all squared away as far as that 
12 issue? 
13 MR. RICHARDS : I thi.."lk so . 
14 THE COURT: The other thing, of course, on the 
15 questionnaire, I 'd really like to spend same time next week 
16 going through the 200 people that we did the questionnaire on 
17 because I think as I read through it, theres a lot of people 
18 that just are not going to make it. They are just going to be 
19 excused for one reason or another. 
20 MR.. RICHARDS: I agree. 
21 THE COURT: And I was hoping we could spend a good 
22 part of Friday going through that trying to decide. 
23 MR. RICHARDS: I agree. 
24 THE COURT: If we can do that. And the other 
25 question I had is we talked about a time line. We're going to 
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1 start on March 8th with jucy selection. And we thought maybe 
2 we'd get through most of it by Thursday. And I guess I was 
3 trying to figure out whether we bring the jucy back on Friday 
4 at 9 a.m. or 1:00 o'clock to select the jucy. Any thoughts on 
5 that? 
6 :MR. HEWARD: I guess it's just hard to say until we 
7 see how fast or slow it' s going. 
8 THE COURT: What I am worried about is the people 
9 that come in on Monday, some of them are going to be coming 
10 back, that are qualified. 
11 MR. RICHARDS: Could we have them called? 
12 THE COURT: Figure out, do we have them call in, do 
13 we just tell them to be back on a certain date or certain 
14 time 
15 :MR. HEWARD: Well, there's -- I suppose you can 
16 handle in what's most convenient or what's most efficient. And 
17 most convenient ·is to tell them to came back at a certain time, 
18 but that might ?Ot be very efficient. Because again, we may be 
19 done sooner, we may be done later. 
20 :MR. RICHARDS: I think the afternoon, Friday 
21 afternoon we knqw we' 11 be done by then. 
22 THE COURT: Well, we hope. That's what I said. I 
23 guess what I am trying to get away from is I worry about 
24 jurors. They just don't want to sit around twiddling their 
25 thumbs and we don't want that either. And yet, like I say, we 
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1 want them back here at a certain time to make the selection. 
2 MR. HEWARD: And I suppose then from that standpoint, 
3 you could tell them to came at 1: 30 or whatever time you chose 
4 on Friday afternoon, and then if we were done earlier, we could 
5 decide whether or not we wanted to go to the time and expense 
6 of moving that up. 
7 THE COURT: Because by my figures if we seat 12, each 
8 side has 10 perernptories. Plus, if you are going to seat three 
9 or four alternates on each side as a peremptory I think you are 
10 looking at around 40, 44 people we'd have to qualify. And I 
11 know we talked yesterday about maybe qualify-ing more tha."l t.lLat 
12 just in case. So that' s a lot of people. 
13 I'm just trying to figure out what's the best way to 
14 keep this moving. Anyway, think about it, and then I don't 
15 know if there's a simple solution for that or not, or whether 
16 we need to call all the people and tell them we are targeting 
17 Friday but it may cl-..cu"'lge, because I obviously have to tell them 
18 something if we decide when they came in and they are qualified 
19 they are going to be coming back on a..'"l.other day for jury 
20 selection. 
21 So all right. The other ttli.ng is at sorr.e point I 
22 still would like to talk about those lesser included offenses. 
23 I'd really like to do that before you get started with the 
24 trial. I know, Mr. Ricl-.ards, I think you s'l..ll:xni tted five or six 
25 more proposed instructions. 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: Should we do that Friday also? 
2 THE COURT: Tcy to do that also Friday? As I recall, 
3 I think I'm more concerned about what the State's response is 
4 to sane of those lesser includeds. There was manslaughter and 
5 negligent homicide and homicide by assault and aggravated 
6 assault. Okay. 
7 All right. And then, you know, we got a Decorum 
8 Order. We haven't published that yet. I'm just trying to 
9 figure out when's a good time to put that in effect. I don't 
. . 
10 know if you've had a chance to think about that. 
11 MR. RI~.JIDS: I'm --
12 THE COURT: I know we drafted one up, but I didn't 
13 want to put it out too soon because, you know, I want to make 
14 sure the trial is going. It looks like we're on target to 
15 start on March 8th. 
16 MR. RICHARDS: Is there any reason to do that before 
17 the 8th? 
18 THE COURT: . Well, that's what I was wondering. Any 
19 thoughts? 
20 MR. SHAW: · I don't see -- I don't think so. 
21 THE COURT: And I assume it's understood by both 
22 parties no ~g to the press at this point in time? 
23 MR. SHAW: We've honored that. · 
24 THE COURT: I know you have. You've done a nice job. 
25 But I know how these trials work. And the week before trial, I 
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1 can just guarantee there' s going to be several articles in the 
2 paper about it. And you know, there's no way to control that 
3 from our standpoint, but I think I can put some restrictions on 
4 the parties and the witnesses. 
5 All right. Any problems other than that that you can 
6 see? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
MR. SHAW: No. 
MR. RICHARDS: No. 
THE COURT: Any other issues we need to address? 
MR. SHAW: There is one issue I 'd like to approach 
11 • the bench on l"li t.."l counsel. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Discussion held at the bench.) 
(Proceedings concluded at 11:12 a.m.) 
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Feb.ruazy 26, 2010 
PROCEEDINGS 
* * * 
1 
2 
3 
4 THE COURT: This is the time set on State of Utah vs. 
5 Riqo Perea, Case No. 184 7 . And let's see, I got Mr. Shaw and 
6 Mr. Heward and Mr. Lyon for the State. 
7 
8 
9 Defendant. 
MR. SHAW: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Richards and Ms. Sipes for the 
10 MR. RICHARDS: Yes. 
11 MS. SIPES: Good morning, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: And Mr. Perea is also present. This was 
13 the time we were going to try to deal with a number of motions 
14 that have been filed in this case. And I guess maybe the best 
15 place to start, we should have the record reflect, I had a 
16 telephone conference yesterday with the attorneys from the 
17 State and also with Mr. Ric..l-:Lards . And I guess I 1 11 let you put 
18 this on the record, but you indicated the State had filed a 
19 motion to have Mr. Ri,....hards disqualified on the case aT'ld also a 
20 motion to have the trial continued and just indicated to me 
21 that you wanted to deal with that motion and have the court 
22 rule on it as soon as possible. And I think Mr. Richards 
23 indicated that he just got the motion, needed a little time to 
24 maybe respond to it in writing. 
25 MR. RICHARDS : That 1 s correct. 
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1 THE COURT: So anyway, Mr. Shaw, if you want to put 
2 something on the record then for the record, go ahead. 
3 MR. SHAW: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. 
4 Your Honor, given the telephone conference that we 
5 had yesterday, it's the State's position that we still at this 
6 juncture need then to move the court to strike the trial date 
7 and continue these proceedings. And it is necessary that I go 
8 into our position relative to the conflict of interest that has 
9 arisen for me to adequately address that. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
11 MR. SHAW: You know, I U."1dersta.'1.d Mr. Ric.l}ards hasn't 
12 had an opportunity to respond to that, but I need to say, for 
13 the record, that rhis con~lict developed fully on Friday, 
14 February 19th, 2010 in our last hearing. And the court is 
15 well, aware of what went on there. 
16 We had cited in our motion to disqualify and continue 
17 tr..is trial to t...ry to resolve this po_rspecti ve conflict, various 
18 parts of the record wherein we believe that it is clear that 
19 the conflict is not a potential col"'..flict but is a real acttlal 
20 and concurrent conflict. 
21 And let me say if I can in the most simplest ter.ms, 
22 basically what happo_ned at that hearing was further record in 
23 addition to the motion that Mr. Richards filed relative to the 
24 testifying of anonymous witnesses, further record was presented 
25 to this court that the reasons that he was not willing to . 
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1 reveal the name of those witnesses were that they were in fear 
2 for their lives, their families were in fear for their lives, 
3 or retaliation of some sort. And the record is replete with 
4 that representation. That conduct in and of itself places 
5 Mr. Richards in a direct conflict with his client because he 
6 has manifested a duty to third pe-rsons to the disadvantage of 
7 his client. 
8 It's the State's position, and the court said, and I 
9 think accurately and correctly, that those witnesses unless 
10 disclosed won't testify. The court also gave direction that 
11 t.."'lose wit.."'lesses should be disclosed by lf..onday of t..'ris week at 
12 1: 00 o'clock. Nevertheless, Mr. Richards has filed a 
13 subseqt.1e.11.t discovecy d.ocume.11.t that says he's taL'k:ed to two 
14 people and that those two people won't testify abse.."'lt him 
15 securing the ability for them to testify anonymously. 
16 In doing tr.at, he r.as further complicated this matter 
17 and ma~""lifested that :his du'b.f of loyal 'b.f to his client is 
18 compromised. These are witnesses, remember your Honor, that 
19 Mr. Richards said could exonerate pote.."'ltially Mr. Perea. He 
20 claimed and proffered on the record that those witnesses, two 
21 of which were there at the scene and would indicate that 
22 Mr. Perea was not the shooter. Two other witnesses had 
23 info.r:mation, we don't know what that infonnation is, but had 
24 info.r:mation that he w"as not the shooter. 
25 Now that places Mr. Richards and his client in a 
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1 direct conflict of interest by his refusal to identify those 
2 witnesses . 
3 The core conflict is had we known, the State known 
4 about these witnesses six months or a year ago, and this has 
5 been out there six months or a year, the record is very clear 
6 on that, we would have had the ability to try to corroborate 
7 that infoz:mation, further investigate that infoz:mation, and 
8 then make a decision relative to this case that could frankly 
9 benefit Mr. Perea. 
10 So this isn't a potential conflict, it's not a 
11 conflict t..l-at doesn't eY..ist or :may not be out there. The vr:>ry 
12 real terms of this conflict. are this may not be a death penalty 
13 case if the State had that infonnation. And we don't. 
14 And so 10 working days bt=>._fore trial, this comes out 
15 essentially. And the court has ruled correctly that those 
16 witnesses need to be disclosed. 
17 There is a lot of guid::~nce from our state Supreme 
18 Court on how to deal with this particular issue. The State is 
19 1 concerned, number one, that Mr. Richards has created a Sixt..h 
20 Amendment argument that because of this conflict he has now put 
21 himself in the position of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
22 And the court knows and we know that on appeal, 
23 appellate counsel often turns on trial counsel. That's the 
24 very first issue that's raised on capital appeals, ineffective 
25 assistance of counsel. It' s raised in other contexts, criminal 
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1 context also. And so what we are facing is a record that at 
2 this juncture is inadequate to protect any verdict on appeal. 
3 And that's any verdict. I mean any verdict. I mean guilty as 
4 charged with a death penalty inposed, guilty as charged with 
5 life without parole inposed, guilty as charged with life with 
6 parole, guilty of some lesser included offense. That's any 
7 verdict is at risk. 
8 Now, I want the court to also understand that we have 
9 not taken this position lightly. When we left this hearing on 
10 Friday afternoon of the 19th, the hearing we had that day, we 
11 we."'lt i..~ately back to t.l-).e office, we began carnprehensive 
12 research into this matter. We've been working on this case 
13 since Friday afternoon, Saturday, Sunday, yesterday -- the 
14 whole we=-..Jc. We have consulted with the appellate capital team 
15 at the Attorney General's office. They have advised us to take 
16 this course of action. 
17 We spe..."'lt an hour on the phone with t.~em Monday, 
18 another hour Tuesday. We spent 15 or 20 minutes on the phone 
19 last night at about 5: 30 or 6: 00 o 1 clock. And that is +-he 
20 level of our concern regarding this matter. 
21 Now that or...ly deals with :Mr. Perea' s right to 
22 effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. We 
23 are also concerned ti'.at this infonr..ation has impacted the 
24 State's ability to proceed fairly in this case. We should be 
25 preparing for trial, your Honor. We should not be arguing the 
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1 existence of a potential Sixth Amendment violation at this late 
2 stage. This matter could have been raised six months or a year 
3 ago by defense counsel. That 1 s very clear. 
4 ·And I think the court said it best, you said you were 
. 5 appalled by the fact that that information hadn 1 t been turned 
6 over to law enforcement. And so are we. And so are the 
7 Attorney General 1 s Office and so will be the Supreme Court of 
8 the State of Utah. That 1 s what we are concerned about. 
9 I have had the unfortunate or fortunate experience of 
10 having been placed in this very context as a neutral appoin'Lo.d 
11 la~yer i..'1. a murder case in t:.:b.is C f"\1U"'Mr •·Tho~o. I ••T::OS ::oppo-i ni-o...-:1 by 
--...- .. ~.z •• -- n- - '1:'--·--- -
12 Judge Baldwin to investigate and advise the court and conduct a 
13 hearing on whether a conflict of interest rising to the level 
14 of a Sixth .Amendment violation occurred in a murder case. That 
15 was the Richard Gunn case here a few years ago. 
16 Your Honor, the conflict in that case nearly was an 
17 alleged violation betwee."1. the Webe~ Cou..""l.ty Attorney's Office 
18 and the Public Defenders Association by previous counsel who 
19 t-ad indicated because of t.'h.is .i::'.!JJ.i.. system, +-he P'ublic d.o.fend.or 1 s 
20 association system, there wasn 1 t enough money to properly 
21 dofend a deat.~ po._nalty case. The State subsequently removed 
22 the death po._nalty in that case; nonetheless, we had to deal 
23 with that issue. 
24 So we had a hearing wherein John Caine and Steve 
25 Laker were called as witnesses. We went down that road. I was 
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1 appointed special counsel to the defendant. And I had to 
2 consult with him on numerous occasions about the nature and 
3 extent the infonnation he had received from prior counsel, 
4 review the contract of employment relative to the Public 
5 Defenders Association and the County. 
6 All of those things in a conflict like that, this is 
7 not what we have in this case. We have a direct conflict, 
8 conduct which given the court's ruling and given the current 
9 status of this case is directly to the disadvantage of 
10 Mr. Perea. This is an actual conflict. This is a conflict 
11 tha-t- .;S a pe.,.. ea:y con-F'1 oj ,...of- WO. be1 oj Q .. TQ ..... ~ -- ..... _____ , - ----:•-· 
12 The law on this matter is clear. In the event of an 
13 actual concurrent conflict, this court has to hold a hearing 
14 after counsel is appointed by the court, not counsel that we 
15 choose, not counsel that Mr. Richards chooses, but indepo._ndent 
16 counsel appointed by the court, to deal with this issue because 
17 i.11 order to protect t..'h..is record, we have to have -- two things 
18 can happen. This court could rule after a hearing that the 
19 conflict is so direct, so concurrent, so problematic it amounts 
20 to a p.::._r say conflict and Mr. Richards can't participate as 
21 trial counsel, or potentially t.'h.is court could under +-he 
22 Y'.aughan and Level decisions, this court could hold a hearing, 
23 enter findings of fact and conclusions of law finding that 
24 Mr. Perea is capable of entering a knowing and intelligent 
25 waiver of any conflict. But that has to be a hearing held on 
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1 the record and that has to have -- and the court has to make 
2 findings of fact sufficient to support any waiver. 
3 Now I won't go into this further with regard to what 
4 our position is on that, but let me just say that that is very 
5 clear in the Maughan case. State vs. ~.aughan, that's a Brigham 
6 City murder case. That conflict was wherein defense counsel 
7 who had been appointed went to Spokane, Washington, and they 
8 started telling witnesses they couldn't talk to the police. 
9 And the Supreme Court sent -- and then Maughan waived 
10 the conflict. The Supreme Court sent that back for a hearing 
11 to determine whet..~er !Yf.aughan could waive t..~e co!".flict wit.~ 
12 regard to Mr. Williams who was co-counsel at the time. 
13 Those lawyers were working in the interests of the 
14 client; although, the State argued unethically, and that was a 
15 conflict. That 1 s a minor comparison to what 1 s gone on here. 
16 In the Lovell decision the conflict was essentially 
17 Lovell plead guilty to the aggravated :murder, he was se.."'lte..""lced. 
18 Immediately after sentencing, he asked Mr.· Caine to withdraw, 
19 1 and on appeal argued t..'E.t because of the long-time personal 
20 relationship that Reed Ricl-..ards had had with John Caine, they 
21 being fol:Ifier, them being fm::m=--r law partners and having real 
22 estate interests in common, that there was a conflict, and he 
23 wan.ted that case overturned and his plea withdrawn. 
24 The court sent that back on appeal, sent it back on a 
25 23B ruling on the conflict issue. They said, look, we have to 
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1 investigate this. And there 1 s very clear guidance about the 
2 trial court finding after a hearing facts to support whether or 
3 not the conflict was real, concurrent or could have been 
4 waived. 
5 In that case there was evidence that initially 
6 Mr. Lovell thought that Mr. caine' s representation was helpful 
7 to him because he did have a relationship with Mr. Richards. 
8 Now bear in mind that ;i.n that case Reed Richards had gone, had 
9 left the County Attorney's Office. He had bee-n gone for almost 
10 five and a half months I ~-lieve before they entered the plea, 
11 before ~..r. Lovell entered the plea. 
12 So, so those two conflicts, situations pale in 
13 comparison to what we have presently be~ore this court. 
14 Because we have an allegation, a proffer of evidence that there 
15 are witnesses out there that refuse to testify unless they can 
16 do so anonymously. And Mr. Richards won't, in spite of this 
17 court 1 s ord.o.r, he won't reveal who they are. Tr...at' s a ver:f 
18 real problem, your Honor. 
19 A.""ld frankly, five days b=>_fore working ~_fore trial 
20 starts is simply not enough time to acL""'qtlately address this 
21 issue. Again, we should be getting ready for trial, preparing 
22 ourselves and our police officers and everything that goes into 
23 it. And we are about to create a record that's going to cause 
24 a problem, I believe. 
25 And again, we can address this argument on the 
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1 conflict itself, but this has prejudiced the State's ability to 
2 proceed. It's also prejudiced more importantly perhaps 
3 Mr. Perea's right to effective assistance of counsel. And 
4 that IS f that IS a big f big problem. 
5 I weult to also suggest that we're running out of 
6 time. And with all due respect certainly, your Honor, if this 
7 case isn't continued, we have to seek the assistance of the 
8 Attorney General' s Office to try to stay these proceedings. 
9 Because this is the level of the problem that we are facing 
10 today, five days be--fore we're supposed to start to pick a jucy. 
11 Jl..nd we are also of the opinion that th..is court in 
12 holding a conflict hearing, those witnesses ought to be 
13 summoned into this court, they ought to be placed under oath, 
14 and they ought to be examined as to the nature and extent of 
15 the promises that were made to them. 
16 Now, for purposes of a conflict hearing, the State 
17 would agree that at least at that level t.'t!eir information does 
18 not need to go out to police officers and law enforcemo~t so 
19 that we can examine tl-.at particular problem in a conflict 
20 hearing. But that's the State of the record, your Honor. 
21 And tl-t.e State r.&.a.S done absolutr:>Jy nothing to create 
22 this record. This is not our problem. This is a defense 
23 problem for not revealing this infonr.ation or at least bringing 
24 it to the attention of t.'l-).e court six months ago. We could have 
25 r..ad this hearing at a minimum back in August, and that is the 
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1 current statement. That' s why we are asking the court to 
2 strike the trial. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Shaw, can I ask you, you mentioned 
4 you thought that somehow what's happened here affects the 
5 state's ability to go forward. I'm curious, I d.idn' t get that. 
6 How does that affect the State's ability to put on a case? 
7 MR. SHAW: It doesn't affect our ability to go 
8 forward and proceed with the case. In fact, as pro-counsel 
9 will stand up and tell you too, we want this case tried just 
10 like everybody else. But it affects our ability in the sense 
11 t.'llat we are essentially conceding to a Sixth Ame..Tldme..'l'lt 
12 ineffective assistance of counsel issue here. And we cannot do 
13 that on the record, your Honor. 
14 We're prepared to put this case on with the witnesses 
15 that we have, make no mistake about that. We're prepared to 
16 go. But in ardor to solve this problem, these four witnesses I 
17 ~-lieve need to be tPrned over, we need to talk to them, we 
18 need to have them here in court and they need to tell us the 
19 nature and the extent of this conflict that' s created. And 
20 that's a very important part of this court's decision on 
21 whether or not J.Vf..r. Perea could l'v-a.ive 'b.~ p:>ta"'ltial cor1.flict. 
22 Again, I don't want to argue whether or not he can or 
23 can't waive fr..at today, but, yeah, I don't want the court to 
24 misunderstand that. But when we talk about preparing for 
25 pretrial, we shouldn' t be handling this type of a motion, these 
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1 kind of proceedings at this stage five days before trial. This 
2 could have bee=>-n done and handled months ago. So in that sense, 
3 yes, it does affect our ability and it does prejudice our 
4 ability to prepare our case as we would like so that we can do 
5 it in the most efficient and professional, competent manner. 
6 We 1 re here messing around with, and I shouldn 1 t even 
7 say messing around. This is a Sixth .Amendment issue. This is 
8 ing;:>ortant. But we are here arguing this motion at this late 
9 stage in the proceeding because of the position Mr. Richards 
10 has taken and has taken as late as February 19th, and that 
11 position conti.."lues . We still don 1 t :b..ave t.~e names of t.l,.ose 
12 witnesses . 
13 THE COURT: Let me ask you one other question. I 
14 know it 1 s a fine line sometimes, but you agree, I mean I can 1 t 
15 as a judge tell the defense to disclose the names of these 
16 people. I can say if you are going to call them as witnesses 
17 under the rules of discovery, you have to disclose ~he names. 
18 But I certainly can 1 t dictate to the defense or the 
19 proseC'Jtion, you know, we need t.."r).e names -- you have to 
20 divulge. Because the defense has no obligation to put on 
21 anything. They can decide they are not going to c= 11 anybody. 
22 They can decide to just rest on what the State offers. And 
23 again, I know that' s a fine line sometimes but 
24 MR. SF..AW: I agree with that. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. SHAW: But the problem here is that in taking 
2 that position, the record is already made clear, last Friday 
3 that there are witnesses out there that could exonerate 
4 allegedly Mr. Perea. Granted, he doesn't have to put those 
5 witnesses on but in light -- and the reason he' s not putting 
6 them on, that's what is important here, the reason he disclosed 
7 last week was that he owes a duty of loyalty to them because 
8 he' s promised them he wouldn't divulge their names. That puts 
9 him in a direct conflict of interest with Mr. Perea. If those 
10 witnesses, as he proffered, are going to say that they were 
11 t.'lj,ere and so.TI~..eone else did it. That's +-he subtly +-hat ma:trbe 
12 isn't clear here. 
13 TrlE COURT: It is very clear. I get the issue. I 
14 don't have any problem with that. 
15 MR.. SHAW: And I agree they could choose, well, we 
16 are not going to call those witnesses. ~.aybe we should call 
17 them or r....aybe we should evaluate t.'l)em to detennine whether or 
18 not this is, in fact, the case should proceed as it is charged. 
19 T'.ti.t!,; COU"'Rl': But you agree, the defense attor:ney 
20 doesn't have any obligation to help law enforcement with the 
21 prosecution to solve the murder. 
22 MR. SHAW: Absolutely. 
23 T'tiE COtiRT: And that's kind of what we are at here, 
24 is what is the responsibility of the defense? You know, these 
25 witnesses could very well have came to Mr. Richards and told 
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1 him something that either helps the state or helps the defense. 
2 I don 1 t know that he has any legal obligation to came forward, 
3 unless he 1 s going to call them as witnesses. 
4 MR. SHAW: Right. And that 1 s what he intended to do. 
5 THE COURT: And -- okay. 
6 MR. SHAW: That 1 s what he intend-od to do. And his 
7 attempt to do it has created this problem. And the State now 
8 ·is responsible for this problem. We -- the State gets hit both 
9 ways because on appeal the defense lawyers then attack trial 
10 counsel. Then the Supreme Court attacks the State for not 
11 correcti...'ig tho record for not han~1;ng ~~0 mat~or pr~-ly 
- --- ' - .. .. --·· -·- .. --- --r~ · 
12 And that 1 s the problem here. 
13 Had Mr. Richards said, look, his duty to those 
14 witnesses would be thus, I can 1 t keep your name co:r1£ido.ntial. 
15 If you choose not to testify, that 1 s your problem. That 1 s the 
16 duty. He owes them no duty. Instead he 1 s created a duty, and 
17 continues to create t.."'lat duty, continues to Inarl..ifest to eve.."l 
18 today. 
19 I agree that he doesn't have to disclose them, but 
20 now the problem is created, they are out there, and the 
21 appellate cou.."'l.sel is going to j'll!rp on t.'lll.s if we don 1 t go 
22 through the process of curing the defect and detennining if it 
23 is wai vable No. 1, No. 2 whether Mr. Perea understands the 
24 direct conflict, whether he consents to it and whether he 
25 knowingly and intelligently can waive it. And that's the State 
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1 of the record. And this court has to make a finding on that 
2 prior to going forward in a trial phase. That' s our position. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Thanks, Mr. Shaw. 
4 Mr. Richards, I certainly give everybody the benefit 
5 of the record. I went a little longer than I thought because I 
6 know you wanted the opportunity to respond in writing to the 
7 State's motion, but go ahead if--
8 MR. RICHARDS: That did go a little longer than I 
9 thought it would too. I do think I need to respond briefly. I 
10 do reserve the right to pos~ne this for final conclusion 
11 until sometime next \"reo-k.. I've contacted, I've also contacted 
12 same of the brightest minds on the defense side as far as the 
13 appellate attorneys. I had a conference with them, and they 
14 all believe that there is no conflict and this is an 
15 unnecessary proceeding, but I'll go ahead and address it but 
16 reserve the right to put toge1:.11.o=>_r a memorandum and then address 
17 it properly whe..""l I have other cou.""lsel p=>-rhaps. 
18 Just a couple of things . No. 1, this isn't a 
19 situation that I or my client created. T:.'1.is is a si t-1.1ation 
20 that the State could have avoicLod. And it bothers me to same 
21 extent that they get up and say they are so concerned about my 
22 client's rights, they are concerned about this potential 
23 conflict, which I don 1 t believe t.""l!:>_re 1 s one, but and they have 
24 the perfect way to resolve it. They agreed to the anonymous 
25 hearing or the testimony as I suggested. They don't want to do 
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1 that. I understand. They can make that call. But for them to 
2 get up here and say they do so with clean hands belies the 
3 facts to me. 
4 THE CO'ORT: Well, but we're kind of missing the 
5 target here. It's not a question of hiding the identity of the 
6 witnesses to the jw:y or to people in the courtroom. It's a 
7 question of giving them the names before the trial gets 
8 started. And that's not a situation they created. That's a 
9 situation that you or the witnesses have elected -- because I 
10 gave you until Monday to decide whether or not you wanted to 
11 1 give t-hose na.T!'.es up to the State. I'm a little puzzled by the 
12 argument that it's not a situation created by the defense. It 
13 is . All you have to do is give them the names of these 
14 witnesses 
15 MR. RICHARDS: Except they won' t agree not to talk to 
16 other people and have their investigators st-.a.re all this 
17 info:cnation with people who :might hann these individuals. 1md 
18 therein lies the basis of the lack of conflict. After having 
19 t:::U.ked to t."'J.ese individuals, some of them are better for us 
20 than others certainly, but after having talked to these 
21 individna 1 s, t.l,ey all said fr.at t.l,ey wouldn't testify without 
22 this anomini ty. 
23 T""dE COURT: Okay. But tr.a.a t' s never bee.'"'l off the 
24 table, has it? I mean, .reme.rnber I said we're going to take 
25 that under advisement. I said I think the first step here is 
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1 to decide if they are willing to testify and are you willing to 
2 give the names up to the prosecution? I think that's the only 
3 thing I asked. I haven't made a ruling on whether or not they 
4 can use pseudonyms or false names or whatever on the witness 
5 stand and what they do in the courtroom. That's never -- but I 
6 just thought we needed to break this down and say, I think the 
7 first decision is are they willing to testify? And are you 
8 willing to give up the names to the prosecution so that they 
9 can at least prepare for cross-examination here. And that --
10 and I don' t know whether I 
11 MEL RICH.n...RDs: I understand e:Y.actly what the court's 
12 order was, and I think I followed it. T'ney are not willing to 
13 go forward under those parameters. 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. RICHARDS: Therein I think resolves the issue of 
16 conflict. I 1 ve bee..'"'l in, and I know your Honor has and I know 
17 that counsel has been in so many trials where witnesses decide 
18 they don't want to testify as to things that they either saw or 
19 things they!ve told counsel, investigators or police or 
20 whatever. That happens all the time. 
21 Jl..nd t.L"ie last t:b.ing we do as cow'"'lsel is put on a 
22 witness that' s going to get up and say well, I don 1 t rem.ernbo...r, 
23 wf1..iC!'1. is what would happo_n here. I k..l"low that would happ=-_n. I 
24 would then have to say, well, isn 1 t it true that you talked to 
· 25 me? And they will say, no, I didn't tell you that. I don 1 t 
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1 recall ever telling you that. And what that does is it makes 
2 me look bad in front of the jw:y. And not only does it not 
3 help our case, it hurts our case. 
4 So given those parameters, we made a decision that 
5 we, given those parameters, are not going to call those 
6 witnesses. Plain and simple we won 1 t call them. Because in my 
7 opinion that would hurt our case more than it would help our 
8 case. It' s a tactical decision on our part, and I think it 1 s a 
9 reasonable and I think it's logical, and I think you having 
10 been a prosecutor and having, I know, had hundreds of these 
11 happ=>_n to you, you Jr_Tlow exactly where I can coming from. 
12 I want to make it very clear that I do not represent 
13 these people. I have never represented these people. I have 
14 never told them that I would represent them. I simply talked 
15 to them with the understanding that they would -- I wouldn 1 t 
16 divulge their names unless we could have this anonymous 
17 hearing. I ca..'1. 1 t do t.l-ta.t. A.'1.d, t.lierefore, the case is over in 
18 my opinion. And so I don 1 t see that there's a conflict based 
19 1 upon tr.a.a t. 
20 As far as, you know, the potential conflict, that 
21 I bothers me to sar-ue exta'"lt. I mean, Y~. Shaw r.a.as gotte11 u-p and 
22 said he has potentially a conflict because if somebody 
23 testifies differently as to what occurred in this unrecord-oci 
24 alleged confession of my client, that he would have to then 
25 step up and testify because he heard it. So we 1 re not without 
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1 potential conflicts on either side. I don 1 t believe ours in 
2 this situation rises to a potential conflict because putting 
3 these witnesses on the stand may hurt us more than help us, and 
4 we believe at this point given those parameters. 
5 My client wants to go to trial and he is invoking his 
6 right to speedy trial. If he should do that verbally, we 1 11 do 
7 that. He wants to go to trial a week from Monday. 
8 I 1Ve also had private counsel unrelated to me that is 
9 also death penalty qualified, who had talked to my client about 
10 these issues. And if we need to bring him in, we can do that, 
11 but he has taLlced. to :bim he 1 s told me. A.T'ld it would be a 
12 waiver if even necessary that he understands all the 
13 consequences, Mr. Perea does, and wants to go ahead with trial 
14 without utilizing these witnesses given the rulings of the 
15 court. And I want the court to understand that I highly 
16 respect the rulings the court makes and understand that 1 s the 
17 ruling and t.~t 1 s where we are at. 
18 It 1 s interesting that the State mentioned the :V.aughan 
19 case because that's one that the court disqualified 
20 Mr. Williams, left Mr. Mauro on. The Supreme Court reversed 
21 the court 1 s decision on the trial court cuJ.d said they could 
22 both represent him and currently are both representing him on 
23 the ongoing trial. So that v.-as a reversal. And the conflict 
24 there was multiple times more severe than any potential 
25 possible conflict in this case. But given that, that 1 s all I 
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1 want to say today. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: That's where we are at. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Just so I understand, you 
5 agree that your duty is to your client, not to the witnesses? 
6 MR. RICHARDS: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. 
7 THE COURT: And you also agree I mean, as a ·judge, 
8 I can 1 t order you to turn over the names of anybody unless you 
9 are going to call them as witnesses. And then, of course, the 
10 rules of discovecy come into play. 
11 MR. RICHA..TIDS : Jl.nd given the rulings t.l-at t.l-te court 
12 has made, we're not going to call those witnesses. And it 1 s 
13 not because I have any duty to those witnesses, it 1 s because 
14 it 1 s not going to do me any good; it 1 s going to hurt me. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shaw. 
16 MR. SHAW: Yes, your Honor. Counsel misreads . 
17 Maughan. I want to make sure that the ruling is correct, or 
18 correctly understood. 
19 Wnat happ.o._ned in lf.eughan was the one lawyer was 
20 disqualified, the other lawyer was allowed to remain by the 
21 defendant 1 s choosing. In other words, Judge Hadfield issued an 
22 order saying pick one or the other. He picked Mr. Mauro. 
23 Mr. Williams w-as disqualified. 
24 The Supreme Court didn 1 t reverse the judge 1 s 
25 position. What they did is they sent it back for a hearing so 
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1 the judge could find after a hearing and enter findings of fact 
2 which would have deter.mined whether or not the alleged conflict 
3 could be knowingly and intentionally waived. 
4 Let me read from that case. This is instructions 
5 regarding waiver on remand. 
6 "We recognize the challenges that confront a district 
7 court when assessing whether a Defendant has knowingly and 
8 voluntarily waived an attorney's potential conflict of 
9 interest. As we noted above, the specter of being whipsawed by 
10 claims of error no matter which way a judge rules is more than 
11 fanciful. We are sensitive 
12 Defendant may seo-k a waiver and then try to use it to his or 
13 her advantage later." 
14 That's what the problem is here. That's exactly the 
15 problem here. We have no record before us that allows 
16 Mr. Perea to waive this potential -- this isn't a potential 
17 conflict; this is a concurrent conflict. J:-f..r. Ric...'1ards ca.T"J. say 
18 I don't owe him any duty. He's already demonstrated the duty 
19 that he has marlifested with these people, trying to keep their 
20 names confidential to the detriment of his client, given the 
21 level of infonnation that t.~ey allegedly have. 
22 Then the court goes on and says this: "We, 
23 therefore, instruct the District Court to reruu~d to appoint 
24 qualified conflict counsel to represe..-·1.t Mr. V.aaugha..."'l for the 
25 limited purposes -- purpose of ascertaining whether Mr. Maughan 
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1 desires to waive the potential conflict with respect to 
2 Mr. Williams and to ensure that Mr. Mauro' s waiver is knowing 
3 and voluntary. " 
4 It's also important to note in the case of State vs. 
5 Holland. It cited a Supreme Court case, Glasser vs. United 
6 States that essentially says this, whether -- basically says 
7 whether counsel' s conduct is prejudicial is really not relevant 
8 to the detenni.nation of whether a Sixth Amendment ineffective 
9 assistance of counsel has arisen. And Glasser says, let me 
10 just read it out of Holland, it says this: In Glasser, the 
11 Supreme Court reversed a conviction because a.""l attorney 
12 represented co-defendants with adverse interests. The court 
13 refused to inquire into the issue of prejudice because the 
14 right to r~ve assistance of counsel is too fundamental and 
15 absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to 
16 the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. 
17 Tr~s court has no infor.mation bP_fore it today on the 
18 amount of prejudice. It doesn't rratter, but we still have no 
19 1 infor.m.ation available that would allow anyone to conclude 
20 Mr. Perea can waive this conflict knowingly and intentionally. 
21 And that is the proble.-rn. That is t..'lte problem. 
22 If our Supreme Court is going to send back Lovell and 
23 send back Maughan for hearings on this very issue, what's going 
24 to happo_n when we get whipsawed, whe.."1 this district court gets 
25 whipsawed by the Supreme Court and they tell us, prosecutors, 
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1 you di.dn' t stand up and do your duty either. That's what we 
2 got set up here, Judge. The classic whipsaw. That's what is 
3 set up in the current state of this record. 
4 And we can't do anything about it until counsel is 
5 appointed for Mr. Perea to examine this issue of conflict and 
6 detennine if it can be waived and whether he can knowingly and 
7 intelligently do it. But that's the status of the case, your 
8 Honor. It can't be any clearer. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Should we set it for a 
10 hearing then next week and then deal with the issue? 
11 MF.. F.ICF.l\.RDS : Yeah. 
12 ~. SHAW: First we have to appoint counsel. 
13 THE COURT: Right. And I think Mr. Richards 
14 mentioned he had somebody in mind. 
15 MR. SHAW: I don't think that' s good enough. 
16 THE COURT: Well, do you even know who it is? 
17 MR.. SH..~W: Well, I don't. I have an idea. I have an 
18 idea. 
19 MR. RIC"rlARDS: I ca...'"l tell you tl-.Lat I contacted 
20 Mr. Roy Cole who is one of the few capital qualified attorneys 
21 .h'"'l town. ~.nd he J:-~s gone and alread-.f spoken with 1.-f..r. Perea and 
22 he would be willing to come and testify. 
23 T'".clE COURT: ~..re you okay with 1-I.!I'. Cole? 
24 MR. SHAW: Well, ho~o's tho t~N 
_,.._ - '=::'· I think what has 
25 to happ=>-n, this is a public defender case. I think Mr. Balis 
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1 (phonetic) needs to be notified of the issue, and I think 
2 Mr. Balis should select somebody to handle it within the public 
3 defender realm. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. They've got to be death qualified. 
5 MR. SHAW: I don't think they have to be death 
6 qualified for conflict pw:poses. I don' t think that's the 
7 issue because we are dealing simply with the issues of waiver 
8 knowingly and intelligently. 
9 THE COURT: Is there same reservation about Mr. Cole? 
10 I know this is hitting it kind of broadsided, but I guess I'm 
11 having trouble u..T'ln~rstanding why ~,... Cole is not 
12 MR. SHAW: He's not a public defender. 
13 THE COURT: Right. 
14 MR. SHAW: And the county has --
15 MR. RICHARDS: Neither were you. 
16 MR. SHAW: Huh? 
17 MR. RI~..PDS: Neither were you on t.'l-).e othP_r case. 
18 MR. SHAW: I know but the County -- the court ordered 
19 the county to pay for it after the county -- what happo_ned in 
20 that case is John Caine and Bill Dais stipulated to my 
21 appointment. 1-.nd the..J. t..'!,_e court advised. 
22 THE COURT: I guess that's what I am asking if you 
23 are willing to do that. Are you willing to stipulate to Mr. 
24 Cole? 
25 MR. SHAW: We are supposed to stay out of the 
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1 decisions relative to the appointment of counsel. 
2 THE COURT: Well, if you want to stay out, I' 11 just 
3 make the appointment. I mean, that's why I was asking do you 
4 have any objection to Mr. Cole? Either you are in or out on 
5 this issue. 
6 MR.. SHAW: No, no, no. There's an issue between the 
7 civil cL~artment. We're not -- as the prosecutors, we're not 
8 supposed to be involved in the issue of appointment of counsel. 
9 That would be Mr. Wilson or Mr. Allred from our office. They 
10 are the ones who handle the appointment of counsel issue in 
11 indigent cases. They are s1..-pposed to be a ~..inese wa 1 1 --
12 THE COURT: You know, the problem is, like you say, 
13 we are a week from trial. I'm hying to get this thing 
14 resolved if at all possible before we bring in 200 jurors a 
15 week from :Monday so. If you are opposed to it, I guess I need 
16 to know. If you don't have a position and, you know, like I 
17 say, I 'm just trying to move th.is th.i.."'lg along if we ~""'a.'1. 
18 MR.. SHAW: Well, that's we want the court to rule 
19 on our motion to continue because we don' t think we can move 
20 this thing along adequately, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: L-et me ask you, do you agree though tr..a t 
22 if Mr. Perea agrees to waive any pot:P_ntial, does that resolve 
23 the problem? 
24 MR. SHAW: No, it doesn't. 
25 THE COURT: Why? 
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1 MR. SHAW: It doesn't resolve the problem until this 
2 court has a hearing and makes sufficient findings of fact and a 
3 ruling--
4 THE COURT: Well 1 and I know that. We're going to 
5 give you a hearing. I'm going to make findings -- I just, I 
6 guess I'm trying to figure out where we are in agreement or 
7 disagreement on the issue. 
8 MR. SHAW: As I told the court 1 our view regarding 
9 whether he can waive it may differ from the court's and from 
10 counsel's ~_nding on what evidence comes out at that hearing. 
11 THE COURT: How long do you t:h.i!'.k t.."'e hear~ ng is 
12 going to take? 
13 MR.. RICHARDS: A couple of hours, I guess . 
14 THE COURT: Well, I got next Tuesday in the morning 
15 or I got all day on Thursday, the 4th, or all day on the 5th. 
16 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, I'm good Tuesday morning. 
17 THE CO't.'IRT: I can give you half a day on Tuesday 
18 morning. 
19 MR. RICH..ZffiDS: I could do that. I can do Thursday 
20 all day. Yeah, I could do Thursday all day or Friday all day. 
21 MR. SHAW: 'VI.'Ihat about the State' s request to h=ve 
22 these witnesses subpoo_naed to that hearing? No. 1 
23 THE COURT: Well, I think if you want to subpoena 
24 witnesses that's your responsibility not mine. 
25 MR. SHAW: But we don't know who they are yet. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
duty? 
say. 
to--
THE COURT: Well, and I don 1 t either. 
MR. SHAW: Don 1 t they go to the very core of the 
THE COURT: They may, depend.ing on what they have to 
But I don't know that I can -- how do I order people 
7 MR. SHAW: I think the court can order them disclosed 
8 in the context of this hearing. 
9 
10 
11 
THE COURT: Well, but 
MR. RICHARDS: I disagree. 
THE CQT.JRT: Like I say, it 1 s your hearing. If you 
12 want them there, I guess you need to make arrangements to have 
13 them. If you don 1 t want them there, I guess I have to rule 
14 based on 
MR. SHAW: We don 1 t even know who they are. 
THE COURT: Yeah, that 1 s what I say. 
15 
16 
17 MR. SHAW: So we are asking the court to order t.'l-:l.ose 
18 names disclosed so we can evaluate that and have them here if 
19 necessary. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I thought we went through this. I 
21 thought you agreed I do not have --
MR. SHAW: That 1 s for trial pw:poses. 22 
23 THE COURT: Yeah, but it doesn 1 t make any difference 
24 if it 1 s trial or hearing. I can 1 t require the rio.fense to turn 
25 over names of witnesses unless they are going to testify. If 
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1 they are not going to testify, I can't say I need to know what 
2 your trial strategy is, I need to know who you are going to 
3 call, I can't do that. 
4 MR. SHAW: For the limited pw:poses of assessing the 
5 duties that Mr. Richards has manifested to those witnesses, you 
6 can. That's what we are talking about. We're not talking 
7 about disclosing and calling them as trial witnesses. We're 
8 talking about we have a record created thus far that puts every 
9 one in mind. 
10 THE COURT: I'm just not inclined to do that at this 
11 po-iTlt. I u..Tlri.:::..,-.staTld your position. I just-- that's why I 
12 asked you, there's no way I can force the defense to disclose 
13 the identity of people if they are not going to call them, so. 
14 I MR. SHAW: Well 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. sa~: -- if that' s the court' s ruling, t:r-.aa t' s 
17 the court' s ruling, I guess . 
18 THE COURT: Which day is better for the State? 
19 M:"(. SHAW: Well , the next question is --
20 MR. RICHARDS: Probably Thursday would be better for 
21 1 :me if tr.at' s at all possible si...uply because I'm going to No. 1 
22 try to have to get a memo prepared, and No. 2, I think I might 
23 r~ve another attorney came in on tl1is trial, so. 
24 THE COURT: You are &.inking about somebody ot..~er 
25 than Mr. Cole? 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: No, I'm saying another attorney to --
2 THE COURT: To argue the motion? 
3 MR.. RICHARDS: To help argue the motion, yeah. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. So the 4th is the best? How about 
5 for the State? 
6 MR. RICHARDS: If that works it would be good. I can 
7 do it all day on the 4th. 
8 MR. SHAW: Well, we would prefer as mentioned to have 
9 Mr. Balis appoint someone to deal with this issue. I don't 
10 know how conflict counsel can get up to ~ fully on this 
11 issu.e. We've been t-rorki.'l"lg on t.'llls isS"..J.e si."1.ce Friday 
12 afternoon, every day, virtually all day. 
13 T"'rlE COURT: Like I say, I ' 11 give you a hearing. I 'm 
14 trying to keep this trial on track if at all possible. I know 
15 the State doesn't want to do that, but I guess I'm just trying 
16 to see if we can resolve the issue before trial. So I know 
17 where you are coming from. 
18 MR. SHAW: And that prejudices the State's case. 
19 T"nat prejudices our ability to put on a case 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. SHl:>.:W: -- by dealing with t.c'1i.s kind of motion at I 
22 this late date. That' s the problem. 
23 T"rlE COURT: All right. 4th, 5th or 2nd? 
24 MR. Hg"WARJ) : Tuesday, t.."le 2nd. 
25 THE COURT: The 2nd. You Y.-ant to do it in the 
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1 morning then? 
2 MR.. HEWARD: Well, I guess how do we resolve the 
3 issue, Judge, of the appointment? 
4 THE COURT: I 'm ·going to appoint Mr. Cole. I '11 talk 
5 to Mr. Balis but that's the one name I 've got is Roy Cole. 
6 MR.. SHAW: Then --
7 MR.. HEWARD: We' 11 submit a name as well. If the 
8 defense is going to su1:mi t one, we' 11 sul:mi t one as well. 
9 MR.. RICHARDS: If you want to ask Mike to do it, I 'm 
10 fine with Mike. It d.oesn' t matter to me. 
11 MF.. ~.FD: !vf..ike ~_lis is fine, your Honor. 
12 MR. RICHARDS: That's fine with me. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Let me talk to both of them 
14 and find out. I'm sure this is going to come as a sw:prise to 
15 both of them. 
16 Okay. So I got Roy Cole and I got Mike Balis and 
17 I' 11 make the appointment on one of those. A.T'ld you t:b.ink we 
18 can do the hearing on Thursday morning then? You want to start 
19 at 9:00 o'clock? 
20 MR. HE""WARD: I guess the issue dep=-..nds on what 
21 1 first issue is if they CA.L'i be reacty b-.i Tuesday morning. 
I 
22 MR. RICHARDS: And that's my problem. I just don't 
23 think you know, I 'm going to be in hearings all day today. 
24 I got another cammi tment tomorrow. I just don't think I '11 
25 have time nor will my co-counsel. 
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1 THE COURT: So you want to go on the 4th? 
2 MR. RICHARDS: Go on the 4th. 
3 MR. HEWARD: But, Judge, what Mr. Richards is saying 
4 just continues to make the record worse. We're just putting 
5 both sides in a position that we're -- in the time p=-_riod we 
6 should be preparing, we're not, because we are having to deal 
7 with issues that we should have dealt with six months to a year 
8 ago. We would ask your Honor to continue this case today. 
9 Then let us march down the road that we are talking about to 
10 detel::mine whether or not we can even go any farther. 
11 THE COt.lF..T: Jl..nd I Y-"'low tb.at, but honest to God, t-lri.s 
12 case has been p=-_nd.ing for two and a half years . And we've set 
13 it at least twice. We have 200 jurors ready to came in on it. 
14 And I mean, I 've set deadlines and motions and hearings . The 
15 Defendant has been sitting in jail for two and a half years. I 
16 just-- I know you want to continue the case. I'd like to t..-ry 
17 to keep it on track at all possible. I realize your position 
18 but I just 
19 MR. f;...!:.,;Wl-\RD: The State hasn 1 t asked for a continuance 
20 once, Judge, not one time. 
21 THE COURT: Well, tr...at rr..a.y be true, but the point is 
22 if you can't get ready for a trial in two and a half years, I 
23 mean I'm just-- you know, I'm frustrated too because I thought 
24 we put up a sc..'ledule. And I come in here and we're ready to go 
25 on same of the motions and then we end up continuing same of 
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1 them. And I understand the frustration. I know there's a lot 
2 to do. I 'm not saying that there isn't a lot of work involved 
3 in these cases because there is. But I'm just not ready to 
4 concede that we're going to continue this case. I may have to 
5 but --
6 MR. HEWARD: And your Honor has set the guidelines 
7 and cutoffs. You talk about them. The defense continue to 
8 ignore them. 
9 THE COURT: I know. I know. I 'm not saying it's 
10 necessarily your fault. 
11 
12 
MR. RI~P-DS: Well --
THE COURT: It' s frustrating for me as a judge 
13 because I 'm trying to move this case along, and we got motions 
14 and I can tell you it' s going to happo-n again today. And I 
15 have no response on same of the motions . And we end up bumping 
16 them, and again, I have no response. And I just -- I mean I 
17 feel like I 'm the only one that wants this case to go to trial. 
18 It's just, like I say, it's two and a half years and here we 
19 are, you know, a week from trial and people are asking to 
20 continue. And I just-- I guess I'm just not willing right now 
21 to give up this trial setting. I :may have to, but all I ':m 
22 asking for is what dates are available next weo_k that we can do 
23 this hearing. 
24 MR. HEVmRD: TlJ.esday. 
25 MR.. RICHARDS: Tuesday it is. 
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1 MS. SIPES: Your Honor, just so -- I would not be 
2 able to be here Tuesday. There are other attorneys out of town 
3 that I'm covering for and I don't have anybody to cover for me. 
4 Thursday I do have the day free. 
5 THE COURT: Well, let's go with Thursday then. We' 11 
6 put forth and we' 11 do it at 9 a.m. 
7 MR. HEWARD: I 'm not available on the 4th, your 
8 Honor. 
9 MR. SHAW: That's right. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I guess we' 11 just have to go 
11 wi t..'l-).out you t..,_en. I don' t k..T'low what to do. 
12 MR. HEWARD: Why do we go without -- we won' t go 
13 without defense counsel, but we will go without the State's 
14 representation? 
15 THE COURT: I guess I 'm just trying to give everybody 
16 a chance to get ready for the hearing. And I realize it's 
17 going to be virtually i.mpossible to satisfy ev.:.rybody' s 
18 schedule. Let's go with the 4th, nine clock. 
19 MR. RiuL'Z\RDS: 9:00 o'clock we' 11 be here. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Now the other thing I just 
21 wanted to clarify on the record, th.ere was -- the Defenrlant r...ad I 
I 
22 filed that motion to exclude witnesses. I think we kind of 
23 talked about it a little bit. I just -w-anted to make sure I had 
24 this right. It was my undorstanding that on this motion to 
25 identify the witnesses that the defense filed, the defense has 
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1 decided not to give up those names. Is that --
2 MR. RICHARDS: That's correct, your Honor. I mean 
3 THE COURT: I had set a deadline for Monday, the 
4 22nd --
5 
6 
MR. RICHARDS: I understand that. 
THE COURT: at 1:00 o'clock, and that was the 
7 court order. And your decision was --
8 MR. RICHARDS: I'm not going to call them because 
9 strategically I think it would be detrimental in our case to 
10 call them at this point. 
11 THE COLlRT: ~.11 right. Now let !!'.e just ask. ~..s I 
12 read your response to the discovexy, you say you can' t find two 
13 of the witnesses. Is that correct, Mr. Richards? 
14 MR. RICHARDS: I'm still t.I:ying to locate t-wo. They 
15 are the two lesser quality. 
16 THE COURT: I guess, my thinking is if you can't find 
17 t.'l-:!.e witnesses, doesn't this part of the issue become moot? In 
18 other words --
19 
20 
21 
22 
lv.IK. RIC'"iARDS: It potentially could. 
THE COURT: if you can' t locate people 
HR. RICHA.~S: Tr.Ld.t' s trtle. 
THE COURT: at least to two issues, this issue 
23 would be moot. 
24 
25 
MR. RICHARDS: That's correct. I still a."tl. tr..{i..Tlg. 
THE COURT: Now the other two witnesses , though, 
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1 you've indicated that they said they wouldn't testify. And I 
2 guess I was a little confused about the way you've written this 
3 up in your response. You say neither of those witnesses are 
4 willing to testify without the court's protection as requested. 
5 And again, we've talked about this. I'm not saying that we 
6 won't protect their identity, but I think you have to turn the 
7 names over to the State. Am I misreading that or --
8 MR. RICHARDS: Could I have just a manent, your 
9 Honor? 
10 
11 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. HEWA.~: Judge, w:h.ile they are th.ii1king about 
12 that, on that motion you never made findings and conclusions; 
13 we would ask for that. You simply -- we got to the end of it. 
14 Things kind of fell off. There were never any findings made by 
15 your Honor with regards to --
16 T""rlE COURT: I thought that's why we were doing the 
· 17 hearing on Thursday to make findings. 
18 MR. HEWARD: No. On the motion where they wanted to 
19 have the witnesses testify anonymously. You never made 
20 findings and conclusions. 
21 THE COURT: I did.""l.' t know I was s~l:-'posed. to. I knew 
22 I had to make findings on the conflict of counsel but 
23 MR. HEW'Jl..RD: Right, but there was a motion. And 
24 you've got to make findings a~d conclusion so t~ere's a final 
25 order on that. . And that ~-as never done. 
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1 THE COURT: Do you want to prepare a suggested order? 
2 MR. RICHARDS: I don't think you finished ruling on 
3 it. 
4 THE COURT: I guess the question is which motion? I 
5 know they are close, but there are actually two issues , right? 
6 One is the question of whether or not I disqualified 
7 Mr. Richards. You are not asking for findings on that, are 
8 you? 
9 MR.. HEWARD: No. 
10 THE COURT: You're asking about the anonymous 
11 wi t..~esses? 
12 MR. HEWARD: Yes. The ones we were here on last 
13 w~_k. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to sub:n.i t some kind of 
15 suggested or proposed findings? 
16 MR. HEWARD: I'm not sure I can do that until you 
17 make t-hose, your Honor. I don't know what your thinking was. 
18 There was certainly arguments presented to you fra..'"Il both sides. 
19 T:8E COt.i"R:T: Okay. Well, I guess I' 11 take that undor 
20 advisement and try to draft something and sul::mit it to you. So 
21 you need fin~ings of fact on the anonyrr~us w~t~esses. 
22 I MR.. HEWARD: Correct. And then an ul ti.mate court's 
23 decision. 
24 THE COURT: .All right. I '11 try to get something out 
25 on that. 
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1 MR. RICHARDS : Okay. 
2 THE COURT: But again my question was about the way 
3 this is worded in the order, you almost make it sound like that 
4 the reason they won't come forward is because I can't guarantee 
5 protection. And again, I don' t think I ever said that. 
6 MR. RICHARDS: No, it's, it's -- they say if we have 
7 to turn the names over to the prosecution and they can go out 
8 and spread their names and their proposed testimony around, 
9 that they won't do it under those parameters. That's it. 
10 THE COURT: And I guess, again, maybe it's just 
11 semantics, but I never got t..lLe i..rnpression that the State was 
12 going to quote, leak the info.:z:mation to somebody else, but 
13 obviously investigators and law enforcement need an opportunity 
14 to go out and talk to them and try to verify wr...at they would be 
15 testifying to, but are we talking about the same thing here? 
16 MR. RIC.liARDS: Well, my understanding when we had the 
17 hearing, and maybe this would resolve the whole tJ-!.ing, my 
18 understanding -w-as we said we'd turn over the names as long as 
19 counsel wouldn; t give out the names or identifying ir..foDr.ation 
20 to anyone else. 
21 And then the colJ.rt said how about t..'le law e.?">..forcement 
22 officers so they can investigate? And I said, well, I don't 
23 have any problem with that as long as the officers don' t the.."1 
24 disclose those names or t.~t info.J::mation to other individuals. 
25 They are worried about other people in the gang. So if the 
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1 police go out and say, well, Joe Jones said that he was there 
2 and saw that it was not Riqo that was shooting or something to 
3 that nature --
4 THE COURT: Well, I don 1 t think law enforcement has 
5 the idea that they are just going to go out and make trouble 
6 for these people, are they? I mean but they do need to do an 
7 investigation to have the name. And I thought that 1 s where the 
8 State was coming from was to say, you know, you can 1 t just say 
9 you can only give it to A, B and C, the names of witnesses, 
10 but 
11 MR. RI~..P.DS: Well, the problem is I understood the 
12 State said, no, we want to be able to have our officers go out 
13 and talk to Sam Smith and say, Sam, Joe Jones told me that 
14 this. And the minute he does that, the minute the officer does 
15 that, then that whole confidentiality thing, the dilemma comes. 
16 THE COURT: Wouldn't it be part of their 
17 investigation t-rying to ~_rify what they are saying, whet.'iLer 
18 it 1 s true? 
19 I 
20 I position. 
21 j allowed. 
22 I 
MR. RICHARDS: Exactly. I U.."lderstand that's their 
And so based on that, the witnesses say we're not 
We're not willing to go tl-.LO.t far. '!':'"'.at's 
1'1R. HEWARD: Yeah, but Mr. Richards would like to 
23 dictate how the State investigates their .L."'lfonnation. He also 
24 specifically only wanted to give us the in-Formation n=-xt Friday 
25 on the 4th so we have the weekend with which to track down and 
Noteworthy Heporting, LLC (801) 634-5549 40 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 verify and interview. Your ruling as I understand it, no, 
2 Mr. Richards, you are not going to dictate nor is the court 
3 going to dictate how the State investigates their case. That's 
4 an executive branch function. 
5 THE COURT: And I know the deadline has came and 
6 gone, so the witnesses aren't going to testify, but I just was 
7 a little troubled with the way this was worded because it 
8 almost makes it sound like, well, they would have testified but 
9 since the court can' t guarantee their protection, we are not 
10 going to. And I didn't think that was real -- I mean we never 
11 said tr~t. The court' s never said I can't protect or won't 
12 protect their identify here. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: And your Honor, I probably worded that 
14 wrong. And I can reword it if you would like to say that they 
15 wouldn' t be willing to came forth if their names have to go to 
16 the State and the State is going to give that, names and 
17 iP.fonna. tion out to oth=>_r people. 
THE COURT: Okay. 18 
19 MR. RICHARDS: And could we just make tl-...at arnendment 
20 on the record somehow? 
21 T"".tiE COu'RI' : Sure . T.r.La t ' s fine . 
22 I guess the other question I had, and I think 
23 V.I.!:'. He-v.-ard raised it last week, and maybe I misunderstood what 
24 the proffer of what these wit.."1.esses would have said. Were same 
25 of the witnesses going to testify that they didn • t have 
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1 personal knowledge of what happened but if somebody else had 
2 told them that or? 
3 MR. :H:EWARD: That's what defense counsel said. 
4 THE COURT: That's what I just wanted to clarify. Is 
5 that --
6 MR.. RICHARDS: We had -- I don't know how much I can 
7 lay out on this, but we had someone over there, actually three 
8 that would have been there and could testify differently than 
9 what some of the State's witnesses have testified to. We have 
10 one individual that's confessed to actually doing the shooting. 
11 THE COURT: Wouldn't -+-h..at be hearsay? 
12 MR. RICHARDS: Tr.at would be a statement. It would 
13 be hearsay, yes, statement against interest. 
14 THE COURT: Statement against 
15 MR. RICHARDS: Interest. And if I got up and say, 
16 hey, I 'm the one that did the shooting, I think tr.at comes in 
17 u_n.der 803. 
18 THE COURT: So the witness t.~t you would be calling 
19 is not, is not ~~e one? 
20 MR. RICHARDS: Oh, no. 
21 T"rlE COti'RT: Th;:y are saying samebott.{ else told t..lLem 
22 that they did the shooting? 
23 MR. RICHARDS: Exactly. 
24 MR. HEWARD: Stateme.."lt against interest doesn't get 
25 that statement in, your Honor. That's clearly hearsay. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, it's all moot now anyway. I just 
2 wanted to clarify what the witnesses were -- I mean, I kind of 
3 agree with Mr. Heward. I mean otherwise everybody could get on 
4 the stand and say, well, I talked to so and so, and he actually 
5 told me that he committed the crime. And how would you ever --
6 it's got to be an admission against the witness --
7 MR. HEWARD: Statement of the defendant in this case 
8 makes it admissible. 
9 THE COURT: Or the witness, doesn't it? 
10 MR. RICHARDS: Or the witness, right. 
11 THE CO'CJRT: In o+-her words if the witness got on the 
12 stand and said --
13 MR. RICHARDS: No. If I get up and I testify --
14 T'"rlE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. RICHARDS: hey, I was talking to Sharon Sipes 
16 and Sharon Sipes said that she w-as the one that did the 
17 shooting, not Riqo Perea, that's admissible because it's a 
18 statement agai..'"lst her interest. That's what t..'l-).e rule says. 
19 MR. HEWARD: It's not admissible through 
20 Mr. Richards . 
21 T"rlE COu"RT: Yeah, see --
22 MR. RICHA..~S: Sure it is. 
23 THE COURT: I don' t w-ant to get in an argum.en.t over 
24 I'm just t...."'Ying to clarify --
25 MR. RICHARDS: Well, then Mr. Perea's testimony or 
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1 his statements to the Officer Thomas and ~._nt would not be 
2 admissible under that rule. 
3 MR. HEWARD: They. are admissible as nonhearsay under 
4 Rule 801. 
5 THE COURT: Yeah. And I don't want-- I want to 
6 clarify for the record you had four witnesses, three of which 
7 you claim were going to say that they were there and they can 
8 testify that somebody else pulled the trigger, right? Or I 
9 don 1 t mean to put words in your mouth. 
10 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah. They could testify that things 
11 happened differe."ltly t.'i-a."l some of the state's witnesses 
12 testified to. The other one would came in and say that I 
13 talked to individual A; individual A admitted that he or she is 
14 the one that p..llled the trig<?_r. 
15 THE·· COURT: Okay. And now of the two t.r.a t you can 1 t 
16 locate --
17 
18 
MR.. RICHll..RDS : The-j" would be two of the three. 
THE COURT: Two of the three t.r.at would say what? 
19 T"hat they were there or 
20 MR. RICHARDS: That they were there. 
21 TrlE COti'RT: Tl-l.d.t th-:".f were there. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: And certain things 
23 TdE COURT: See, this gets a little difficult too. 
24 And again, I don' t know how far to go, but I do think we need 
25 to make a record as to what these witnesses were going to 
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1 testify to. Saying that is different than what the state 1 s 
2 witnesses are going to say, that 1 s pretty general, isn 1 t it? 
3 MR. RICHARDS: I can put together a proffer and have 
4 that by Thursday. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. So at least put something on the 
6 record as to what they would have testified to, what you 
7 believe they would testify to. 
8 All right. So my findings, of course, is that the 
9 defense is precluded from calling these four witnesses because 
10 the defense had failed to comply with the discovery request. 
11 And I 'd set a deadline for this last Monday, t.~e 22nd. And 
12 like I said, I 1 11 go ahead and prepare findings on that 
13 particular issue. Okay? 
14 MR. RICHARDS: Good enough. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Let 1 s see if we can handle 
16 another issue then. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
MR. RICH..Zl:...~S: Could we --
TrlE COlJRT: You need a break? 
MR. RICW...P..DS: No, I 1m ready to go. 
MR. HEWARD: I could use a break. 
21 TrlE COl.JRT: Let' s take about --
22 MR. RICF.A.'R.DS: Could we do the Gaskell matter first? 
23 T'ne only reason I request that is we got Mr. Gaskell here and I 
24 don 1 t want him to sit through --
25 THE COl.JRT: No problem. All right. Let's take 10 , 
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1 15 minutes. 
2 MR. SHAW: If we're going to do the Gaskell matter 
3 first, I would like to sul::mi.t, at least let the court review 
4 his report because I don't know if you have seen that. 
5 THE COURT: I haven't seen the report. 
6 MR.. RICHARDS : No, that' s fine. 
7 MR.. SHAW: Let me give that to you, your Honor, 
8 bP_fore you go back on recess. 
9 THE COURT: You can just leave that here if you want. 
10 Take about a 15 minute recess. 
11 (A Recess is taken by the Court. ) 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
,.., .. 
.G..L 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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Noteworthy Reporting Case No. 071901847 
1 
2 
3 
4 
March 4th, 2010 9:05 a.m. 
P R 0 C E E D I N G S 
* * * 
THE COURT: This is the time set for further 
5 hearings. State of Utah versus Riqo Perea in case ending 2215 
6 [sic]. Mr. Shaw and Mr. Heward are here for the State. And 
7 we've got Mr. Richards and Ms. Sipes, is that right, for the 
8 defense? 
9 
10 
MR. RICHARDS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And the record should also reflect that 
11 Mr. Perea is also present. Anyone else? 
12 MR. RICHARDS: There is also Kent Hart. He'll make 
13 his --
14 THE COURT: Appreciate you coming, Mr. Hart. All 
15 right. That's --
16 
17 
MR. HEWARD: Mr. Bouwhuis is also present. 
THE COURT: That's who I was looking for. Should we 
18 deal with that motion first? I know Bouwhuis is here. And 
19 it's still the State's motion to disqualify Mr. Richards. I'm 
20 not sure you want to proceed. Actually, I think the State had 
21 asked for a hearing so I don't know if you want him to testify 
22 or just want him to make a proffer as to what he has done? 
23 MR. SHAW: Well, first of all, I would like to 
24 address the filing of an Amicus brief. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. SHAW: And then, yes, we would like Mr. Bouwhuis 
2 sworn. And have him tell us what he's done and go through that 
3 with him. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MR. SHAW: But, yes, I want to address this Amicus 
6 situation. 
7 THE COURT: I know Mr. Bouwhuis probably needs to be 
8 someplace else. I thought we'd try to get him in and out if we 
9 could --
10 MR. SHAW: Yeah. 
11 THE COURT: -- as to accommodate his schedule. 
12 MR. SHAW: I will be brief on the Amicus. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
14 MR. SHAW: The State is moving to strike the Amicus 
15 brief, Your Honor. There is no precedent, no rule at all that 
16 supports the filing of an Amicus brief without Court 
17 invitation. There is no rule in the Criminal Procedure. There 
18 is no rule in the Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, Rule 24 
19 of the Utah Rules of appellate Procedure requires a motion and 
20 leave of the Court to file an Amicus or an invitation from the 
21 Court. 
22 It's wholly improper to simply file a motion to ask 
23 the Court for leave for an Amicus brief, because as counsel put 
24 it, "They are keenly interested." They are not parties to this 
25 action. They have no standing to file a brief. It's 
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1 unprecedented at a trial court level. That motion, that 
2 memorandum should be stricken. For those reasons. 
3 This is not a matter in which the Utah Criminal 
4 Defense Association or Criminal Defense Lawyers are -- have any 
5 interest in at this level. If at appeal they are invited to 
6 file a brief then fine. But at this point in time, Your Honor, 
7 that should be stricken from the record immediately and not 
8 considered at all. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Richards or Mr. Hart, I 
10 guess is that 
11 MR. SHAH: Well, the State is going to object to 
12 Mr. Hart having any argument whatsoever in this matter. He is 
13 not a party. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Richards then. 
MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, in regard to their motion 
I believe that all Amicus briefs are done there is a 
petition done, I seldom see a Court, even on an appeal, Supreme 
Court or the Utah Supreme Court, any of them, that actually 
solicit Amicus briefs. 
Typically what happens is an individual or a group or 
whoever it is filing the Amicus briefs, do so with a motion to 
have, as far as friend of the court-type situation, which is 
exactly what is happening here. And for Mr. Shaw to say this 
is unprecedented is simply not true. This happens all the 
25 time. I don't know that there are very many appellate briefs 
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1 that go to the Supreme Court that don't have at least one or 
2 more Amicus briefs filed. 
3 On the trial court level it happens also. One of the 
4 main cases the State sites in their brief and we have sited in 
5 our brief is the case of State versus Maughan, which was very a 
6 similar case to this. And that particular case as counsel well 
7 knows there was Amicus filing at the trial court level and 
8 Amicus counsel was allowed to argue it at the trial court 
9 level. 
10 The fact that this has all fallen down here so 
11 quickly certainly plays into it, as well. We got this motion 
12 we are trying to prepare for trial. We're having to spend all 
13 of our time working on this particular motion rather than on 
14 important motions or working on the case. And I specifically 
15 asked counsel, Mr. Hart, to help out on this thing. And I 
16 think it's appropriate. I think it's certainly certainly 
17 precedent that this occurred. I think it would be instructive 
18 to the court and beneficial. 
THE COURT: All right. Thanks Mr. Richards. 
Any response? 
19 
20 
21 MR. SHAW: Well, the problem with that argument, Your 
22 Honor, is that there is no rule that allows it in a criminal 
23 proceeding. And this Court has to invite that motion and 
24 brief. What they've done is they have circumvented a process. 
25 They filed a motion with it without an order of this Court and 
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1 they include a brief. And that's simply not proper. At the 
2 appellate level it's only allowed filing the motion. This is a 
3 court of law. This is not create the procedure to your 
4 advantage as we go through it. There is simply no precedent. 
5 There is no request that has been filed to this Court and the 
6 State objects to it. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. RICHARDS: May I respond briefly? 
9 THE COURT: Sure. 
10 MR. RICHARDS: Procedurally that's how it's always 
11 done. I mean, I have seen amicus briefs filed. I have 
12 actually filed one myself some time ago. And you also file the 
13 brief and you file the motion at the same time. It's typically 
14 how it ' s done . 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess I agree with 
16 Mr. Shaw though. I just don't know that there is not a rule 
17 here. And I was kind of surprised to get it. I didn't get it 
18 until 5:00 yesterday. But I haven't had a chance to even look 
19 at it. But I think Mr. Shaw's motion is well taken. I'm going 
20 strike the pleading, itself, the brief that was filed by 
21 Mr. Hart. 
22 And I appreciate your interest in the case, Mr. Hart, 
23 and I don't mean to be condescending, at all. But Mr. Richards 
24 you filed a brief, originally you had not and that's one of the 
25 reasons we continued this is you indicated you didn't have 
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1 time. And I don't fault you for that, but you have now filed a 
2 written response to the State's motion and I have considered 
3 your brief at this point. 
4 But I think the problem is, is if I start allowing 
5 Amicus briefs on this, I mean, next thing you know the State 
6 will turn to SAP, which is the organization that handles a lot 
7 of things for the prosecutors. And I will be just inundated by 
8 briefs from everybody. And at this point I just don't know 
9 that it's necessary or appropriate under the law. 
10 So I'm going to grant the State's motion to strike. 
11 I just don't think-- I haven't invited the brief. And I just 
12 don't think there was any rule that permits it at least in 
13 state court. 
14 But again, Mr. Hart, I just want to tell you, I 
15 appreciate your interest in your case. I know it is an issue 
16 that you're concerned about and I understood that. But I just 
17 will strike the brief and it won't be part of the record. 
18 Okay? 
19 Anything else on that issue before we return to 
20 Mr. Bouwhuis? 
21 MR. RICa~s: We would like it part of the record 
22 just not part of your consideration. 
23 
24 
THE COURT: Right. 
How would you like to handle Mr. Bouwhuis? I know 
25 this kind of area-- at least that I'm not familiar with and I 
8 
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1 don't know if there is any rules. I don't know if you just 
2 want him to make a proffer on what he has done or if you want 
3 him to actually testify. It was actually kind of the State's 
4 motion so I will kind of let you take the lead on this Mr. 
5 Shaw, if you would like. 
6 MR. SHAW: We want Mr. Bouwhuis sworn. 
7 THE COURT: Did you want him to come up and be a 
8 witness then? 
9 MR. SHAW: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bouwhuis. 
11 * * * 
12 MICHAEL BOUWHUIS, 
13 railed by the Plaintiff, having been duly 
14 sworn, is examined and testifies as follows: 
15 * * * 
16 EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. SHAW: 
18 Q. Good morning, Mr. Bouwhuis. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Good morning. 
State your full for the record. 
Michael D. Bouwhuis. 
And you are an attorney; is that correct? 
I am. 
How long have you been practicing law? 
Oh, about 16 and a half years. 
9 
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1 Q. What is your area of practice or do you have a 
2 primary area of practice? 
3 A. The primary area is criminal defense. There is some 
4 other things but mostly criminal defense. 
5 Q. Can you give a brief background into your criminal 
6 defense history? 
7 A. Well, back in 1993 I started doing the public defense 
8 working for Box Elder County, did that for a few years. I also 
9 did -- all along done private work. I can't remember the year 
10 but I have been doing public defense work for Weber County for 
11 13 years, maybe. 
12 Kind of cases I have handled range anywhere from 
13 theft, drugs, rape, murder, kidnapping, pretty much the entire 
14 range. I have not handled any capital cases. 
15 Q. Okay. What is your current occupation? Do you have 
16 a -- do you have a position with the Public Defender's Office 
17 at present? 
18 A. I do. I'm the -- the official name is the 
19 coordinator for Indigent Defense Services for Weber County. 
20 It's a mouthful. 
21 Q. 
22 position? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. And how long have you been appointed in that 
Officially, October 1st of 2009. 
Prior to that, could you give some background 
25 relative to your quote assignments as a Weber County Public 
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1 Defender? 
2 A. Well, I've been working in two courts. I'm assigned 
3 two courts, Judge Direda, before Judge Allphin, and then Judge 
4 Lyon. And so each week I would appear on law and motion 
5 calendars, get assigned new cases and handle those cases from 
6 the beginning to end. 
7 Q. Have you ever served as conflict counsel in a 
8 situation such as this particular proceeding? 
9 A. Well, that is some what vague in all do respect. I 
10 have served as conflict counsel, never in a capital case, and 
11 never in a case where it was alleged that there was as is 
12 the case here, they are witnesses who are saying their safety 
13 is at risk if they come and testify and certain arrangements to 
14 be made. 
15 Q. This is a unique situation, we'll concede that. You 
16 haven't had an opportunity and I won't suspect that most people 
17 would. But you have served in a conflict counsel capacity in 
18 other instances is that what you're saying? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Can you tell us what you have been asked to do in 
21 this particular case? 
22 A. Okay. My -- I received a call from the court and 
23 spoke with Judge Jones he asked me -- he advised me of the 
24 claimed conflict here, asked me if I would go visit with 
25 Mr. Perea at the jail, talk to him about the two parties' 
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1 positions, advise him of his options, and find out if he had 
2 any questions, find out what he wanted to do, whether he wanted 
3 to waive a potential conflict or would rather have Mr. Richards 
4 replaced. 
5 Q. Okay. Now, you said waive a particular -- a 
6 potential conflict or have Mr. Richards replaced, you mean have 
7 him Mr. Richards in placed by him by waiving potential 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
MR. RICHARDS: Replaced I think he said. 
Oh, replaced. 
Right. You want me to clarify? 
Yes. 
What I meant to say was that the court wanted me to 
13 find out if Mr. Perea was willing to waive the conflict of 
14 interest with the claimed conflict or whether he would -- is 
15 not willing to have that waived and have Mr. Richards removed 
16 from the case. 
17 Q. And so that was the assignment that Judge Jones gave 
18 you in this particular instance? 
19 A. It is. 
20 Q. Now, as part of that assignment you received a brief 
21 from the State; is that correct? 
22 A. I did. 
23 Q. You also received a transcript of the proceedings 
24 from February 19th 2010; is that correct? 
25 A. I did. 
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1 Q. And I hope you received a copy of the Defendant's 
2 brief, did you receive that? 
3 A. I did not but I had a telephone conversation with 
4 Mr. Richards. He had previously received a copy of the State's 
5 brief and he verbally gave me his response. 
6 Q. Okay. And so, your view in this case was to -- was 
7 that you were to consult with Mr. Perea as independent counsel 
8 appointed by the Court to determine whether he understood the 
9 issue; is that fair? 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And whether, in fact, he desired to waive any 
12 conflict issue? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 issue 
20 right 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
is 
to 
Correct. 
And keep Mr. Richards on the case? 
Correct. 
Or remove Mr. Richards, correct? 
That is correct. 
Did you explain to Mr. Perea that this is -- this 
-- conflict issue, directly impacts, potentially, his 
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
21 Amendment of the United States Constitution? 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I did. 
Okay. 
And, in fact, I did. I read to Mr. Perea a number of 
25 portions of the State's brief so that I could fully convey to 
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1 him the concerns the State had. 
2 Q. Okay. And did you also consult with Mr. Perea about 
3 the alleged anonymous witnesses, in terms of the --
4 Mr. Richards failure to discuss those names? 
A. I did. I reviewed the facts as I understand them, 5 
6 
7 
8 
regarding the nature of these witnesses and the State's concern 
and Mr. Richards' response. 
Q. And when we talk about the State's concern, let's be 
9 clear. What we're what you were asked to do and I'm 
10 understanding you're -- you did it this way, would be to 
11 consult with Mr. Perea and inform him the State was concerned 
12 about the fact that there were undisclosed witnesses that were 
13 potentially exculpatory? 
That's correct. 14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. Did you explain to him the ramifications of what that 
means? 
A. I did. I told him that -- I'm not sure if this goes 
to your question, but I told him that -- well, I don't know how 
19 exactly I explained it to him. But we talked about the issue 
20 with the four witnesses and how they would -- indicated to 
21 Mr. Richards they were willing to come forward and testify 
22 under certain conditions that were aimed to protect their 
23 safety. I explained to Mr. Perea the claimed conflict that 
24 Mr. Richards has an obligation to Mr. Perea to make sure he 
25 presents the best defense he can. And that there is a claim 
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1 that he can't do that because he -- in protecting the witnesses 
2 he is placing their security over the interest of Mr. Perea to 
3 have a zealous defense. 
4 
5 
Q. 
A. 
And did he respond to you when you explained that? 
He did. And, in fact, Mr. Perea's response -- and I 
6 reviewed -- I actually became quite redundant. Not him 
7 necessarily, but the conversation. I visited with him for 
8 about 45 minutes and from the beginning to the end and in 
9 between he was fairly consistent and unequivocal. He said, "I 
10 want Mr. Richards on my case. " 
11 I wanted to make sure he understood that there was a 
12 concern that his defense may be compromised because these 
13 people had information that, according to Mr. Richards, would 
14 be exculpatory. But, of course, at the same time I'm --
15 Mr. Perea, by the way, was -- he didn't seem 
16 surprised by anything I told him. He didn't seem to be 
17 learning anything new. He seemed to be fully aware of the 
18 issues. And so as I'm talking to him about the State's 
19 position, also making sure he understood his attorney's 
20 position. 
21 Can't remember the question. 
22 Q. Well, that's exactly what I was looking for. Do you 
23 also did you also speak with Mr. Perea about the fact that 
24 if, in fact, he exercises a knowing and intelligent waiver, he 
25 waives his right to effective assistance of counsel as it 
Michael Bouwhuis - Examination by MR. SHAW 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Noteworthy Reporting Case No. 071901847 
1 relates to this particular issue, both at the trial court level 
2 and at the appellate court level? 
3 A. I did. I made it clear to him that he had the option 
4 of -- if he wasn't comfortable with Mr. Richards and the 
5 position he's taken with regards to these witnesses, that he 
6 could have Mr. Richards removed and have another attorney serve 
7 as lead counsel in his case. I explained to him there was a 
8 possibility that that would delay his case perhaps six to nine 
9 months, that's an estimate. 
10 And he indicated to me he was fine with that. I 
11 said -- I said to him that if somebody were to suggest to him 
12 that extra six to nine might be worth the wait, if it ended up 
13 with him getting a better defense. And he indicated he 
14 understood that and he said, again, "I want Mr. Richards on my 
15 case. I trust him. He had worked very hard for me. My family 
16 trusts him." 
17 Q. Specifically, with regard to Mr. Perea's right to 
18 appeal though, did you talk to him about the fact if he waives 
19 at this level that waiver would follow him henceforth and 
20 forever at any appellate court level? 
21 A. I believe we did talk about that. I took some notes 
22 as we talked but I don't have the transcript. We had a long 
23 conversation and went over things several times. I believe 
24 that I talked to him about the appellate issue. But I'm not 
25 going to say unequivocally that he did. 
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1 Q. Do you need more time to do so today, such that we 
2 have an unequivocal record that he understands that? 
That's probably fair to say, yeah. 3 
4 
A. 
Q. Okay. We can get to that in a minute. With respect 
5 to the interview at the jail -- this occurred at the jail, 
6 right? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
It did. 
Were you able to meet with Mr. Perea in close 
9 quarters, in other words, or were you behind glass or --
No. 
-- anything like that? 
10 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. Actually, I had anticipated it would be a non contact 
13 visit but we were able to visit in a room, about 8 by 8 room, 
14 seated across the table from each other, close contact. 
15 Q. And during that conversation did Mr. Perea appear to 
16 be of clear mind? 
17 A. He did. And that's one of the issues that I wanted 
18 to cover with him. Of course, I did talk to h~m, as I 
19 mentioned for 45 minutes. He appeared to track the 
20 conversation. His responses were appropriate. At the end of 
21 the conversations I asked him -- because I had vague 
22 recollection that there may have been some competency 
23 evaluation in this case, so I asked him about that~ 
24 Recognizing, of course I'm not an expert or psychologist or 
25 anything like that. 
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1 But, he acknowledged that there had been some testing 
2 done. But I didn't see that as impacting in any way our 
3 communication. I asked him if he was under the influence of 
4 anything at the time that we talked, drugs, or alcohol, or 
5 medications and I believe he indicated he was not. And he felt 
6 like he understood -- at least he expressed that he understood 
7 the things that I had said to him, the questions I had asked 
8 him. And, in fact, my observations of his responses would be 
9 consistent with that, that he understood what we were talking 
10 about. 
11 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
His responses were appropriate? 
They were. 
Okay. And so you didn't detect any physical and/or 
14 mental deficiency? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
I did not. 
Okay. Did you nave any conversation-- and I'm not 
17 asking you-- this is all part of the record. I'm not asking 
18 you to disclose, discuss confidences, but prior to your 
19 interview did you have a conversation with Mr. Richards about 
20 the psychological testing that was done on Mr. Perea? 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
I did not. 
So you didn't take that into account when you met 
23 with Mr. Perea, fair? 
24 A. Well, I was aware that there had been some testing 
25 done. And so -- I'm not sure how to answer the question. I 
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1 did, as I indicated previously, toward the end of your 
2 conversation, just to be clear I asked him about the testing, 
3 but, again, at that point we had been talking for 45 minutes 
4 and I had had an opportunity to observe his responses and not 
5 only the things that he said, but his, you know, body language 
6 and all that. Of course, again, I'm not an expert looking for 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
' 
those things. 
Q. Sure. 
A. Just as a person who has been in the system for over 
16 years and aware that those issues can impact the ability of 
a person to understand. 
Q. Right. And I'm not trying to paint you into a corner 
on that particular issue at all. I just want to know that 
you having that in mind during the course of the interview with 
Mr. Perea, you felt that he was, nevertheless, able to 
articulate his responses appropriately to you and answer your 
questions appropriately; is that correct? 
A. I did. And, in fact, I -- well, I did. I mean, over 
19 the years I have dealt with thousands of criminal defendants. 
20 And, of course, we get a variety of personalities and 
21 abilities. And I didn't detect any problems whatsoever with 
him understanding me and responding appropriately. 
Q. How long did the interview last? Do you know? 
Forty-five minutes. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. Forty-five minutes. You may have said that already. 
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And at the end of the day -- and we will get this as part of 
the record from the Defendant -- but at the end of the day 
Mr. Perea, did he express a willingness to keep Mr. Richards on 
the case to you affirmatively? 
A. He did. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 Q. And, in fact, he did that repeatedly throughout. And 
7 I, of course, I had a conversation with him and asked did you 
8 or one of your colleagues express a desire to make sure that 
9 his -- if he was going to waive it was knowing and intelligent. 
10 So I think I went over everything probably three times. But he 
11 was consistent throughout. 
12 I asked him -- in fact I asked him at one point if 
13 Mr. Richards had threatened him in any way to get him to waive 
14 the conflict and he laughed at me and said, "No, Mr. Richards 
15 is a very nice man. He wouldn't do that." But he was clear 
16 and consistent and unequivocal. He said, "I want Mr. Richards 
17 to remain on the case." 
MR. SHAW: That's all. 
THE COURT: Mr. Richards, any questions or --
18 
19 
20 MR. RICHARDS: Do we need for him to talk about that 
21 issue? 
22 THE COURT: Well, I guess that's the question. Do 
23 you want to take a break and talk to him further on that 
24 question about understanding the appellate issue? 
25 MR. SHAW: I think he should. 
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MR. RICHARDS: Why don't we do that. 1 
2 THE COURT: All right. Let's just take a short 
3 recess if we would. 
4 And Mr. Bouwhuis if you will talk to Mr. Perea just 
5 for a few minutes. Let us know. Why don't we just take a 
6 short recess. 
7 (Break Taken.) 
8 THE COURT: Back on the record in the State versus 
9 Perea and Mr. Bouwhuis is back on the witness stand. 
10 Go ahead and ask him. 
11 Mr. Perea is also present. 
12 MR. SHAW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 Q. (BY MR. SHAW) Mr. Bouwhuis, we took a recess and you 
14 have now had an opportunity to further discuss Mr. Perea's 
15 waiver of any potential conflict regarding the Sixth Amendment 
16 ineffective assistance of counsel as it relates to future 
17 appeal; is that accurate? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
That is correct. 
And do you feel like you've had an ample opportunity 
20 to clarify that particular issue with the defendant? 
21 A. I do. And I may tell you what I did. It just took, 
22 you know, four or five minutes back there and I explained to 
23 him just generally what the appeals process is, that if he is 
24 convicted that there would be an appeal or a number of appeals 
25 that those appeals would be looking at potential errors that 
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1 were committed at the trial court level. 
2 And that if he waives the potential conflict here 
3 that waiver would be binding on him and that any further 
4 appellate -- any appellate review is going to maintain that 
5 that is binding, that he can't then claim that Mr. Richards had 
6 a conflict and therefore was ineffective. 
7 
8 
Q. 
A. 
What was his response to that explanation? 
His response was the same as it was the other day 
9 when I visited with him. He said, ni still want Mr. Richards 
10 on my case." I again asked him the question, two or three 
11 different times if he understood that he a right to not have 
12 Mr. Richards on the case to have somebody else. And he, again, 
13 was consistent and said, "I want him on the case. And I want 
14 him to continue with the case." 
15 Q. And did Mr. Perea's responses appear to you as though 
16 he understood the appellate process? 
17 A. Well, yeah, I indicated to him as I did the other day 
18 in talking to him nobody expects you to be an attorney in this 
19 process, but I need to make sure you understand as best you 
20 can. And he appeared to understand. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
I asked him several times if he had any questions 
about what I was explaining to him and he did not. 
Q. Okay. You feel you've had adequate time to discuss 
all of these issues with him now? 
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1 A. I do. Let me add, if I may. Mr. Richards had 
2 prepared and given to me a typed written waiver of conflict 
3 potential conflict. And at the end of my conversation with 
4 Mr. Perea at the jail, I reviewed some of that with him and 
5 than handed it to him and had him read it. He indicated that 
6 he could read English. He appeared to read through it. He 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
told me he read through it. I asked him if he had any 
questions about it and he did not. I asked him if he 
understood it and he said he did. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
court. 
Did you sign it at the jail or --
He did not. 
Did you hold that for him to sign today? 
I felt it was best that he sign it here 
MR. SHAW: That's all, Your Honor. 
MR. RICHARDS: I have no questions. 
in open 
THE COURT: Can we excuse Mr. Bouwhuis then? 
MR. RICHARDS: Yes, we would like to. 
THE COURT: I have one question Mr. Bouwhuis. 
Do you remember the date of the interview? 
THE WITNESS: It was Tuesday. That was the second. 
THE COURT: This Tuesday? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: That's going to be March 2nd. 
THE WITNESS: March 2nd. 
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1 THE COURT: So March 2nd. And what time early 
2 afternoon? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
THE WITNESS: It was from 1:00 to 1:45. 
THE COURT: Okay. In the afternoon then. 
THE WITNESS : Yes . 
THE COURT: All right. Any other questions? 
MR. SHAW: No. 
MR. RICHARDS: I would like to --
THE COURT: You're okay with him --
THE WITNESS: You want the forms? 
MR. RICHARDS: Well --
MR. SHAW: Leave the waiver form. 
THE WITNESS: Leave it up here. 
14 MR. SHAW: Should we offer -- should we mark it as an 
15 exhibit? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
MR. RICHARDS: Let me see it here. 
THE COURT: Can we go ahead and excuse him though? 
MR. SHAW: Yes, we can. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bouwhuis, I just want to take an 
20 opportunity to tell you thank you for your help. 
21 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 
22 THE COURT: I know this was kind of a rush situation 
23 I really appreciate the fact that you were willing to drop what 
24 you were doing to help us out. 
25 THE WITNESS: That's fine. No problem. 
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THE COURT: Thanks for coming. 
All right? Any other evidence? 
MR. SHAW: If I may approach, Your Honor. 
1 
2 
3 
4 THE COURT: This is the waiver of the conflict. And 
5 have we marked this as an exhibit yet? 
6 MR. SHAW: Let's mark it as Exhibit 1. 
7 THE CLERK: Is that State's one or Defense one? 
8 MR. SHAW: It doesn't matter. It's their form 
9 actually. It probably ought to be theirs. 
10 THE COURT: So we should have Mr. Perea go ahead and 
11 sign that today in open court? 
12 MR. SHAW: Yes. What we would like to do is we would 
13 like to have Mr. Perea sworn. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. SHAW: We would like the Court now to inquire 
16 into those same lines of questioning. And I'm happy to help 
17 out. But we would like Mr. Perea sworn. Established that he 
18 is fully capable today of understanding these things. He is 
19 not under the influence of anything and going through it. 
20 THE COURT: You all right with that, Mr. Richards? 
21 MR. RICHARDS: I'm okay with the inquiry on that. 
22 THE COURT: As long as we focus just on the conflict, 
23 right? 
24 MR. RICHARDS: Focusing on the conflict. I think 
25 that we have to remember that anything he says here would not 
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1 be used against him in the trial. And then number three that I 
2 have the right to object at any point if we start to get into 
3 attorney/client privileged information. 
4 MR. SHAW: Well, let me say for the record that I'm 
5 happy to allow the Court to ask those questions, if the Court 
6 so desires and Mr. Richards so desires and I can supplement the 
7 record if I feel the need to. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. RICHARDS: And also that Mr. Perea is 
10 specifically not waiving any attorney/client privilege? 
11 MR. SHAW: No, that's stipulated. 
12 MR. RICHARDS: Okay. All right. 
13 THE COURT: Let's have Mr. Perea sworn then, if we 
14 could. 
15 * * * 
16 RIQ:) PEREA, 
17 having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
18 testified as follows: 
19 * * * 
20 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Shaw, I think just 
21 to be consistent if it's okay I'll let you go ahead and ask 
22 those same questions. 
23 MR. SHAW: I'm happy to do so, Your Honor. 
24 EXAMINATION 
25 BY MR. SHAW: 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
I guess I get to ask the questions, Mr. Perea. 
Yes. 
Would you please state your full name? 
Riqo Marrano Perea. 
And what is your date of birth? 
11/7/87. 
11/7/87? 
Uh-huh. 
Makes you 22 and a couple, a few months, right? 
Yes. 10 
11 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. Now, you have sat here in court today and listened to 
12 Mr. Bouwhuis' testimony; is that correct? 
Yes. 13 
14 
A. 
Q. And you were also here on February 19th when we had a 
15 brief hearing on Mr. Richards motion to have witnesses testify 
16 anonymously. Do you remember that? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I do. 
And the issue in that particular hearing was that 
19 unless those witnesses were disclosed such that the State knew 
20 their names, they would not be allowed to testify, that was the 
21 Court's ultimate ruling. Did you understand that? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And understanding that those witnesses who have not 
24 yet been disclosed may have exculpatory information. And let 
25 me explain what exculpatory means. 
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1 A. Please. 
2 Q. That means that they could testify in your behalf 
3 like Mr. Richards proffered, that you did not commit the crimes 
4 for which you are charged. Do you understand that? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. So that they would testify in your favor, correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And that you specifically understood that those 
9 particular anonymous witnesses and there were four, right? 
10 A. (Witness nods head.) 
11 Q. There are four potential anonymous witnesses? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. You knew that? 
14 A. (Witness nods head.) 
15 Q. And two of those witnesses would have testified if 
16 they were allowed to remain anonymous that you were not the 
17 person that committed the crime? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
You fully understand today that you're charged with 
20 two counts of aggravated murder? 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
(Witness nods head.} 
And two counts of attempted murder, correct? 
Yes. 
Do you understand that at present you face the 
25 possibility of a -- the death penalty being imposed by a jury? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
3 parole --
Yes. 
Okay. Other potential sentences are life without 
(Witness nods head.) 4 
5 
A. 
Q. -- and life with the possibility of parole under the 
6 current charge. Do you understand that? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Now, back to these anonymous witnesses. You 
9 understand that going forward today and having Mr. Richards 
10 remain as counsel that those witness are not going to testify 
11 on your behalf? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. Nevertheless, you are willing to go forward 
14 with the trial that's scheduled to commence next week? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. Regarding your discussions with Mr. Bouwhuis 
17 at the jail on Tuesday, do you agree that you had enough time 
18 to speak with Mr. Bouwhuis regarding this particular issue? 
19 A. Yes. I understood the issue when we had this hearing 
20 before. 
21 Q. A week ago? 
22 A. A week ago, yes. 
23 Q. The first time the State brought up the issue? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. You were able to understand what was going on at that 
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1 point in time? 
2 A. Yes. Well, there was words I didn't understand but I 
3 understand the situation, yes. 
4 Q. Sure. Okay. And yeah we don't expect you to 
5 understand all the legal jargon. But you felt like at that 
6 hearing on the -- what was that? The 26th? Friday, the 26th? 
7 
8 
9 
A. Yes. 
Q. You felt like you understood the issue that was 
presented to the Court at that point in time? 
Yes. 10 
11 
A. 
Q. Okay. And so what you're -- are you telling me then 
12 that you had from Friday last week through today to think about 
13 this issue again? 
Yes, I have. 14 
15 
A. 
Q. And you have had an opportunity to talk with conflict 
16 counsel, Mike Bouwhuis, that the Court appointed? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And do you feel that Mr. Bouwhuis has done his job 
efficiently and effectively? 
A. From what the Judge requested for him to do, yes. 
Q. Is there anything about what Mr. Bouwhuis did in 
22 interviewing you and talking to you and explaining this issue 
23 to you that you would like to have redone? 
24 A. No. I think he was patient with me. He explained 
25 what I didn't really understand as far as your guyses legal 
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1 talk. So he actually explained everything to me and was 
2 patient with me. And so I was able to understand, comprehend 
3 what was going on. 
4 Q. Okay. Now, you understand also that this issue 
5 that's been brought up, regarding the alleged conflict of 
6 interest that the State has raised because of Mr. Richards' 
7 willingness to keep witnesses that could help you anonymous, 
8 that essentially that creates potentially a constitutional 
9 right that you have under the Sixth Amendment of the United 
10 States Constitution. Do you understand that? 
Yes. 11 
12 
A. 
Q. And both Mr. Richards and Mr. Bouwhuis have informed 
13 you and spoken with you about that particular right to have 
14 effective counsel in any proceeding; is that correct? 
Yes. 15 
16 
A. 
Q. Okay. And are you willing then to go forward at this 
17 point with Mr. Richards as your lawyer and proceed to trial in 
18 this case? 
Yes, I am. 19 
20 
A. 
Q. And are you willing also to concede that by doing so, 
21 you are waiving any future right to make a claim that 
22 Mr. Richards, was ineffective in his representation of you in 
23 this particular trial? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
That's a lot. 
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MR. RICHARDS: ~rudge 1 
2 MR. SHAW: Well, let me rephrase that. I know where 
3 you're going. 
4 Let me say for the record that this is only with 
5 respect to this particular issue. Okay? This conflict of 
6 interest issue. 
7 
8 
g 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And you do understand that? 
Yes. 
Okay. You are willing to proceed with trial next 
10 week, keep Mr. Richards on as trial counsel? 
A. Yes, I am. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. Let me have just one moment. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
11 
12 
13 
14 Q. One other thing. Just physically today, you are not 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
under the 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
waiver of 
A. 
Q. 
influence of any alcohol or drugs, correct? 
Correct. 
You feel that you have a sound mind today? 
Yes. 
You are able to proceed today and execute, sign a 
the conflict? 
Yes, I will do the best to sign as I can. 
MR. SHAW: I might approach the witness Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon Defendant signs waiver.) 
Mr. Perea, for the record, what you have signed is a 
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1 waiver of conflict of --potential conflict of interest. It's 
2 marked as Defense Exhibit 1. I will offer that to the Court. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 3 
4 MS. SIPES: Was that dated, as well? Did he date it, 
5 as well. 
6 MR. SHAW: I don't know if he dated it or not. 
7 THE COURT: He needs to date it. Today is March 4th. 
8 
9 
10 
11 defense? 
12 
13 
THE vliTNESS: Fourth. 
MR. SHAW: March 4. Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: So there is no objection from the 
MR. SHAW: That's their Exhibit. 
THE COL"RT: \hJell, \lle \rJill go ahead and receive the 
14 Defendant's Exhibit 1, which was the waiver of conflict or 
15 potential conflict. 
16 Q. (BY MR. SHAW) Let me just establish for the record 
17 also, Mr. Perea, that the document that you just signed is the 
18 same document that Mr. Bouwhuis showed you at the jail and 
19 discussed with you; is that correct? 
20 A. You want me to look at it? 
21 Q. Did you look at it? 
22 A. Yes. This is the same one. 
23 Q. And also for the record you read and write the 
24 English language? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. You have -- did you have any difficulty reading and 
2 understanding Exhibit 1? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
Exhibit 1. 
No. 
Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll go ahead and receive 
MR. SHAW: I think that's all, Your Honor. 
MR. RICHARDS: I have no questions. 
THE COURT: No questions. All right. 
You may step down. Thank you, sir. 
Any other evidence that we need to take? 
MR. SHAW: I don't think so, Your Honor. 
State would rest. 
MR. RICHARDS: I don't have anything. 
THE COURT: Did you want to argue the matter or --
MR. SHAW: Yeah. I mean, I don't -- I think given 
17 the record before us today I think that there is sufficient 
18 evidence in the record for the Court to make specific findings 
19 of fact that will allow ~I. Perea to waive the conflict. And 
20 we'd ask that the Court QO so such that an order can be entered 
21 in this matter and we'll submit it on that basis. 
22 
23 
THE COURT: Mr. Richards anything else? 
MR. RICHARDS: Just want to make it clear that all 
24 he's waving is the conflict. 
25 THE COURT: Right. 
Riqo Perea - Examination by MR. SHAW 34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Noteworthy Reporting Case No. 071901847 
1 MR. RICHARDS: Okay. Not any prior rulings of the 
2 Court or anything of that nature. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. We'll-- this is actually, as I 
4 recall, State's motion to have Mr. Richards disqualified from 
5 the case, and also a motion to continue. And I think I can 
6 rule at least on the record for now as to that motion. I 
7 certainly understand the States concern in this matter. I 
8 don't think there is anything more frustrating as either a 
9 prosecutor or defense attorney to try a case and do everything 
10 right and then find out that the appellate court has overturned 
11 the case because of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether 
12 that be an allegation against a defense lawyer or a prosecutor. 
13 Boy, there is nothing more frustrating then to have -- find out 
14 that you did it all right and now you have got to retry a case 
15 because in the eyes of the appellate court there was some 
16 ineffective assistance by one of the attorneys. 
17 In this case, of course, Mr. Richards is an 
18 experienced criminal defense attorney. I think he's been 
19 involved in about seven death penalty cases. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: That's correct. 
21 THE COURT: And I know he's been a defense attorney 
22 for well over 20 years now. 
23 
24 
MR. RICHARDS: That is 25, actually. 
THE COURT: Twenty-five years. All right. 
25 Congratulations. 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Noteworthy Reporting Case No. 071901847 
1 Anyway, Mr. Richards is experienced, he knows what he 
2 is doing. At least we hope. You know, most attorneys just do 
3 the best they can. But I understand where the State's concern 
4 is here. The State's argument of course, Mr. Richards is 
5 ineffective or was because he didn't identify these four 
6 witnesses. And had decided not to call those as witnesses. 
7 And these are witnesses who potentially if their testimony was 
8 accepted could clear Mr. Perea on this murder charge. And the 
9 argument is that somehow Mr. Richards doesn't have the 
10 Defendant's best interest at heart. 
11 Certainly, the Court ruled earlier that the defense 
12 can call these witnesses, but if they decide to do so they had 
13 to disclose the name of those four witnesses last Monday, which 
14 was the 22nd of February. And that was pursuant to the rules 
15 of discovery. 
16 Certainly, I want to make it clear that the defense 
17 attorney, of course, has no duty, no obligation to call any 
18 witnesses or put on any evidence at all in a case, whether it 
19 be a murder case or any other criminal case. They have no duty 
20 to call witnesses or offer evidence at trial. 
21 Certainly the Court has to be careful about trying to 
22 interfere with or somehow dictate what the defense or the 
23 prosecution does by way of evidence. The State, of course 
24 can't, compel the defense to have witnesses testify. Both 
25 parties certainly can subpoena witnesses to testify, both the 
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1 prosecution and the defense. 
2 And the one thing I guess that I'm concerned about is 
3 that the Court does have the ability, I think, to try to insure 
4 a fair trial. And that's what I'm trying to deal with here. I 
5 just want to make sure that if both parties are going to call 
6 witnesses then the other side knows who those witnesses are 
7 going to be. And they have an opportunity to check on their 
8 background and try to check on the story. 
9 And I ruled back on February 19th that if the defense 
10 intended to call these witnesses, they had to disclose their 
11 identity. And since they have not disclosed their identity, 
12 the Court has ruled that they can not testify in this case. 
13 The question came up as to why the defense won't 
14 identify the witnesses. And I know Mr. Richards' original 
15 argument was that they were afraid that if they testified 
16 somehow there would be retaliation, they might be injured or 
17 killed for testifying in this case. 
18 But, of course, there is another aspect of that and 
19 another reason which may be the reason that they don't want to 
20 testify is that after someone looked at their story it might 
21 fall apart. And in reality, at this point it's simply a 
22 proffer as to what they might say, we don't know exactly what 
23 the testimony might be, and to a certain extent it's 
24 speculation as to what they would testify and why they are not 
25 testifying. And so, it becomes very difficult to figure out 
37 
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1 the real reason, the real motivation as to why they won't 
2 testify. 
3 It is the defense's decision not to call these 
4 witnesses. And in my opinion, the fact that the defense 
5 decides not to call these witnesses does not really mean that 
6 it's ineffective assistance of counsel by the defense. It may 
7 be strategy. It may be that Mr. Richards has decided that 
8 after thinking about it, after talking to the witnesses, and 
I 
9 his client, it's not a good idea to put them on the stand. 
10 What I sensed in this case is that there was a little 
11 shift in opinion, and maybe not deliberately by Mr. Richards. 
12 But it seemed to me that the argument he made on the 19th of 
13 February was that, you guys, I feel like I'm caught in a catch 
14 22, as far as trying to identifying these witnesses, they are 
15 afraid to come forward without some protection, they are afraid 
16 of the retaliation. And yet, I'm concerned about protecting 
17 the best interest of my client. 
18 But on the 26th of February what I heard Mr. Richards 
19 say is that he simply decided as a defense attorney for 
20 Mr. Perea that it's not-- it's not in his best interest to 
21 call these witnesses because they won't help his client. They 
22 can get on the stand and simply say I don't recall and that 
23 could have the impact or the effect on the jury of saying, 
24 well, these witnesses are hiding something. 
25 And I think Mr. Richards said on the 26th, "If I put 
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1 them on as witnesses they simply could hurt my client.' s case 
2 and his chances of being acquitted." He also indicated that at 
3 this point the witnesses decided not to cooperate in this 
4 matter. 
5 And as I recall, he also told us that he cannot 
6 locate or is unable to locate at least two of the four 
7 witnesses. And if that's true, of course, all of this becomes 
8 moot because if he can't locate the witnesses then they are not 
9 going to be able to testify for whatever reason. 
10 So, in addition to that, or course now we have the 
11 waiver, you have the testimony here today from Mr. Bouwhuis and 
12 from the Defendant. And the Court is going to find that the 
13 Defendant has waived that conflict of interest or potential 
14 conflict, he's done so in writing here today. I think he's 
15 been asked all the appropriate questions. It appears to be an 
16 informed decision after talking to Mr. Bouwhuis, who has been 
17 appointed by the Court as independent counsel. It appears that 
18 he understands what the issue is. His decision to waive the 
19 conflict is both knowing and voluntary. 
20 And as I mentioned before it's an informed decision 
21 on his part. He understands English. He has been present at 
22 all of the hearings. I think we have now had three hearings 
23 where we have dealt with this issue in court. He's had an 
24 opportunity to talk to his attorney. I think Mr. Bouwhuis did 
25 an excellent job. He spent 45 minutes with Mr. Perea at the 
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1 jail. He went over all of the options that were available to 
2 him. He's discussed all of the issues. And it appeared to me 
3 that the Defendant understands the impact and the effect of 
4 this waiver. 
5 So based on that I will deny the State's motion to 
6 disqualify Mr. Richards. And I will also deny the State's 
7 motion to continue the trial. 
8 Are there any other findings you think I need to make 
9 at this point or any other issues you think I need address? I 
10 thought I covered it all, but sometimes you 
11 MR. RICHARDS: Just one matter, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: And that is, one of the reasons that 
14 we believed that the witnesses at this stage would not be 
15 helpful to our case is the fact that we couldn't somehow figure 
16 out how to do this anonymous system. 1\nd we understand the 
17 Court's ruling and I'm not asking the Court to go back. I just 
18 want to make it clear that is the reason we believe at this 
19 point that they would be ineffective and may be harmful to us 
20 because that's the situation. 
21 THE COURT: But you understand that the ruling that I 
22 made was that I didn't say that I wouldn't try to protect them, 
23 I didn't say that I wouldn't let them testify anonymously. 
24 What I said was: I think the first thing that needs to happen 
25 is you give the names to the prosecution. And then after 
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1 that's done we would try to figure out a way to protect them in 
2 the courtroom. But since we've -- since the decision was made 
3 not to identify them, it's seems to me I don't have to really 
4 deal with the issue of trying to protect their identity. At 
5 least that's what I understand. 
6 MR. RICHARDS: But my understanding was is that when 
7 we gave those name to the prosecution that they could then give 
8 it to their investigators and they could go and tell other 
9 people about it. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. RICHARDS: Which kind of undermined the 
12 situation. 
13 MR. HEWARD: In other words, we would be allowed to 
14 do which is exactly what we should do, which is try to verify 
15 their information. Mr. Richards didn't want us to be able to 
16 do. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. I just don't know how you would --
18 I know what the witnesses concerns were and I understand what 
19 yours were. But I just can't -- I can't prohibit the 
20 investigators and the prosecutors from at least checking out 
21 their stories and what they are going to testify to and the 
22 background. I know what the concern was. You thought they 
23 were going to leak this information to somebody else. 
24 MR. RICHARDS: Well, we made that offer that we would 
25 give it to them as long as they wouldn't leak it and they said 
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1 no we have to be able to 
2 THE COURT: And based on that you then decided not to 
3 give the names? 
4 MR. RICHARDS: Because it would be useless in our 
5 opinion. And from a protocol standpoint I understand that 
6 Mr. Shaw's -- or rather Mr. Heward. 
7 MR. HEWARD: Mr. Heward was the one who responded on 
8 the original motion, which is why I was responded now, Your 
9 Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Right. That's okay. But I just -- I 
11 guess didn't want to get into a catch 22, which is to say, and 
12 this was your argument before, I thought was that, well, geez, 
13 we would really like to call these witness but the State or --
14 excuse me, the Court won't protect them. And what I was saying 
15 I thought was: We are not going to deal with that issue until 
16 you make a decision as to whether you'll divulge their identity 
17 to the State. 
18 MR. HEWARD: Which their written pleading indicated 
19 they are not willing do that. 
20 THE COURT: Right. And so as a result of the 
21 unwillingness, for whatever reason, I have decided that they 
22 cannot testify because their names haven't been given to the 
23 State. 
24 
25 
MR. RICHARDS: I guess we have made our record. 
MR. SHAW: I guess the only thing I would add for 
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1 purposes for the finding, is specifically that the Court finds 
2 that Mr. Perea has concurred with both conflict counsel and 
3 Mr. Richards now and he has made a direct statement that he 
4 believes it's in his best interest to go forward, specifically 
5 in way of any conflict or potential conflict. 
6 THE COURT: I will make that finding. I think it's 
7 appropriate. All right. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Anything else then on the motion, Mr. Richards? 
MR. RICHARDS: No. 
MR. SHAW: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Can we move -- I don't know if maybe you 
12 have a preference, but I thought maybe we could deal with the 
13 State's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Dr -- how 
14 do you say it? Ofshe. I don't know if you want to deal with 
15 one or if you prefer to 
16 
17 
MR. HEWARD: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Well, I did get State's request for 
18 discovery notes, but I -- my question is, and I almost think we 
19 could dissolve this issue without that. But I don't know how 
20 the State feels about it. 
21 MR. LYONS: I guess it depends on how Your Honor is 
22 going to rule. We might be able to --
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. LYONS: Your Honor, what I want to do is just lay 
25 out in summary briefly the State's reasoning why Dr. Of she 
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WAIVER OF CONFLICT OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
I, Riqo Perea, have been advised by counsel that claims of conflict of 
interest and the potential for a conflict of interest have been raised by the 
prosecution in my case. I understand that the claim for conflict or potential conflict 
arises out of a decision not to disclose the names of witnesses who claim to have 
information that I did not shoot the victims I have been charged with killing and 
. . . 
InJurmg. 
I understand a "conflict" may arise when a lawyer represents one client at the 
risk of materially limiting the lawyers responsibility to another client. I understand 
that Mr. Richards has never represented in the past any of the four individuals who 
may have information that I did not shoot the victims in this case; that he does not 
now represent any of the four individuals who may have information that I did not 
shoot the victims in this case; and, that Mr. Richards specifically informed the 
individuals that he does not represent them. 
I have discussed with Mr. Richards, and understand that the names and 
identities have not been disclosed to the prosecution or law enforcement because 
our request that the prosecution and law enforcement be ordered not to disclose 
their names and identities has been objected to by the prosecution and denied by 
the court. As a consequence, the court has indicated those individuals may not 
testify at my trial. 
If any conflict of interest does arise out of our decision to refuse to disclose 
the names and identities of these particular individuals, I hereby waive any conflict 
of interest or potential conflict of interest arising out of the decision not to disclose 
the names and identities of the four individuals who claim to have information that I 
did not shoot the victims I have been charged with killing and injuring. 
DATED this __ day of March, 2010. 
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